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Abstract 
Owing to the immediate nature of global warming, some countries like those in the 
EU indicate that up to 30% of their mitigation strategy for 2050 should be CCS 
technology based. The need to diversify and use different approaches within climate 
change mitigation mix cannot be overstated; hence technologies that contribute to 
the overall mitigation strategy must be in tandem as each has a role to play. 
Contingent on this therefore, is the need to consider different but equally important 
factors along with the technologies being used, their strategic locations and other 
resources needed to bring about the climate change mitigation. 
To this end, it is expedient that the search for the appropriate jurisdictions with 
adequate regulatory and correct geological profiles should not be undermined by 
restricting advanced technological climate change mitigation strategies to developed 
or economically/technologically advanced countries. The spread to include nations 
hitherto not economically or technologically advanced but have the potential and 
capacity either in terms of geology, or proximity to carbon emission sources or other 
viable resources should be encouraged due to the urgency needed to abate climate 
change effects nationally and globally. Suffice to say, such jurisdictions need to 
develop the right regulatory and policy frameworks in order to be fit for purpose. 
The uniqueness of this thesis underscores these observations by research into 
different risk indicators and strategies such as risk assessment and management, 
exploring the potential CCS-CDM linkage using regulatory/legal and risk indicators, 
identifying and analysing the regulatory, legal elements and the geological profiling 
vis-à-vis analogous operations in the implementation of CCS under CDM Kyoto 
Protocol in a Non Annex 1 country using Nigeria as a case study country; and finally 
point to tentative means of linking CCS and CDM. 
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Introduction 
Assumptions of the past associated with the climate as almost a constant or 
nominally changing feature of the earth’s geo dynamics have in recent times been 
questioned (and rightly so) due to scientific observations, data and evidence of 
significant variation in collected data of climatic elements such as temperature, 
atmospheric constituent gases, weather patterns, rainfall pattern etc. The debate is 
global, the reactions and responses are very divided but the impact is certain to be far 
reaching as current dictates suggests it is impacting economies, politics, individual 
life styles, governmental and institutional policies etc. The need to think outside the 
box in proffering solutions while facilitating the involvement of all concerned is no 
longer optional but a necessity. 
The technologies and approaches available for mitigating the effects of the climate 
change are almost as varied as the reasons attributed to the causes and effects of 
climate change. However, this thesis will concentrate on just an aspect i.e. Carbon 
Capture and Storage (or Sequestration
1
 (CCS)), its risk and regulatory 
implementation considerations in a Non Annex 1 country within the Kyoto Protocol 
regulatory framework of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)/CCS.  
CCS technologies according to the IEA 2006 have the potential to be second to 
energy efficiency by 2050 giving a global economic potential cumulatively of about 
2200Gt CO2at an atmospheric GHG concentration of 450ppm. In terms of 
distribution of emission reduction and storage potential, indications from IEA 2006 
modelling for 2050 further suggested that countries within the Kyoto protocol Non 
Annex 1 spectrum could double (to about 2621Mt CO2) when compared to with that 
of the OECD countries (at 1171 Mt CO2). Countries with large deposits of 
hydrocarbon (coal, oil and gas) mostly in the former spectrum will increase their use 
of such energy sources and emission of GHG to the atmosphere. Congruently, their 
potential to store away the emitted GHG is also high due to their geological 
formation. However, it remains only a potential if all other factors are not considered 
and harnessed to actualise this potential. 
Consequent to the urgency needed to reduce or avoid the release of greenhouse gases 
(GHG) into the atmosphere to avoid a wide spread catastrophic impact currently 
                                                          
1
This term will be used interchangeably with storage in this thesis. It has the same meaning – 
American literature has often used the term sequestration while the British or European 
literatures prefer the use of the word storage. 
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experienced in most parts of the globe, the need for a multifaceted approach to 
ensure CCS projects are integrated into CDM is of importance in any multi-pronged 
climate change mitigation strategy.  
CCS is considered controversial and less tested or proven as a mitigation strategy 
within the Kyoto Protocol framework. It remains a critical and high potential 
strategy for avoiding large emissions of GHG into the atmosphere. The actualisation 
of this mitigation option within the framework of the CDM is contingent on factors 
that transcend just individual party’s ambition but varying complexities of legal and 
regulatory (national and international) frameworks, risks, liabilities, leakage, 
permanence, project boundary, monitoring and verification etc. which will be 
discussed in this thesis while analysing each in context to relevant international 
regimes, Annex 1 country’s regimes that have engaged to facilitate the operation of 
CCS technologies and Non Annex 1 country’s regimes that have the capacity and 
potential of operating CCS technologies due to the hydrocarbon based economy and 
its geological formation.  
Finally, the inclusion of CCS projects within the CDM framework along with other 
measures is pertinent to the extent it achieves the long term goal of climate change 
mitigation. It is true that the risk and regulatory concerns associated with the 
implementation of such technology is high and the need for the appropriate 
regulatory framework to mitigate these risks cannot be overstated. However, it is 
important that a balance is struck to ensure that nations with the potential to execute 
the projects have a thorough assessment of their capability vis-à-vis their regulatory 
framework and the geological capacity.  
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Structure of Thesis 
This thesis involves a normative and comparative analysis of different subject areas 
and regimes associated with the implementation of CCS projects (within the 
framework of CDM in a Non Annex 1 country) such as regulatory regimes, risk 
management strategy, tort liability issues and contractual definitions as it affects 
implementation. A combination of narrative and descriptive critical analysis of 
existing literature was integral to every chapter according to the coverage of its 
subject matter. Also, using case study and survey to analysis and interpret the level 
of risk awareness and perception relevant to the subject discussed.   
Objective of Research 
This thesis intends to critically examine and analyse comparatively the available 
evidence by   
 Evaluating the impact and effectiveness of current legal and regulatory 
regimes in relations to the integration of CCS projects into CDM framework 
in a Non Annex 1 country 
 Evaluate the interrelatedness between CCS and CDM frameworks vis-à-vis 
risk assessment and management mechanisms  
 Assess the perception among the stakeholders in the Non Annex 1 country. 
 Finally, the applicability of CCS within a CDM regime in Nigeria. 
Research Design 
This is integral to the whole methodology since it holds in situ the logical 
progression by which the author plans to reach the set out objectives. The research is 
designed in line with the components articulated by Robson (2002) which suggests 
the component parts of a research to include purpose of the research, the theories or 
literatures that accentuates and guides the research by providing a contextual 
understanding of the work. The third component typified in this research work is the 
interrogatives to the object of the research. This provides the needed focus and 
barrier definition, time and resource allocation.  The methodology component helps 
address the way the research questions were answered vis-à-vis specifics of 
techniques used such as the review of relevant literature, case study approach, survey 
collation and analysis etc. The final component as suggested involves the sampling 
strategy used in the survey conducted during this research as to where, when and 
how the data was sourced and analysed to justify the credibility of the analysis. 
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Methodological Approach 
Through the processes defined above, the writing of this thesis undertook a modular 
or chapter based approach to discussing and critically analysing individual aspects of 
the subject area as explained above giving a comparative analysis where the is a 
need for such. 
The thesis commenced with a conceptual introduction to the issues of climate change 
and international environmental regulatory framework. This chapter is broadly 
divided into 3 sections with the first section discussing the historic context of the 
climate change regime, the second section, further discusses the relevant element of 
the Kyoto Protocol flexible mechanism vis-à-vis additionality, how this is assessed, 
impact on environmental integrity of the project and possible policy and regulatory 
options in a post Kyoto framework. The final section of this chapter introduces the 
Non Annex 1 case study country in relation to its obligation to international 
environmental regulatory framework. 
Chapter 2 extensively discusses the contractual underlining principles that surround 
the implementation of CCS projects within the CDM framework. This chapter 
analysed contract law in order to critically consider the operational side of CCS-
CDM project structure. It further brought into focus how such issue as 
intergeneration liabilities validates the necessity for a robust contractual relationship 
between parties. Under this chapter also jurisdictional compliance and non-
compliance rights as stipulated by the contractual provision were considered. 
Finally, liability issues within the context of torts and the contract providing a 
framework for risk mitigation in CCS-CDM project. 
The CCS processes were analysed in this chapter 3 in order to understand the risk 
component associated with the different constituent elements of CCS. This will 
methodologically lead to the discussion of the geological and storage capacity 
characterisation and subsequent monitoring and storage of CO2 in such identified 
geological formation. 
The next chapter identifies and gives a critical analysis of CDM regulatory 
framework risks as a non CCS project by discussing the risk elements within a 
generic CDM project context as it applies to its project life cycle and possible 
investment decision challenges resulting from this. While chapter 5 concentrates its 
analysis on risk assessment and management more within the context of operating 
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CCS under a CDM regime. Identifying those risk peculiarities to CCS projects such 
as leakage, site storage, vulnerability and methodological considerations in 
accounting for risks. The final section of this chapter discusses risk management 
strategies within the precincts of precautionary principles and insurance 
mechanisms. 
Chapter 6 in further detail discussed how CCS best interplay with CDM and how 
issues like permanence and leakage reflect on or interplay out with the 
environmental integrity as a core necessity in CDM framework and how CDM 
models like LULUCF hold similarity with the CCS model and can be used to 
achieve same goal  
The discussion and comparative analysis of relevant international and national 
regimes is discussed in chapter 7 since such legal analysis has to be understood 
premised on the understanding of the risk indicators and implications associated with 
CCS/CDM. To this end, analysis is done in an extrapolative manner and in 
chronological order; accentuating relevance and importance to the concept of CCS 
within a CDM framework while analysing the respective laws within the limits of 
the relevant principles that makes the laws relevant to CCS-CDM. The international 
legal regimes are indicative in laws such as UNCLOS London Convention 1972 and 
its 1996 protocol, while the EU (supranational laws) and UK national laws 
represented the Annex 1 reference points. Relevant Nigerian domestic laws formed 
the bases to analyse such laws that could be applicable with a Non Annex1 
jurisdiction. 
Nigeria is eminently suitable for CCS-CDM project implementation hence this 
chapter 8 aims to survey and critically analyse the potential stakeholders levels of 
awareness and risk perception to the implementation of this process. The 
methodology used for this survey is well laid out in section 8.1. Importantly, this 
chapter further accentuates the originality of this research as this case study country 
has not been so critically profiled vis-à-vis CCS-CDM risk and regulatory 
framework. 
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Research Originality 
 Methodological approach to profiling potential risk 
issues and regulatory framework of a Non Annex 1 
country and establishing implementation strategies 
within such jurisdiction. 
 Undertaking a critical analysis of the contractual 
implications to case study country 
 This research provides a unique and detailed risk 
analysis framework for a country like Nigeria as a 
possible CDM-CCS project country. 
 Finally to the best of my knowledge this is the only 
unique academic perspective to the risk-regulatory 
framework that considers the legal and regulatory 
regime of a hydrocarbon rich Non Annex 1 country 
like Nigeria and its link to the international 
environmental laws and Annex 1 nations in the 
implementation of CCS under a CDM framework. 
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Chapter 1 
LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK FOR 
CLIMATE CHANGE CONVENTION AND THE NIGERIAN CHARACTER 
1.0 Climate Change its Historic Regulatory Development 
The Clean Development Mechanism often referred to as the “Kyoto Surprise” is 
“[...] a complex and enigmatic product of the Kyoto negotiations”2 remains the 
centre piece of most activities within the Kyoto Protocol framework as it provides 
the bases for both the developed and developing (emerging and least developed) 
countries to participate in a relatively equitable manner in the mitigation of climate 
change under the UNFCCC while also helping to attain Sustainable Development 
(SD) for less developed economies in the process ensuring the building of national 
capacity and transferring technology from developed countries. However, the 
paradox that characterises this mechanism if properly understood could clear a lot of 
the uncertainties about the way forward (i.e. post Kyoto) especially in the 
deployment of innovative technologies like the CCS. It must be mentioned also that, 
the implementation complexities and dynamics of the CDM projects and CCS 
technologies have inherent in them risks associated with issues of legality, politics, 
regulatory and socio-economic interests inter alias which are a mix of issues that 
cannot be easily resolved unless a holistic approach to viewing the problem and 
proffering a solution is articulated. 
The issues that are integral to CDM have been litigious since the Marrakesh Accord 
that mandated the “prompt start” of the mechanism allowing the first registration of a 
CDM project on 24 November 2004.
3
 The controversies surrounding CDM are based 
on the complexities and ambiguities associated with its composite elements (such as 
Baseline and Additionality Methodologies), the broad categorisation of participants 
into Annex 1 and Non Annex 1 countries
4
 and costs associated with the mechanism 
                                                          
2
 Grubb, M et al., (2001) “The Kyoto Protocol, A Guide and Assessment”, published by The 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, Energy and Environmental Programme, Chatham 
House London and Earthscan 
3
Id 
4
 For instance countries such as China, Brazil, India and Mexico categorised into Non Annex 
1 grouping have a completely different economic and political dynamics from the rest 
members of this group. This will most likely suffice for the reason why most of the CDM 
project execution is concentrated in these countries. Also the fact their economies are 
significantly growing does not justify their inclusion in the Annex 1 grouping as the 
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on one hand; on the other hand there has been the issue of marginalisation in terms 
of project investment and execution resulting in projects concentration in few 
countries;
5
 and finally, some project types such as renewable energy, energy 
efficiency and transport project are not competitive enough hence facing further 
marginalisation.
6
 
Suffice to say, there are ongoing research endeavours and material evidence to 
suggest significant success is being achieved through the Flexible Mechanism (see 
Section 1.1.2.1) in particular CDM in combating climate change mostly in terms of 
its contribution of Certified Emissions Reduction (CERs) credits to the global carbon 
market.
7
 But these credits do not necessarily reflect ‘real’, ‘verifiable’ and ‘long-
term’ emissions reductions (as stipulated in Art. 12, (5b) of the Protocol)8 and it is 
not sufficient to assist developing countries in the transition to low carbon economy, 
neither is the element of sustainable development adequately justified due to 
environmental policy flaws in most host countries (in an attempt to attract investors 
purely by setting greater priority on the inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
instead of the sustainability advantage of such project.)
9
 
The framework of this chapter is set to clearly discuss the following; Section1 will 
give a brief historical perspective of the climate change framework appropriating 
two significant mile stones in the development of a global environmental regulatory 
framework. Section 2 will review the current state of the CDM providing also an 
overview of CDM project cycle vis-à-vis the relations between the Executive Board, 
and other functional sectors and stakeholders both at the international and national 
levels. While Section 3 will examine the composite elements that characterise the 
Clean Development Mechanism and the peculiarities of the distribution, the 
mechanism within the world regions and how they have contributed to the overall 
                                                                                                                                                      
conditions associated with this group would significantly undermine the economic growth 
while so many of the population still live under the poverty line. 
5
 Bossley, L., 2008, Time is Running Short for post-Kyoto Protocol Deal, Middle East 
Economic Survey, Vol. LI No. 14 (7
th
 April 2008) 
6
Supra note [Grubb et al, 2001] & Sterk et al, 2005, Addressing Opportunity and Challenges 
of Sectoral Approach to Clean Development Mechanism. Wuppertal Institute for Climate, 
Environment , Energy (JIKO Policy Paper 1/2005) www.wupperinst.org/download/JIKO-
PP/2005-1.pdf 
7
 Michaelowa 2007 
8
See Appendix 1 for complete version of Article 12 of the Protocol 
9
Sepibus 2009, Voigt 2008, Pearson 2006, Egenhofer et al 2005 and Bygrave 2004 and Diniz 
2007 
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mitigation process vis-à-vis the overall environmental integrity if at all it has. In 
summary this chapter will expound the thoughts of different authorities on the 
current framework and possible structure of future CDM and how it interplays with 
the environmental integrity overall. The final section will give a synopsis of the 
credentials of my case study country in relation to climate change. 
1.1 Climate Policy and the Legal Framework 
1.1.1 The United Nations Framework on Climate Change 
Conference – UNFCCC Historical Perspective 
The discussion and research into climate change has progressively gathered steam 
internationally since the UNFCCC Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit of 1992 (UNFCCC 
Convention).
10
  The current UNFCCC metamorphosed consequent to concerns in the 
1970s by climate scientists that based on scientific evidence, human activities were 
influencing the climate system significantly. The late 1980s saw a growing political 
and public awareness on issues surrounding climate change.
11
 Due to the high profile 
nature of the evidence, the IPCC organised under the support of World 
Meteorological Organisation and the United Nations Environment Programme an 
assessment of this scientific evidence on climate change and reported to the 1990 
IPCC’s First Assessment Report.12 
The UNFCCC Convention constitutes a major source of international environmental 
law albeit as a non-binding commitment on all Parties. Pursuant to Article 20 of the 
UNFCCC Convention, Parties were invited to sign the convention, while the 
ratification, acceptance approval and accession by State was in accordance with 
Article 22 of the Convention. (See Appendix for details of relevant Articles). At the 
time of going to the print with this thesis, there were 194 States and 1 regional 
economic integration organisation (i.e. the European Union) that have ratified and 
                                                          
10
 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty 
Doc. No 102-38 (1992). 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, 165, U.N. Doc.A/AC/237/18.Available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf, for the results of the deliberation that 
formed the framework of the convention. 
11
Supra note [Grubb, et al., 2001] 
12
This report confirmed that anthropogenic activities resulting to carbon dioxide emission and 
other GHG were contributing to the changes in the climate system. The report also 
underscored the need for immediate actions to address any future increase in such 
anthropogenic activities to prevent potential man made changes in climate (system) that 
might be adverse to humanity’s wellbeing (WMO (1979)). 
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acceded to the Convention making the Convention the most comprehensive 
agreement on tackling anthropogenic climate change in the world. 
The core essence of the UNFCCC Convention as stated in Article 2 was “[…] 
stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with climate system.”13 The summary 
of the resulting resolutions from the meeting is worth mentioning here. They include; 
 Developed countries are responsible for the present level of emissions and 
greenhouse gases 
 Developing countries need to increase their levels of emission as result of 
their effort in order to catch up with developed countries. The immediate 
priority for developing countries is to attain economic growth in a 
sustainable way and eradicate poverty 
 The principle of common but differentiated responsibility 
 Environmental standards need to be tailor made for each country since 
otherwise could produce high socio-economic costs. 
 Policy measures to minimise climate change in developing countries must 
avoid adverse effect on economic development... 
 Intergenerational concerns in other words current developments must take 
into recognition the climate system for present and future generations 
(United Nations 1992) 
The consensus of this declaration as understood, gives credence first to the aim of 
stabilising GHG emissions which remains as “at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”14 By this, it is 
accepted that there is a possible interference in climate systems by human activities; 
and the mitigation of climate change while factoring the need to maintain the 
integrity of the climate system for both the present and future generations and also 
the need to ensure that developing countries are not deterred from making economic 
and social progress while the mitigation or adaptation measures are in progress.
15
 
This indicates therefore the use of measures and technologies that are not necessarily 
conventional but meet strict regulatory framework.  
                                                          
13
UNFCCC (1992), Article 2 
14
Id. 
15
Id. 
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Reaching for this fair and workable balance is still debated till date both within the 
political and academic circle and it is proving to be a work in progress even for a 
long time to come. CCS is included as such a measure or technology but remains 
contentious in its integration and implementation within the UN acceptable 
regulatory framework like CDM. However, at CMP.7/COP17 there was a resolve to 
some extent to implement the technology under the CDM FM of the Kyoto 
Protocol.
16
 
The legality of the Convention vis-à-vis it being soft law, is based on non-binding 
commitments that developed country signatories have towards their obligations 
albeit with no enforceable consequence for not meeting the commitment. The 
impacts of the non-binding nature of the Convention have become evident by the 
shortcomings in meeting these obligations and continued emission of GHG by the 
developed countries.
17
 
Regardless of the present and future outcomes of the convention, it remains the 
bedrock or platform on which other international climate policies and laws are 
founded and other policy negotiations would take direction this is as a result of the 
overwhelming participation and acceptance of the resolutions by participating 
countries.  
Also, different COP meetings have resulted from the UNFCCC Convention all 
aiming to proffer solutions, clarify and flesh out different climate change issues and 
mitigation strategies, provide policies directions, objectives and options to reduce 
GHG emissions. One of the most significant outcome of such meetings on climate 
change was the Kyoto Protocol held in the Japanese city of Kyoto. 
1.1.2 Kyoto Protocol 
The Protocol which entered into effect on February 16, 2005 has a distinguishing 
feature as an environmental agreement in comparison to other climate change 
international agreements and in particular the preceding Convention. Unique to the 
Protocol is that it provides for some specific set of legally binding targets to be met 
by some Parties often referred to as Annex 1 group of states who ratified the protocol 
within a defined time schedule.  
                                                          
16
Durban 2011 summit Communiqué on CCS 
17
Some emerging economies like China, India and Brazil have increasingly become major 
emitters as their fossil fuel based economy grows. 
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Thirty nine
18
industrialised nations of the 184 countries that ratified the Protocol 
referred to as Annex B countries (including the European Union) have an obligation 
to bring down their GHG emission level to an average of 5% measured against the 
1990 level over a five year commitment period (2008-2012)
19
. However the rest 144 
countries that ratified the Protocol which includes Nigeria are referred to as the Non 
Annex 1 countries. They do not have any set out obligation to reduce their levels of 
emission but within the framework of the flexible mechanism (i.e. CDM) they are 
able to engage in the project based activities that would contribute to global GHG 
emissions reduction through the investment of Annex B countries in their territory.  
The Annex B Parties were given the option to reach the set targets by either the 
adoption of “Command and Control” regulation or by using the FM to meet with 
their emissions reduction obligations.
20
 
1.1.2.1 Flexible Mechanism in Nutshell 
Enshrined in the Protocol are 3 main FM by which these stipulated targets for Annex 
1 Parties can be achieved are 2 project based and 1 trading operational activities and 
projects namely the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),
21
Joint Implementation 
(JI),
22
 and Emission Trading (ET).
23
 Each of the mechanisms is a derivative of legal 
frameworks articulated in the Protocol forming bases to carry out operation and 
project activities aimed to mitigate or adapt to the effects of climate change. As 
noted by Annie Petsonk of Environmental Defence during a workshop attended in 
2009, noted that the flexible mechanism was fundamental to the consensus reached 
                                                          
18
They are mostly the industrialised countries excluding the United States of America who 
did not ratify the protocol despite signing up to it. 
19
 UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php 
20
 Carr, C. & Rosembuj, F, (2007) “World Bank experiences in Contracting for emission 
reductions”, [2007] 2 Environmental Liability Published by Lawtext Publishing Limited, pp. 
114 119 www.lawtext.com; Yamin, F., 2005, “Climate Change and Carbon Markets: A 
Handbook of Emissions Reductions Mechanisms (Earthscan Publication 2005); Grubb, et al., 
2001. The Kyoto Protocol, A Guide and Assessment. The Royal institute of International 
Affairs, Energy and Environmental Programme, Earthscan Publication. 
21
 CDM details of this mechanism will be discussed extensively in the course of this paper.  
22
 Joint Implementation as defined in Article 6 of the protocol, was designed to enable the 
different parties (i.e. an Annex B Party) to develop and execute projects (in another Annex B 
Party) which will result in Emissions reduction Units ERU which can be counted towards the 
Kyoto quota of the investing Party or possibly tradable within the Emissions Trading scheme. 
23
 ETS or Carbon Market simply as the name depicts is a platform that allows excess 
emission units to be traded between the different Parties and other legal entities that require 
the units to offset their required legal quota. 
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about the protocol and “... it help[s] mobilise the market place to meet 
environmental goals”.  
The overriding objective of the FM according to the Convention was to help 
stimulate green investment and help Parties meet their emission targets in a cost-
effective way
24
using the generated Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs)
25
 as the 
mitigation [or adaptation] currency in the global carbon market. However with the 
CDM, there was an additional aim which was to mainly assist the project host 
country[ies] (i.e. Non Annex 1 -developing countries) achieve SD and also 
consequent to the activities, ensure technology transfer (TT) and capacity building 
(CB) in terms of intellectual and human resource. These fundamentals anchor as the 
core essence of the FM not only to the Non Annex 1 countries but also to the Annex 
1 countries that is widely viewed to hold a moral obligation to contributing the 
largest share to the mitigation and adaptation process due to historical industrial 
antecedence. 
  
                                                          
24
Supra note (UNFCCC, 1992) 
25
 One metric ton of reduced emission of CO2 to the atmosphere is equivalent to 1 CER. 
However for other GHG emission it has to be multiplied also by the global warming potential 
relative to carbon. 
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Figure 1 A Schematic summary of the Kyoto Protocol Flexible 
Mechanism  
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1.2 Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Project Overview 
As stated above, CDM came into the Kyoto negotiations as a late resolve to allow 
Non Annex B Parties to participate in the global carbon market purely on a project-
by-project basis to attract the United States’ ratification of the Protocol. Suffice to 
say, this did not prove to be enough to persuade the United States to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol at the end.  
Various debates (policy, technical, academic, etc.) sequel to the CDM have brought 
different issues that articulate both the advantages and challenges associated with the 
mechanism, for instance that the framework limits the ability for CDM to bring 
about large-scale infrastructural and technological changes in developing countries
26
 
such as the implementation of projects like the CCS under CDM has remained an 
ongoing challenge for all parties concerned due to different technical, legal and 
regulatory risk questions that have proved difficult to articulate answers to. Striking 
a workable balance between these complexities and multiplicities (often conflicting 
and controversial) remains Herculean tasks for the different authorities on the 
subject, nevertheless, the current and future development in CDM are expected to 
bring about fundamental reforms to the structure in terms of it functionality, 
regulatory framework, regional distribution of the projects and implementation of 
projects and technologies like CCS in other to have a wider appeal and credible 
outcome on emissions reduction and the global carbon market. 
To understand the intricate nature of the CDM and the many reasons for the current 
anomalies, the author will attempt to give a brief overview of how the current CDM 
works vis-à-vis basic criteria for qualification and the project cycle. The detailed 
impact of each will be discussed in subsequent sections as an integral part of its 
relevant chapter.  
Article 12 of the Protocol formed the legal framework on which the CDM operates, 
clearly defining the functionalities and structure of the mechanism. Fundamental to 
the acceptance of a project as a credible CDM, such project needs to fulfil or 
demonstrate 2 critical criteria which are broadly classified as the Additionality vis-à-
                                                          
26
 Bell, et al, 2005 “Climate Change and the International Carbon Market: Summary”, 
published by International Institute for Sustainable Development (August 2005) 
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vis Baseline Scenario and the sustainability impact of the project (i.e. Sustainable 
Development).
27
 
Additionality: The emissions reduction of the project must be in addition to 
those that would have occurred under a business as usual scenario. In other words it 
is not enough for a project to reduce emission but it has to do so consequent to 
actions that would not have been made under normal operational circumstances. The 
reduction therefore must be real, measurable and of long term benefit to the whole 
climate change mitigation process.
28
 Demonstrating Additionality is essential to 
justifying the environmental integrity objective of CDM project activity as otherwise 
would imply any issued CERs is a not only a fraud but would have resulted in global 
increase of GHG emissions as CERs allows Annex 1 countries to increase the GHG 
emissions whilst the emissions reduction from the project would have occurred 
anyway.
29
Additionality can be assessed by any of the following analysis; Positive 
lists, Barrier analysis, investment analysis or common practice analysis. See section 
1.5.1 for detailed discussion. 
Sustainable Development (SD): This is aimed at contributing sustained 
positive environmental impact on the host country. The criteria and assessment of 
this factor is determined by the host country  
In addition to the above mentioned criteria, the project methodology of monitoring 
and verification are important and required to be part of the PDD - although this is 
not critical but over the years it has proved to be essential as many projects are 
rejected by CDM Executive Board (herewith referred to as EB)
30
 based on poorly 
developed monitoring and verification methodologies.
31
Detailed discussion of 
                                                          
27
Art. 12 of Protocol  
28
Art. 12.5 of the Protocol 
29
 Schneider L., 2007“Is the CDM Fulfilling the Environmental and Sustainable Development 
Objectives? An Evaluation of the CDM and Options for Improvement” Oko-institut,  Report  
prepared for WWF, Berlin 5 November 2007 
30
 is directly accountable to the COP/MOP and is composed of 20 members in all (10 of 
which are alternative members from Parties to the Protocol who are nominated by the 
COP/MOP. 2 members from the developed countries and 8 from developing countries) CDM 
rules, par. 5 or COP/MOP to Kyoto Protocol, Montreal, December 2005 Modalities and 
Procedures for Clean Development Mechanism par. 7 UN Doc. 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1 available at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/COPMOP/08a01.pdf  
31
Supra note [Michaelowa et al., 2005] 
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Sustainable development in the context of CCS is out of scope for this thesis hence 
will only be mentioned when relevant but not discussed.  
1.2.1 CDM: Its Current state and Structure 
Article 12 of the Protocol and the modalities and procedures articulated the need to 
use CDM projects to assist Non Annex 1 countries in achieving main goals of 
sustainable development, capacity building and the transfer of technology on the one 
hand, while for the Annex 1 investor (country or private legal entity) the generation 
and utilisation of Certified Emissions Reduction credits (CERs) which can be used 
for compliance thereby contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention, and 
assist Annex 1 Parties of the Convention meet their [Kyoto] commitment. The 
overall importance of this is the achievement of emissions reduction in a cost 
effective way and allowing sustainable economic growth in host countries.   
A critical analysis of these goals has been widely studied and published.  The 
diversity of conclusions on this subject is consistent with different authors having 
varying views about how well the CDM has contributed to the set goals. However 
there is a commonality in published and unpublished conclusions read during this 
research, there is a need to redefine CDM in terms of the structure and operations 
making it fit for purpose and achieving the overriding important goal of climate 
change mitigation [and adaptation].
32
To this end, despite CDM’s “astounding 
success” it requires distinctive repositioning from its current ‘learning-to-doing’ 
approach
33
to a more proactive approach to implement its goals, as these successes 
should not make oblivious its short comings.
34
 This redefinition and redesign of 
CDM is compelling and necessary in the face of evidence for a credible post Kyoto 
regime. Furthermore, Schmidt et al (2006) & Winkelman, (2005) suggested that the 
ability for the market to have [the needed] impact and attract a larger pool of credits 
will only come with the inclusion of policies and standards/technologies that are 
                                                          
32
 This is a questionable indicator in the CDM as most approved CDM projects are mitigation 
projects not adaption projects 
33
 IETA State of CDM 2008 Report, 
http://www.ieta.org/ieta/www/pages/getfile.php?docID=3111 Last viewed 9 June 2010 
declaring   
34de Sepibus, J., 2009, “The environmental integrity of the CDM mechanism – A legal 
analysis of its institutional and procedural shortcomings”, Working Paper No 2009/24, 
“NCCR Trade Working Paper” 
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relevant and inclusive of all Parties in the negotiations.
35
 Allowing for a multifaceted 
approach to working the post Kyoto regime is important for CDM credibility and 
success while minimising the impact on investors. 
A recent review of the UNEP Risøe CDM/JI Pipeline Analysis and Database 
confirms an increase in the number of CDM projects registered by 188 new projects 
submissions in December 2011. The CDM Pipeline now contains 7692 CDM 
projects after subtracting the 1075 CDM projects where the DOEs terminated 
validation, the 198 where the DOEs gave a negative validation, the 213 projects 
rejected by the EB, and the 53 withdrawn projects and 86 are in the registration 
process. The issuance of CERs in January was again high with 36.2 MCERs issued. 
However, with 852 MCERs now issued, the monthly average issuance has to be 
around 30 MCERs for the rest of the year in order to reach the projected of 1157 
MCERS at the end of the year. Therefore, the projection only slightly increased from 
1151 MCERs a month ago to 1157 MCERs. The average issuance success is 
94.5%.
36
 
However, following the report of IETA as far back as 2008 (the trend has not 
noticeably changed) there is usually a significant percentage of about 29% from 
overall amount of projects usually idling in the system as either ‘requesting 
registration’, ‘undergoing a completeness check’, ‘requesting for review’ or ‘under 
review’. Conservatively, these amount to about 25 to 30 percent of the total CDM 
project in the pipeline (meaning 1 in 4 projects are still unsure of completion. The 
impact of this on the overall projected 2.2 billion CERs by 2012
37
 is significant 
emphasising issues relating to the integrity of CDM, the processes and technologies 
used in pursuing the goal.  It is clear that this set goal of 2.2 billion will not be 
reached based on the current rate of issuance. Therefore a large scale operation like 
CCS under the CDM framework would be of benefit in achieving the goal although 
not within the current commitment period and a well thought out framework to 
                                                          
35
 Schmidt, J., et al., 2006. Sector-Based Approach to the Post-2012Climate Change Policy 
Architecture Center for Clean Air Policy, Washington, D.C.; Winkelman, S., 
2005.Transportation and the CDM: Towards a Policy Agenda for Climate Change, 
Presentation at Asilomar, August 2005, http://www.ccap.org/trans.htm 
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http://www.cdmpipeline.org/ CDM News as available 8
th
 February 2012 
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 UNFCCC (2012), CDM Statistics: http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/index.html last viewed 
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mitigate the flooding of the carbon market with “worthless” CERs from such 
projects. 
Also, the problem of uneven distribution of CDM projects according to Jorgen 
Fenhann of the UNEP Risøe centre contributes to the lack of credibility of the 
current structure of Mechanism. A stark statistical picture which shows three 
countries (China, India and Brazil)
38
 accounting for two thirds of the projects and as 
regions, Latin America and Asia & Pacific host 96% of the projects. Eleven out of 
the 50 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) host a total 50 CDM projects or 2.09% of 
all CDM projects. Africa has earlier been bypassed in the CDM investments flow, 
but has now somewhat risen to hold a market share of 5% of transacted volumes of 
CERs even though the number of projects (67) is still rather low. Forty four percent 
of all CDM projects are small-scale and the issuance-success is just as high for 
small-scale. See Figure 2 for host Parties distribution pattern and Figure 3 for the 
average annual percentage CERs registered by host countries.  
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Supra note (http://www.cdmpipeline.org/). The share of CDM project hosted by China, 
India, Brazil and Mexico dropped to 65% in January. The share of projects from the other 
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Figure 2 Registered Project Activities by Host Party Total Numbers 3816 
Source: 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/NumOfRegisteredProjByHostPartiesPie
Chart.htmllast viewed 02/02/2012 
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1.2.2 CDM Stakeholders and Constituent Elements 
The CDM regulatory framework is engrained in the Kyoto protocol stipulating the 
administrative, legal and operational functions of institutional bodies running the 
mechanism. This detailed institutional framework provides the necessary rules to 
attain the targets by both arms of the parties and this has brought about a glossary of 
different terminologies and vocabularies which make the whole study, operations 
and legalities of the mechanism unique.  The section below aims to give a 
descriptive overview of each of the entities involved in the regulatory regime 
a. UNFCCC Secretariat: The function of providing organisational support and 
technical expertise to climate change related negotiations and institutions while 
facilitating the flow of authoritative information on the implementation of the 
Convention underpins the role of the secretariat. As a contact point for activity 
coordination, the administrative and technical aspects of all UNFCCC activities 
1% 
64% 
11% 
4% 
4% 2% 
1% 
1% 
1% 1% 
10% 
Expected Average Annual CERs from 
Registered Projects by Host Party 
Nigeria
China
India
Brazil
Rep. of Korea
Mexico
Indonesia
Uzbekistan
Malaysia
Chile
Other
Figure 3 Expected Average Annual CERs from Registered Projects by Host Party. 
Total CERs 564,696,186 
Source:  
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/AmountOfReductRegisteredProjPieChart
.html last viewed 02/02/2012 
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is coordinated from the office in Bonn, Germany and disseminated to all 184 
contracting parties and relevant organisations. 
 
b. COP/MOP: Pursuant to Article 2 (1)(b) of the Kyoto Protocol, the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change effectively constituted the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) serving as the Meeting of the Parties (MOP)
39
 
with a pseudo legislative function
40
 as Parties retains the ultimate control to opt-
out or approve the recommendations of the COP. The COP/MOP is established 
with a broad mandate to elaborate and adopt the guidelines, rules or procedures 
that are needed and to flesh out several of the Protocol’s key provisions41 
making this body the ultimate decision maker for Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) and related activities. However, Brunnee (2004) argue that 
the Protocol is short on making explicit the provision for binding decision 
making for the COP.
42
 
The CDM often dubbed an afterthought or the “Kyoto surprise” has been 
burdened with the fact that there is limited provisions and guidance for the 
operational regime of the mechanism but has been given clear mandates as 
stated above among other functions to determine and address issues related to 
the compliance regime. However, the COP/MOP adopted Modalities and 
Procedures for the CDM during the Marrakesh Accord.
43
 The Accord, despite it 
not being a formal and binding agreement on the Parties, it formulates decisions 
that guide the operation and implementation of the CDM.
44
 
c. The CDM Executive Board (CDM-EB): The CDM is supervised by the 
CDM-EB, and the members are appointed by the Conference of Parties COP. 
They fundamentally are responsible for overseeing of operations of CDM 
processes, approve baseline methodologies and issue CERs. With regards the 
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 This legislative function does not provide the COP/MOP of the Protocol with the 
legislative powers as the decisions reached are not binding on Parties without their consent.  
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See Kyoto Protocol, Supra note 9, Arts. 3.4, 5.1, 6.2, 7.4, 8.4, 12.7, 16, 17 and 18. 
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COPing with Consent: Law-Making Under Multilateral Environmental Agreements Leiden 
Journal of International Law (2002), 15: 1-52, Published by Cambridge University Press 03 
Mar 2004 
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 For details of the Marrakesh Accord see appendix 
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Streck C et al 2008, “Making Markets Work: A Review of CDM Performance and the Need 
for Reform”. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 19, no. 2 pg. 409 - 442 
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day-to-day management of the CDM, the  EB has the main responsibility of 
overseeing projects
45
 submitted to it by Designated Operation Entities
46
 (DOEs) 
for registration and ensure they provide ‘real’ and ‘measurable’ reductions that 
are ‘additional’ and must also provide a long time benefits related to mitigation 
of climate change.
47
 Other responsibilities include, approving project 
methodologies and calculating emissions reductions.
48
 Although COP/MOP do 
finally decide on the strategic development of the CDM, the EB’s interpretation 
and conveyance of these decisions for implementation at project levels is 
expected to be apolitical and conducted professionally therefore crucial to the 
whole process. The regular interaction of the EB and the other players in the 
CDM project cycle is crucial to the overall success of any particular project. 
The supervisory role of the EB is articulated in Article 12(4) of the Protocol
49
 
and the CDM M&P: 
The clean development mechanism shall ... be supervised by an executive 
board of the clean development mechanism (Kyoto Protocol, Article 12(4)). 
and 
The Executive Board shall supervise the CDM, under the authority and 
guidance of the COP/MOP, and be fully accountable to the COP/MOP 
(3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 5). 
 
This regulatory and supervisory role delegated to the EB by the COP/MOP as 
articulated above allows for the implementation of CDM rules by the EB and to 
take decisions on methodology and projects. Also, requesting for reviews and 
revision of project applications makes the EB fully accountable to the 
COP/MOP on the issue of clarity concerning the decisions reached on a project.  
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 Article 12 par. 3 
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 CDM rules, par. 26 
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 CDM rules, par. 5; Article 12 Par..5(b) of the Kyoto Protocol 
It is therefore overriding responsibility of the EB to determine what is additional and that all 
CDM project meet with the criteria of baseline and Additionality as specified under Art.12 of 
the Protocol. 
48
 It is important to note that EB use highly technical and specialised organs within the 
UNFCCC Secretariat to carry out this functions due to it complexities. The two most 
prominent of these organs are the Methodologies Panel (Meth Panel) and the Registration 
and Issuance Team (RIT) both also playing and advisory role to the EB. 
49
 See Appendix for the full copy of the Kyoto Protocol. 
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Although the board is not necessarily technically robust on all matters related to 
every individual project, it is provided with various panels or team of experts 
commissioned to assist as the need arises on relevant technical issues albeit the 
EB is under no obligation to take on board their technical recommendations. An 
example of such non acceptance of panel’s recommendation was in the case of 
the double counting of emissions reduction generated by the use of biofuel. The 
MethPanel developed a way of addressing this issue but the EB rejected the 
proposals.
50
 
 
According to Stewart (2005) and Streck et al (2008), the delegation of powers is 
akin to the delegation of a national legislature to regulatory agencies with the 
recognised ability for technical expertise to implement a regulatory framework. 
The implication of implementation is that the EB have a dual role of both rule 
making and rule enforcement and this suggest the need for accountability, 
transparency and legitimacy.
51
 In context therefore, the regulatory delegation 
provides for the EB to act as regulatory authority akin to regulatory 
governmental agencies. While accountability of the EB to the COP/MOP is 
paramount as this reinforces transparency and legitimacy of the EB. The EB’s 
responsibility of providing operational level guidance to participants on CDM 
matters allows for downward flow of the decisions and strategies once 
articulated by the COP/MOP.  
In summary, the role of the EB inter alias include  
 Making recommendations to the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties (COP/MOP) on further modalities and procedures 
for the CDM; 
 Approving new baseline and monitoring methodologies; 
 Overseeing the accreditation of operational entities; 
 Establish and maintain a database of approved rules, procedures and 
methodologies; and 
 Develop and maintain the CDM registry. 
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 The implication of this is that there would be the risk of delays in the approval of related 
methodologies. This is regulatory risk is counterproductive for project developers.  
51
A detailed explanation of this in the context of risk is provided in Chapter 4 
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EB decisions at this level of the hierarchy are not expected to be insubordinate 
or in contradiction to those of the COP/MOP rather must be consistent and 
support the formal decisions of the COP/MOP. See Figure 4for the broad 
categorisation the EB functional framework
52
 in relation to the CMP/COP 
authority over CDM guidance. 
 
d. Designated Operational Entities (DOEs): These are independent third parties 
accredited by the CDM-EB to validate proposed CDM projects, verify the 
resulting emissions reductions and certify those emission reductions as CERs. 
In pursuant to Section E paragraph 26 of the CDM Modalities and Procedure 
(CDM M&P) the DOE as an [independent auditing body] is accountable to the 
COP/MOP through the Executive Body and shall comply with the provisions in 
decision 17/CP.7.
53
 These provisions clarifies the functions of the DOE to 
include inter alias as listed in paragraph 27 CDM M&P, the validation of CDM 
projects, verification and certification of reductions in GHG emissions, the 
demonstration of accountability and transparency in the processes. Although the 
EB hold the responsibility of selecting and appointing the DOE, however the 
cost implication of the services rendered is usually bore by the project 
developer. 
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 FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1 Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its first session, held at Montreal from 28 
November to 10 December 2005 
CMP decisions &  
resolutions   
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by the project participants  
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Figure 4 Categorisation of EB Functional Framework Adapted from UNFCCC website 
 
Figure 3 Categorisation of EB Functional Framework Adapted from UNFCCC website 
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In the case of CDM Afforestation and Reforestation (AR) project activities the 
provision of Section E of the CDM M&P allows for decision 17/CP.7 to be 
applied mutatis mutandis which therefore implies that DOE verify and certify 
project activities net GHG reduction by sink. The applicability of this could be 
relevant in solving CCS Permanence related problems. See Section 6.12for 
LULUCF Activities relevant discussion in more detail.  
e. Designated National Authority (DNA): Every Non Annex 1 country or host 
country designates a competent authority with the powers to approve and 
manage local regulatory aspects of the CDM. This is a crucial requirement to 
ensure a CDM project is registered with the UNFCCC. The competent authority 
to conduct this function in Nigeria is the Presidential Implementation 
Committee on Clean Development Mechanism (PICCDM).As noted above this 
authority has the responsibility of ensuring the LoA is written and issued. 
Figure 5 below shows an annotated synopsis of DNA involvement in the 
process of CDM project implementation. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 DNA involvements in CDM Life Cycle 
Source: UNFCCC Website 
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f. Expert Affiliates - Panels/Working Groups/ Teams: As mentioned above, the 
EB has limited expertise on different project technicalities associated with 
CDM, however, 3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 18; 4/CMP.1, Annex 1, Rule 32(1) 
has provided the EB with the capacity and responsibility to establish panels, 
working groups or teams with the sole aim of assisting in carrying out their 
functions.
54
 The expert affiliates have a responsibility to advise and recommend 
to EB on issues related to their specific functions but do not have the mandate to 
make regulatory decisions about their recommendations. Broadly, these expert 
groupings are in the forms of Panels, Working Groups and Teams e.g. the 
Accreditation and Methodology Panels, Small Scale CDM Working Groups, 
operational teams such as CDM assessment team, the Registration and Issuance 
team, technical advisory bodies like the SBSTA and SBI teams and others 
include forums for Registry Systems Administrators or the Applicant 
entity/DOE.  
 
Crucial to the inclusion of CCS as a CDM project is the role of SBSTA. The 
body is one of the two permanent subsidiary bodies armed with the 
responsibility of providing information on scientific and technological matters 
by carrying out methodological work under the convention and Kyoto 
Protocol.
55
 In relation to its work on CCS, the body was instructed during the 
COP16 to explore technical issues related and relevant to the CCS CDM 
modalities and procedures and consequently present recommendations to the 
CMP for decision at the COP17. However, there are never guarantees that such 
recommendations will be adopted or implemented by the CMP (mentioned 
earlier). Its findings (which included a draft decision on options on modalities 
and procedures, for consideration by the Conference of the Parties serving as 
the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) at its seventh session 
(the text of the draft decision is contained in the annex to 
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 The Executive Board may establish committees, panels or working groups to assist it in the 
performance of its functions. The Executive Board shall draw on the expertise necessary to 
perform its functions, including from the UNFCCC roster of experts. In this context, it shall 
take fully into account the consideration of regional balance (3/CMP.1, Annex, paragraph 18; 
4/CMP.1, Annex 1, Rule 32(1)).Cited on CDM rulebook website 
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FCCC/SBSTA/2011/L.24)
56
presented at it 35
th
 session contributed and formed 
the bases for the overall success of CCS inclusion in CDM during the COP17. 
g. The Project Design Document (PDD): A detailed documentation of how the 
proposed project would result in a GHG emission reduction and which must 
include a substantive explanation of the baseline scenario, Additionality and 
other methodologies is formalised by the Project Design Document (PDD). 
Project developers must ensure that there is substantive evidence that the project 
would create emissions reduction which is additional to any that would have 
occurred under a business as usual scenario. In other words, the PDD must give 
a clear comparison of the baseline scenario, the methodology by which the 
Additionality criteria will be achieved and the Additionality that will be achieve 
at the end of the project. Other elements of this document should include a 
comprehensive monitoring plan, local stakeholder consultation and a proof of 
stakeholder contribution (i.e. their comments and summary of these comments). 
It is also important to state in this document how due account was (or will be) 
taken for the stakeholders’ comments57 during public consultation for the 
project. 
Based on the monitoring plan detailed in the PDD and the size of the project, 
the project is consistently verified for GHG reductions (this verification should 
be carried out by a different DOE except the project is classified as Small-Scale 
CDM). The logical conclusion of every CDM project is the issuance of the 
CERs to certify the reduction of greenhouse gas emission as a result of the 
project activity executed.
58
 The issuance of CERs is a clear indication that all 
due process concerning the project has been carried out and the environmental 
integrity of the project is theoretically unquestionable. However, the practice of 
this has been documented to be contrary. Hence bringing into question pertinent 
issues related to the current framework and how this can be further enhanced to 
fit the purpose of environmental integrity needs of post Kyoto regime. Section 
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57Meijer E., and Werksman J., 2005, “Keeping it Clean – Safeguarding the Environmental 
Integrity of the Clean Development Mechanism”, a chapter in “Legal Aspects of 
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Figure 6 Schematic of the CDM Project  
1.4 to 1.7 provides a detailed discussion on issues relevant to the environmental 
integrity of CDM projects. 
h. The Letter of Approval (LoA) from the host country
59
 must be submitted with 
the PDD to the DOE for independent validation before it is submitted to the EB 
for registration. It is important to note that although the DOE is chosen and paid 
for by the project proponent, they have to be approved by the EB after due 
process
60
 as this could impact on the project credibility.  
 1.3 CDM Project Life 
The following of steps as depicted in Figure 6 are crucial in the progression and 
approval of CDM project. The continuous interaction of proponents and other 
stakeholders facilitates the realisation of the CERs.  
 
 Eligibility Analysis 
 Review Methodologies 
 Quantify Potential GHG benefit    
 
 
 Develop Project Design Document 
 Obtain Host Country Government approval 
 
  
 Project Validation by DOE  
 
 Registration by CDM-EB 
 
 
 Project Construction and Start-up 
 
 Install additional monitoring facilities 
 
 Monitoring project and baseline 
 
 Verification and certification by DOE 
 
 Issuance of CERs by the CDM-EB 
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 The LoA is a legal document which the host state can use to devolve rights and obligation 
or show the authorisation allowing a private legal entity can engage in the CDM. 
60
 Due process in this instance infers that the DOE would have to meet set criteria by the EB 
for the CDM to be eligible and this also means they are to prove or confirm to the EB that 
there is no conflict of interest with the project as stipulated in CDM rules, Appendix A 
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Figure 5 above shows a summary of the project cycle of a typical CDM project. 
Each of the stages is briefly explained in this section to give a better understanding 
of its workings. 
i.  Preliminary Feasibility Study: The aim of this phase is to provide 
recommendation and evidence that the proposed project meets with the Marrakech 
Accord and CDM-EB standards. In this case it has to articulate the GHG emissions 
reduction credentials of the project compared to a business as usual scenario, prove 
whether or not the project is located in an eligible country. This study is required to 
also determine the possible amount of emissions reductions resulting from the 
project activity putting into consideration the expected carbon credit prices making it 
possible to ascertain the extent of financial involvement that would be required from 
CDM for the overall profitability of the project. A Project Ideal Note (PIN) prepared 
from this initial feasibility study will serve as the document provided by the project 
proponent as the summary of all necessary information collected to facilitate the next 
phase of the project. 
ii. Project Development: This phase requires the development of a 
complete Project Design Document PDD
61
 which needs to include the following 
information 
 General description of project activity 
 Baseline methodology 
 Duration of the project activity/Crediting period 
 Monitoring methodology and plan 
 Calculations of GHG emissions by sources  
 Environmental impacts assessments 
 Stakeholders’ comments. 
iii. Validation and Registration: As stated in section1.2.2d above the 
validation of CDM project activity as described in the PDD is the responsibility of 
the DOE. This validation process entails a rigorous scrutiny of the institutional 
capacity of the stakeholders, the evidence underlying the calculations of carbon 
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benefits, the monitoring system applicable and the host country approval. The 
scrutiny includes making public the PDD for public comments. 
In a case the Baseline methodology submitted was previously approved by the 
CDM-EB the DOE is obliged to validate the PDD immediately. However, on the 
contrary, the PDD and the new methodology is submitted to the CDM-EB for review 
and approval. Upon completion of the validation process by the DOE, it is their 
responsibility to produce a validation report with the PDD which is to be submitted 
to the CDM-EB for registration of the CDM project. Within 8 weeks of submission 
the EB is required to confirm and inform about the registration of the project and if 
otherwise (i.e. if at least 3 members of the EB object to the registration) a request for 
review of the CDM project is requested.
62
 
The Emission Reduction Purchase Agreements (ERPA) which is the contract 
between the project proponent (seller) and the investor (buyer) is usually arranged 
during this phase. However, this contractual arrangement can come to bear at any 
time during the project cycle.  
iv. Project Implementation and Monitoring: This phase would have 
an overriding impact on CCS-CDM project vis-à-vis long term liability issues. It is 
important to note that monitoring referred to in this context is within the operation of 
the project activity towards the issuance of emissions credit. However in the case of 
CCS operation the monitoring for leakage of sequestered CO2 stretches beyond the 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The approval and registration of a project 
must be followed with a systematic and periodic monitoring of the project, its 
baseline performance according to the monitoring plan stipulated in the PDD. It is 
important that the specifications of the monitoring plan are checked and verified, 
also properly documented to ensure that all data collected and management systems 
are in place to allow for future successful verification and certification. And more 
important to the design is the effective risk management strategy for the whole 
operation (see Chapter 5 for discussion on risk management)  
Based on the monitoring plan detailed in the PDD and the size of the project, the 
project is consistently verified for GHG reductions - this verification should be 
carried out by a different DOE for validation except the project is classified as 
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Small-Scale CDM.
63
 The logical conclusion of every CDM project is the issuance of 
the CERs to certify the reduction of greenhouse gas emission as a result of the 
project activity executed.
64
 
v. Verification and Certification: This phase involves the DOE 
verifying the project’s monitoring system and determining the GHG reduction 
resulting from the project. A report for the verification is produced and made public 
for further scrutiny and comments. This is also provided to the project proponents 
and all other parties involved including the CDM-EB. Consequent to no negative 
response on the verification report, the DOE can produce a publicly available 
certification report for the project which serves as a request for issuance of carbon 
credits which is also presented to all parties involved and the CDM-EB.  
vi. Issuance of credits: The issuance of the CERs is done by the CDM-
EB within 15 days of the receipt of the certification report of the project from the 
DOE unless there is a request for review by the CDM-EB. The distribution 
agreement is important in the process of issuance. This stipulates the amount per 
month or per year and what ratio each party is entitled to.  
1.4 Environmental Integrity of CDM: Fraud, Farce or faute de 
mieux
65
 
Fundamental to the acceptance of a project as a credible CDM is the need to fulfil or 
demonstrate the fundamental criteria vis-à-vis the project’s “Baseline scenario” and 
the “Additionality” to justify the environmental integrity of each individual project. 
However there is overwhelming evidence that most CDM projects conclusively are 
failing to meet with these criteria.
66
 Schneider further substantiated this by a study of 
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Project Design Document (PDD) of 93 registered projects, it was found to lack 
evidence, transparency and objectivity in the whole design and presentation hence 
lacking a convincing argument that the projects meets the Additionality criterion,
67
 
thereby substantively affecting the overall confidence in the mechanism. In addition, 
there was a high level of ambiguity in determining what a real baseline scenario is, 
resulting in substantial number of non-additional projects.
68
 
The integrity of environmental projects through CDM is significantly dependent on 
the integrity of the methodologies by which this project is carried out. The need for it 
to be additional to what would otherwise have been “business-as-usual” is 
fundamentally crucial. Although it is arguably difficult to determine what “business- 
as-usual” is, it is inferred therefore that the factor of Additionality subsequently 
would be flawed if the baseline scenario is not accurately determined, thereby 
increasing the risk of negative emissions equity in real terms. 
 1.5 The ‘Additionality’ Quandary for CDM 
The concept of Additionality is fundamental to the environmental integrity of any 
CDM project. The Protocol explicitly implies in its provision that the Additionality 
of a project is crucial to the acceptance of the project for certification.
69
 There is a 
misconception about CDM that by itself it can reduce emissions. However, 
according to Wara et al., (2008), the point was argued that since the Additionality 
factor in CDM can never be 100% ascertained due to lack of credibility in the 
Additionality test of CDM projects leading to issuance of CERs for CDM projects.
70
 
CDM can therefore be considered only as an offset mechanism. It is however not, an 
understatement to suggest that the credibility of offsets in the global carbon market is 
lower when compared to that of cap and trade system. Although the Additionality 
quandary in CDM has been highlighted by different scholars and project 
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participants, the fix for it is still elusive and should be an integral part of any post 
Kyoto CDM framework and in particular the implementation of CCS under a CDM 
framework due to potentially large quantities of CERs  produced by CCS projects.  
A study carried out by Sutter and Parreno in 2005 suggested at the time, there was a 
30% rise of Additionality issues in all registered CDM projects.
71
 Has this trend 
changed? There is however no clear evidence to state otherwise and to the best of my 
knowledge no further study has been conducted to ascertain this. The difficulty 
encountered in defining or calculating what is additional in any given CDM project 
is compounded by the fact that the different institutional players in the project cycle 
are either ill equipped for this task
72
 or are deliberately or unknowingly taking 
advantage of the flaws in the system.
73
 The following issue are considered to be the 
possible reasons for the quandary. Firstly the challenge of demonstrating 
Additionality and the multiplicity of methods available to verify the suitability or 
demonstrate the Additionality of a CDM project, and secondly, the potential for host 
countries to manipulate environmental policies as discussed in section 1.5.1 and 
section 1.6 respectively.   
  1.5.1 Demonstration of Additionality 
Two of the main controversies associated with CDM Additionality (as fundamental 
as it is to the legitimacy of environmental integrity of CDM projects) are the 
approaches used to demonstrate Additionality and the acceptance of such approach’s 
credibility and suitability.
74
 The debate has lingered within the international climate 
change community since it was introduced into CDM. It is generally accepted that 
the environmental integrity of CDM is dependent on the Additionality clause 
however the demonstration and interpretation of this remains vague, subjective 
uncertain and almost indeterminable without significant recourse to errors in the 
process.
75
  The fundamental challenge however remains as to the assumption that a 
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CDM project implementation is hypothetical and counter-factual undermining any 
possibility for absolute certainty. It remains the objective of all concerned to find an 
objective and transparent method(s) of determining what is additional about a project 
and provides for the avoidance of non-additional projects or “lost opportunity” 
projects.
76
 
Different methods of determining Additionality have been articulated and submitted 
to the CDM-EB, the most consistent and commonly used of the methods in 
demonstrating baseline and monitoring methodologies vis-à-vis Additionality are 
mainly the following.  
1.5.1.1 Barrier Analysis 
This approach remains the most popular, used in over 74% of the analysed projects 
by Schneider
77
 but however it remains clear that it is not without its flaws. Its aim is 
to demonstrate that barriers exist that would prevent the proposed project from being 
conducted under a business as usual scenario. This analysis has been flawed by some 
serious challenges. Such flaws include the credibility of the barriers presented, the 
cost associated with the project, current or prevailing practices, lack of or 
insufficient evidence (such as information on the stakeholder consultation process) 
on the impact of CDM project on overcoming such barrier, and Institutional 
assessment of the barriers by DOEs.
78
 
Analysis of the barrier showed its weakest when it is comes to its credibility. 
Furthermore, Schneider 2007 was able to show that 43% of analysed projects did not 
provide credible explanation to why the identified barrier would prevent the 
proposed project.
79
 Other issues of speculation and subjectivity in the process of 
demonstrating the Additionality factor in the projects include policy risk claims, 
prohibitive technology risks assertions, the financial risk impact vis-à-vis the risks 
associated with currency exchange rates, computation of the feed-in-tariff or how 
any of this financial indicators could impact on the project.
80
 
With regards to CCS–CDM projects, such weakness will even be more significant 
due to the complexities involved in the implementation and determining 
Additionality criteria in such a large scale project with minimal data to work with 
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due to lack of precedence of implementation under the CDM framework. It is 
unclear how such weakness in the barrier analysis would impact IRR and the CERs 
issued but it is clear that it will significantly compromise the environmental integrity 
of the CDM project in mitigating climate change since it has the potential to generate 
large quantity of CERs.  
1.5.1.2 Investment Barrier 
This analysis requires that another project (which will act as the baseline project) is 
more economically or financially attractive to the proposed CDM project. To reach 
this conclusion of economic attractiveness, it is expected that the investment analysis 
must use sensitivity analysis to show that the conclusion is robust and will stand 
reasonable variation with the critical assumptions.
81
 However, in situation where 
CERs revenue is the only economic benefit accrued to the project, a “simple cost 
analysis” in the Additionality tool and the combined tool is used to show the above 
two indicators (i.e. robustness of investment analysis and reasonable variation).  
Although barrier analysis remains the most frequently used for CDM projects, 
Additionality test investment analysis hold a third of the analysed projects most of 
which are large scale projects. Benchmark analysis represent 61%, while investment 
comparison and simple cost analysis hold 23% and 16% respectively.
82
 
1.5.1.3 Common Practice Analysis 
The common practice analysis must accentuate the rarity of the project in the region 
or country. The assessment considers the plurality of such project activity in the 
geographical location and how this could be used as bases to prove Additionality. 
Unfortunately this demonstration method by itself cannot justify Additionality as this 
could have been the bases for it in Non Annex 1 nation like Nigeria where there is 
obviously no such project in the country. This common practice analysis is a 
mandatory step in the Additionality tool and combined tool but it is however 
required in addition to the barrier and investment analysis to justify or prove 
Additionality of a project activity.  
The merit of the common practice analysis is the ability to approach assessment 
objectively without considering issues that are subjective to the project proponent. It 
is based on facts easily accessible under normal condition. However the weaknesses 
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include the lack of adequate provision with the current framework as to the 
definition of when a project activity should be considered as common practice. Also, 
what would be considered a comparable technology or the bases for such 
comparison?  
1.6 Environmental Policy Manipulations 
There are suggestions that host country environmental policies have been designed 
to lower the standards of baselines in other to infer that a proposed CDM project 
would meet the Additionality criterion.
83
  According to Haites et al 2000 and Sterk 
2008 indicators used to determine the Additionality of a project can [and have been] 
easily manipulated to modify project assumptions and respective verifying bodies 
have neither the time nor the expertise to identify this discrepancy in the 
project,
84
while in other instances, individual companies such as Holcim the Swiss 
cement company stated that their involvement in the CDM has been stifled by the 
Additionality criterion.
85
 The interpretation of this must be in the context of 
discourse as manipulation of environmental policies by host States proves it could be 
used for both political and economic gains in countries where corruption is prevalent 
and transparency in governance is minimal.  
If this argument is considered from a financial benchmark perspective, it could be 
argued that “[...] if companies behave perfectly rational, they [could] implement 
projects that generate a positive NPV at a discount rate equal to the lending 
rate[...]”.86 Thus, in a rational world the stringent environmental policies might not 
necessarily lead to a reduction of CDM activities, provided that the discounting and 
lending rate is known and in equilibrium. Therefore, the effect of a financial 
benchmark would depend on its relation to the lending and discounting rates. If the 
financial benchmark for the project is lower than the lending rate, projects would 
therefore not be implemented.
87
 In this case, Additionality would not only be 
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achievable and profitable but in the contrary, the lack of stringent Additionality 
procedures in CDM activities makes CDM projects unprofitable in the overall not 
necessarily only the framework of the domestic environmental policy .   
According to de Sepibus 2009, there are indications that host countries for instance, 
China manipulate policies by modifying project assumptions and undue interference 
in CDM processes by the use of policies to give comparative advantage over 
others.
88
 Flip flopping of policies or deliberately developing or engineering these 
policies into the host country’s regulatory main stream to achieve biased goals has 
been suggested to be operational in some countries involved in CDM project 
activities. At the centre of this allegation was the concern that China for example 
might be manipulating power tariffs in order to guarantee Additionality and 
subsidising its domestic renewable energy development with carbon finance. This 
could also come in the form of what is referred to as E+ Policies
89
 and E- 
Policies.
90
Such manipulations to gain advantage or work round the definition of any 
of the CDM criteria.
91
 This can be seen as attempts to affect the overall result of the 
CDM accreditation process in favour of the CERs issuance to host countries, this 
brings along increased chance of generating CDM with ‘meaningless’ [worthless] 
credits and bringing to question the authenticity of the results of the CDM 
activities.
92
 Although the EB has taken measures to mitigate this tendency after the 
adoption of CDM Rules but there are challenges with the implementation process of 
EB decisions as they are not often straightforward.
93
  With regards to the DOEs, they 
are usually less informed compared with the project proponents checking the 
credibility of their claims or in some cases lack the needed expertise to verify and 
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evaluate the local specifics of the project activities.
94
 By providing a manual with 
guidance the EB has been able to mitigate this anomaly.
95
 
Furthermore, the fact that the EB has a compilation of methodologies making it 
available for host countries and project participants (available on the CDM 
UNFCCC website) as a comprehensive tool for demonstrating and assessing 
Additionality
96
 and baseline scenario
97
 albeit not mandatory goes to show the 
difficulty associated with these two criteria is not going unnoticed.  
It is worth mentioning as enumerated by Umamaheswara et al (2006) and as 
explained above that these tools consist of a 6 step approach starting with 1. 
Screening based on the starting date of the project. 2. Identification of alternative 
projects consistent with current laws and regulations. 3. Barrier analysis. 4. 
Investment analysis. 5. Common practice tests for Additionality.
98
 And finally, 
impact of CDM registration.
99
 However, the underlining interest of this multi prong 
Additionality “Methodology” tests is that they are expected to be evidence based to 
ascertain their credibility as tests. This however brings about some level of criticism 
by different observers of these tests
100
 and different questions are asked. One of such 
very important question was “how do we determine how important a barrier is to 
consider it evidential?”101 As stated earlier, this section of the paper will not attempt 
to expand on these critiques and questions but the author would elaborate further in 
subsequent sections as the issue arises.  
Finally, it is important to add that CDM experts (i.e. policy-makers, Business, 
Researchers and NGOs) have not so far brought clarity to what CDM Additionality 
definition, determination and interpretation is or should be. Instead these main actors 
have helped fuel the debate by maintaining their views purely from a biased 
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understanding of the term thereby perpetuating the Additionality quandary. This 
remains even more significant in projects like CCS as methodology will need to be 
defined based on the Additionality indicator. 
1.7 Baseline Scenario safeguard to CDM 
Due to the bias of interest of different project proponents in CDM activities, due to 
the need to be seen as contributing to the call for reduced global GHG emissions and 
demonstrating Additionality in projects there have been incidences of overestimating 
the quantity (by altering the baseline levels) of emissions reduction
102
  as prevalent 
among sector participants. It is therefore important that for the fundamental criterion 
of Additionality to be calculated and workable within large projects like CCS there is 
a need to determine what the baseline scenario or current business-as-usual status is 
on the bases of evidence of statistical data available. Different ideas or methods have 
been proposed (some are well articulated and other are not) but there is generally no 
uniformity in approach this must be due to the current and only “target based 
approach” used in tackling the issue of climate change under the Protocol. 
Different documents have articulated what the definition of baseline should be, 
however the most widely accepted is the UNEP 2005 definition.
103
 The simplicity of 
this definition could be misleading, however, when attempting to implement the 
principle and details behind this crucial CDM project requirement the complexity 
and depth becomes evident. Boyd et al 2007 in their work highlighted the problem of 
determining a credible convincing baseline scenario which defines likely activities 
and sources of GHG emissions in the absence of a CDM project.
104
 These activities 
are often not taking into context or consideration when calculating the baseline of 
related or relevant CDM projects. Other issues associated with further substantiating 
baseline scenario are that it is only hypothetical, counterfactual and cannot be 
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monitored or verified.
105
 This supposition brings the issues of subjectivity, 
transparency, uncertainty and credibility to bear.  
According to the CDM rules and the EB Annex 3 documents the subjectivity of 
baseline analysis can be reduced by  
 Being transparent,106 
 Baseline must be project specific i.e. it should be calculated on a project by 
project bases
107
 and in particular it must be relevant to the national and or 
sectoral policies,
108
 
 The boundary of project must be defined to include all anthropogenic 
emissions by sources of GHG within the scope control of the project that are 
significant,
109
 
 The baseline must take into consideration leakages and adjust accordingly,110 
 Force majeure or event outside the determination of the project participants 
or boundary should not be taken into account in any calculation of baseline,
111
 
The implication of these rules is that the simple definition of ‘baseline’ has simply 
raised new and complex questions that do not have straightforward definitive 
answers and disallows for ease of interpretation or manipulation of what the baseline 
is and bias advantages towards a section of the global hosting economies. More 
crucial is that as the EB attempts to clarify the rules and enforce them, there is the 
paradox of firstly, the “race to bottom” on one extreme as host countries bring about 
weak environmental legislations that compromises the integrity of global 
environmental efforts all in an attempt to encourage and lure investors to its 
economy. And secondly on the other extreme of the spectrum is the urge to strictly 
enforce the precepts of the of the rules thereby making it difficult to meet the 
expectations of this baseline scenario as could be the case for most developing 
countries as they not only lack the technological and technical capacity to provide 
the highly sophisticated inventories required to determine the baseline scenario. The 
                                                          
105
Supra note [de Sepibus 2009], ASPEN 1998 
106
 CDM rules, par. 45 
107
 CDM rules, par. 45c 
108
 CDM rules, par. 45e 
109
 CDM rules, par. 52 
110
 CDM rules, par. 50 
111
 CDM rules, par. 47 
59 
 
overall consequence of this could be [or has contributed to] the disenfranchisement 
of genuine potential CDM host countries. This is evident in the current global CDM 
distribution where countries from the LDC who not only need the foreign 
investment, technological transfer and climate change adaptation measures are not in 
the spectrum of global CDM participation and some are not even attempting to 
participate.
112
 
There are different recommendations about determining baseline (very much so 
project Additionality) which could be integrated into the post Kyoto framework. 
Such baseline methodologies could be enshrined in the different approaches that are 
discussed below.  For example, Bodansky (2007a) suggests that baseline could be 
simplified by determining it from a sectoral perspective (see below for sectoral and 
policy approaches)
113
 and others suggest it could be defined based on the region or 
the technology and product. The definition and determination of these CDM 
elements could be fundamental to the success of any post Kyoto CDM framework in 
my opinion. 
1.8 Post-Kyoto CDM Framework 
For any effective post 2012 framework, it is the view of most contributors  and 
indeed from the points discussed above that there is a need for a systemic overhaul 
of the current Kyoto framework (not only in terms of the regulatory framework and 
structure; complexities inherent in the CDM project cycle; lack of institutional 
capacity by Non Annex 1 participating States  and methodology tests issues), but 
also in the orientation and direction of the different Parties and of the importance of 
environmental integrity to projects or programmes of CDM for credible possibility 
of attaining the set out goals of climate change mitigation and adaptation. It was the 
author’s view like many others that Copenhagen 2009 could have been an 
opportunity to articulate proportionate measures to the urgency of climate change 
and more importantly draw the United States into a binding commitment due to 
euphoria focused on Obama’s election victory. But this was not the case. The 
progression of these expectations has however cumulated in the resolutions credited 
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to the Durban 2011 summit especially with regards the CCS integration in to the 
CDM framework. 
The fundamentals of any post Kyoto period must include broadly speaking the 
following, Firstly, the involvement of all countries that are major emitters – i.e. 
developed and developing countries alike - in the attainment of the commitments.
114
 
Secondly, the utilisation of mechanisms and measures that will not only accentuate 
the need for ‘real’ and ‘verifiable’ reductions in the overall global emissions of GHG 
but will bring about a credible and transparent ways of achieving the reductions and 
are also workable within the definitions of international and national policy 
frameworks. Finally, the use of policy instruments (domestic and international) and 
political will to achieve these crucial goals are essential.
115
 It is important to lay this 
foundation to preclude any sentiment that “a one sided solution” or “one size fits 
all” approach (that has characterise the present framework) would be a credible 
alternative to any post Kyoto regime. 
In reforming the CDM framework, its set out objectives require the contribution of 
all parties under an equitable but multilateral framework,
116
 while upholding the 
principle of ‘Common but differentiated responsibility’ in designing the next 
emissions reduction framework [and] avoiding the isolationist approach in 
formulating policies
117
 in relations to other policies is a credible alternative to the 
current regulatory regime. It would make compliance and enforcement easy to 
articulate, achieve and measure from both a national and international stand point. 
As suggested by all literature reviewed during this research, the importance of a 
reasonable integration of the developing countries’ policies and measures in the 
global carbon market and any future climate change regime was unanimous 
(suggested reading include Bossley, 2008; Bodansky 2007a & b; Lewis et al., 2007 
Watson et al., 2005 inter alias) and in my view are incontrovertibly  necessary to 
achieve the goal of averting the almost certain consequence of global warming due 
to anthropogenic activities.  
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1.8.1 Proposed Approaches for a post-Kyoto CDM 
Framework 
The entry of CDM into the Kyoto negotiations though late despite all the challenges 
has so far proved to be one of the most successful climate change mitigation strategy 
that incorporates all parties to the Protocol for achieving the goal of global GHG 
emissions reduction. The current framework that is based on an economy-wide 
emission target does not only have compliance and methodological issues but with it 
are potential for disparities in ability to bring different parties to efficiently 
participate in the framework and the impact of it on the overall goal of individuals 
country’s national economic goals especially for the Non Annex 1 Parties.  
Although pre Kyoto had tinkered with different approaches to CDM such as the 
“sectoral-based CDM”,118 “policy-based CDM”,119 “programmatic CDM120” and 
project-based CDM,  the consensus was however in favour of the “project based” 
mechanism. Recent events have shown the re-emergence of the other non-target 
based approaches. This section of the chapter will attempt to discuss the relevance of 
these different approaches in the post Kyoto regime and how they can be articulated 
within a post-2012 international and domestic regulatory framework to meet the 
overall expectations of the parties. Also, there will be discussion on elements of new 
market mechanisms that will possibly ease and facilitate the integration of the Non 
Annex 1 Parties into the global target based or market based framework as a steady 
bases for integrating CDM based CCS projects. 
1.8.1.1 Policy-Based Approach 
The fact that project-based approach has brought with it this level of success is in 
fact a clear indication that other mechanisms - if well worked and implemented - can 
create the needed impact also.  The lessons learnt from project-based approach could 
be relevant in developing and stabilising other approaches within the new framework 
especially the above named approaches.  
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Policy-based approach as a component of the overall multilateral framework could 
be a means by which developing countries can contribute to the post-2012 CDM 
regulatory framework. Allowing for a bottom-up policy model provides the 
opportunity for national policies to be developed to meet not only national objectives 
but integrated into the global goal framework. An insular view on developing 
policies about climate change mitigation measures to particular or individual sectors 
of the economy has been nourished by the top-down approach of developing climate 
change policies and it has effectively isolated the developing countries from 
contributing significantly to the overall reduction of emission through CDM.  
CDM Policy-based framework should provide the needed freedom by States to draft 
their policies within the unique context of domestic socio-economic and political 
dynamics and constraints, allowing for the inherent evolutionary characteristics to 
play out without being deterred by externalities such as international demands and 
allowing developing countries to initial voluntarily commit and ultimately join the 
binding quantifiable emissions limits scheme.
121
 
It is important at this point to note possible questions often arise about the structure 
of such a policy-based regime. For instance, what is the benchmark for the voluntary 
contribution and what policy actions can be translated into the next phase i.e. if 
regulated? These questions though appropriate but are outside the scope of this 
research. It is also however important to state that a well-structured climate policy-
based model should promote a synergy between all policy elements of the 
developing country within overriding objective being to develop a low carbon 
economy in both the medium and long term alongside economic, infrastructural and 
technological growth. Such policies have to be proactive and result orientated, must 
be interactive in terms of best practices with both domestic and international 
regimes, verifiable to external entities and finally provide a stronger impetus for 
OECD or Annex 1 countries to commit to stronger action towards ensuring 
emissions reduction by structuring assistance directed at developing countries. It is 
the view of existing literature that policy-based commitments could be a major key 
element of balanced package of commitments across major developed and 
developing countries. 
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   1.8.1.2 Sectoral-based Approach 
One of the most discussed ways of dealing with the CDM riddle was to approach it 
from sector-by-sector bases. The sectoral based approach can be worked in different 
ways. The flexibility of allowing for both inter-governmental and intra-national (i.e. 
governmental and non-governmental participation) partnership based on sectoral 
definition to attain the goal of emissions reduction is characteristic to sectoral based 
approach. Among other uniqueness is that it has the potential to make projects with 
large sustainable development gain feasibility within the CDM framework
122
 and it is 
a proven approach among other international regimes like the International trade and 
ILO regimes in which it has been used to successfully define and address 
international agricultural and textile trade issues.
123
 Bodansky (2007b) suggested 3 
possible models within the inter-governmental partnership as  
 Serial sectoral approach: Allow for different sectors in different countries to 
negotiate (simultaneously or sequentially) and agree on emissions reduction 
target based on different profiling models or 
 Independent negotiation of sectoral agreement i.e. allowing for one or more 
sectors to work out their agreements independent of others or 
 Integrating the sectoral agreement is the overall framework of emissions 
reduction. 
Other authors such as Baron and Ellis (2006); Bosi and Ellis (2005); Samaniego and 
Figueres (2002); Schmidt et al. (2006)
124
 have suggested that sectoral based 
approach can take the form of Sectoral Credit Mechanism by allowing for states to 
establish baseline for sectors in their economy and grant emissions reductions credits 
relative to the set baseline.
125
 Although not an entirely new concept, as early as the 
late 1960s there was the introduction of another form of sectoral based approach 
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referred to as the Unilateral Industry Initiative (UII).
126
 This initiative succeeded in 
bringing corporations to agree to a voluntary measure to reduce GHG emissions 
within their sector. Most recent instance of this type of sectoral based approach is the 
World Business Council on Sustainable Development’s Cement Sustainability 
Initiative and similarly Aluminium initiative.
127
 What is also clear in all of such 
initiatives and sectoral models according to the OECD report 2005 was that sectoral 
based approach as an option alone is counter-productive in terms of it lack of 
environmental benefits (i.e. it encourages emission leakage) and lacks economic 
efficiency by reducing options of mitigation and increasing the overall cost.
128
 
International policies based on this approach would be flawed and result in increased 
GHG emission. It is important that sectoral approach should be appropriated to 
ensure the desired effect across board. As noted by Stehr 2008, sectoral CDM must 
be redesigned to maximise legitimacy, effectiveness and efficiency of respective 
objective.
129
 In line with the views stated above, it is also the author’s opinion that 
sectoral CDM has the potential of jump starting “Sustainable Development 
Mechanisms” if well integrated in to the implementation of CCS projects under 
CDM. The sectoral approach brings relevance to the case study country (discussed 
below) as the predominant sector in terms of economic revenue, vast amount of 
hydrocarbon deposit from its geological formations, and high amount of GHG 
emission from exploring companies, there is potential to implement CCS under a 
CDM framework. 
1.9 National Character of the Case Study Country 
Nigeria is geographically located between latitude 4
0
N and 14
0
N, and longitude 3
0
E 
and 15
0
E. With a total area of 923,800 Sq. km. and a land area of 910,770 Sq. km, it 
is the 32
nd
largest country and the most populous black nation in the world. Bordered 
in the North by Chad and Niger Republics, in the East by Republic of Cameroun and 
Benin Republic and the Gulf of Guinea an extension of the Atlantic Ocean to the 
West and South respectively, it has a climatic variation of wet coastal areas to the 
south with annual rainfall of about 3500mm to typically dry (almost all year round) 
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Sahel region in the north western and north eastern part of the country having less 
than 600mm recorded annual rainfall.   
A nation well-endowed with natural resources having large deposit of hydrocarbon, 
the World Bank World Development Indicator 2011 indicated that the GDP for 2010 
at $193.67 billion with a growth rate of 7.79% in 2011 up from 6.59% in 2005. With 
petroleum providing 95% of the foreign earning and 85% of the country’s budget 
revenues, while two-third of the nation’s 158,423,180 population have their main 
source of revenue from agriculture. 
 
 
 
Other relevant peculiarities of Nigeria include the drainage and relief of the country. 
Nigeria has two main rivers (river Niger and River Benue) that confluence at Lokoja 
and flows down into the Atlantic Ocean through the Niger Delta region. This region 
has numerous estuaries and forms the oil and gas basin of the country. The coastal 
line of the country which includes areas where oil and gas has been mostly found 
and explored covers over 853km
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The southern part of the country mainly the western and Eastern part of the country 
are generally between 300m and 600m at the highest points while in the northern 
part of the country the highest points on record are over 1500m.  Table 1 shows the 
physical and socio-economic characteristics of Nigeria for 2010
131
 
Table 1 Summary of the Nigeria’s Physical and Socio-economic Character 
Character 2010 
Location West Africa Sub-region 
Total Area (Sq. Km) 923,800 
Land Area (Sq. Km) 910,770 
Population Estimate (2007) 158,423,180 
Population Growth Rate 2.5 
Share of Global Petroleum Reserve 
(%) 
2.8 
Share of Mining (%) 0.3 
Share of Agriculture (%) 37.19 
Share of Industry (%) 20.07 
Services (%) 41.75 
Manufacturing (%) 7.18 
Adult Literacy 71.5 
Life Expectancy at Birth (years) 50.9 
GDP (in Billion US$) 267,779 
GDP Growth Rate (%) 7.70 
GDP Per Capital Income (US$) 2748.00 
Human Development Index (Ranking 
in world) 
156 
1.9.1 Nigeria under UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol 
Nigeria is party to the UNFCCC, which it signed on the 13
th
 of June 1992 and 
ratified in August 1994. Nigeria participated in a dual role as a Party entity as well as 
a member of regional grouping like the Group of 77 and China for which it served as 
Chairman of COP 6. Nigeria ratified the Kyoto Protocol on the 10
th
 of December 
2004 and the Protocol came into effect for the country on the 10
th
 of March 2005. 
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The different authorities and stakeholders are given the responsibility of 
implementing activities for the Federal Government of Nigeria in order to meet the 
national obligations on climate change mitigation. The Federal Ministry of 
Environment serves as the Focal Point on climate Change, engaged in providing 
national and broader environmental policies. However with relations to CDM the 
Presidential Implementation Committee on Clean Development Mechanism 
(PICCDM) was constituted in 2005 to act as the DNA for the country on matters 
relating to CDM with the following set out goals 
 Promote CDM projects in Nigeria 
 Provide procedures for the review and approval of CDM projects 
 Provide documentation and communication portals that provide clear 
information to project proponents and investors on the necessary steps 
required to approve CDM projects in Nigeria 
 Provide clear guidance on the national sustainability criteria that should be 
taken into consideration in developing CDM projects 
 Write Letters of Approval (LoA) for projects being sent to the CDM EB for 
review  and other CDM Project cycle activities  
 Keep a registry of CDM projects in the pipeline in the country. 
The stakeholders in Nigeria include different organisations from both the public 
(which include Federal and State Parastatals responsible for Industry Power, 
Environment, Justice, Agriculture and National Planning, academia) and private 
sectors of oil and gas, transportation, forestry, NGOs, power etc.
132
 
1.9.2 Climate Change and Nigeria 
Nigeria is not isolated from the impact of climate change, it remains a global issue 
and the dangers pose serious environmental, economic and socio-political threat to 
the whole of Nigeria. The existing environmental challenges such as desertification, 
erosion, flooding and ecological devastation will even be made more significant with 
the impacts of global climate change. It is estimated that between 89,297km
2
 to 
133,994Km
2
 of arable land will be at risk in the Sahel region of the country to desert 
encroachment, this capital risk is valued to the equivalent of about US$6.4billion for 
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the current level of development.
133
 As such there is a strong correlation between 
climate change and socio economic development and suffice to say will expose 
Nigeria to greater risk in almost all developmental areas which could impact the 
government’s attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) such as 
poverty alleviation, environmental sustainability, along with other related issues e.g. 
energy and food security, infrastructural development etc. 
As stated in the communiqué by the Federal Ministry of Environment resulting from 
the Climate Change summit in Copenhagen 2009, the Nigerian Government 
expressed its commitment to tackling the challenges that climate change presents 
within its borders and act in partnership with regional and global institutions to 
achieve this.
134
 It is also evident that climate change is not only seen as a threat but 
as a unique opportunity to generate new stream of revenues and investment 
opportunities while building a more diverse and resilient economies using policy 
frameworks like the CDM which has potential to generate investments worth billions 
of US dollars yearly.
135
 
Nigeria remains highly dependent on fossil fuel as its source of revenue making it a 
nation with its development constrained by climate and environmental activities
136
. 
The oil dependent economy is set to be negatively impacted based on emissions 
reduction as other countries articulate their GHG reduction policies. Firstly, the 
country’s foreign earnings will be affected both in the immediate and long term due 
to climate change vulnerability cost.
137
 For instance due to coastal proximity, it is 
estimated with climate change there could be rise in sea level, with a rise of 0.5m to 
1.0m the estimated capital value at risk could be between US$ 8.05 billion and 
US$17.5 billion respectively.
138
 At the 5% projected population growth and 30 year 
development, the capital value at risk could be as much as US$43.13 billion.
139
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Secondly, considering the responses and measures by developed countries, the main 
stay of the Nigerian Economy which is the energy sector could also be vulnerable 
since Parties to the convention and the Protocol in their various countries would aim 
to meet their obligations by reducing the GHG emission with measures such carbon 
tax on the consumption of petroleum.
140
 By extension, this will impact the fossil fuel 
industry since an introduction or increase in carbon tax in an attempt to combat 
climate change will reduce the consumption of fuels thereby reducing the export of 
oil from the oil producing developing countries like Nigeria. However the 
implementation of CCS will mitigate the sentiments against traditional energy 
sources and production will consequently be affected. 
In summary, the following are the specific challenges facing Nigeria with regards to 
climate change 
 The high and still growing population is heavily dependent on climate 
sensitive activities such as agriculture as the rural source of income and the 
fossil fuel as its source of national revenue 
 Low literacy and awareness rate of the impact of climate change among 
citizens and the stakeholders. 
 Lack of infrastructural and institutional framework for research and data 
collection, and organisation and dissemination. 
 Inadequate human capacity development in all areas of climate change.  
Putting these factors into consideration, it is therefore of necessity that infrastructural 
development, capacity building and manpower development, development and 
transfer of technology, poverty reduction and other socio-economic policies are 
articulated within national regulatory framework and international cooperation to 
adapt to and mitigate climate change
141
 and sustain the economy that is currently 
very dependent on fossil fuel.
142
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1.9.3 Greenhouse gas Emissions Inventory in Nigeria 
Although currently the levels of emission is relatively low in Nigeria at about 0.21% 
of the world total CO2 emission
143
 (with about 0.6% CO2 emissions tonnes per 
capita)
144
 based on the low per capita energy use in the country, this is set to increase 
in the future due to high population growth rate, increased economic growth, 
increase in disposable income of the citizens and corresponding increase in the per 
capita energy and other resource consumption.
145
 However, Nigeria remains the 
second largest gas flaring country in the world only second to Russia
146
 with about 
110 billion cubic metres of associated gas (AG) flared or vented annually
147
 (about a 
third of Europe’s gas consumption) resulting in the release of about 400 million 
tonnes of CO2 into the air, this is roughly about 1.5% of the world’s CO2 emission 
index.
148
 Adequate and sustainable measures need to be put in place to reduce this 
potential GHG emission increase. 
Provisions within the UNFCCC framework (Article 4) recommends that Parties to 
the framework through the National Communication must report the national 
emissions level of the different greenhouse gases. These gaseous compounds include 
CO2, CH4, N2O, and precursor gases (like CO, NOx and Non-Methane Volatile 
Organic Compound (NMVOC). The 2008 World Bank report indicated that the total 
CO2 emission in Nigeria was 95756.37kt. Most of which were emitted from the 
burning of fossil fuel or fossil fuel related activities like gas flaring and 
manufacturing of Cement.
149
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Figure 8 Imagery satellite photos taken over a 14 year period by source below 
of Hot spots of Gas flaring in Niger Delta Area of Nigeria 
Source: The World Bank collaborated with the U.S. National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration to produce the eagle-eyed imagery. 
 
Figure 9 Gas Flaring sites in Niger Delta Area. Due to lack of fuel for 
cooking, many people in the Niger Delta resort to using the heat from 
pipeline gas flares for cooking. A child dried cassava over burning gas.  
Source The New York Times published 21
st
 April 2007 
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Chapter 2 
CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM AND CONTRACTUAL 
INTERPLAY 
2.0 CDM Contractual Background 
Fundamental to every project engagement is the need to clearly legalise (in 
contractual form) the relationship between the Parties in relation to their obligations, 
representations, warranties etc. in a legal document referred to as the Contract or 
Agreement. It is important for clarity of functions and resolution of any possible 
dispute that might arise in the pre, during and post project execution phases. One of 
the many possible sources of liability and litigation as per CO2 storage operation 
would be the breach of contractual agreement by either participating parties. The 
contract therefore should be detail and clear making unambiguous the obligations, 
responsibilities and any other issues that would be relevant in the smooth execution 
of such CDM project(s).  
In the case of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), project developers, investors 
and other third parties (such as suppliers, home and host countries) should be bound 
to contractual obligations to ensure the execution of the project and generate both 
Certified Emissions Reduction (CERs) credits for compliance purposes in the 
instance of Annex 1 country (or countries), and sustainable development for the Non 
Annex1 host country (countries). In itself, this could on one hand form a risk to the 
project (if the Contract is poorly and badly thought through or implemented) or a 
vital tool to resolve legal and operational issues if and when they arise in other words 
a good risk mitigation framework.  
Peradventure there are any disputes resulting with legal consequence about the 
objectives mentioned above as stipulated by Article 12 of the Protocol, a pre 
negotiated and agreed legal document acceded to by the different parties referred to 
as the “Contract” or “Agreement” can be referred to in the process of adjudication 
by jurisdiction of law in case litigation arises.  
Daskalopulu (1998) highlighted in a very general sense the framework that a well 
formed contract should have. Contracts according to him must be 1. Descriptive: 
providing provisions for definitions and guidance; 2. Prescriptive: specify the time 
frame and actions of parties; 3. Procedural: should elude the procedures and manner 
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by which these actions have to be conducted; 4. Algebraic: it must provide specific 
formulae or methodologies used to evaluate the various parameters of the contract – 
this is particularly in case of scientific or engineering oriented CDM projects; 5. 
Effective: it must specify the conditions by which other provisions interact and relate 
with the contract.
150
 
A major influence on CDM contracts is the provisions articulated in the Protocol. 
According to Streck 2007, the provisions of Article 12 though have been the sole 
source of knowledge and reference [vis-à-vis FM projects] on this matter, it has 
albeit, been silent with respect to the details and ways Annex 1 and Non Annex 1 
entities should contractually interact with regards the implementation of the FM and 
any resulting contractual liabilities.
151
 This makes available some level of flexibility 
in the Contractual definition and interpretation when formulating and utilising the 
Contract. 
2.1 Overview of Contract law and underlining Principles 
The Nigerian legal system is based on English common law modified by Nigerian 
rulings, the Constitution, and legislative enactments.
152
 English Law of contract often 
governs the operations of project development, whereas in places like Saudi Arabia 
the legal system is based on Shari’ah law which draws its source from the Koran, the 
Sunna, Ijma’a and Qiyas.153 According to Kornet (2010), the implementation of the 
law, its role and the function of contracts is society dependent vis-à-vis their culture, 
and legal heritage and traditions, and the politico-economic environment within 
which such operate.
154
 It is, therefore, important to take the interpretation of contract 
and understand its applicability within the context of the jurisdiction whose laws are 
applicable. 
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A contract is a promise or a set of promises that results in remedial processes or 
consequences by the law once there is a breach of it.
155
The enforceability of a 
contract is crucial to its credibility as a legal tool for ensuring the performance of an 
obligation. Superficially, this is straightforward but there are intrinsic issues that are 
associated with project development generally (more so CCS under a CDM 
framework) that could result in breach of the promise or contract. In most cases, 
these result in litigation and the involvement of an adjudicating body or bodies in 
seeking redress by the aggrieved parties. However, as a general rule, each participant 
duly fulfils his or her promise without the need for intervention or threat of 
intervention by the law. 
The contract is fundamentally a legally binding mechanism to synthesise varying 
(and possibly conflicting) interests of project participants in order to achieve the 
objectives and interests of all parties.
156
 It is important, therefore, that the three 
points listed below are carefully considered when drafting the contract for any 
project. 
Firstly, any tenable contract must clearly stipulate the value of exchange for the 
project.  This is crucial, not only for the parties to be able to allocate value to the 
resources used in the project and the output, but also to be able to measure the cost 
of project implementation against revenue in the eventuality of a liability suit.
157
 
Secondly, it is within the context of the contract that responsibilities and obligations 
are defined for the different participants to the project. The performance of the 
parties is weighed against these criteria at specific stages of the project life cycle. 
This assures that all contracting parties have confidence that returns will be realised 
from the project at a specific time a breach of this can be so adjudged by the 
arbitrator.
158
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Thirdly, contracts also aims to serve as a risk mitigation measure for the participants, 
allowing for preparation in the case of any eventuality. Risks such as natural 
disasters, force majeure or financial impropriety should be allocated between the 
parties and clearly stipulated in the contract.
159
 The extent to which eventualities are 
considered in a contract determine the robustness of the contract, and therefore the 
lower the chances of any parties to the contract resorting to litigation.
160
 It is, 
therefore, in the interest of all parties that in the negotiation of contracts, there are 
clear legal provisions on how disputes arising from such events are to be resolved.  
Despite an agreement between parties maybe undocumented, it does not always 
mean that it is unenforceable. Oral offering and acceptance is contractually binding 
and such contracts can be admissible in the English courts, and to the degree that is 
evidentially witnessed it is admissible in the Nigerian courts as it still holds the 
jurisdictional and legal allegiance to the English law.
161
One of such contractual 
acceptance was the case in Maggs v Marsh & another
162
 in which the Court of 
Appeal admitted evidence of the parties’ conduct arising from an oral contract. 
However, there are situations such as guarantees, share transfers and issues related to 
intellectual property where oral contracts are not admissible.
163
 Further, in oral 
contract or part-oral part- written contract, the court has the prerogative to decide 
what part of the agreement is a term or simply a representation, while in the context 
of a written contract the statements are considered a ‘term’ and the whole document 
is referred to as the contract. It is, therefore, preferable that all agreements are 
documented. 
 
Project participants need to understand crucial principles in relation to a project 
contract. The implication of these principles make unambiguous the level of 
importance project participants must give to a robust contractual framework before 
the commencement of the project. The sanctity of a contract, its freedom and 
protection of interests are crucial to all parties in the negotiation and drafting of 
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project contracts. Hence, they are discussed further in the following subsections of 
this chapter. 
2.1.1 Sanctity of Contract (pacta sunt servanda) 
This principle emphasises the duty of all participants and their obligation to perform 
roles and duties within the definitions and requirements of their agreement(s) and 
also gives the right for either party to demand the performance of duty and 
responsibility from the other party. It is the duty of the Court to act as protector of 
contracts by upholding the principle of “pacta sunt servanda” in case there is a 
breach or default. Liability falls on the party that fails to meet its contractual 
obligations, unless the non-performance is excused prior to the breach or default. 
2.1.2 Freedom of Contract 
The above principle stems from the freedom of contract principle which in itself is 
theoretically robust and socially idealistic but has its flaws in its application. 
Regardless, the flaws do not undermine the importance of this principle and its 
implications to project participants. As an ideal (legal concept) integrated into 
classical economic theory, it pursues a freedom in the need for parties to negotiate 
their terms into the contract they are going to be bound by (at the very least to 
maximise the returns on their investment). But if otherwise unsatisfied by the 
contractual definitions, obligations or risk allocation, they are not obliged to accede 
to the contract if it is not within the confines of their objectives or interests. 
 
The intricacies of processes and proceedings in the case of environmental issues 
related to CCS-CDM projects and their legal implication requires a multidisciplinary 
approach (i.e. the expertise of specialist lawyers, engineers, environmentalists and 
stakeholders) in the preparation of the contract for any such project. The complexity 
of this process has led to calls for standardisation of CDM project contracts, but as 
will be discussed later, this question is not as straightforward as it would seem. 
2.1.3 Contractual protection of the parties’ interests 
Contractual provision makes it possible for the aggrieved party (or parties) to have a 
protection of his or her or their interest(s) in the performance of the Contract in the 
event of a default. The legal principle is that the injured party must be put in the 
same position as it would have been if there was a completion and delivery of the 
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project. For example, should the contract be breached just before the commencement 
of the project, it is expected that the compensation will not only cover any work 
already done in preparation for the commencement of the project, but also the 
injured party’s loss of its expectation of performance. 
 
This principle provides for three basic tenets in the protection by contract against 
default by one of the parties. Firstly, there is expectation of the performance of the 
promises made by the contracting parties to each other and secondly, in the case of a 
breach, the restitution of interest. Finally, the principle makes possible not only the 
protection of interest against default but also equitability or parity of interest 
between the parties. 
2.2 Contract Design 
Under CDM, the Contract design could differ along the lines of many different 
factors of which the legal and operational relations of the entities involved are 
crucial. For instance, a model of contractual interaction could be based on private-
private entities, private-public entities or public-public entities.
164
 Any contractual 
model used for the implementation of CDM requires the formulation of the Contract 
by expert CDM lawyers (which are almost not available to the developing country 
CDM partners due to various reasons).
165
 These different models may require 
individual governmental or corporate entities to form cooperation of commercial, 
quasi-commercial and or intergovernmental agreement
166
 by legal entities in 
executing the project. 
As suggested by Michaelowa (2006) & Streck (2007), project developers mostly in 
developing countries do not have access to adequate and robust CDM legal 
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expertise.
167
 The lack of technical know-how to undertake the complexities and 
intricacies of CDM Project Contract development and interpretations
168
vis-à-vis its 
consistency and adherence to the UNFCCC and the Protocol
169
 and the host country 
jurisdiction’s environmental law requirements (if such laws are available or robust 
enough) prove to be disadvantageous not only to the outcome of the project but to 
the disproportionate distribution of projects among Non-Annex1 parties
170
 and more 
particularly the implementation of such a technical complex project like CCS. 
Suffice to say however the result of project implementation would be beneficial to 
the sector if capacity building and technical transfer is integral to the goals of such 
project execution and contractually defined.  
In general the reasons attributed to these concerns are firstly the cost of employing 
the services of such legal experts (which is often a case of it being unaffordable for 
small project developers); secondly, the lack of specialist [environmental and 
energy] lawyers in the area of CDM project legalities due to financial differential in 
investment for such lawyers;
171
 and thirdly, the lack of adequate and or poor 
enforcement of environmental regulations for most of the jurisdictions in which the 
CDM projects are to be implemented. These above reasons often result in parties 
employing the services of non-specialist lawyers to draft (and interpret) a very 
generic contractual agreement (or in some extreme cases buy an off-the-counter 
Contract to suffice for the project’s contractual needs).172 
The implications of these are far reaching for both parties in case of any legal actions 
or adjudication resulting from project execution disputes (in particular for the project 
developer(s) from developing countries who are usually more financially 
disadvantaged and possibly legally naïve to the intricacies of CDM legal 
framework). Also, the overall success of the project in terms of the legitimacy of the 
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generated credits ownership as discussed in Section 2.6 onward and finally, the 
likelihood of resolving or mitigating any dispute arising in the process which could 
have an overall impact on the goals of the Convention and the Protocol. 
2.3 CDM Contractual interplay with Kyoto legal framework 
Article 12: § 2 of the Protocol states: 
The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to assist Parties 
not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in 
contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention, and to assist Parties 
included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their quantified emission 
limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3
173
 
Under this sub Section of the provisions, there is a clear identification of two 
elements set as the goals of CDM namely: Sustainable development for Non Annex1 
countries (by this provision suggests that the project host country or its approved 
representative in executing the CDM project ensures that the SD is also an integral 
consequence of the project). Secondly, the achieving of compliance by CERs for 
Annex 1 Parties. The integration of these two goals
174
 in any contractual undertaken 
is imperative. It must however be stated that the design of this integration is outside 
the scope of this research therefore justifies future research work.  
This integration into any binding Contract(s) is to ensure that it is credible and 
acceptable to the supervisory and verifying (Executive Board (EB) and the 
‘operational entities’ designated (DOE) bodies approved by the COP to certify and 
issue CERs. It is within reason to imply that sequel to any likelihood that there could 
be a need for dispute resolution with regards issues pertaining to the framework of 
the project such as methodology and additionality, the EB as the supervisory body 
for the UN process has the jurisdiction over the interpretation and implementation of 
the COP/MOP Directives
175
 and any other legal contractual matters such as liability 
adjudication (see section 2.7 below for discussion on Contractual liability) can be 
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resolved within the jurisdiction for arbitration as specified and accepted by the 
Parties to the Contract.
176
 
Although presently, most CDM host countries’ domestic environmental law 
provisions and courts do not have legal regimes that deals robustly with intangibles 
like GHG CERs,
177
 as such there is a need to factor in the legal proficiency of the 
jurisdiction that would determine the contractual interpretation and dispute 
settlement for CDM projects based on the clarity and inference of different domestic 
legal systems.  
The robustness of Section 2 of Article 12 of the Protocol
178
 underscores the 
importance of not only the mitigation of [and adaptation to] climate change but also 
the importance of enshrining into Contract(s) and ensuring that developmental needs 
of developing and least developed countries - which have been agreed not to have 
historically contributed to the anthropogenic causes of climate change - are not 
compromised or impeded by any measure but as such that is within the context of 
sustainable development.  
2.4 Intergenerational Principle in Contractual Framework 
The review of eclectic literature during the writing of this chapter supporting the 
school of thought of intergenerational principle have suggested that CDM project 
Contract’s structure and composition must firstly, not deprive or undermine the 
needed socio-economic growth in the host countries but rather encourage and assist 
growth in such a manner that does not undermine the intergenerational principle
179
 
vis-à-vis climate change impacts in line with equity and justice
180
 for future 
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generation. That said, it is very relevant in terms of CCS and the long term impact 
and liability consequences on future generations.  
This presumption underpins the principle behind John Rawls’ theory of Justice 
which argues that social primary goods such as the atmosphere or broadly speaking 
the environment should be equitably distributed unless inequality would be in the 
best interest of the worst off.
181
 In this case, the future generation and to a large 
extent the least developed countries
182
 of the current generation. This could be 
argued as rational and generally accepted to depict the conscience of the ethos of 
rational legal approach to achieving sustainability in the face of relentless 
exploitation of global natural resource. The implementation of CCS in these 
countries could also be further argued to be the exploitation of their natural resource 
in the event of any catastrophic event resulting from storage of CO2 in geological 
formations in these developing states. To suggest however this is contractually in 
compatible is however not true as the contracts (especially the non-off-the-shelf 
ones) can be drawn to address sustainability and futuristic legal fears of CCS-CDM 
projects. 
Secondly, that the attainment of sustainable development is integral (in no wise 
mutually exclusive) to any acceptable climate change mitigation and compliance 
strategy. CDM projects must be proposed and executed with an overriding adherence 
to the ethos of sustainable development of Non Annex1 [host] countries. The 
inclusion of this framework in the Contract of any CDM project is important and 
must be accounted for in the verification and auditing of the CDM process as this is 
crucial not only for arbitration process (if the need arises) but also for the overall 
credibility of the CER credits generated for the Annex1parties.  
A similar argument in line with Rawls, Barry 1989 accentuated the need for 
sustainability in development. However, by his argument suggested the need to find 
equilibrium in the claims of the different generations as it would be unreasonable for 
existing generation to impoverish the future generation
183
 neither would it be 
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 Although J. Rawls did not associate in any direct form the idea of primary goods in the 
theory of justice with a future generation he however emphasized the need to ensure that the 
environment is not damaged at the expense of the successive generation’s wellbeing. 
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 Barry, B.,  (1989) “ The Ethics of Resource Depletion”, in Brian Barry Democracy, Power 
and Justice (Oxford, Clarendon), pp. 511-28 
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sensible to use this argument to justify inaction on issue as pertinent as climate 
change. This opinion is common to other policy and economic theorists who support 
the concept of intergenerational equity and international justice
184
 as crucial for the 
future of available resources and stable environment to exploit and utilise the 
resource for the progress of all concerned. 
It is in the interest of all Parties concerned and in particular the developing countries 
(and indeed the future generation as inferred from the argument above) that the 
sustainability criteria as defined by the Protocol is not only implied but explicitly 
articulated in any contractual document and other agreements associated with CDM 
projects as this remains the essence of such project’s benefit to developing countries 
and the future generation.  
The possibility of complacency by ignoring the inclusion of the core objectives of 
the Protocol purely based on the financial and economic returns indicators is 
tempting but grossly unsustainable. The dash for quick financial returns and the 
avoidance of legal intricacies and complexities in the Contract is counter-productive 
and could result in project risks and litigations both in the short and long term. Since 
it is expected that contractual obligations to sustainable development and compliance 
can be met within the framework’s legal scope, it is crucial therefore that the 
framework which presupposes and takes into cognisance sustainable development 
along with technological assistance, investment and income inter alia must be an 
integral part of any properly defined CCS- CDM Contract vis-à-vis the definition, 
allocation, representation and any dispute settlement procedure if the need arises
185
 
to achieve an intergenerational integrity of the project. 
2.5 CDM Parties and Interests under a Contractual Framework 
As stated above there are various players in any effective execution of CDM project, 
their impact is intergenerational likewise their interest (both on the short and 
medium term) it is vital to developing a balanced and robust binding Contract to 
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meet these interests. CCS-CDM Contract must suffice therefore as the legal platform 
to express the interests, relationship of the interaction, consequences and dispute 
settlement measures or procedure for the project. This section of this chapter is 
aimed at discussion the implications of the different parties and their interests in a 
possible CCS-CDM contract.  
CCS-CDM Contractual frameworks like any other are dependent on intricate and 
interrelated factors as highlighted by Daskalopulu (1998) and Worika et al (1999). 
The consideration of any CDM Contract must involve an assessment of converging 
as well as conflicting interests of the various actors along with the legal intricacies of 
the Convention, jurisdictions for arbitration, scope of obligations by parties for 
project implementation, any concerns of the parties and indeed the structure and 
legal parties or entities involved.
186
 
The model of CDM project interaction mentioned above as stipulated in Article 12 § 
9 of the Kyoto Protocol
187
 identifies the participation of two generic legal entities 
(private
188
 and governmental entities) that needs to be considered in the development 
of the Contract for purposes of CCS-CDM projects. In this section, there will be a 
brief identification of how these interests could be reflective of the Protocol’s goals 
based on the different participants’ affiliation and obligations. 
The public or governmental entities front in CDM projects as host country (Non 
Annex1) or as Home Country (Annex 1) of the private entity. Their interest in CDM 
is aligned within the two overriding expectations of Article 12 of the Protocol. For 
the host countries (and environmental civil societies) it has an overriding interest in 
the sustainability impact of the project along with the added benefits of technological 
transfer, capacity building and the influx of foreign direct investment that 
accompany the projects.
189
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The issue of carbon credits is not of foremost interest to host as they do not have a 
binding obligation to the Protocol
190
 in terms of Quantified Emission Limitation and 
Reduction (QUELR) hence they have little impetus to include this in there priority of 
project benefits. Also due to the uncertainty surrounding the degree of involvement 
of developing countries in any post Kyoto framework, it is not obviously of primary 
interest for CDM host countries to negotiate for a share in the emissions reductions 
credit unless however, as suggested by (Worika, 1999) there are credit sharing 
Contract negotiated models or frameworks which could be employed for credit 
sharing if the need arises in which the benefit would be considerable and relevant for 
the host country in a post Kyoto framework. An example of this is the multilateral 
model in which the multilateral investment entities e.g. international development 
banks or UN agencies or World Bank could negotiate directly with the host country 
on how the carbon credit derived from the project will be shared
191
 and this would be 
integrated into the Contract.  
With home countries who have agreed to a binding commitment under the Kyoto 
provision (i.e. Annex 1Parties), it is primarily of interest for them to ensure that the 
objective of achieving compliance with their QUELR commitment is articulated in 
the Contract defining and making obvious any needed legal clarity, intricacies and 
implications. Whilst in the case of the private entities which include the investors, 
and project developer (and in some cases the Designated Operation Entities (DOE)) 
the interests are the financial returns of the investment and the work done. In 
addition to the DOE’s financial returns, they are appointed to represent the interest 
of the UNFCCC/KP (COP/MOP and the EB) in ensuring that the goals of Article 12 
§ 2 and 5b/5c
192
 are achieved consequent to every CDM project before the CERs is 
issued.
193
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Sustainable Development and quality of the carbon credit stands as the core of the 
UNFCCC interest and these must be represented in the conduct of the DOEs. 
However on the contrary, the investor and project developer would justify their 
contractual obligation and legitimacy based on the quantity of emissions credits 
generated and at what cost.  
It is important that all these complexities of interests are duly reflected in the 
composition of the Contract. By this, there is the notion (among other factors) that 
standardising any CDM Contract would be difficult as suggested by Worika (1999). 
As recognised, the entry into force of the Protocol in February 2005 and the 
implementation of various emissions trading schemes has pluralised the amount of 
private entity participation along with the varying interests represented. Suffice to 
say however is that, this plurality consequent to de-regularisation of the market has 
also resulted in the complexities that need to be considered along other legal issues 
such as liability when designing any Contract document.
194
 The details and scope of 
the contractual sophistication is out of the scope of this research work, however the 
rest of the chapter will concentrate to a greater extent on generic legal issues that 
may arise within the framework of CCS-CDM contractual terms and condition, 
contractual ownership rights, contractual liability, consequence of contract 
standardisation and regulatory risk mitigation with CDM project Contracts.  While 
under the risk management chapter the possible risk management mechanisms will 
be a follow up on the contractual issues discussed. 
2.6 Legal Ownership Rights (CERs) from CCS-CDM projects 
The legitimate ownership of “the rights” (i.e. CERs) which are the products of CDM 
GHG abatement projects is crucial and needs to be defined in terms of the 
contractual legal ownership for it to be considered a legal [compliance] tender usable 
for the mitigation of GHG within the framework of the Protocol in the carbon 
market.  
The participants’ eligibility to lay claim to the rights and its benefits must be their 
eligibility to the legal title of the rights otherwise there is a flaw in the contractual 
framework (unless otherwise stated in the Contract). It is possible that such 
contractual flaws could result in disputes over the real ownership rights of the CERs 
and consequently the legitimacy of its trade in the emissions trading market. 
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Although the rights could be defined as a natural resource;
195
 however none of the 
legal frameworks available gives a clear guidance as to the legal interpretation to the 
issue of project credits ownership. Due to inexplicit provision of relevant 
international legal frameworks it is important to refer to national laws of the host 
country as to the definition, interpretation and classification of such intangible 
resource which could also be referred to as a natural resource.  
According to Wilder et al 2005, it could be argued that reduction of GHG is in 
effect, the management of natural resource.
196
 The ownership of natural resource 
varies with different countries
197
 based on the national and domestic interpretation of 
the law. Whilst in the case of CERs it should not be taken as a foregone conclusion 
that the project developer who is often a private entity commissioned to execute the 
project that generates the carbon credits is unquestionably the legal owner of the 
CERs generated, it is therefore important that a full comprehension of the national 
laws relating to the ownership of intangibles like CERs within the context of the 
provisions of the Protocol (or any related international legal framework) vis-à-vis 
private rights or sovereign rights should be clearly specified in the Contract
198
 and 
properly enshrined in the contractual provision for the CDM project.  
It is vital that any robust legal Contracts for CCS-CDM projects should adequately 
provide for the apprehensions or concerns of the ultimate owner[s] of legal titles 
about the delivery of rights and titles. In other words, warranty for the legal 
ownership of the credits must be included in the Contract to the effect that suitable 
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remedies are articulated if the seller or provider of the credits cannot deliver the 
rights and legal titles due to any impediments. Any matter of disputes over issues 
such as the rights and titles, the ownership structure, the legitimacy of entitlements 
etc. in CDM between the different legal entities must be catered for in the Contract 
and adequately anticipated to avoid possible future litigation especially on the matter 
of derivatives like CERs.  
2.7 Contractual Liability within a CCS–CDM Framework 
A potential source of contractual challenge is in the area of liability for the CO2 
storage during operation vis-à-vis the breach of the contract by either Party to the 
Contract or against a third party. My interest in this section will be the liability 
resulting from the breach of the contractual agreement during the operational phase. 
For this purpose, I am using the Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) 
contract to illustrate contractual liability that could occur between the contracting 
parties and third party.
199
 
Liability associated with CCS is often discussed mostly within the context of leakage 
and long term liabilities as it relates to leakage of stored GHG. This remains a very 
important issue that requires more research work. However, my focus in this section 
is to consider issues related to the legal issues that could potential affect construction 
and procurement for the facility. The use of contract in this respect is crucial to the 
success or failure of the whole climate change objective. 
This section looks into some common contractual clauses and principles in order to 
clarify the framework of the typical CCS-CDM EPC contract and how it impacts on 
liability of parties 
2.7.1 EPC contracts – characteristics and typical clauses 
2.7.1.1 Singleness of responsibility 
The EPC contract is structured to give cradle-to-grave responsibility for the project 
implementation to one party. The liability lies with this party in case of any problems 
consequent to their actions in the project, except in exceptional cases such as force 
majeure. 
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The EPC contract must state this in detail and with clarity identifying the entities that 
are liable and the extent of liabilities. 
2.7.1.2 Completion date specificity 
A completion date or period must be specified in the contract, taking into account the 
length of the project in relation to the date of contract commencement.
200
 It must also 
be stated in the Contract that parties are liable for liquidated damages if there is 
delay in complying with the contractual obligations by the agreed date.
201
 Thus, the 
law of liquidated damage applies if the contract is not fulfilled within the specific 
timeframe. However, some defences such as force majeure may be acceptable in the 
event of non-compliance by one of the parties with its obligation by a set deadline. 
2.7.1.3 Predetermined Contract price 
The cost of the project must be accepted by the parties under the contract to avoid 
the risk of cost overrun. It is often in the interest of both parties to maintain this 
contractual obligation. It acts as an impetus for the contractor to efficiently use its 
resources, since the SPV is not contractually obligated to deliver the payment 
beyond the predetermined amount. If construction is completed under budget, the 
profits accrue solely to the contractor. However, the quality of the delivered project 
cannot afford to be jeopardised by cost-cutting due to the desire to work within 
budget or make savings. Costing should therefore be meticulously negotiated by 
both parties to avoid any negative impact on the project. There is also provision for a 
Variation clause (discussed in section 2.7.1.6), which covers alterations to the plan. 
2.7.1.4 Guarantees 
The parties will need to provide guarantor(s) under the EPC Contract for the 
performance and completion of the project. In instances where there is a consortium 
of contractors, it is vital that a ‘wrap-around’ guarantee is provided for all the 
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different entities involved in the project. This fulfils the need of singleness of 
responsibility (discussed above section 2.7.1.1) as the SPV enters into the 
contractual obligation with only one legal entity that guarantees the performance and 
delivery of the project and allows for the management of the different contractors in 
a seamless manner. Also, a well drafted ‘wrap-around’ guarantee into a contract 
prevents contractors from employing the tactic known as ‘Horizontal Defence’, in 
which contractors take advantage of contractual flaws to rely on defaults from other 
contractors or third parties to circumvent their own obligations. 
Performance guarantees clearly articulated in the EPC contract in the form of 
performance specification include guaranteed production capacity, quality and 
efficiency. Contracts should stipulate that Performance Liquidated Damages (PLD) 
is paid by a contractor who fails to meet the performance level. Correctly calculating 
the appropriate amount of PLD is important as it is usually expressed as a net present 
value (NPV) of the revenue over the project life. 
2.7.1.5 Security 
It is normal for the service provider under the EPC contract to provide the SPV with 
some form of security in case there is a breach in delivery of obligations. This 
security or surety could take the form of a bond, an agreed advance payment or a 
bank guarantee. The percentage of indemnity relative to the contract price can vary 
from contract to contract.  
2.7.1.6 Variations clause 
This clause allows the SPV to instruct the contractor to make variations to the 
project either in whole or in part.
202
 The contractor or service provider may also be 
able to propose variations should the project run into difficulty. The clause would 
normally include a mechanism for evaluating the financial impact of the variation 
and any possible changes in the completion date. This clause underpins the principle 
of freedom of contract discussed in Section 2.1.2. Although the freedom in the 
contracts allows for a variation of contract, it is important that the parties do not 
abuse this clause in such a way that it would be misconstrued as a breach of contract. 
If the clause is not drafted clearly, legal arguments could arise as to whether a 
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variation should be considered enough of a deviation from the originally planned 
work. 
2.7.1.7 Liabilities 
Consequent to a breach in contract, the aggrieved party is entitled to compensation. 
Consequential damages, for example for loss of profit, may also be awarded. It is 
important that these are reasonably considered by both parties and appropriate 
remedies included in the Contract before it becomes binding. The level of liability 
should be comprehensively considered and capped at a percentage of the Contract 
price.  
In the case of defect liability, it is the responsibility of the service provider or 
contractor to make repairs and this is extended to a period following the completion 
of the Contract as agreed by both parties. Stratification of the clause is possible; in 
other words, for an initial timeframe the whole project could be under full warranty, 
and following that only a partial warranty according to issues that are critical to the 
functioning of the project. This clause should not be considered as exclusion or 
exemption clause as a defect could be treated as a breach in contract. Defect liability 
clauses come in many different forms and it is not unknown for a ‘no fault’ liability 
approach to be adopted at least in relation to the requirement to carry out remedial 
work.
203
 
2.8 Standardisation of CDM Contracts 
It is expected that – given the complexity of the issues discussed regarding CDM 
contracts – calls have been made for greater uniformity in the contracts to abate 
contractual risk issues and reduce the amount of work and cost involved in drafting 
individual contracts. Unfortunately this remains a cumbersome task due to various 
reasons, some obvious such as the peculiarities of individual and scope of projects 
while not too obvious concerns include issues of project technicalities and 
jurisdictional difference is legal interpretation. Different questions asked and 
answered need to articulate these peculiarities for uniformity and standardisation to 
occur.  
These questions include firstly, what is the likelihood that any standardisation would 
be achieved based on the variations that exist in the operational culture and 
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commercial situation of CDM based projects? Secondly, on what bases would this 
standardisation be based since every CDM project is unique in character and 
methodology and as for CCS as an evolving technology or concept? Also would the 
argument that Contract standardisations undermine flexibility and dynamism in 
reaching the objectives laid out in the Contract be tenable?  
These concerns are fundamental to determining the strengths of arguments for or 
against standardisation. However, the rest of this chapter would make lucid the 
fundamentals every CCS-CDM Contract must contain than delve into the analysis of 
“for or against” debates. In addition, it is crucial, given the uniqueness of CDM vis-
à-vis the participants and mitigating the risk impact on the overall project such as 
CCS, that every individual contract should be designed to lend credence to the 
workability and execution of the project and to bring about the actualisation of the 
objectives set out in the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol.  
2.9 Summary 
The effectiveness of a contract is not based on the standardisation but rather on the 
proactive design and approach in tackling any possible emergence of risk 
This chapter intended to make clear the importance of using CDM contracts not only 
as the means to achieving the overall goals of the climate change mitigation and 
adaptation strategy but also as a legal tool to abate inherent risks that are in project 
based mitigation strategies of the Protocol. It is important that all CDM project 
contracts meet or are in conformity with the Convention’s framework and goals. 
However, risk arising from project implementation could well be mitigate if there is 
thoroughness in the preparation of the Contracts. 
2.10 CDM Contract Framework 
Since the issues that arise in the execution of CDM projects are diverse and complex 
in dynamism and remedies, the arguments to standardise the CDM Contracts have 
always been contentious just as the question of standardisation has elicited much 
controversy in Contract law. There is currently no standard CDM Contract, as noted 
by Lecocq (2007), although most contracts are designed with the interest of forward 
purchases
204
 of CERs in mind even further complicated by the inherent risks CDM 
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projects (see Chapter 4 for details on these risks) may carry, resulting in increase in 
Contract diversity – mixed contracts combining drivers such as equity or debt with 
technology transfer and carbon pricing etc.
205
 
The arguments for and against the standardisation of CDM Contracts may be 
copious but a fundamental uniformity and consensus is that, the volatility of CDM 
project dynamics, its complexities due to the various risk factors, and the possibility 
of aligning all these different factors under a homogeneous consensus has proved 
(and would remain) to be a crucial divergent point for all interested parties. 
However, the variance should not overshadow the fundamental commonalities that 
should exist in all CDM Contracts. It is pertinent that CDM Contracts must 
underscore the following,  
 The internationalism of the framework, in other words, the varying legal 
jurisdiction of participation must be entrenched in the design and wording of 
the Contract making a clear and unequivocal reference to the legal interests of 
all parties concerned,  
 The fundamental elements of KP Article 12 must be articulated in the legal 
design and expected results of the project. Clearly stating this in the Contract 
providing for every participant the obligation and responsibility to attain the 
goals of the Kyoto Framework.
206
 
 The Contract must be design based on an agreed legal structure by all 
participating parties reflecting Condition Precedents, Obligations, Warranties, 
Undertakings, terms of Termination, Disputes and Arbitration etc. Table 2 
gives a synopsis of these different constituent of a draft contract. According to 
Worika et al. 1999, CDM contractual design should represent the legal 
structure [and interests] of the parties i.e. based on commercial, quasi-
commercial or intergovernmental agreement. Also the jurisdiction for 
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arbitration should be selected and agreed to within the context of robust access 
to adequate and substantive legal provisions and representations for all parties 
concerned. 
 Finally, it is important to visualize within the context of the Contract a time 
frame that allows for continuity in the delivery of obligation.  
 
It must be pointed out however that standardisation is an instrument for short-term, 
immediate consumable transaction rather than long-term contractual undertaking but 
it is pertinent to infer also that there is a growing trend in standardising long-term 
agreements, for example, the convergence of standardization in Contracting 
approaches, such as the World Bank’s own General Conditions for ERPAs, allowing 
reduced transaction costs and increased transparency
207
 and other standard Contracts 
from organisations like International Chamber of Commerce (ICC International Sale 
Contract), United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) and 
Association for International Petroleum Negotiators (AIPN) Contract model 
considered as the gold standard Contract for international petroleum Contracts.
208
 
2.11 Possible Legal Issues in CDM Project Contracts 
The legal issues that influence the composition of a CDM legal Contract are broad 
and far reaching due to the dynamics and uniqueness of every individual project, 
however strong the urge to have and use a generic Contract for CCS-CDM projects 
and ER transactions, it is important to provide answers to legal issues highlighted in 
the Table 2 below with the goal of (as much as possible) avoiding operational and 
legal risk consequent to the process of executing the contractual obligations of the 
project. Even more vital is appropriating the peculiarities of each project type, the 
generated ER credits to be transacted; the level of participation of the parties and risk 
allocation, and the design a comprehensive matrix of risk distribution for the project 
to encapsulate every eventuality within the project life cycle.  
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Content of T&C Explanation of Articles Legal Issues 
Definitions and 
Interpretation 
This Article explains by 
definition and 
interpretation of the 
terms specified in the 
Agreement. 
 The definition of the 
ownership of project 
and other terms and  
elements in the 
Agreement 
Condition Precedent  Under this Article, the 
clauses specify all the 
conditions that need to 
be met by the 
participants (buyers and 
sellers) before the 
Agreement can fully 
come to effect. 
 Should CDM projects 
carried out before the 
implementation of the 
EU linking directive 
be under a special 
Contractual expression 
or Agreement separate 
to the post directive? 
 How should the legal 
consequences be 
balanced between the 
buyer and the seller in 
the development of the 
conditions?  
 How are would the 
uncertainties and 
Risks associated with 
post Kyoto be resolved 
with the contractual 
framework? 
Commercial Terms of 
Agreement 
Under this article the 
commercial terms of the 
Agreement is defined in 
relations to the pricing 
of the CER vis-à-vis the 
Volume CER to be 
delivered and the 
payments and other 
financial implications of 
the Agreement e.g. 
Taxes and fees 
 How are the liabilities 
defined with respect to 
the buyer or seller? 
 Should the method of 
purchasing or selling 
the CERs be specified 
under the Contract 
 Who takes 
responsibility for the 
taxes and fees on 
issued CERs? 
 Will these terms of 
Agreement suffice for 
the CERs generated 
post first commitment 
period (2012 -??)?  
 The definition of 
“delivery” in relation 
to compliance with the 
Trading Emission 
Scheme vis-à-vis date 
of delivery, mode of 
Table 2 Constituent parts of a Contract, Explanation and possible legal issues. 
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delivery place of 
delivery inter alia. 
Obligations of 
Participants 
This Article and it 
clauses specifies the 
different responsibilities 
and obligations of the 
buyer(s) and or seller(s) 
vis-à-vis the project 
description and 
Agreement prior to the 
commencement of the 
project. 
 The compliance in 
relations to the 
Penalties and fines 
associated with 
defaults 
 The interplay of roles 
and responsibilities 
among project 
participants 
 Possible imposition of 
own requirements for 
the project by investor 
(buyer). 
Representation 
Warranties and 
Undertakings 
  To what extent will a 
third party (if any) be 
involved in the 
validation, and 
representation of any 
undertakings? 
 Are Warranties needed 
for CDM project? 
Termination  Default issues resulting 
to Contract termination 
are highlighted under 
this Article resulting 
from the activities of 
both the buyer and or 
the seller. However in 
the circumstance of 
Force Majeure, the 
Agreement clearly 
should specify the 
settlement process.  
 What are the general 
and specific 
circumstances for the 
termination of the 
Agreement and how 
will the legal 
consequences be 
defined?  
 Terms of termination 
of Agreement require 
clarity in the Contract. 
Disputes and Arbitration   Arbitration of 
Disputes and how the 
remedies are split in 
the event of default(s)  
 Process (definition of 
the rules) of 
Arbitration and 
dispute settlements 
 The application of the 
Force Majeur clause 
 Jurisdiction of the 
court dispute 
settlement 
 Exclusion clauses 
 How are the issue of 
remedies defined and 
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“interpreted” in all 
possible cases of 
default in the 
Agreement by 
participants i.e. from 
intentional breach to 
regular event of 
defaults? 
Miscellaneous    To what extent should 
an intermediary 
(Escrow) agent be 
involved in the 
transactions process? 
 Any other legal issues 
that may arise in the 
process of executing 
the project. 
 The issue of 
confidentiality and 
permitted disclosure 
 The need to 
unambiguously 
indicate the 
component of 
sustainable 
development in the 
Agreement. 
 
Overall, the question of standardisation might be pertinent, it is however more 
important that in the scheme of things (especially the uniqueness of CCS-CDM vis-
à-vis the participants and mitigating the risk impact on the overall project) every 
individual Contract should be designed to lend credence to the workability and 
execution of the project vis-à-vis its definition, obligations, warranties, dispute 
resolution and remedies inter alias and to bring about the actualisation of the 
objectives set out in the Convention, the Protocol and any post Kyoto binding 
mitigation and adaptation measures to be agreed.  
2.12 Compliance and Non-Compliance Rights: Contractually 
Interplay 
As accentuated in sections above, contractual agreements is fundamental not only to 
legal operational framework for the working parties of CDM project but it is also 
intricately necessary within the contractual context of the compliance and or non-
compliance regimes of the rights generated in CDM project and in which these rights 
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are traded, the ER credits transferability, its fungibility and their contractual link to 
the legislative frameworks of the jurisdiction it will finally be utilised in.
209
 The 
legitimacy of the rights is a function of the international or domestic legal framework 
to which these contractual rights are based and comply to. It is in context to infer 
therefore that non-compliant emission reduction programmes generating “Verified 
Emissions Reductions” (VERs) - from companies like ClimateCare, Future Forests 
etc. - do not have compliance legitimacy with the framework of the Protocol but 
could however suffice for public relations purposes.
210
 The validity, ownership, 
transferability
211
 and other legal intricacies of these rights are also crucial within the 
scope of climate change mitigation regardless of the originating regime as long as 
the credibility of the process is ascertained and comply with the goal of the 
Convention.  
The Emissions Reduction (ER) rights generated in a non-compliant regime (i.e. 
VERs) can be used as “offsets” to mitigate, abate or sequester greenhouse gases only 
under a non-compliant regime. The use of these offset credits in Kyoto compliant 
regimes is currently not the case due to huge repercussions for the interchangeability 
and values of the credits.
212
 It is apt to submit at this juncture that in the eventuality 
that a resolve on ER credits interchangeability and transferability issues between 
both regimes, a robust and well structured contractual agreement on rights transfer 
within the different available regimes and the bundling of products with offsets
213
 
should be linked into the contractual terms for exigencies that might arises – e.g. 
need for dispute resolution and any other risk mitigation. As suggested by Wilder et 
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al 2005, the ‘mere’ contractual nature of rights and their absence of regulatory 
recognition (in the case of non-compliant VERs) are contractual necessities for legal 
title of the credits, its validity and value in the market place.
214
 However, the 
comparison and interchangeability of rights vis-à-vis Kyoto compliant and the non-
compliant credits is in interaction with fundamental impact on the reduction or 
removal of GHG in a manner that is legally sound and contractually unflawed within 
both regimes. 
2.13 Contract as a Risk Mitigation Mechanism 
As identified in chapter 4, CDM projects (like every other project) have inherent in 
them some degree of risk. Managing, minimising or complete avoidance of these 
risks is crucial for the successful and profitable completion of the project. Robust 
contractual arrangements should be an integral part of risk management strategy for 
CDM projects. This section will discuss the contractual risk mitigation strategies.  
Different uncertainties and risk elements surrounding not only the future of the 
Flexible Mechanisms of the Protocol but also current implementation of projects 
accentuates the risk contours associated with emission reductions regimes. These 
necessitate the need to contractually hedge in or indemnify these risks using clauses 
in the contract (UNDP 2003 & Wilder et al 2005), negotiating and allocating the 
risks properly in the early stages of the project is also essential.
215
 For example, in a 
scenario where the Contract extends beyond the seven year baseline, it is sensible 
and expedient to provide contractual clause (or clauses) within the contract as 
dictated by the Marrakech Accord provisions to remedy or avoid consequences of 
associated risk and penalties.  
CDM projects encounter risks that are common to those that exist in other projects. 
The risks could be based on externalities e.g. as created by other dynamics (like 
market dictates) and in some cases force majeure event (beyond the dictate of human 
influence or control),
216
 or internal factors such as poor management strategies
217
 and 
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internal efficiency problems which in either cases could result in cost overrun of the 
project or delayed or aborted delivery of the ER credits resulting in possible 
litigation.  
In a case of ER transactional risks, such risk could include factors such as the 
discrepancies over the legal title of the ER, the uncertainties surrounding the future 
of CDM under any post Kyoto regime, the risk of verifiable additionality of the 
process etc. All these risk issues can and should be dealt with under the appropriate 
provisions in the Contract. Risk allocation should be discussed and negotiated, and 
must be contractually defined. As suggested by Wilder et al 2005, this allocation 
must be based on which party has control over the occurrence of the particular risk 
and in the case of a force Majeure or politically initiated risk? Such a risk can be 
mitigated by other means e.g. the price paid for the ER credits or by making room 
for termination of the contract in the event of such force or allow for the acquisition 
of verified contractual ER credits in the place of certified emissions reductions 
credits.
218
 The risk of contractual breach results in liability. The following 
Section2.14 will discuss the issue of liability in CCS CDM framework within the 
context of tort, the statutes and the cause of action for such liability under Nigeria’s 
legal regime. 
2.14 Liability 
A party’s legal responsibility to another or the society that is enforceable by civil 
remedy and criminal penalty or punishment is referred to as liability.
219
 This is 
broadly classified into two types of liability namely, contractual breach or tortuous 
liability. The former has been discussed above in relation to Contracts. However 
tortuous liability often arises from breach of duty that is defined by law and owed to 
persons or parties in general.
220
 
This final section will expatiate on liability consequent to tortuous breach of duty 
and it will further discuss the different available mechanisms used to mitigate the 
above liability types within the context of CO2 storage liabilities.  
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2.14.1 Tortuous Liability 
One of the pitfalls of CCS is that it could result in tort based litigations consequent to 
the liabilities arising. Generally, such claims could be issues resulting from trespass, 
negligence, nuisance and strict liability in other words the causes of action are also 
respectively. Any of such cases, the claimant brings a civil or criminal suit for 
damages against the defendant based on perceived breach of duty owed to the 
claimant. The pertinent issue when it comes to CCS and its long term uncertainties 
however revolves around the time lapse for litigation to be brought due to legal 
clauses of Statute of Repose (SoR) and or Statute of Limitation (SoL). These statutes 
will be examined in context. 
2.14.2 Statutes of Repose and Limitation (SoRL) 
The similarity between these two statutes is based on the fact that it is time 
prescriptive in other words it prescribes the time lapse for which a cause of action 
can be brought. However, the SoR may impose a stricter timeframe than the SoL. A 
further difference is that the former “is designed to bar actions after a specified 
period of time has run from the occurrence of some event other than the injury which 
gave rise to the claim.”221 
In Nigeria, the SoL clauses are designed to bar a case or lawsuit from being brought 
after a designated period. Most relevant is the oil and gas companies (analogous 
industry to CCS operation) which use this legislation frequently to reduce litigation 
way back. The most important of such statutes is the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) Acts 1997 which prohibits the prosecution of NNPC, its Board 
members or any employee. It states, “No lawsuit against the NNPC, Member of its 
Board or any employee shall be instituted in any court unless it is commenced within 
twelve months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or, in the case of a 
continuance of damage or injury, within twelve months next after the ceasing 
thereof.”222 This statute was brought to bear in the case Eboigbe v. NNPC223 where 
the claimant lost the case on the grounds that the case was inconsistent with the 
timeframe of twelve months provided by the law. However, lawsuits against other 
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oil companies have a statute of limitation limiting the period of lawsuit to six years 
from the date on which the cause of grievance accrues.
224
 
The SoL is set to serve justice in that it protects the defendants from backdated 
claims and impose some level of finality on the compensation claims
225
 which 
invariably is set to justify the bases for fairness for the defendant. Another possible 
justification for the SoL is that the defendant may find it difficult and out of reach to 
provide evidence with regard the time the plaintiff makes reference to and 
articulating evidence based on current technology in the case of environmentally 
related injuries might not be deemed fair.
226
 However, the justices could impede 
against the plaintiff since there are usually difficulties in obtaining access to the 
court and latency period or the literacy level of the plaintiff.
227
 Furthermore, 
Nigeria’s SoRL do not take into account of the delay between economic activities 
and their long term effects.
228
 
The SoRL serves legislative determination that does not uphold for all injuries or 
claims to be compensated, for instance a judgment could be reached temporally to 
deny or bar the plaintiffs’ claims based on the overarching negative impact that 
prevail over the interest of continuing the cause of action.
229
 
The argument that resulting injuries from environmental activities often have long 
latency period
230
 makes the argument against SoRL very potent especially as 
expressed by relevant Nigerian Environmental laws. Since environmental claims and 
injuries are dependent on evolving scientific knowledge, the cause of the injury 
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might come to bear only after the designated period to bring a case has expired.
231
 
Therefore to assume a single approach of time limitation on bringing a cause of 
action is not deemed adequate for provide in fair justice to both the defendant vis-à-
vis his or her activities or for the plaintiff(s) compensation for injuries
232
. 
Finally, it could be argued that application of SoRL to CCS is less persuasive when 
compared with other areas with historic evidence. The impact of injury could in the 
case of CO2 storage for example, be the third party who has no direct involvement in 
the CO2 storage transaction or activities hence the risk associated might not be 
assumed by the injured parties. It is therefore in order to consider temporal 
limitations on the claimant(s) cause of action for injuries resulting from externalities 
and or imperfect consent which is the case in CO2 Storage.
233
 
2.14.3 Cause of Action in Tortuous Liability 
As stated above, there are critically four issues to be considered as possible causes 
for action as tort cases in relation environmental activities. Within the scope of CO2 
storage it behoves on the operators and or project developers to ensure safety for the 
operation. In this case, the potential to bring to bear the subject for strict liability as a 
cause of action is in making a case for absolute duty to ensure that operation is as 
safe as possible.
234
 A case for strict liability does not necessarily depend on the 
amount of care taken by the defendant but the weight of evidence of abnormally 
dangerous activity or activities is engaged in by the defendant creating the potential 
for significant risk even if reasonable care is in place.
235
 The application of this 
doctrine suggests that in any such case related to CCS, if any of the activities is 
proven to be abnormally dangerous, the plaintiff or claimant need prove the causal 
connection between the activity and the injury which could prove to be problematic 
in most cases.
236
 For instance, if leakage of the stored GHG is deemed abnormally 
dangerous the causal link of this to the injury is enough to fulfil the test of strict 
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liability and the operator liable for harm. The fairness and efficiency of this cause of 
action is however censured for its in adequacy when discounting the contributory 
responsibility of the victim or plaintiff.
237
 
The second cause of action is the doctrine of negligence. Most tort cases are centred 
around negligence as it covers not only the human health resulting from CCS 
activities like CO2 leakage but it can be used to bring a case for property and 
environmental damages. 
Tort of negligence has the following component ingredients and its success in action 
is a function of proving the relevance to the case. Firstly, the existence of a duty to 
take care [over the storage site and operation] which was owed to him by the 
defendant (i.e. the CO2 storage operator), secondly, breach of such duty by the 
defendant which implies that the operator was involved in unreasonable conduct for 
instance by not having the needed monitoring procedure or safety measures in place, 
and thirdly resulting damage to the plaintiff as a result of the defendants breach of 
duty.
238
 Such harm could include but not limited to sub surface water contamination, 
physical or health harm to plaintiff, harm to property (above or subsurface). It is also 
crucial that a causal connection between defendant’s activities and the effect on the 
defendant is established. The remedial implication for the defendant if found 
culpable could include compensation for increased risk of future harms, medical 
cost, property repairs or restoration value of the property, future medical monitoring 
cost, and emotional injury compensation.
239
 
The trespass cause of action is mostly in relation to interference with property, goods 
and person.
240
 The trespass claim needs to show actual intentional physical invasion 
of the plaintiff’s property.241 In the case of CCS operation the most likely occurrence 
of trespass is subsurface migration or leakage of the stored CO2 or flow of chemical 
solvents used during CCS operation into the adjoining subsurface or property could 
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be considered an act of trespass. However, trespass could also be applicable to 
surface forms of properties and entities in a case were the leakage of the contaminant 
or gases escape to the surface and cause environmental harm.  This could be a result 
of poor geological site selection and characterisation. The likelihood of properties 
and aquifers
242
 of adjoining properties (under different ownership to the site operator 
or project developer) been damaged or contaminated respectively could hold a 
liability case against the site operator.  
In practice according to Ragdales 1993, courts are generally careful “[…] in finding 
liability for injected fluid subsurface entries”,243 however the remedies vary from 
compensation in the form of diminution in value to full pay out for any damage and 
restoration. It must be added however that in the English law trespass to land is 
actionable per se but trespass to property is not normally a criminal offence.
244
 There 
is however no case reference of this that I am aware of even if it is especially within 
the context of this research.  
Finally, the tort of nuisance could be of public or private delineation. The public 
nuisance is crime which requires the Attorney-General to bring a criminal 
proceeding to seek remedy
245
 as it relates for instance to obstruction of public 
highways, dangerous activities etc.
246
 However claims could be a possible private 
cause of action on the grounds of nuisance. Although often considered identical to 
the trespass claims, private nuisance would only arise if there is substantial 
interference of the use and enjoyment of the plaintiff’s property247 for instance the 
obstruction of right of way, or interference with the plaintiff’s water supply, access 
of air, light or support.
248
 An example of this in context is the Gulf Oil Corp v. Hugh 
(1962) in which nuisance claim was brought by the plaintiff against the defendant for 
contamination of private water well due to the injection of salt water for post-
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secondary recovery of oil.
249
 Akin to this analogy in the context of CCS could be the 
migration of stored or injected GHG into private ground water supply resulting in 
carbonation of the supply in this case interfering with the use and enjoyment of the 
plaintiff’s groundwater or the GHG contains a high level of other contaminants 
which could result in the contamination of the water supply without necessarily 
carbonating the water. 
Remedies for nuisance could be the use of court injunction (which is a court order 
that forbids the party to whom it is served to take any further action as dictated by 
the order) to stop further operation on the site. 
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Chapter 3 
CHARACTERISTIC PROFILING OF CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE 
3.0 Greenhouse Gas Sources for Capture 
The different gases that make up the greenhouse gases have different global 
warming potential
250
 (see Table 3 comparison GHG GWP with each gas multiplier) 
and the cost of capturing the GHG emissions alone is approximately 70 – 90 percent 
of the whole cost of CCS.
251
 Carbon dioxide (CO2) is considered the most important 
anthropogenic GHG with the potential to remain in the atmosphere for hundreds of 
years
252
 and is used as the baseline measurement and representation for 
anthropogenic gas emissions, most of the capturing processes are aimed at extracting 
the CO2 from the emissions. With annual emission growth rate of about 80% and 
global concentration level of 750Gt,
253
 the sources and quantity of the emissions of 
CO2 into the atmosphere are more diverse than those of the other GHG and remains 
the major GHG emission aimed at to be significantly reduced. 
Table 3.  Distribution of Comparison of GHG GWP with each gas multiplier 
Source: U.S. Department of Energy Geocraft 
 
Gases Pre 
Industrial 
baseline 
New 
Natural 
Additions 
New 
Man-
made 
Additions 
New 
Total (ppb) 
Concentration 
Total Relative 
Contribution  
Percentage 
of Total 
New 
(%) 
GWP 
(Multipli
er) 
Carbon 
dioxide 
(CO2) 
288,000 68,520  
68,520  
11,880  
11,880  
368,400  
368,400  
99.438 
72.369 
1 
Methane 
(CH4) 
848 577  
12,117  
320  
6,720 
1,745  
36,645  
0.471 
7.199 
21 
Nitrous 
Oxide 
285 
88,350 
12 
3,599 
15 
4,771 
312 
96,720 
0.084 
19.000 
310 
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(N2O) 
CFC 
(and 
other 
gases) 
25 
25,000 
0 
0 
2 
4,791 
27 
7,291 
0.007 
1.432 
Varied 
data 
TOTAL 289,158 
396,658 
69,109  
84,236 
12,217 
28,162 
370,484 
509,056 
100.00 
100.000 
 
 
The sources of CO2 are usually from hydrocarbon based industrial activities as such 
the capture, transportation and storage needs to be done at industrial scale for it to 
have any meaningful effect as a climate change mitigation activity.
254
 It is suggested 
that the implementation of CCS can help reduce CO2 by 54% in the EU and 33% 
globally by 2050 compared to the current global emissions level.
255
 This translates to 
an estimated 25 billion tonnes of CO2.
256
 
The schematic in Figure 10 adapted from the work of Herzog et al., (2004) shows the 
flow of GHG from source and the capture. It is used to explain the cycle and options 
of operation from capture at source to the storage at the geological formation site. 
There are broadly 3 options. First, the option of capturing CO2 from industrial power 
installations or plants fuelled by fossil, majority of the CO2 in industrialised and 
emerging economies emanate from these sources.
257
 Secondly, carbon could be 
captured from such fuels that are carbon intense material used for the production of 
hydrogen fuel which is used in fuel cells and gas turbines. Finally, CO2 could be 
captured from industrial sources that are engaged in chemical, physical and 
biological processes that transform materials e.g. oil refineries, cement and steel 
production installations. This option is most relevant to Nigeria due to the vast 
amount of hydrocarbon reserve and potential for economic growth ceteris paribus. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
254
 Herzog et al., 2004 
255Stangeland A., 2007, “A Model for the CO2 Capture Potential”, International Journal of 
Greenhouse Gas Control I (2007) 418 - 429 
256
Id. 
257
 The US EPA estimate that 40% to 45% of their CO2 emissions come from the use of fossil 
fuel 
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The capture, transportation and storage of CO2 are well documented and published in 
different scholarly works especially for oil and gas production (in developed and to a 
degree some developing (oil producing States) where it is used as EOR technology 
or post-secondary extraction for oil and gas has reached mature stage. The capture of 
CO2 from high emitting sources like fossil fuel powered installations e.g. Steel, 
Cement, Electricity industries, and Oil and Gas industries, and transporting the 
captured CO2 for storage to different locations or used to increase the recoverable oil 
in the case of Oil and Gas industry from a mature well is not only considered an 
important emission reduction strategy, but also has the potential of increasing the oil 
revenue and recovery efficiency of oil fields and reservoirs
258
 by providing 
additional financial gains per unit barrel exploited
259
 from the field, while capture 
cost as suggested by Bankes 2009 could have an offsetting revenue stream 
implication also.
260
 Other than the EOR operation which stores part of the used 
                                                          
258Han et al., 1999, “Recent Development of Enhanced Oil Recovery in China”, Journal of 
Petroleum Science and Engineering, Volume 22, Issues 1–3, January 1999, Pages 181–188   
259
 It is also important to note that this type of EOR used as a secondary recovery method 
would have an impact on the overall cost of extraction from the well.  
260Bankes N., 2009, “Developing Legal a Regime for Carbon Capture and Storage in Canada: 
Some Reflections based upon a Survey of Natural Gas Storage Regimes”, ISEEE Research 
Paper, December 2009 
CO2 Storage in Geological formation 
Hydrocarbon carbon rich sources 
Option 1: 
Industrial 
Installations 
Option 2:  
Decarbonised 
Fuels 
Option 3:  
Power 
Production 
Figure 10 Simplified Schematics of CCS Pathway. Adapted From Herzog and Golomb 
2004 
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CO2in depleted oil and gas reservoirs, geological storage is also possible in deep 
saline aquifer, and Enhanced Coal Bed Methane recovery (ECBM).
261
 
Furthermore, major consideration in terms of viability of CCS project is the issue of 
the so called Source-Sink matching.
262
This suggests the need to consider CO2 
sources and the distance to the final geological storage site. The proximity of these 2 
factors significantly impact the costs associated with the transportation or 
transmission infrastructure.
263
  How feasible and cost effective CCS can be as 
mitigation strategy for climate change would depend to a degree on how well the 
“Source-Sink matching” model is implemented.264 
According to Bradshaw and Dance (2005), the possibility that an area is suitable for 
geological storage site suggests the prospectivity of that area. In other words, the 
area could either be highly prospective or prospective or non-prospective
265
 but this 
does not however imply proximity to CO2 source.  A highly prospective area 
indicates that such area has a high storage potential which is typical of such areas 
that are currently producing significant amount of hydrocarbons,
266
 also this does not 
mean that it is confirmed that such area has the capacity, other need geo-
infrastructural capability to engage in the storage of CO2. The southern Niger Delta 
basin of Nigeria could be categorised as having such potential due to the large 
proven reserves of hydrocarbon (37.2billion barrels of proven crude oil reserve and 
5,100 billion M
3
 of gas),
267
around its territorial waters of the Gulf of Guinea which is 
in the West African prospective geological basin for CO2 as identified by IEA 
report.
268
 
 
 
                                                          
261
Id. [Bankes 2009]; Anastassia, M et al., 2009, The Future of Carbon Capture and Storage 
in Nigeria”, Science World Journal Vol. 4 (No 3) 2009 www.sciecnceworldjournal.org and 
IEA 2008, “CO2 Capture and Storage: A key carbon abatement option”. OECD/IEA 2008 
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 Bradshaw, J and Dance T 2005, Mapping geological storage prospectivity of CO2 for the 
world's sedimentary basins and regional source to sink matching E.S. Rubin, D.W. Keith, 
C.F. Gilboy (Eds.), In: Proceedings of the 7th international conference on greenhouse gas 
control technologies, vol. I Elsevier, London, UK (2005), pp. 583–591 
263
 IPCC 2005 Special Report 
264
Supra note Bradshaw et al 2005. 
265
Id. 
266
Id. 
267
 OPEC 2012: Nigeria Facts and Figures. 
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm Site last viewed on 14/02/2012. 
268
 IEA 2008 Report 
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However, further test and analysis have to be conducted to confirm the capability of 
this geology to handle CCS operation. To the best of my knowledge no such research 
has been carried out for this area.  
The prospective areas are usually with minor tectonic deformations which mean 
smaller hydrocarbon formations
269
 while the non-prospective formations are not 
suitable for CO2 storage.
270
 Figure 11 and Figure 12 show the regional locations of 
areas that are sources of CO2 and a detailed distribution of the different prospective 
storage formations. Figure 11 above identifies the distribution of stationary sources 
of CO2 showing that it is mostly concentrated in North America (37%), Asia (24%) 
and other OECD countries in Europe (14%).
271
 Projections however, indicate that 
there will be a significant increase in CO2 emissions in the developing countries 
within the next few decades.
272
 Hence, the need to start developing necessary policy 
framework for CCS based technology projects not only as a climate change 
mitigation strategy but also as an economically viable project is pertinent. 
                                                          
269
Supra note [Bradshaw et al 2005]. 
270
Id.  
271
 OECD 2006 Report, 
http://www.oecd.org/about/0.2337.en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1.00.html (last viewed on 
19/07/2010 
272
Id. at pg 85 
Figure 11 Regional emission clusters with a 300 km buffer relative to world 
geological storage prospectivity  
Source: IPCC 2005 Special Report) 
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3.1 CO2 Capture Phase 
A mixture of emitted CO2 and other gases referred to as flue gases can be captured at 
source using physical and chemical methods with the aim of extracting the CO2 for 
sequestration in stable geological formations. The methods of extracting CO2 are 
categorised into post-combustion, pre-combustion and Oxy-combustion (Oxyfuel) 
and the almost quintessence CO2 extraction is transported for storage. 
Broadly, there are 4 distinct stages in the process of getting carbon sequestrated of 
which the capture of the CO2 is one of them. Each stage forms an intricate legal, 
technological and economic entity each overlapping to the other and are burdened 
with risks that require a holistic legal and risk management strategy. However the 
variation in the technical complexities of the technology and the economic or 
commercial viability is outside the scope of this thesis but it is necessary for any 
possible integration of the technology in CDM framework. For the purpose of this 
thesis, I will give a brief introduction into the alternative chemical methods available 
for the capture of GHG flue gases before it is transported and finally stored in the 
geological storage formation. 
Figure 12 World Map of CO2 Storage Prospectivity. Source Bradshaw et al. 2004 
112 
 
3.1.1 Post combustion 
Post combustion method use Alkanolamine solvents under specific physical 
conditions (temperature and pressure) to separate and capture CO2 from flue gas 
before its discharge to the atmosphere.
273
 The flue gas that is produced from coal 
fired power plant when coal is combusted in air in a boiler during the production of 
electricity is carbonate of Nitrogen
274
 that can be dissociated under catalytic process 
to release CO2 for transportation to its storage site (See Box 1 for the chemical 
reaction and the list of known Alkanolamines and Figure 13 for the schematic flow 
in a post combustion process). This technology is in use by ScottishPower at the 
Longannet power station in Fife with the capacity to process 1000 cubic metres of 
exhaust gas per hour.
275
 
The Interagency Task Force report on CCS (2010) identified 4 major challenges to 
this method to include large volume of gas to be treated,
276
 the use of chemical 
solvents in the extraction of the CO2 gas,
277
 the pressure level in the boiler,
278
 and the 
trace impurities such as NO2, SO2 and particulate matter that are in the flue gas. The 
potential of this technology is high for reducing GHG emission in the power sector 
since it can be retrofitted to currently operational installations to capture the CO2.
279
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
273
Galadima, A. & Garba, Z. N., 2008, Carbon Capture And Storage (Ccs) In Nigeria: 
Fundamental Science And Potential Implementation Risks, Science World Journal Vol 3 
(No2) 2008www.sciecnceworldjournal.com 
274Bohm, M. C. (2006), “Capture-Ready Power Plants – Options, Technologies and 
Economics”. Cambridge, MA, MIT 
275
BBC New Website 2009 Carbon Capture Technology Tested, 29
th
 May 2009 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/edinburgh_and_east/8072583.stm. Site last viewed on 
20.01.2012 
276
 With about 2 million cubic feet per minute for a 500 MWe size plant 
277
 6 to 8 volume percent and 12 to 14 volume percent in gas and coal fired turbines 
278
 15 to 25lbs per sq inch absolute however the use of amines  chemical reaction have proved 
not to be adversely affected by this levels of pressure. But amine scrubbing technologies are 
not commercially viable since they are not currently available. 
279
Supra note [Interagency Task Force report on CCS 2010] 
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Figure 13 Post Combustion Separation Process Flow 
Adapted from ITF report 2010 
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Box 1 Chemical reaction and the list of known Alkanolamines 
2RNH2 + CO2 + H2O   (RNH3)2CO3 
        (RNH3)2CO3 + H2O + CO2   2RNH3HCO3 
2RNH3HCO3  2RNH2 + 2H2O + 2CO2 
NAMES OF CHEMICAL  FORMULA 
Monoethanolamine   HOC2H4NH2 
Methyldiethanolamine  (HOC2H4 )2NCH3 
Diethanolamine   (HOC2H4)2NH 
Triethanolamine   (HOC2H4)3N 
 Di-isopropanolamine  (i-HOC2H6)2NH 
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3.1.2 Pre-combustion  
Pre-combustion is conducted by using controlled flow of air or oxygen to oxidise the 
fuel (i.e. in Integration Gasification Combined Cycle –IGCC) to produce “syngas” 
which is a mixture of Carbon monoxide (CO) and H2 and at a higher pressure has a 
much higher concentration of CO2. KBR the engineering company responsible for 
the In Salah CO2 capture project uses this technology and on their website indicated 
CO2 concentration of the syngas generated is between 15 and 65% as result of using 
pre combustions technology making it more economically viable to operate.
280
 
However, the cost implication associated with gasification technology is higher than 
for conventional pulverised coal plants due to the better emission profile.
281
 
The production of hydrogen in this process makes the technology compatible with 
the hydrogen economy
282
 and further reaction with steam produces CO2 and more 
H2.
283
 In the presence of the catalytic removal solvent, polymeric ether in a process 
called Selexol
TM
 can be used to separate carbon dioxide from hydrogen.
284
 The 
chemical Equation1 shows the chemical reaction for this process.  Although there are 
theoretical assertions that these physical and chemical processes could be achieved 
in a single process (see Figure 14 for the schematics of pre-combustion separation 
process) but there is no definitive evidence of this happening at industrial scale. This 
method of capture as suggested by Galadima et al., (2008) could be an important 
                                                          
280
 KBR Website, “Pre Combustion Carbon Capture”, 
http://www.kbr.com/Technologies/Process-Technologies/Pre-Combustion-Carbon-Capture/ 
last viewed 21.12.2011 
281Fuel Cell and Hydrogen Energy Association Fact Sheets. “Hydrogen Production from 
Coal.” 
http://www.fchea.org/core/import/PDFs/factsheets/Hydrogen%20Production%20From%20C
oal_NEW.pdf  last viewed 21.12.2011.  
282
Elwell, L. C., and Grant, W. S. 2005. Technical overview of carbon dioxide capture 
technologies 
for coal-fired power plants. Alexandria, VA: MPR Associates, Inc. Available from: 
www.mpr.com/energy/extras/co2/_capture (accessed on 20.12 2011) 
283
 There is a higher concentration of CO2 and H2 in lower volume syngas after further 
processing in the Water-Gas shift. This has the advantage of making the pre-combustion CO2 
capture process less expensive than the post-combustion since it would reduces the overall 
infrastructural and production cost. 
284
 The catalytic solvent Selexol
TM
 allows for reduction in energy use which has an overall 
impact on the energy penalty which is often considered as a major factor against CCS within 
the context of CDM. The cost of electricity for a base IGCC power plant using Selexol
TM
 
system is less by 40% when compared with the equivalent conventional coal-fired power 
plant according to the United States Department of Energy. 
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Figure 14 Pre Combustion Separation Process Flow 
Adapted from ITF report 2010 
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 Rubin E. S. (2008), “CO2 Capture and Transport.” Elements 4(5): 311-317. Hamilton M. 
R (2009), “An, Analytical Framework for Long Term Policy for Commercial Deployment 
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3.1.3 Oxy-fuel Combustion 
Similar to the post-combustion system is the Oxy-combustion (Oxy-fuel) system
286
 
which uses very highly purified air of about 95% oxygen (instead of normal air)in 
the combustion process of the flue gas allowing for the recycling of flue gas to 
produce H2O (vapour) which is removed by condensation process and CO2 is 
captured for storage.
287
 The major challenge associated with this process is the cost 
involved in the cryogenic separation of air vis-à-vis the energy penalty on the 
project, the dilution of the flue gas with N2, the separation of the sorbent and 
solvents, and the level of O2 present in the extracted CO2 stream.
288
 
The low concentration of Nitrogen in flue gas consequent to this combustion in the 
presence of this quality of air has enhanced the prospective application of the Oxy-
fuel system.
289
 Also there is the production of highly concentrated CO2 stream of 
approximately 60%. The integrity of the CO2 purity is further enhanced by further 
purification of the stream in other to meet the specifications for transportation (as 
stipulated by relevant international environmental laws) and subsequent storage in 
geological formations.
290
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
286
 (IPCC, 2005) Chapter 3 pg. 109 
287
 (IPCC, 2005) (IEA, 2008) (Herzog, 2009) 
288
 IPCC, 2005 pg. 109 
289
 (Galadima et al 2008) 
290
Id 23 
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Figure 15 Oxy-fuel Combustion Separation Process Flow 
Adapted from ITF report 2010 
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As simple as the above processes or techniques may appear in Figure 15 (and indeed 
all the other separation schematics shown in this chapter), the cost of capturing CO2 
and other associated cost such as the energy penalty, environmental impact, water 
consumption and solid waste management
291
 account for about 75% of the overall 
CCS cost.
292
 According to IPCC special report on the CCS it is estimated that there a 
wide range for capture cost between US$5 and $115 per ton of CO2.
293
 However, 
according to Keith (2002), with improved technological innovations there is 
possibility for a change in this cost proportion.
294
 Also, it would be in the interests of 
project developers to concentrate on projects that provide high CO2 contents as this 
would make the project viable in terms of return on investment. 
                                                          
291
 (WRI 2008) 
292
 (Bankes et al 2008) 
293
  See Table 15 for component cost full break down as adapted from IPCC Special Report 
2005 
294
 Keith, D.W., 2002, “Towards a Strategy for Implementing CO2 Capture and Storage in 
Canada”. Ottawa, Canada, Oil, Gas and Energy Branch, Environment Canada, Ottawa, 
Ontario. 
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3.2 CO2 Transportation Phase 
Although surface transportation of gas is well established in developed countries, for 
instance in the US, the pipeline infrastructure has the capacity to transport over 
216,000 tonnes of CO2 per day,
295
 however the lack of infrastructure, distribution 
system and effective transmission in Nigeria
296
 along other socio political 
uncertainties prove to be risks associated with this phase. Other potential risks 
associated with the transportation of CO2 in Nigeria are the possibility of impurities 
or contaminants in the transported CO2,
297
 poor or lack of regulatory framework,
298
 
public and social perception,
299
 design and operational issues in the transportation 
infrastructure
300
 and possible sabotage in case of social uprising as is often the case 
in Niger Delta of Nigeria where pipelines are vandalised by disgruntled indigenes. 
Depending on the jurisdiction, the regulation of CO2 transportation by pipeline is 
often similar to that of natural gas transportation
301
 in most countries where there is 
currently the transportation of CO2.  
                                                          
295
Heddle, G. et al (2003) “The Economics of CO2 Storage 15 (MIT Laboratory for Energy & 
the Environment Report No. MIT LFEE 2003-003 RP 2003 
296Igwe G J 2011, “Natural Gas Transmission and Distribution in Nigeria” Last viewed on the 
13/01/12 at 
http://elombah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&Id=7493:natural-gas-
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297
 Marston P.M et al (2008), “From EOR to CCS: The Evolving Legal and Regulatory 
Framework For Carbon Capture And Storage”, Energy Law Journal [Vol. 29:421-490 2008] 
298
 Federal Government of Nigeria and UNDP (2009), “Nigeria and Climate Change: Road to 
Cop15: Achieving the best outcome for Nigeria”, Country Report by Federal Ministry of 
Environment. 
299
Id 
300
 Barrie, J. et al., “Carbon Dioxide Pipelines: A Preliminary Review of Design and Risks”, 
http://uregina.ca/ghgt7/PDF/papers/peer/126.pdf 
301
 (McLaren et al., 2005)  From Galadima. 
Table 4 CCS Component Cost. Source: IPCC Special Report on CCS, 2005 
 
CCS component Cost range 
Capture from a power plant 15 - 75 US$/tCO2 net captured 
Capture from gas processing or  
ammonia production 
5 - 55 US$/tCO2 net captured 
Capture from gas processing or  
ammonia production 
5 - 55 US$/tCO2 net captured 
Transport 1 - 8 US$/tCO2 transported per 250km 
Geological storage 0.5 - 8 US$/tCO2 injected 
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Transportation of liquid gas (i.e. either from natural or anthropogenic sources) of any 
form including liquefied CO2could be through pipeline as referred to above (see 
Figure 16 for such transportation by pipeline of oil and gas to a port in Niger Delta 
region of Nigeria) or by road using high pressurised insulated tankers by rail cars at 
low temperature
302
 or if it requires the movement over a long distance by ship.
303
 The 
transportation of oil and gas in Nigeria has resulted repeatedly in fatal accidents due 
to deliberate sabotage or poor infrastructure maintenance and lack of adequate health 
and safety measures. This and many other factors must be considered in 
implementing CCS transportation in Nigeria. 
  
 
3.3 CO2 Storage Phase 
The uncertainty associated with CCS at this stage is mostly that of legal consequence 
in terms of it regulatory implications, contractual relations and liability issues in a 
                                                          
302
 According to a Greenfacts document published online as the Scientific Facts on CO2 
Capture and Storage - Sourced from IPCC 2005 and Summary and Details: Greenfacts 2007. 
It is concluded that this means of CO2 transportations only suitable and advisable for very 
small scale application. http://www.greenfacts.org/en/co2-capture-storage/co2-capture-
storage-greenfacts-level2.pdf  
303
Id. Pg 6 
Figure 16 The Trans Forcados Oil and gas pipeline leading to the Calabar Sea port in 
the Niger Delta area of Nigeria. 
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post closure stage, and the viability of risk assessment of the storage site vis-à-vis the 
site characterisation and selection.  
There are a lot of variables that have not been adequately clarified and understood 
about the storage of CO2 under different geological formations and conditions both 
on the medium and long term. Although there are different geological storage 
projects presently undertaken especially in Annex 1 countries and the USA (Figure 
17 shows the distribution map for the locations where CCS projects are planned for 
future and or are currently operating
304
), none so far is implemented on such a scale 
in any Non Annex 1 country apart from the In Salah CO2 project in Algeria, neither 
is there any successfully implemented for the CDM as provided by the current 
Modalities and Procedures regulatory framework. The possibility of CCS project 
taking place in a Non Annex 1 country could be enhanced consequent to the 
approval of appropriate methodology by the EB CDM.  
For CO2 to be considered safely stored away for a long time, the following factors 
must be identified and duly considered, first a comprehensive risk analysis of the 
project in terms of the environmental impact on humans and ecosystem of the 
storage location,
305
 leakage (or seepage) issues need to be adequately resolved vis-à-
vis the liability and remediation;
306
 regulatory and legal issues vis-à-vis the national 
and international regimes,
307
 cost implications on the project execution and the 
characterisation of the storage site.
308
 The impact assessment should result in a broad 
based and robust risk management strategy for such a project.  
                                                          
304
 Note this distribution has no bearing to CDM since there is no indication of CCS been 
implemented under CDM when these locations were selected. 
305
  (Herzog, 2001 & Herzog and Golomb, 2004) 
306
Id. 
307
Id. 
308
Id. 
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Figure 17 A pictorial depiction of the GHG Life cycle from capture to 
storage. Courtesy CO2CRC  
 
 
   
 
Figure 18 Future and Current Locations of Geological Storage Sites 
Source: IPCC Special report 2005 EU OPEC Roundtable on CCS Presentation 
2006 
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3.4 Geological Formation for CO2 Sequestration 
Geological CO2 sequestration can be defined as a systemic [and systematic] storage 
of carbon dioxide captured from industrial processes, fuel combustion or from fuel 
and minerals, in stable geological formations such as hydrocarbon fields and 
aquifers thus prevent its release into the atmosphere.
309
 The storage of CO2 can be 
carried out in geological formations which were depleted or previously used as oil 
and gas reservoirs (i.e. hydrocarbon fields), deep saline formations
310
 or in coal 
seams to displace methane absorbed in the coal. The IEA 2008 report on CCS 
identified regions that have large enough oil and gas geological basin as suitable for 
the storage of CO2. These regions include Nigeria for oil and gas while other 
countries like China and India have large deposit of coal in their territories.
311
 
The storing away of gases in the earth’s natural occurring geological reservoir, 
biosphere and deep Ocean is a process that has been occurring over millions of years 
and forms the bases for the formation of carbonates minerals, natural gas, oil and 
coal
312within the geology of the earth. It is estimated that the earth’s geological 
reservoir capacity is 100trillion cubic feet (5600 million tonnes) of CO2
313
 and 
current utilised capacity is less than 0.1GtC/yr.
314
 See Table 5 for estimated Global 
capacity from different sources. Natural occurring CO2 field
315
 can be found in 
places like Pisgah Anticline, in Mississippi USA with a storage capacity of over 
200Million tonnes of pure CO2 stored away for some 65 million year.
316
 But no 
evidence of such naturally occurring sources within the Nigerian geographical 
jurisdiction. The nearest of such occurrence to Nigeria can only be linked to Lake 
Nyos in Cameroun. See Box 2 for detailed discussion. 
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Supra note (Torvanger 2005) pg. 694.  
310
 The Sleipner Project in the North Sea by the Norwegian company Statoil is an example of 
this. With over 1km into the seabed 
311
 IEA 2008 
312
 IPCC Special Report 2005 
313
Supra note (Interagency Task Force on CCS 2010) 
314
  (Herzog, 2001 & Herzog and Golomb, 2004) 
315
 Such fields give the confidence that CO2 can be stored away within the earth crust for 
millions of years with minimal risk impact on the environment. 
316
 Sam Holloway Monitoring and verification of CO2 retention at storage sites BGS  
123 
 
However, as mentioned above, geological sequestration of CO2 is achieved by the 
systematic injection and storing away of captured CO2 gas from industrial processes, 
fossil fuel and mineral exploration processes or fuel combustion, into stable 
geological formation such as the depleted oil and gas reservoirs, coal seams, aquifers 
etc. in order to prevent its release into the atmosphere
317
 this would have a decisive 
impact on the level of CO2 in the atmosphere while more sustainable and climate 
friendly technologies are developed not only to mitigate global warming but also to 
bring about a lasting solution or solutions to the global warming challenges. 
3.5 Geological Reservoirs and CO2 Behaviour 
The process of storing carbon dioxide in geological formation is contingent on 
different factors. One of such is the injection of the CO2 into the porous and 
permeable rock layers thereby trapped in by the impermeable layer of rock to hold 
back any migration of the liquid or gaseous CO2.
318
 The other is the material state of 
the CO2 injected into the geological reservoir. For storage to occur, geological 
formations require satisfactory capacity and injectivity. While the capacity of a 
storage formation indicates the amount of CO2 that can be sequestered in the 
formation, injectivity in this context refers to the rate of CO2 injection into the well. 
It is simply the rate of mass flow of the substance (in this case CO2) that can be 
injected per unit of the reservoir thickness and per unit of downhole pressure 
difference
319
 or the mobility of the substance which is mathematically expressed as 
the ratio of the absolute permeability of the reservoir and injectate viscosity.
320
 
Under atmospheric conditions the thermodynamic state of CO2 is considered stable, 
however, the supercritical phase of the CO2 becomes evident when the temperature 
and pressure reach >31.1
o
C and >7.38 MPa respectively.
321
 This is the Critical Point 
referred to as Supercritical state of CO2 (Figure 19 shows a graphical expression of 
what temperature and pressure the supercritical properties of CO2 start to manifest). 
                                                          
317
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318
 Wilson E. J et al, 2006, “Geological Carbon Dioxide Sequestration: An Analysis of 
Subsurface Property Law”, 36 ENVTL. L. REP.10114, 10115 
319
 Heddle et al (2003) pg. 16 
320
Law D et al (1996) Hydro-geological and Numerical Analysis of CO2 Disposal in Deep 
Aquifers in the Alberta Sedimentary Basin, 37 Energy Conservation Management 1167 
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CO2 as a supercritical fluid maximises the use of the storage space by displacing 
liquid material in the pores by possessing properties of both a liquid and a gas. This 
process is critical to the success of the EOR technology as it provides an additional 
benefit to the problem of produced CO2 in the oil exploration process
322
 and also the 
storage of CO2 under CCS. Since supercritical fluid under normal geological 
reservoir (i.e. 800m to 1000m below the earth surface) conditions
323
 (the pressure 
and temperature) has the characteristic properties of gaseous into liquid state, it is 
possible for it under this condition and material state to displace material less dense 
in the pores both laterally or upward, and occupy the available space due to variation 
in the density of the supercritical CO2 and the surrounding brine.
324
 
There is also a tendency in geological formations with brine for supercritical CO2 to 
migrate anti gravitational pull and laterally due to the difference in density.
325
 The 
higher the density of CO2 the greater the efficiency by which the pores can be used to 
sequester CO2 as a separate phase therefore, the forces that migratory movements of 
the gas is affected by its density.
326
 The storage capacity is maximised by the 
injection of CO2 in its supercritical state.  
                                                          
322
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Figure 19 Carbon dioxide pressure-temperature phase graphical expressions 
Sources IPCC 2007 
 
  
 
3.6 Types of Storage Sites and Storage Capacity 
The classifications of storage sites are broadly based on the materials present in the 
site or that was explored from the storage sites. Generally geological storage site 
include depleted hydrocarbon fields of oil and gas, Unmineable Coal Seams (UCS) 
and deep saline formations.
327
 The depleted oil and gas reservoirs prove to have the 
greatest potential for the purpose of EOR or Enhanced Gas Recovery (EGR) or for 
the storage of pure CO2 in Non Annex 1 country like Nigeria or other oil and gas 
producing states, due to the large oil and gas reserve, extensive characterisation of 
both the physical and geological properties and the existing infrastructure to support 
the injection process of CCS.
328
 Leakages however remains pertinent concern as 
abandoned wells are characteristic of mature field
329
 and could result in the 
undermining of the environmental benefit and integrity of CCS projects under CDM.  
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Deep saline formation and the ocean offer the greatest storage resource and capacity 
potential.
330
 In the United States for instance, the potential storage capacity of the 
UCS is believed to be considerably larger than for oil and gas formation but less than 
the deep saline aquifers
331
 (see section 7.6.2 for detailed discussion on UCS). The 
United States for instance is endowed with the largest coal reserves in the world, 
with recoverable reserves of approximately 270 billion tons, representing 27% of the 
world total of 1 trillion tons,
332
 whilst in the UK where the coal reserve is 
significantly low compared to the United States, the potential for CO2 sequestration 
is within the oil and gas geological fields. However, in the case of Nigeria, capacities 
of such storage sites have not been estimated and it would only be speculative to 
suggest that the capacity will be equal or proportionate to the size of the country’s 
current oil and gas reserve capacity. 
Since pores in geological formations are usually the storage spaces for the injected 
gaseous and liquid materials (see Figure 20a), the suitability for sequestration of 
these materials remains a function of the caprock permeability, the structural 
integrity or stability of the in situ and the adequacy of its injectivity and capacity.
333
 
In context therefore, injectivity by definition refers to the mass flow rate of CO2 that 
can be injected per unit or reservoir thickness and per unit downhole pressure 
difference
334
 while capacity refers to the amount of CO2 that can be stored in the 
formation
335
 as articulated above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
330
Supra id. (Interagency Task Force on CCS 2010) 
331
 Marston et al., 2008, “From EOR to CCS: The Evolving Legal and Regulatory Framework 
for Carbon Capture and Storage”, Energy Law Journal Vol. 29 pg. 439.  
332
EIA, "Annual Coal Report 2005", Table 15 
333
Supra not 243  (de Figueiredo 2007) 
334Heddle, G., (2003), “The Economics of CO2 Storage 15 (MIT Lab. For Energy and the 
Environment Report No. MIT LFEE 2003-003 RP, 2003)  
335
 IPCC Special Report 2005 208, 213 
127 
 
 Table 5 Estimated Global CO2 Sequestration Capacity 
 Herzog et 
al
336
 
Gale
337
 IPCC/ARC Ecofys Parson et 
al 
Utilisation < 0.1GtC/yr - - - - 
Terrestrial 
(biosphere) 
10 – 100GtC -  
- 
-  
- 
Coal seams 10 – 
1000GtC 
5.4GtC 150-200 267 100 – 
300GtC 
Depleted Oil 
and Gas 
Reservoirs 
 
100 – 
1000GtC 
 
251GtC 
 
1870 
 
1152 
 
200 – 
500GtC 
Deep Saline 
Formation 
100 – 
10,000GtC 
109 – 
2725GtC 
4000 240 100 – 
1000GtC 
Ocean  1000 – 
10,000GtC 
- - - - 
From Table 5 above, ocean and land-based sites combined have an enormous 
capacity for storage of CO2. The world’s oceans have by far the largest capacity for 
carbon storage. Worldwide total anthropogenic emissions based on the estimation of 
Herzog et al., (2004) is around 7GtC per year (1 GtC = 1 billion metric tons of 
carbon equivalent).
338
 
It is possible to trap CO2 by a combination of natural occurring trapping mechanisms 
within geological formations (see Figure 20b). Such processes include geological 
(stratigraphic and structural) trapping in depleted oil and gas reservoirs, absorption 
trapping in uneconomic or unmineable coal beds, solubility trapping in reservoir oil 
and formation water, cavern trapping in salt structures and mineral trapping by the 
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mineralisation of the surrounding materials into carbonates
339
 - mineralisation is of 
significance if only for the issue of permanence.
340
 
(a) (b) 
 
 
 
The process of mineralisation has its influence on leakage or permanence of CO2 
within the geological formation as carbonated products are thermodynamically 
favoured to remain sequestered in solid states for a long period.
341
 The process of 
achieving the storage has both underlining and defining risks which could manifest 
either due to migration of CO2 within the subsurface in aquifers thereby causing 
underground pollution of water sources or leakage to the surface thereby causing 
climate change.   
However, before any further discussion on the issues of risk assessment and 
management which will be discussed in detail in chapter 5, the rest of this chapter 
                                                          
339
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Figure 20a CO2 will be trapped as a supercritical fluid in tiny pore spaces within the 
storage rock, as is shown by the blue spaces in this photograph of a microscopic section 
of storage sandstone. The white grains are mostly quartz. Image Source: CO2CRC.  
Figure 20b The four trapping mechanisms shown above all contribute to the storage 
security of CO
2
. Over time the permanence of the stored CO
2 
increases (Metz et al., 2005) 
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will discuss the storage potential and classification relevant to Nigeria; an analogous 
operation in the post-secondary recovery of oil and the monitoring and verification 
techniques that is most appropriate when considering storage of CO2 
3.6.1 Depleted Oil and Gas Reservoir 
Despite the relative newness of this process in climate change mitigation, Depleted 
Oil and Gas Reservoir (DOGR) presents a logical opportunity as a storage option for 
CO2 due to the geological structural composition that has successfully trapped oil 
and gas over millennia by roofing in the hydrocarbon with non-permeable rock layer 
over the permeable rock.
342
 These geological structures make the reservoir a viable 
option.   
There are different possibilities with regards the storage of CO2 in depleted 
hydrocarbon formations. One of such options is to store CO2 geological formation 
while the process of EOR is taking place; the other is in the process of EGR. This 
option has only been discussed theoretically as an option but there are no 
demonstrations or commercial scale operations of this in any part of the world.
343
 
The final option is the storage of CO2 in the depleted or abandoned oil and gas fields 
that are not in production. However, this option requires that the operator(s) ensure 
that inadequately plugged injection wells are avoided and such permeability such as 
poorly plugged well could result in leakages which will undermine the 
environmental integrity of the project. Theoretically, Nigeria in this regard has a 
huge potential to engage its depleted oil and gas wells for the purpose of CCS 
operations ceteris paribus.  
3.6.2 Unmineable Coal Seams 
Due to various reasons (ranging from inadequate technology to the structural 
integrity of the deposit area’s geology or even governmental policies) coal seams 
could be abandoned or unmineable. However, this type of geological formation 
could be used as a sequestration site for captured CO2. According to Herzog et al. 
                                                          
342
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2004, the total worldwide potential for storage of CO2 in this kind of formations 
could exceed 7.1 billion tons of CO2
344
it however has comparably the smallest 
potential for CO2 storage when compared with oil and gas fields or deep saline 
formations.
345
 
Despite the inability to mine coal beds for coal, it is very possible to extract trapped 
gases notably methane from the sites due to the permeability of the geological 
structure that trapped the gas. The resource is called the Coal Bed Methane (CBM) 
having a worldwide potential of about 2 trillion scm or 1.76billion tons of oil 
equivalent. Methane and many other gases have the affinity to physically bind to 
coal. Different scientific studies as cited by the IPCC Special report of 2005 suggest 
that CO2 has a greater affinity to bind to coal more than methane.
346
 The injection of 
CO2 into coal seams could therefore easily displace methane. Therefore, given coal’s 
intrinsic storage potential and potential for growth in coal-bed methane exploitation 
especially in coal rich nation like Nigeria, the option of injecting CO2 into coal seam 
for long term storage is attractive.  
Although Nigeria ranks low in global coal production, it has an estimated coal 
reserve of over 1.5billion metric tons with proven coal reserve of about 396million 
metric tons.
347
 With 4 existing mines operating under capacity, and 13 other 
undeveloped coal fields, there is potential for involving different mechanisms not to 
only harness these fields vis-à-vis coal production but also the potential to harness it 
for CO2 storage. These fields are mostly situated in the Cretaceous Anambra and 
Makurdi Basin in the eastern part of the country
348
 (as shown in Figure 21). The 
undeveloped Coal fields in Nigeria are of two categories, namely: the Virgin Coal 
fields where further detailed exploration work and/or access roadways are required 
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and the developing Coalfields where reserves have been proven and mine access 
roadways are developed. 
 
 
Although there is currently no data for abandoned and virgin coal mines for methane 
extraction, however, 2 methane capture projects with the potential for power 
generation of estimated 1.24MW of electricity and reducing 6.9million m
3
 of 
methane emission annually
349
 are being developed in the Anambra Basin.
350
 This 
process could potentially generate revenue to offset costs associated with CO2 
injection if the CO2storage project is considered under CDM. More research into the 
feasibility of such project would be of benefit but outside the scope of this work. 
In terms of storage of CO2 in UCS, the process of injecting CO2 will require that the 
following factors among others be considered. Such factors include determining the 
coalbed geometry (i.e. the thickness of the seams); the vertical isolation and lateral 
continuity when considering the issue of leakage; the depth and permeability of the 
rock when considering the entrapment of injected CO2 gas for storage.
351
 None 
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Figure 21 Coal Deposit distributions in Nigeria Source: CIA 
(2010) and EarthByte (2008) 
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disturbance of the seam with mining activities will allow for the CO2 to bound with 
the coal reducing the potential for its escape.
352
 
 
 
 
3.6.3 Deep Saline Formation 
Deep Saline Formation or deep saltwater reservoirs are rocks with porous spaces that 
are filled with brine hundreds of meters underground. They exist nearly worldwide 
and have great potential for CO2 storage. The saltwater brine is ten times salt 
concentrated than the ocean
353
and trapped under cap rock making it very unsuitable 
for agriculture or drinking purposes.
354
 Using 3D and 4D seismic technologies, this 
type of natural occurring reservoirs can be detected or determined on a case-by-case 
basis.  The advantages associated with this potential form of CO2 sequestration is 
purely on its share size in relation to the other forms of storage (see Table 6) and 
                                                          
352
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Figure 22 Schematic showing both terrestrial (surface) and geological (subsurface) 
sequestration of carbon dioxide emissions from a coal-fired plant. Designed by Le 
Jean Hardin and Jamie Payne. 
Source: http://www.ornl.gov/info/ornlreview/v33_2_00/research.h 
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they are much more widespread globally than the previously mentioned above. 
However, there is little known about the different dynamics associated with this 
formation (vis-à-vis leakage resulting from mineralization processes, immobilization 
of injected CO2 stored and stabilization as a result of chemical reactions which could 
affect the integrity of the reservoir) in comparison with the other geological 
formations and there is a cost implication of using this form of reservoir which 
cannot be offset with any known usable side product.  
Interestingly, the first commercial scale carbon storage operation i.e. the Sleipner 
Project in the North Sea
355and the Gorgon Project which is currently the world’s 
largest CCS project  situated in Western Australia with full capacity to inject 
10,000tCO2 per day are both deep saline formation operation.
356
 
3.6.4 Acid Gas Disposal 
Over the years, DOGR has been used basically for purpose of “acid gas” disposal 
and the EOR operations. The injection of acid gas which is made up primarily of 
CO2 (90%) along with high levels of H2S impurity and other by-products from oil 
and gas exploitation and refinery is done for the purpose of disposal. It is currently 
industrially accepted as the alternative to sulphur recovery and acid gas flaring 
process mostly in Western Canada.
357
 There is a considerable reduction in the overall 
environmental impact when compared with other processes of capturing and 
disposing of the gases. This acclaimed success could be linked to the historical use 
of DOGR and the level of stability reported over the years. This option is an 
attractive one due to this proven capacity to retain underground fluid and gases over 
a geological time scale. However, the risk concerns associated with a number of well 
penetrations is very present.
358
 There is no documented evidence of such activities 
operational in Nigeria. 
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3.7 CO2-EOR Operations 
CO2-EOR is one of the many oil recovery techniques used in the oil industry to 
recover oil from low producing wells. Often, it is used as a post-secondary recovery 
activity to recover up to 60% of the reservoirs’ original oil359 compared with at most 
40% from the primary or secondary oil recovery activity.
360
 There are four ways to 
carryout EOR namely by gas injection(which involves the use of hydrocarbon, CO2, 
flue gases (all in miscible and immiscible states); Chemical injection using 
polymers, alkaline surfactants; thermal recovery method using steam, combustion 
and hot water; and finally Microbial and Carbonated water flooding.
361
 
 
(a) (b) 
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(c) 
 
 
 
 
 
According to Tzimas (2005), CO2-EOR is an established and successful technique 
for recovering additional oil, mainly from onshore North American oilfields.
362
 
Worldwide in 2004 there were only 79 CO2-EOR operations,
363
 but the survey 
conducted by OGJ in 2010 suggested that the US alone had 130 of this type of 
enhanced recovery
364
 that is an estimate of about 88% of the projects were now 
situated in the United States.
365
However, a full global picture and distribution could 
not be determined because new or updated information from most of the other 
countries was not provided but there is significant evidence there is an increase in 
such activities in other countries. 
Of the 193 EOR projects, 130 are CO2-EOR with 109 of this as miscible CO2-EOR 
projects and 5 as immiscible are currently implemented in the USA.
366
As of 2004, 
there were 2 active miscible displacement CO2-EOR projects in Canada, 5 
immiscible displacement pilot fields in Trinidad and 1 commercial immiscible 
                                                          
362
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Figure 23(a),(b),(c) Schematic and Pictorial Representation of CO2-Enhanced Oil 
Recovery mechanism. 
Source: World Coal Association. Available online 
http://www.worldcoal.org/carbon-capture-storage/ccs-technologies/ccs-
technologies-more/ 
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displacement operation in Turkey.
367
 These projects cumulatively produced 
approximately 230000 barrels of oil per day in 2004, which was approximately 0.3% 
of world oil production
368
 this has increased with the US based on the OGJ report 
producing 663000 b/d in 2010.
369
 In the 1980’s a number of small CO2-EOR projects 
were operated in Hungary, however they were terminated in the mid-1990.
370
 Until 
recently, there were no CO2-EOR projects deployed in the North-Sea
371
 with the 
exception of a miscible CO2-EOR project undertaken in the Egmanton oilfield. This 
project was however unsuccessful due to low injectivity.
372
 
Within the oil and gas sector the process of enhancing the quantity of oil and gas 
produced from a well has been long operational and wide spread. However, the use 
of this technique to mitigate the effects of climate change or to permanently 
sequester CO2 underground is a new development.
373
 In fact, the Weyburn 
Saskatchewan EOR-CCS project is currently the only project in the world that does 
not have a “blowing down” of the reservoir as part of the decommissioning phase of 
tertiary oil recovery process. Current EOR practices require the removal of CO2 from 
oil fields after the oil recovery process has been conducted. It is approximated that 
138 billion metric tonnes of CO2 could be captured using CO2-EOR as a storage 
mechanism in more than 10,000 oil and gas reservoirs.
374
 
Different methods as listed above of enhancing oil recovery from depleting oil 
reservoir include thermal EOR (widely used EOR method but cannot be used for 
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instance in the North Sea oilfields due to the low viscosity of the oil and depth), 
Chemical EOR (using Surfactants, polymer solutions and alkaline). Also, the use of 
miscible solvent gases such as methane, nitrogen or liquefied Petroleum Gas and 
microbial based on the injection of a solution of micro-organisms and nutrients, 
which produce surfactants, CO2 and other compounds that improve the fluidity of 
oil. Other EOR techniques include the Microwave EOR using the underground 
application of microwaves to heat and mobilise oil to the surface, and seismic 
simulation by using high power surface vibrators. Figure 23(a),(b),(c) shows a 
schematic and pictorial representation of CO2-EOR operation. 
The Scottish Government 2006 identified 14 oilfields within the Scottish Renewable 
Zone with an approximate total CO2 storage capacity of 994Mt CO2
375
around the 
United Kingdom North Sea with the potential for CO2-EOR project (Table 7 below). 
Nevertheless, no CO2-EOR project has been undertaken due to surface facilities,
376
 
environmental regulations
377
 and operational conditions
378
 issues but there has been 
consideration to carry out CO2-EOR project in the Miller oilfield.
379
 
The estimates of CO2 storage potential in Africa vary widely from 6 to 220Gt in 
aquifers and 30 to 280Gt in oil and gas fields. West Africa, and particularly Nigeria, 
represents the highest potential for CO2-EOR and CO2 storage in oil and gas 
fields.
380
In the case of Nigeria where average primary recovery is about 34% (or 
potential 27.72billion barrels) of the Original Oil Initially in Place (OOIIP),with 
about 80million tonnes of CO2 captured annually from flared flue gas, the CO2-EOR 
will yield 20-40% OOIIP, and this will translate to a savings of $ 474,500,000 
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excluding commercial sales of CO2, none of the oilfields is currently engaged in any 
CO2–EOR project and might not be in the foreseeable future due to lack of capacity 
to engage such a project.
381
 The potential very well exist however, different factors 
need to be considered such as the technological, economic, environmental and legal 
considerations, to make EOR viable in Nigeria.
382
 
Under the context of this thesis, depending on the proven financial viability of such 
projects and other relevant factors remain enduring, the potential to implement CO2-
EOR/CCS projects as CDM project in Nigeria’s vast oilfields remains attractive. So 
far, the closest step to implementing EOR/CCS project under CDM project is capture 
of otherwise flare-able or vented associated gas from oil and gas production. One of 
such associated gas capture CDM project involved in by Nigeria AGIP and Eni 
petroleum companies in partnership with the Global Gas Flaring Reduction public-
private partnership (GGFR) was the Kwale flare reduction project (CDM00513) 
which was the biggest CDM project on the continent to be registered under the 
Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism. Annex 1 countries provided the 
incentives to invest in such projects and also meet their international environmental 
obligation under the Kyoto Protocol. 
Due to the high number of CO2-EOR operations in the United States, the technical 
expertise for CO2-EOR project implementation is concentrated in the United States 
(who has not yet ratified the Kyoto Protocol), unfortunately such vast experience and 
expertise has not been transferred to other countries like the UK despite their robust 
geological characterisation of North Sea geological terrain hence no clear 
competitive advantage over other countries
383
 and the translation of this expertise to 
Non Annex 1 countries like Nigeria under the CDM framework could even be 
farfetched.  
The benefits and potential of engaging CO2-EOR for CCS purposes will not only 
provide climate change mitigation advantage on the broader scale but could also be a 
source of revenue that could offset the cost of the CCS operation. For instance, 
considering the Dakota Gasification Facility in the United States, it is estimated that 
over the 25 year period of the project about 18 million tonnes of CO2 could be used 
                                                          
381
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to recover 130million barrels of enhanced oil with 90% of CO2 used remaining in the 
geological formation
384
 reducing about 16.2million tonnes of CO2 escaping into the 
atmosphere (this is the stored amount of CO2 in the project). Calculating the return 
on the project therefore would be to determine the approximate return of the oil 
recovered by EOR and the returns made on storing the CO2 in the geological 
formation. Using OMC price per barrel of oil and gas produced to be about $3.50,
385
 
the average amount of CO2that can be injected is about 0.12tonnes (6Mcf) per 
barrel
386
 with 0.11 tonnes retained in the geological formation. The OMC for the 
total CO2 to recover 130million barrels over the 25 year period would be 
3.50x18x10
6
 = $63million.With baseline average price for a barrel of oil costing 
$100 per barrel, the return on the enhanced oil will be approximately $13billion. The 
returns on the CO2 stored will be approximately $154.7million if cost of carbon is 
trading at approximately $9.50.
387
 However, it is worth noting that the indirect 
consequence of enhancing the production capacity of these oilfields will be that the 
recovered gas will subsequently be burned thereby releasing more CO2 into the 
atmosphere.  
According to Metz et al (2005), the possibility of compromising the geological 
structure of some of these oilfields due to previous exploration 
activities
388
necessitates the importance to consider the possibility and risk 
implications of leakage through old access points.
389
 To this end, the rest of this 
chapter will review storage capacities relative to the monitoring and verification 
techniques adaptable to the different storage sites discussed earlier. 
 
 
                                                          
384
 Stevens et al., 2001, CO2 injection and sequestration in depleted oil and gas fields and 
deep coal seams: Worldwide potential and costs. Environmental Geosciences, 8(3), 200-209. 
doi:10.1046/j.1526-0984.2001.008003200.x 
385
 Plasynski, S., 2008, “Carbon Sequestration through Enhanced Oil Recovery”, U.S 
Department of Energy, 2008 
386
Supra note [Stevens et al., 2001] 
387
This is an Over The Counter (OTC) approximate price as provided by Point Carbon Price 
Assessment as of the 27
th
 of March 2012. 
388
Metz et al 2005, IPCC Special Report 2005. 
389
Bidlack C., 2010, Regulating The Inevitable: Understanding The Legal Consequences of 
and Providing For The Regulation Of The Geologic Sequestration Of Carbon Dioxide, 30 J. 
Land Res. Envtl. L. 199, 217-18 (2010)   
140 
 
Table 6 Oilfields identified in a 'desk top' review as having potential for CO2- 
EOR Source: The Scottish Government Website 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2009/04/28114540/7 
Field Name CO2 Storage 
Capacity /Mt 
CO2 
Potential for 
EOR 
Projected 
additional oil 
recovery 
(Million 
Barrels) 
Close of 
Production 
date 
Dunlin 
Oilfield 
27 Good 83 2015 
Thistle 
Oilfield 
27 Good 82 2015 
Claymore 
Oilfield 
(Central, Main 
and Northern) 
47 Good | OK 142 2030 
Cormorant 
Oilfield 
52 Good 157 2020 
Scott Oilfield 31 Good 95 2015 
Statfjord 
( UK) Oilfield 
209 ( UK + 
Norway) 
Good 635 ( UK + 
Norway) 
2020 
Beryl A 
Oilfield 
77 Good 232 2020 
Ninian Oilfield 96 Good 292 2030 
Brent Oilfield 165 Good 501 2015 
Murchison  
( UK) Oilfield 
26 OK 79 2020 
Miller Oilfield 17 OK 52 2008 
Buzzard 
Oilfield 
36 OK 108 2025 
Piper Oilfield 46 OK 140 2030 
Forties 
Oilfield 
138 OK 420 2015 
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3.8 A Review of the UK Storage Capacity 
Different authors have suggested different ways by which the CO2 storage capacity 
can be estimated. The storage capacity estimates for CO2 in the UK has broadly been 
based on available knowledge about oil and gas fields and saline aquifers geological 
formations located onshore and offshore of the British isle. The assessment of the 
storage potential has been completed for most offshore areas of the UK.
390
 Table 7 
below gives a synopsis of the different capacity while Figure 24 shows a 
geographical distribution of these capacities for geological storage survey as collated 
by the BGS and SCCCS, showing the distribution of the different geological 
formation that could serve for CO2 storage around the North Sea territorial waters of 
Britain). These publicly available assessment was by Holloway et al. (2006),
391
 and 
SCCCS 2009 showing the technical review and storage assessment of the UK in full. 
Although there is no considerable change in the overall technical assessment by 
other authors but there has been a noticeable adjustment in the methodologies and 
criteria used in reaching their conclusion on the storage formations capacity except 
that of the gas fields which has remained the same.
392
 
Table 7 Different Storage capacity in the UK (adapted from the DECC report 
by Senior 2010). 
Region Source  Total Capacity 
Oil & Gas 
Fields  
(Gt CO2) 
Capacity for 
Saline Aquifer  
(Gt CO2) 
Level of 
Capacity 
Estimated 
Southern 
North Sea 
BGS 3.9 7.1 -16.7 Effective/Early 
stage 
Irish Sea BGS 1.0 0 – 0.7 Effective/Early 
stage 
Central & 
Northern 
North Sea 
 
BGS 
 
2.5 - 5.0 
 
-  
 
Effective/Early 
stage 
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Central & 
Northern 
North Sea 
 
SCCCS 
 
1.9 
 
4.6 – 46.0 
 
Effective/Early 
stage 
 
Total
393
 
  
7.4 - 9.9 
 
11.7 – 63.4 
 
 
The following were the vital considerations deduced from the report which could 
also be relevant in the process of determining the CO2 storage capacity in Nigeria 
 Oil and gas fields that were less than 50Mt CO2 were considered too small to 
be included by the SCCCS in their results. And when these are excluded in 
BSG results the total capacity shrunk to 7.3Gt CO2 
 About 50% of the identified storage capacity in the UK in oil & gas fields 
was located in the Southern North Sea. 
 The potential and capacity in the depleted gas fields was considerably larger 
than those of the oil field. While the oil fields of the Central and Northern 
North Sea showed greatest storage potential. 
 The capacity estimates in the case of the aquifer are still at the early stages 
very much varied depending on the method used to arrive at the figures. 
However, ten offshore aquifers have been identified in Scotland with an 
estimated capacity of between 4.6 – 46Gt CO2 
 
                                                          
393
 This total does not include the BGS value for Central & Northern North Sea for both the 
oil & gas fields and the saline aquifers.   
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3.9 Nigeria CO2 Storage Potential Relative to Africa’s Storage 
Capacity 
Nigeria in West African Sub region remains the leading producer of oil and gas in 
Africa, hence suitable formation for CO2 storage exists in the offshore and onshore 
sedimentary basins
394
 of the country. In my research I did not come across a 
definitive research or documentation of the CO2 storage capacity relative to Nigeria 
in particular. It can only be extrapolated what Nigeria’s geological formation 
capacity can be based on the vast reserve capacity of hydrocarbon mostly in the 
Niger Delta region relative to Africa’s storage capacity estimates as indicated in IEA 
2008 report and Hendricks et al. 2004. Therefore, the data (as depicted in Figure 25) 
provided in this section are not specific to Nigeria but to Africa in general.  
Africa geographically divided into the following regions North, East, West, and 
South cumulatively have oil and gas fields which have CO2 storage potential 
                                                          
394Anastassia, M et al 2009, The Future of Carbon Capture and Storage in Nigeria”, Science 
World Journal Vol. 4 (No 3) 2009 www.sciecnceworldjournal.org 
Figure 24 TheDistribution of potential geological Storage formation for 
Britain around the North Sea Territorial Waters of the British Isle 
Source: British Geological Survey and Scottish Centre for Carbon Storage 
from the work of Holloway et al, 2006 
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Figure 25 Distribution of CO2 Storage Potential in Africa. Source IEA 2008 
capacity of between 30 to 280 Gt
395
 and the aquifer storage capacity of between 6 to 
220 Gt. However, the Northern and Western regions retain the largest share of this 
oil and gas reserves in particular Nigeria, suggesting that these regions have the 
highest potential for CO2 storage. Currently South Africa has Africa’s largest 
potential for CCS operations due to the levels of emissions from coal-fired power 
plant.
396
 With respect to the storage space in aquifer, each region in Africa has 
estimated capacity of between 15 to 60 Gt
397
 except the eastern region,
398
 while 
South Africa has the only ECBM capacity for CO2 Storage of about 8 to 40Gt.
399
 
 
 
 
3.10 CO2 Storage Monitoring and Verification 
The overriding reason for engaging in CCS is to reduce the amount of CO2 escaping 
into the atmosphere. It is important therefore that a system that clearly defines and 
determines how this goal can be monitored and verified not only for health and 
safety purposes or environmental integrity of the project but for resolving issues of 
liability and help enhancing the risk management strategy. 
The operation of CO2 storage require the Measuring, Monitoring and Verification 
(MMV) of the quantity of CO2 injected and retained in the storage reservoirs for site 
                                                          
395
 Hendricks et al 2004, “Global Carbon Dioxide Storage Potential and Costs, ECOFYS 
report EEP-02001,2004 
396
 IEA 2008, “CO2 Capture and Storage: A key carbon abatement option”. OECD/IEA 2008 
397
Id. IEA 2008 
398
Supra note [Anastassia M., et al. 2009]. 
399
Supra note [IEA 2008]. 
145 
 
characterisation of the potential geological formation,
400
 to ensure that the CO2 is 
retained in the formation and that any form of leakage is at the minimum.
401
 With 
these as necessary indicators, Anderson (2003) further suggested that the procedure 
should ensure the monitoring of any subsurface movement and environmental [and 
ecological] impacts.
402
 
In relation to environmental impact, the main concern would be the resulting liability 
from public health and safety hazards due to the escape of CO2 into the atmosphere 
and the potential contamination of groundwater aquifers. It is however possible as a 
risk mitigation strategy to monitor the groundwater contaminant flow by seismic 
technologies akin to that used by Statoil in the Sleipner CO2 storage project.
403
 
Exposure to CO2 at high concentration is one of the main causes of concern for 
public health and safety in the CCS technology implementation since CO2 at normal 
concentration does not impact on the environment and ecology due to ease of 
dissipation in the atmosphere over time. However, with possible blow-outs during 
injections or transportation of the gas, large volume leaks resulting to high 
concentration at low level area could be catastrophic.  
There are various monitoring technologies and measuring techniques for determining 
the exposure of an area to high CO2 concentration (see Table 8). The monitoring of 
leakage into the Vadose zone (an area directly above the water table) can be 
measured by observing the soil air concentration of CO2, the flux from the 
surrounding soils and the impact on the surface concentration of CO2.
404
 (See figure 
26 below). On a commercial scale and due to occupational implications, advance 
technological sensors are used to help with continuous monitoring of CO2 levels in 
the air,
405
 while groundwater monitoring can be achieved by the analysis of noble 
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gas and Isotope.
406
 Lewicki (2005) indicated that overcoming the difficulty 
associated with differentiating between natural ecological flux and the leakage of 
CO2 in small quantities from storage reservoir can be achieved by developing 
methods that aim at proficiently collecting data properties associated with CO2 
leakage at the same time reduce the natural CO2 flux.
407
 It is therefore of necessity in 
my opinion that to eliminate such concerns such methodology is integrated in the 
relevant national regulatory framework.  
Table 8 Monitoring and Verification Techniques for CO2 Storage (adapt from 
IPCC Special Report) 
Monitoring Techniques Application 
Introduction and Natural tracers Flux of CO2 can be traced in geological 
storage reservoirs  
Solubility trapping can be measured 
Tracing of leakage 
Vertical seismic profiling and cross-
well seismic imaging 
Detecting detailed distribution of CO2 in 
the storage formation 
Detecting leakage through faults and 
fractures 
Time-lapse 3-D seismic imaging Tracking CO2 movement and above 
storage formation 
Passive seismic monitoring Development of micro-fractures in 
formation and caprock 
CO2 migration pathway 
Electrical and electromagnetic 
techniques 
Tracking movement of CO2 in and above 
the geological reservoir 
Subsurface pressure Control of formation pressure below 
fracture gradient  
Wellbore and injection tubing condition 
Leakage out of the storage formation 
Well logs Tracing CO2 movement in and above 
storage formation 
Tracking migration of brine into shallow 
aquifers 
Calibrating seismic velocities for 3D 
seismic surveys 
Water composition Quantifying solubility and mineral 
trapping 
Quantifying CO2 –water-rock 
interactions 
Detecting leakage into shallow 
groundwater aquifers 
Soil gas sampling Detect elevated levels of CO2 
Identify source of elevated soil gas CO2 
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Evaluation ecosystem impacts 
CO2 land-surface flux monitoring by 
flux chamber or eddy-coveriance 
Detect, locate and quantify CO2 release 
Visible and infrared imaging from 
satellite or planes 
Detect vegetative stress 
 
 
 
 
Finally, another monitoring concern is with regards the economic impact vis-à-vis 
compromising the integrity of such incentive based program. Small leaks over a long 
period of time may not necessarily impact the public health but could compromise 
the economic integrity
408
 of the project due to the incentive based nature of the CDM 
project.  This problem would arise in a case when on the long term the initial carbon 
emissions reduction (CER) credits or allowances or offsets have been received by 
the different parties involved but eroded by continuous but gradual release of CO2 
into the atmosphere even when the implementation phase and contractual liability is 
ended or over a long period when the receipt of the incentive no longer exist. In this 
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case, it is important a set out financial security for ongoing monitoring and 
verification through either by government or privately funded mechanism in place to 
mitigate any associated risks or financial losses. 
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Chapter 4 
CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: 
RISKS ANALYSISOF NON CARBON CAPTURE STORAGE PROJECT 
4.0 Contextualising the Implication of Risk in CDM Investment 
The implementation of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects are 
influenced by different factors (external and internal) and at varying stages of the life 
cycle these factors and component interests are characterised with risks ranging from 
regulatory risk to investment risk, from volume risk to contractual risks and litigation 
risks. Inherent in every stage of the project life cycle are risks (obvious and not too 
obvious) that could inadvertently negatively affect the outcome of the project. It is 
therefore necessary to identify and analyse these possible risk factors using evidence 
and their consequences on the project regime and the delivery vis-à-vis the investors’ 
decision.  
For the purpose of this chapter, the author will attempt to explain different stages 
within the CDM project life cycle, vis-à-vis a critical analysis of what could 
constitute risk in each stage and why, and attempt to accentuate how this could affect 
CDM investment decisions. This risk analysis of CDM regulatory framework would 
form the bases to discuss the relevance of the overall risk impact of CCS 
implementation under CDM. It is important to note that this is an under-researched 
area for which other academic sources are not widely available, suggesting 
originality. 
Underscoring the fact that the impact of the risk is not only financial, but that it 
affects contracting parties’ ability to achieve the international environmental goals, 
risk will be discussed in this chapter with respect to CDM while identifying the risk 
elements within the regulatory framework namely, Host Country risk, Methodology 
risk, Validation risk, Registration risk, Certification risk and Non Host Country 
Sales/Trade risk. A critique of the risk impacts on investment and how this affects 
the decision process and the output of the project. The other aspect of the CCS-CDM 
risk will be discussed in the next chapter with attempt to articulate the relevance of 
risk based contextual strategies that can be used in CCS-CDM framework.  
The increased awareness about the detrimental effects of anthropogenic activities has 
necessitated a public and private sector participation in the mitigation and adaptation 
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processes of climate change. Kyoto Protocol FM activities to mitigate the climate 
change dilemma could be broadly classified based on the transaction methodologies 
the Allowance-Based Transaction and the Project-Based Transaction (Lecocq et al., 
2007, Kimura 2006). 
The growth that has been observed in FM of the Protocol in the past has significantly 
slowed down due to many factors among such is the current global economic 
recession,
409
lack of political will to push for a more comprehensive global mitigation 
strategy and other inherent risk issues in the structure and processes of approving 
and executing CDM projects. There is no certainty that an upward trend will be 
sustained once the global economy rebounds. Suffice to say however, the constituent 
regulatory and investment decision risks analysed and discussed in this chapter will 
only be related to the Project-Based compliance mechanisms with specifics to the 
Clean Development Mechanism and not the overriding trend of carbon market or 
carbon pricing as this could provide another bases for another research endeavour. 
The majority of project-based activities were accounted for by the CDM in the past 
commitment period. However, there has been a significant trend of growth in the 
contribution of JI as compared with previous years.
410
 Overall, it is worth of noting 
that there is price volatility that is albeit, not peculiar to the carbon market alone but 
in context has been due to varying reasons ranging from market forces to 
governmental policies or the general cash flow of the investors to the procedural 
anomalies or uncertainties in the CDM implementation and certification processes. 
This high price volatility would discourage investment in low carbon emission CDM 
projects.
411
 
The statistical data provided by STCM 2008 report showed that the combined value 
of primary and secondary CDM transactions in 2007 was 791MtCO2e total value of 
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409
 in the Allowance Based 
Transactions. The extent of the impact the global economic recession on CDM projects 
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US$12.9billion (€10billion or £8.41billion). It is apposite to note that these volumes 
and values could have been higher if the project risk elements of CDM processes 
were considerately and meticulously addressed from the outset particularly in 
reference to CCS opportunities related to this mechanism. 
The CDM component of the Protocol as defined in Article 12
412
 lays out the 
mutually beneficial interactive purpose of the activities of CDM vis-à-vis Non 
Annex 1 countries as the project hosts and the Annex 1 countries (and their private 
or corporate entities) as investors. The mutually beneficial attributes of this provision 
and the shared need to contribute to the abatement of climate change and in the same 
process contribute to the sustainable development of the host countries by capacity 
building, and technology transfer, emphasises the need for projects emanating from 
this mechanism to meet some level of stringent regulatory provisions for it to be 
considered compliant.
413
 Consequently, these expectations have inherent risks which 
if not mitigated could result in the failure of the project and non-attainment of these 
mutually beneficial goals.  
4.1 CDM Project Cycle and Risk Elements 
Discussed further in section 4.2, different risks (costs and levels impact) are 
identifiable in the process of implementing any projects and CDM as a project-based 
market mechanism is not an exception. Projects are subject to risks relative to policy 
change, currency fluctuations, technology obsolescence, cost and time overrun 
etc.
414
It is crucial that risk assessment of the project remains an integral part of the 
planning stage, all through the execution of the project. Below is a developed 
schematic of how a typical CDM Project life cycle inter-relates with each attributed 
risk elements at every stage of the CDM project life cycle. 
 
CDM projects are fundamentally high level risk projects.
415
 The high risk element of 
CDM is inherent generally due to the implementation framework for CDM, vis-à-vis 
the Parties involved and the compliance verification characters of the mechanism
416
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such as Baseline, Additionality, monitoring and verification. Non Annex 1 host 
country interests, the need to implement the fundamentally ‘beneficial trio’ of 
Article 12 (i.e. technology transfer, sustainable development and capacity building) 
by Annex 1 country or investors in making the project compliant with the regulatory 
framework, and the overriding compliance verification of Additionality clause are 
important CDM specific risk issues that have to be factored in for smooth execution 
of CDM project.  
Table 9 identifies the risks associated with CDM projects in comparison with 
conventional projects based on the following stages namely planning and design 
stage, implementation stage and operational stage, while subsequent sub sections 
will discuss the CDM framework risk ramification in more detail 
Host locations for CDM projects are mostly in the transient economies or developing 
countries and Least Developed Countries (LDC) which have high political, socio-
economic instability and deteriorating infrastructure
417
 - with the exception of a few 
countries like India, Brazil, China and South Africa. The high risk factors in such 
countries could affect the dynamics and end results of potential CCS-CDM projects, 
costing the investor(s) a lot and could result in litigations and arbitrations. Further 
research studies need to be conducted to establish if there is any correlation between 
risks, arbitration, the final outcome of CDM project and the cost impact to 
investors.
418
 
The UNFCCC registration statistics online publication of February 2009 confirmed 
that consequent to the reasons stated above inter alias, LDC countries like Nigeria, 
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account for significantly low levels (just less than 2% of global projects i.e. 19 CDM 
projects
419
) of participation in the CDM mechanism.  
Kyoto flexible mechanism was founded on the need to ensure that climate change is 
mitigated in a cost effective, sustainable manner and beneficial to the developing and 
LDC by applying the “common but differentiated responsibility” principle of 
International Environmental law.
420
 However, the risks associated with achieving the 
trio (i.e. Sustainable Development,
421
 Capacity building
422
 and Transfer of 
Technology
423
) as stipulated in the  Protocol are not necessarily very explicit but are 
considered significant in view of the importance of having to achieve these goals in 
other to consider the project a success or Kyoto compliant. The extent of 
enforcement of the sustainable development, technology transfer and capacity 
building goals naturally determine the size of the CDM project and the market,
424
 
firstly due to the cost implication on the investor, and secondly, the likely use of 
these criteria to create further delays in the approval process. According to Ascui et 
al. (2008) this magnifies the operational performance risks especially if the 
performance guarantees cannot be provided by the technology providers.
425
 
Finally, the compliance verification element of Additionality
426
 is fundamental to the 
environmental integrity and credibility of CDM. That said, it is one of the most 
difficult paradoxes of emissions reduction to reconcile due to reasons which range 
from the ambiguity of its definition and verification, to been a self-imposed obstacle 
to ensure that the process of executing socio-environmentally beneficial projects 
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under the flexible mechanism is credible.
427
 It is important to note however, that the 
significance of “Additionality” in the verifiability and credibility of CERs should be 
seen as a positive risk that must be embraced by all Parties involved in CDM project. 
The need to use Additionality as a form of surety for the integrity of CDM project is 
important and crucial to the integrity of CDM projects. NGOs like WWF in a 2005 
submission insist that “Without Additionality, the CDM [would] results in increased 
global emissions and thus the Additionality criteria should be strict and the 
enforcement must be effective”,428 this indeed should clearly be the case otherwise 
there would be a flagrant abuse of the mechanism and further increase the GHG 
emission to the atmosphere.  
 
Additionality should be comprehensively integrated into the CDM framework to 
provide a more robust impact on the overall result thereby undermining the issues 
associated with it being a risk. The robustness of the methodology of calculating, the 
enforcement of relevant legal frameworks and ensuring Additionality in CDM 
projects should be the main concern of all the different Parties in the process. 
Although no CDM methodology has been approved for CCS projects so far, 
however in Nigeria CDM registered fugitive type projects for reducing gas flaring 
have been developed with fundamentals similar to CCS.
429
 One of such is the Obiafu 
/Obrikomoil field project (CDM 0513) in the Niger Delta area of Nigeria with the 
aim of using the project to reduce the flaring of gases while using the captured 
associated gases for EOR.
430
 The estimated CERs from the project were 2.64 million 
tonnes CO2e/year.
431
 The Additionality methodology (AM9)
432
was based on the 
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AM0009 (i.e. the Rand Dong Methodology but also incorporating aspects of the 
NMB067 and NMB068) set to address the economic attractiveness and the 
legal/market barriers aspects of this options. However, the laws associated with 
regulating volumes of associated gas sent for flaring in Nigeria have largely been 
unsuccessful due to the inherently riskier alternatives associated with the utilisation 
of associated gases.
433
 The opportunity cost of not flaring gas in Nigeria remains 
low. Despite the Associated Gas Re-injection Act 1979 and its amendment by the 
House of Representative in 2001 which fixed the flare out date as 2004, the flaring 
of gas has remained significantly high. It is clear that the current regulations are 
insufficient to reduce flaring and the capacity to enforce this regulations are lacking. 
The economic interest of continuing to flare remains in favour of the operators if the 
7.5 US cents per 1000 standard cubic foot remains the cost implication for adherence 
to the law and this generates substantial revenue to the government compared to 
when flaring is stopped.  
 
 
Thus the driver for reduced gas flaring in Nigeria is due more to the conditions that 
favour investments rather than regulation. Based on this therefore, additionality test 
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Figure 27 Schematic Review of the stages and possible risk factors in CDM project. 
 
 
Figure.9 Schematic Review of the stages and possible risk factors in CDM project. 
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would suggest that without the Carbon credits from such reinjection project it would 
be economically unviable to operate the project. Also considering the legal barrier as 
a test, this project is beyond the country’s regulatory requirement it could therefore 
be considered additional. See Table 9 below for a summary of potential conventional 
and sovereign risk issues associated with CDM Projects. 
As stated above, there are specific risks associated with each implementation stage 
of CDM project life cycle. See Figure 27 for a schematic review. These like other 
risks have its impact on the investment decisions of both the investor and the project 
developer. The level of its impact on a CDM projects determines the output of the 
project. The contributors to these risks could range from institutional entities such as 
the Executive Body (EB) or Designated National Authorities (DNA) to internal 
infrastructural challenges in the host country (such as bad roads, geopolitical unrest, 
lack of qualified man-power etc.) or lack of properly designed or implemented risk 
assessment analysis. It is also important to note that risks could arise at any stage of 
implementing the project which might not have been foreseen during the project risk 
assessment stage. Hence the continuous need to reassess the project vis-à-vis risk 
potentials and its set goal against the progress made within the stages of the project 
life cycle is crucial cumulating in a robust risk management strategy for the project. 
 
157 
 
Risk on CDM Project 
Stage Conventional Project Risk CDM Risk Project Host Sovereign Risk  
Planning and Design Stage Regulatory Risk 
- Lack of or Delay in Approval 
- Lack or Delay in financial 
disclosure 
- Poor public consultation 
resulting in stakeholder 
objection 
- Poor Feasibility  
- Failure of conclusion of 
contract and agreement 
Regulatory Risk 
- Failure to develop credible 
PIN/PDD 
- Non acceptance of project by 
contracting Parties 
- Failure to demonstrate 
Additionality 
- Lack of conclusive ERPA 
Political and Administrative 
Risk 
- Poor policy and Legal 
framework 
- Institutional changes and 
inconsistencies 
- License and Approval 
Economic Risk 
- Transfer Risk  
- Potential economic crisis  
- Exchange risk 
- Credit risk 
Socio-Political instabilities 
- Wars,  
- Riots 
- Coup d’état 
Implementation Stage Construction Risk 
- Failure to or delay in 
completion 
- Contractual default by any of 
the parties 
- Objection by stakeholders  
- Consequence of Environmental 
Impact 
- Force Majeure 
Regulatory Risk 
- Potential change in Rules 
and modalities of CDM  
- Not continuing with the 
Protocol or fundamental and 
far reaching change to the 
flexible mechanism 
framework 
- Withdrawal by contracting 
Table 9 Risk on CDM Projects compared with Conventional and Sovereign Risks (Adapted from UNEP 2006 and Beidleman 1990) 
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parties from the Protocol 
Operational Stage Operational Risk 
- Low production 
- Accident and break down 
- Problem with the supply chain, 
the buyers or project operation 
- Force Majeure 
- Monitoring/verification risk 
- Post Kyoto risk 
- Review of issuance risk 
- Emissions Trading Scheme 
risk 
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4.2 CDM Regulatory Framework Risk 
4.2.1 Host Country Approval Risk 
The consensus attributed to the CDM and indeed its defining element is the 
involvement and mutually inclusive relationship between Annex 1 and Non 
Annex1 countries
434
 in jointly implementing CDM projects that can mitigate the 
emission of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere. These projects are to be 
implemented in a host country (Non Annex 1) with the funding or investment of 
government or private entities from the Annex 1 countries. The implications of this 
theoretically is to ensure the technological transfer, sustainable development and 
capacity build referred to above as the fundamental trio of Article 12 is achieved in 
the host country and the Certified Emissions Reductions CERs credits from such 
projects can be used to meet the compliance requirement of the sponsoring State or 
entity.   
Along these laudable goals come the inherent challenges for the Host Countries. 
The poor institutional environment, infrastructural, and in some cases the socio-
political instability are cogent realities that militate against the implementation of 
these projects and according to Hines (1995) and Shang-Jin et al (2000) all these 
invariably deter foreign investment flow to potential CDM host countries.
435
 
Generally, “Country Risk” are usually host specific, infrastructural, social, political 
and economic [instability] in nature, and also whether the host country’s approval 
of the project by issuing or not issuing a LoA to the project developer.
436
 
Approval in the form of LoA is required to execute a CDM. This approval must 
come from the host country’s DNA.  The vital and integral nature of the DNA in 
CDM implementation has with it risks and this could be interpreted as either 
certain or variable risks.
437
 The binary approval risk refers to the certainty of either 
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it is approved or not. However, the variable risks would include risks associated 
with time lag and the market interference, corruption, domestic law and order, 
efficiency of bureaucratic structure and other socioeconomic conditions which 
have higher dysfunctional incidence in most host countries. These generally affect 
the approval rates from DNA for PDD.
438
 However, Castro et al (2008) pointed out 
that information on how many project proposals are rejected by host country DNA 
due to failure to meet the DNA requirements was not publicly available (in a 
country like China where the research was conducted) for varying reasons
439
 
including poor data portal and administrative infrastructure to allow for public 
accessibility to of the required information. 
The average duration of getting a LoA is four and half months but there have been 
situations in the past were these have extended to over a year. For instance the 
Thailand military coup of 2006 resulted in the delay of approval by the DNA. The 
impact of this on the investors in the project was far reaching.  Any uncertainty 
involved in the governance of a jurisdiction where a CDM project is implemented 
has enormous impact on the financial involvement of the investors. It is suggested 
one of the reasons why the level of CDM projects are significantly low in Africa is 
due to the political instability and frequent change of government. This is however, 
not the case in Nigeria in the past decade but there has been an increase in civil 
unrest and terrorist activities. 
Another congenital difficulty associated with some host countries is the 
interference with the CERs pricing by the DNA. An example of this is in China 
where there is a relatively indirect meddling; this meddling is intended mostly to 
ensure that the Chinese seller or Party in the CDM project makes the largest 
gain.
440
 The uniqueness of the Chinese CDM framework allows for four main 
means of intrusion according to Xie et al (2008), namely the Chinese authority sets 
the minimum price for CERs, requires that the project owner(s) are Chinese 
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sponsored, a CDM levy is imposed on the CERs revenues and finally, any form of 
consultancy involvement is at a premium.
441
 This intrusion by host country 
governments (and its officials) causes unease in the market and can negatively 
influence the outcome of the project. A high level of certainty and consistency 
across board is crucial for investor confidence and more so to truly determine the 
cost of the project and the price of CERs.  
From an environmental perspective, sustainable development criteria are important 
to the credibility of CDM projects. However, host countries that use this as an 
excuse or opportunity to interfere in CDM projects could risk the ultimate 
withdrawal of investment in the current and future projects. Vital to mitigating 
DNA delays would be to take an “early bird approach” by investors to deal with 
DNAs interference in terms of pre-empting any possible response actions by the 
DNA thereby reducing time wasted. 
4.2.2 Methodology
442
 Risk 
 “Will the process for approving methodologies and projects not deter 
would-be project developers [and indeed an investor] because of undue 
complexity?”443 
 
The vast financial and resource involvement in developing methodologies is 
fundamentally a concern for CDM project actualisation. The use of already 
approved methodologies has proved to be a viable means of reducing the cost and 
overall risk implications to a CDM project. Although, this does not according to 
Ascui et al (2008) negate the possibility of Executive Body (EB) withdrawing or 
putting on hold an already approved methodology.
444
 An example of these was a 
situation in which two methodologies related to animal waste manure management 
system which after four months of putting it on hold was consolidated into what is 
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now known as ACM0010
445
. Approval of projects based on these methodologies 
was also put on hold during this period hence a ripple effect of delay on the whole 
CDM project. 
The attention given to the development of CDM project methodologies is clearly 
seen in the level of recent qualities and complexity in Methodologies submitted to 
the EB. The time involved in the approval of a methodology has a critical impact 
on the willingness of an investor to continue the sponsoring of a CDM project. 
Delays of any form in a CDM project not only could have a negative consequence 
on individual project development but on the whole carbon market.  This 
conclusively draws to light the uncertainties associated with the post 2012 issues 
related to use of CERs in the EU ETS.
446
 
 
In 2007 Carbon market giants like EcoSecurities suffered a significant downward 
revision to their carbon value forecast with a drop in share value of almost 50%
447
. 
The reasons attributed to the Carbon Market tsunami according to Bruce Usher 
CEO of EcoSecurities were the slowdown in project approval rates and a cut in 
credit issuance by the EB of CDM by almost a quarter of the expected 185 Million.  
Emmanuel Fages of Société Générale however expanded on the criticality of 
methodology on the output of investment. In his view the methodologies are 
becoming more complex while the projects are getting smaller. Michaelowa 
commented that it was important that the project developer need to improve the 
quality of their PDD to ensure a greater chance of going through the more robust 
EB scrutiny of PDD. 
                                                          
445
 Consolidated Methodology for GHG emissions reductions from manure management 
systems Version 5, The ACM0010 is a consolidation of 2 methodologies the AM0006 
which is a “GHG ER from manure management systems” based on a CDM-PDD “Methane 
capture and combustion of swine manure treatment for Peralillo whose baseline study, 
monitoring, and verification plan and PDD was prepared by Agricola Super Limitada. The 
other methodology was AM0016 which was a “GHG mitigation from improved Animal 
Waste Management System in confined animal feeding operations”, whose baseline study, 
monitoring and verification plan and PDD were prepared by AgCert Canada Co. (UNFCCC 
CDM EB ACM0010 Version 02 Sectoral Scope 13 and 15 EB 28. 
446ClimateFocus 2008.“Treatment of CDM/JI Credits According to the EU ETS 
Amendment Proposal”. Climate Focus 1st May 2008. 
447
 Carbon Finance 2007 EcoSecurities’ woes prompt CER rethink lead story report 20 
November, 2007 available on http://www.carbon-
financeonline.com/index.cfm?section=lead&action=view&Id=10846 
163 
 
On average it has taken 304 days for a methodology to be approved from the 
deadline of submission. (Around is the methodologies treated at a meeting of the 
Methodology Panel). The risk index of project rejection is current 0.5 on the scale 
of 0 to 1. The average cost implication of developing project methodology 
(depending on the level of complexity or simplicity) is estimated to average at 
about US$ 100,000.00. When compared to the possible returns from this same 
project this is a significant investment. It must be noted however that the lack of 
approved methodology remains the main reason CCS projects submitted to the EB 
was not approved not necessarily the cost of implementing this stage of the project 
life cycle. There is a case however that initial investment may prove to be the 
greater risk against the implementation of the project although; the amount could 
be dwarfed by potential CCS CER returns, it is almost certain for developing 
countries that the upfront CCS investment at this stage would almost of a certain 
represent the biggest risk if the amount the UK government was willing to 
investment in the failed Scottish Power project is anything to go by.  
4.2.3 Validation Risk 
The risk most associated with validation stage is resultant from delay “Time lag” 
and the consequences linked to the amount of money tied down in the investment 
and also the uncertainties associated with the future of CERs post 2012. Since this 
is a required phase to ensure that the quality of PDD to be submitted for 
Registration is reviewed by third party valuators (DoE), often this process involves 
a painstaking review of the document. The lack of needed experts has in most host 
countries resulted in backlogs.
448
 The need for project developers (and in some 
cases investors) to work closely with the DoE would have a more far reaching 
effect vis-à-vis cost of minimising the risk. The initial quality of work put into 
developing the PDD would also have a dramatic impact on the time spent and input 
of the DoE. It is important to note that it is not in the interest of the project 
developer or investor or the overall outcome of the project to attempt influencing 
the DoE approval process as is suggested to be the case in some host countries
449
. 
The outcome of this fast track approach could be far reaching when compared to 
the delay risk. The 2007 UNEP Risøe indicators show that of the total 1523 
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projects, 961 of these are still at the Validation stage. These figures show the 
importance and likely risk impact from this stage and the level of backlog at this 
stage of the CDM project life cycle. 
4.2.4 Registration Risk 
The logical progression of any CDM PDD once it has gone through the rigorous 
scrutiny of the above stages (DNA and DoE scrutiny) is the Registration of the 
project. At this stage, the result is usually binary i.e. either accepted or rejected. 
However, there is a grey flex in this stage. It is common practice to have this stage 
extend beyond the 8 week stipulation.
450
 The delays associated with this stage are 
often consequent of any or a combination of these elements 
 Poor preparation and submission delays by the DoE 
 The non-acknowledgment of receipt of approved PDD by the EB for 
onward uploading to the UNFCCC database/website 
 Also the isolation of project stakeholder (developers and investors) 
from the EB could critically exacerbate the risks associated with this 
stage. Since they are not fully abreast of the developments until the 
results are reached and made public.  
Since inception of the Registration and Issuance Team in 2006 designated to 
review and appraisal requests,
451
 review requests have seen an average increase of 
about 20%. Significant Review has been noticed with the HFC (40.5%) and Fossil 
Fuel (35.7%) project types.
452
 This obviously has resulted in criticisms for lack of 
Additionality despite the use of Additionality tools.
453
 Additionality factor is 
fundamental to all the risk elements of CDM projects. The extent of accuracy of 
Additionality for CDM Methodology underscores the extent risk impact would be 
not just on the acceptance of the methodology by EB but would resonate on the 
outcome of the whole project.  
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There is inconsistency and ambiguity on how registration review is carried out and 
what constitute for a review in terms of the scale i.e. minor or significant. In a case 
involving EcoSecurities the project had been rejected even after the original error 
had been corrected and another call for review was triggered by spelling mistakes 
in the PDD.
454
 The impact of such uncertainty and the risk associated with such 
trivialities is not proportionate to the investment losses that results. The CERs are 
consequently undervalued and the overall capital (or foreign direct investment) 
inflow to host countries in future project are affected.  
4.2.5 Certification Risk 
CDM project certification stage has inherent in it risks as in every other stage of 
the project life cycle. According to UNEP Risøe data studied, 20% of all requests 
for issuance have resulted in a review request, and 70% have resulted in formal 
review and of those reviews completed 20% have resulted in rejection.  
Matsuhashi (2004) notes that certification risk is strongly linked with the project 
types. He further argues that if the technologies could be improved for recovering 
and combusting methane from coal mining in host countries, the baseline in the 
project for recovering methane would be lowered, leading to a reduction of CER 
units. In the worst case, operational entities might not certify the project as CDM. 
In order to suppress these risks, investment in different types of projects, rather 
than in similar projects is appropriate.  
Consistent with other risk discussed, this risk also has the ability to affect the 
developer’s ability to deliver the CERs to the investor. Generally, the issuance of 
certificates (CERs) for the CDM projects might be considered the hallmark of 
project developers in the project life cycle but there are clearly other different risks 
that could be encountered which will impede on the final trading of the CERs in 
the Carbon Market. For CCS though calculation of CERs should be a 
straightforward calculation of the volume of CO2 that could be stored at a given 
site.  
This impact of these overall remains both qualitative and quantitative. In view of 
this stage of the project life cycle it is important that as much as possible the risk 
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factor at this point should be avoided due to the large amount of monetary and time 
invested in the CDM project by all concerned. 
4.2.6 Non-Host Country Sale/trade Risk 
Most of the risk associated with the Annex 1 countries (mainly the investors and 
project sponsors) is linked to the uncertainties of post 2012. EU ETS the main 
market for the CERs generated by CDM is very unclear about the future of the 
CERs. The proposal provided by the European Commission for the third phase of 
EU ETS has introduced a number of changes which include
455
 
 The use of an EU wide cap on emission allowances, with the 
elimination of individual Member States’ National Allocation Plan 
(NAP) 
 The gradual reduction of free allocations of allowances but with more 
interest in auction based system of allowance acquisition 
 Inclusion of more industries and GHG in the scheme 
 New rules of treating CERs and ERU by Member States post 2012. 
As a result, there were a lot of uncertainties with regards the continuity of the 
current mitigating measure and system post Copenhagen 2009 and the post 2008 
global economic crises. These have posed a degree of scepticism in the minds of 
would-be-investors who are willing to wait and watch how the game plays out.  
However, CCS should be given some priority as it is part of the Commission’s plan 
for mitigating climate change (with a possible 20% of carbon savings to come from 
CCS by 2050) 
ClimateFocus (CF) May 2008 commentary on the proposal articulated 2 scenarios; 
Scenario A in which considerable limitations is placed on the use of Kyoto project 
credits (CERs & ERUs) for compliance purposes in the EU ETS, in such a case the 
bankable EU allowance are used up during this specified tradable period that is not 
beyond 2012 to meet the compliance regime, consequently, not allowing for any 
future demand for CERs in the third phase.  
Scenario B assumes a case where there is an International consensus in 
Copenhagen on the continuous use of the Kyoto flexible mechanisms and its 
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credits. But still leaves the EU Commission to decide if it will further allow the use 
of CERs and ERUs from CDM/JI respectively in EU ETS and to what degree. 
That there is a high level of uncertainty among the major buyers of the credits 
could be a nail to the coffin for CDM projects moving forward however the arrival 
of the Durban Accord (from COP17 in Durban)suggests the protection of CDM till 
at least 2017 (if not 2020) at the earliest. It is also important to add that the large 
stakeholder following and carbon economy resulting from the mechanism has the 
potential to keep it going for a long while even more so as the climate change 
crises worsens.  
If the Scenario A above is the case, there is a likelihood that project sponsors 
would have to consider investing in other projects that guarantees returns post 
2012. And if the Scenario B is the case, the need to clarify the degree of EU 
involvement in the use of CERs as a tradable credit will have to be well presented 
before the investors not only in clear manner but with expediency and in time. 
Finally, the Scenario C underscores climate change as a reality and inevitably has 
come to stay and the measures or policies aimed at it should not only be for 
mitigation but should also include adaptation strategies especially towards the LDC 
which are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change.
456
 The risk of not 
integrating adaptation measures would be much greater to the world and 
overarching. The risk element in this scenario does not necessarily infer risk as in 
the context of the project life cycle but its interconnectedness with the outcome of 
CDM project in the developing countries cannot be over emphasised. 
4.3 Ramifications of CDM Project Risk on Investment Decision 
Uncertainty in any form is precarious to investment and its decision making 
processes.  The investment returns of CDM are tied to the turnaround time of the 
project and the capacity to reduce the risk levels. Multi portfolio management or 
diversification of investments or insurance as ways of reducing the impact of CDM 
project risks, but that in it could carry its risks and limitations (see Chapter 4 for 
detailed discussion on Risk mitigation options). Also, CDM bond could or should 
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be viewed as a possible risk mitigation tool.
457
  However, if the risk of a portfolio 
of assets is less than the sum of risks of individual assets; bond managers would be 
in a position to spread the risks among the portfolio thereby reducing the overall 
risk
458
. To some extent it is possible to have to take on the technical risk argument 
that CCS is just not yet a sufficiently mature technology for investment purposes as 
suggested by then Secretary of State Chris Huhne as the reason the Longannet 
project could not be continued.
459
 
 
Just as an investor’s attitude to risk will determine to some extent what project and 
country to invest in; - the more risk adverse investor would have a greater 
propensity to invest more conservatively in projects which have little proven track 
records of acceptance and EB ratified methodology but possible high returns. So 
also, the risk assessment result of projects factoring in different technicalities 
would provide the investors the needed bases to make an informed decision on the 
likely outcome of the project and the possible returns on the investment. It is clear 
that the extent of risks associated with a project remarkably influences the direction 
of investors in a project and in a host country to carry out the project 
4.4 Additional Challenges to Investment Decisions 
In an overall global financial market where Foreign Direct Investment flows have 
declined by 21percent on average (and by as high as 31 percent in developing 
nations as reported by World Bank Global Economic Prospect report 2008)
460
 
achieving financial closure is difficult for projects
461
 consequent to the current 
global economic crises, many promising project ideas languish because of 
insufficient prospect of attracting underlying finance (STCM 2006). Any additional 
project life cycle risk would further discourage any investors’ involvement in CDM 
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projects. The levels of uncertainties associated with the future of the CERs and 
flexible mechanism are precarious to the future of CDM projects. EU ETS latest 
direction in relation to the uncertainties of its third phase is not helping investor 
confidence neither is the current global economic turbulence. Nothing undermines 
any possible investment or investor’s interests as much as the “time lag 
syndrome”, speculations and uncertainty. This is clearly seen with its consequences 
in recent global financial events on Wall Street and the global financial circuits.   
The impact of the economic crises of 2008 might not be the only issue that has 
undermined the investor response to the CDM project all around the world. There 
is definitely the uncertainty that lack of clarity about the direction of the post Kyoto 
dialogue is taking. A wait-and-see approach is prevailing within CDM project 
investment community. This does not only result in decline in returns and share 
values as the case of EcoSecurities and other investors noted above but also on 
micro economies that depend on the inflow of the investment for its subsistence 
and sustenance. 
4.5 Post Kyoto Risk and CDM Risk Analysis 
The post Kyoto risk was associated with uncertainties about the form and direction 
the resolutions in Copenhagen conference in December of 2009 will take. Even 
with the Durban CMP17/COP 7 just recently concluded, issues are still not fully 
resolved about the future and the direction. However there is an appetite for the 
CDM to continue but no clarity about the form it will take. The uncertainties  
associated with the scope and future framework of interaction between Annex 1 
countries and institutions and their future interactions with Non Annex 1 countries 
vis-á-vis the flexible mechanisms remains the most important and exigent 
impediment to the investment decisions of current and potential investors in CERs 
related projects and could more so have a high risk impact in the long run on not 
only the project developers but also on the economies that depend on these 
projects.  
 
A degree of assurance that there will be market for the ultimate sell of generated 
CERs is crucial to the investor (i.e. market continuity is important in making a 
decision as to whether it is expedient to invest in the production of a product). This 
market confidence and certainty of continuity are major indicators for the investor 
in investment decision and the actualisation of CERs trading.  As the case is clearly 
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now with the uncertainties associated with EU ETS and the trading of CERs 
through this platform, the withdrawal of investment in CDM is expected. The 
author is of the opinion that investment decisions will be significantly affected by 
the cloud of doubt presently affecting the future of the flexible mechanism post 
2012. The complexities of achieving a consensus on an internationally binding 
legal framework for post Kyoto climate change issues is brought to bear in 
different publications and dialogues surrounding the way forward for climate 
change post 2012.  
 
From carbon market and pricing perspective, the multiplicity of approaches sequel 
to 2012 could almost certainly create a significant price variance that might reduce 
the size and liquidity of the market along with create a regulatory pool of different 
and disjointed requirements for both the investors and the developers to deal with. 
The entry of Australia has undoubtedly redefined the dynamics of emissions 
trading in particular and the flexible mechanism as a whole and hopefully the 
Durban consensus having incorporated major polluters like China, India and Brazil 
in bringing about more credibility would create some level buoyancy to the carbon 
market by reducing (or possibly reversing) the risk impact so far caused by this 
“wait and see” approach in industry. 
 
Host Country risk considerably undermines the investors’ interest in investing in 
developing countries. The instability from socio-political frameworks and the 
deplorable state of most of the countries’ infrastructure is often highlighted as the 
reason for a poor representation of CDM projects in Africa. Except for countries 
like South Africa that has relatively more stable economic and socio-political 
infrastructure when compared to the rest African States, this particular risk type 
may not be of significant impact to it. EcoSecurities for instance use a CARE
462
  
tool for compounding 3 host country risk factors in a matrix into a single risk factor 
to determine the host country risk level. In considering the host country risk, the 3 
risk indicators used by EcoSecurities include War, Expropriation and Government 
action, and Transfer risks. Using models like this does not only give clear risk 
                                                          
462
Carbon Assets Risk Evaluation(CARE) tool is a bespoke excel based risk assessment 
tool is developed by EcoSecurities. It uses Monte Carlo simulations to give an initial 
assessment of the overall risk profile, screen individual projects at the early stages and help 
formulate a global strategy for the acquisition of CERs.  
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indications but provides CDM investment decision indices about different 
countries and aerates the host country decision choice pathway for the investors 
and project developers Carbon Assets Risk Evaluation 
 
According to Michaelowa (2006) “A lack of resources, institutional barriers and 
other development priorities impede the investment [in] developing countries...” 
while in the case of Annex 1 investors investing in Non Annex 1 countries, the lack 
of confidence in the socio-political structures and other infrastructural barriers in 
most Non Annex 1 countries impede willingness to partner and invest in CDM 
projects hosted in the country. The need to ensure that a level of stability is 
guaranteed in the host country for an investor is paramount to his decision making 
and willingness to commit and wade through the other risks that would or could 
arise in the process of completing the project.  
 
Ideally, host countries have a responsibility to ensure that the right socioeconomic 
and domestic regulatory framework are in place to influence the confidence of 
potential Annex 1 investors, stable political processes and provisions of working 
social, economic and physical infrastructure should be a top priority for host 
countries. It is important also to ensure that projects are facilitated without undue 
interference either directly or indirectly by the government or its officials.  
 
Finally, the methodology risk vis-à-vis the issues of Additionality and baseline 
determinant factors is another risk element that would seriously affect investment 
decisions. The lack of clarity about the calculation and how to determine and 
monitor what is additional is still an area that is unclear and need further research.  
The relatively high risk (in some cases up to 50% rejection) of rejections 
consequent to CDM-EB rejecting methodologies
463
 does not incentivise investors 
to take the decision to follow new methodology. Albeit, the cost of even taking on 
the challenge could be out of reach for most investors as referred to above in 
Section 4.3 and 4.4.  
 
Even with the use of approved methodologies as stated above, there are recorded 
instances where project approvals have been delayed due to the review and 
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consolidation of two or more methodologies and complexities of the methodologies 
based on the requirements of the EB.
464
 The impact of this on small project investor 
is significant. As “time equals money to the investor”, it implies that for every time 
lost, a proportionate amount of money is lost it is therefore important that the risk 
assessment on a CDM methodology stage – as indeed for every other stage – is 
comprehensive and robust enough to mitigate any methodology risk impact on the 
project. 
4.6 Conclusion 
The risk of falling short of the projected 2.7 billion CERs by 2012 according to 
IETA is very likely and more so due to delays experienced in registration of 
projects and the ripple effect of these delays on the delivery by the project 
developer and the obtaining of financing from investors for the implementation of 
the projects.
465
 The predictability of any project is vital to the success of the project 
as such it is important therefore that for there to be growth in the CDM sector and 
innovativeness, it is necessary that there is a high level of predictability in the 
process for security on investment. Every CDM project (as in any other project) 
has inherent in it risk elements that could be either externally imposed or internally 
induced. The full risk-impact assessment of CDM projects is needed to reach an 
informed and robust investment decision.  
The dynamics of CDM project and its inherent risk elements should not be a one 
off engagement but rather ongoing and proactively engaging all the stakeholders in 
the project. Risks are apparent at the early stages of projects life cycle and have the 
same critical impact as risks that are imposed or induced by other unforeseen 
externalities. It is important that these risks are pre-empted and mitigated in the 
continuous risk assessment of the project life cycle. The CDM EB and other 
technical advisory bodies in the just concluded COP 17 to the best of my 
knowledge have not addressed any of this risk issues, it is important that a well-
documented guidance is provided on the issues which would positively impact 
Africa’s share of CDM project in the next commitment period.  
 
It is important also that investment decision makers, project developers and other 
project stakeholders understand the intricate nature of project risk management and 
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465
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the interrelatedness of the different elements and project stages to ensure a robust 
proffering of needed mitigation strategies for any eventualities. The realities of the 
current uncertainties vis-à-vis the post Kyoto talks, CDM investment and risk 
analysis makes the Durban and subsequent COPs a make or break event for the 
global mitigation strategy on climate change.  
 
Beyond the lack of progress in addressing CDM project investment risks at the 
international level, it is the author’s view that the following key measures should 
be considered by all stakeholders in CDM projects  
- CDM Investment portfolio should be over a broad cross section of 
countries to avoid the host country risk from any one particular country 
holding down the project and affect the investment. 
- Standardisation of accounts for treatment of CERs assets 
- There is a need for project investors to attach importance to capacity 
building (what type of capacity building as this otherwise risks being too 
general a conclusion) for the project developers in order to articulate a robust 
risk management portfolio. And investment in this not only has immediate 
returns on the project but also a long term gain on future project.  
- It is also important to secure a firm carbon contract that is an irreversible 
pledge to pay against delivery of emissions reductions.  
- Investors should be able to float CDM bonds after due diligence and 
project risk assessment (this point is also supported by Deodhar et al 2003).
466
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Deodhar, Vinay; Michaelowa, Axel; Krey, Matthias (2003): Financing structures for 
CDM projects in India and capacity building options for EU-Indo collaboration, HWWA 
Discussion Paper No. 247, Hamburg 
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Chapter 5 
CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE REGULATORY RISK 
ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT 
5.0 CCS Risk Assessment and Management contextual strategies 
for CDM 
With different parties (public and private sectors) involved in the CCS projects, the 
exposure to risk associated with operational and non-operational aspects of 
Geological Storage of CO2 (GSC) projects are unavoidable, more so when CCS is 
considered under CDM characterised with additional financial, strategic and 
operational involvements along with meeting different regulatory obligations.  
The impacts of risks and liability on the private and public participants have 
resulted in the need to develop a number of tools aimed at assessing and managing 
such risks and liabilities. This chapter will concentrate on identifying such 
measures. Examples of such mechanisms which could be solely implemented or 
included in other risk mitigation measures or models should include project 
evaluation which involves risk assessment and methodologies, different insurance 
models involving private and or governmental oversight, compensation funds, 
immunity caps, exemptions and floors.
467
 These different mechanisms will be 
discussed in this chapter contextually as strategies for risk management and 
regulatory analogous for dealing with potential CCS liabilities under CDM 
framework.  
5.1 Drivers of Risk 
Risks drivers are broadly classified into two. These factors as identified in a report 
issued by the institute of Risk Management and other Risk Management and 
Insurance governing bodies classified them broadly as External and Internal 
drivers. The external are often considered as outside the control of the organisation 
while the internal drivers are understood and assessed to be internal to the 
organisation or operation been evaluated. These risks can have both external and 
internal influences and drivers providing for an overlap the two broad areas. The 
external risks can be categorised further into risk types such as strategic, financial, 
operational, and hazard. The internal driven risks include organisations operational 
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issues like the intellectual capital, the research and development, companies 
accounting systems and controls and the cash flow or cash liquidity of the 
organisation.
468
 However, when considering geological risk, the context of 
classification must be relevant mainly to the risk of CO2 leaks from the storage site 
or transportation infrastructure as explained in subsequent section. 
5.2 Geological Risk Classification 
Leakage within CCS context is simply the release of captured and stored or trapped 
CO2 back into the atmosphere. CO2 leakage risks associated with geological 
formation could have consequence on either a global or a local scale. This 
simplistic risk stratification is crucial in helping to explain and understand the 
impact on CDM projects.  This section will be used to explain the two generic risks 
associated with geological carbon storage as illustrated in Figure 30 below forming 
the bases for understanding the relevance of risk assessment and management in 
the process of CCS implementation under the CDM framework.  
5.2.1 Localised Risk 
With CO2 leaking out of geological storage formation, an increased concentration 
of the gas in the immediate environment (i.e. earth surface and the shallow 
subsurface) is possible, local impacts may exist for human ecosystems, ground 
water and ocean (food supply) because of the imbalance in the level of atmospheric 
gases.
469
 Leaks to the immediate surrounding could be gradual or sudden. The 
possibility of a sudden or gradual leakage happening could be the consequence of 
failure in the storage seal or injection well, accidental puncture of the reservoir by 
the drilling of wells, seismic activities, faults or fractures.
470
 The degree of impact 
invariably depends on firstly the level of toxic impurity in the CO2, the atmospheric 
and topological conditions of the area, the rate of release which affects the 
concentration levels and the volume of the leak.
471
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Under this categorisation of risk, human health risk could affect the general public 
or the employees. There is also the potential for properties to be at risk due to 
damage, reduced valuation and possible disruption of economic activities within 
the local area could result in liability issues for the operators.
472
 When considering 
liability issues, this category clearly delineate risks within the framework of the 
human health risk, environmental risks, property risks and financial risk 
regulation.
473
 Box 2 explains the impact of localised risk on a community in 
Cameroun consequent to a leak from the earth in 1986. 
5.2.2 Global Risk 
The possibility for CO2 to leak from pipeline or geological storage site into the 
atmosphere (related to infrastructural faults, human error or seismic activity) 
results in greenhouse effects. Once there is a compromise to the transportation 
infrastructure and geological storage, the release of CO2 into the atmosphere 
effectively negates the goal of CCS and the overall climate change mitigation 
strategy. Also, CCS technology implementation is highly energy intensive which 
could result in a higher than expected energy penalty.
474
 
Carbon dioxide emitted as a result of fossil fuel usage during CCS projects with 
any leakage as a result of flaws in storage procedure and sites will result in net 
increase in [global] CO2 emissions.
475
 The release of CO2 could contribute 
significantly to climate change if there is protracted leak from the storage 
formation to the atmosphere. Continuous leakage has the potential to in part offset 
the climate benefit of CCS. IPCC (2005) concluded that carefully selected, 
designed and managed geological storage site have the capacity to retain over 99% 
of the stored CO2 underground over a hundred years period.
476
 
The IPCC 2005 report further provided some insight into the magnitude of local 
and global risks associated with geological storage. Concluding effectively that, 
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“local health, safety and environmental risks would be comparable to the risks of 
current activities such as natural gas storage, EOR, and deep underground disposal 
of acid gas.”477 Whilst in the case of global risk, “observations from engineered 
and natural analogous as well as models suggest that the fraction retained…is very 
likely to exceed 99% over 100 years and is likely to exceed 99% over 1000 
years.”478 
  
                                                          
477
Id. 
478
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The Role of Government and Industry in Risk Management” 
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 (a)  (b) 
Box 2 Effect of CO2 Leakage to Environment 
The Lake Nyos experience is often cited as an example of the impact of CO2 
release to the atmosphere and local ecology hence giving it the name "Deadliest 
lake" by Guinness World Records in 2008. CO2 is beneficial to life on earth at a 
concentration of 0.05-0.08% over an atmospheric background concentration of 
0.037% but higher level of exposure to this gas could prove to be injurious and as 
in the case of the Lake Nyos fatal to the living organisms around the area. 
Prolonged exposure to concentration of 20 – 30% can result in the death of air 
breathing animals while single celled organisms and microbes can survive 50 and 
100% concentrations respectively. 
On 21
st
 of August 1986, the volcanic Crater Lake Nyo in the North Western 
region of Cameroun suddenly released CO2 from magmatic sources into the 
surrounding area and water. The leaked CO2 was claimed to be responsible for 
the deaths of around 1700 people in Cameroon, West Africa. Clinical findings in 
845 survivors seen at or admitted to hospital were compatible with exposure to an 
asphyxiant gas. Rescuers noted cutaneous erythema and bullae on an unknown 
proportion of corpses and 161 (19%) survivors treated in hospital; though these 
lesions were initially believed to be burns from acidic gases, further investigation 
suggested that they were associated with coma states caused by exposure to 
carbon dioxide in air. The disaster at Lake Nyos and a similar event at Lake 
Monoun, Cameroon, two years previously provide new information on the 
possible medical effects of large scale emissions of carbon dioxide, though the 
presence of other toxic factors in these gas releases cannot be excluded. 
In similar exposure of fauna and flora to large emission of CO2, in 1989, the 
volcanic Mammoth Mountain in the United States experienced seismic activities 
which resulted in the seepage of CO2 into the surrounding. In 1990, authorities in 
California reported the death of trees on 100 acres of land around the volcanic 
Mammoth Mountain and concluded that the deaths were caused by exposure of 
the roots to high concentration of CO2.  
The Figures 28(a & b) below shows the crater lake of Nyos and dead a livestock 
nearby as a result of the CO2 release into the atmosphere While Figure 28c shows 
the impact of the release to the Mammoth Mountain in California.  
    
 
Box 1 Effect of CO2 Leakage to Environment 
The Lake Nyos experience is often cited as an example of the impact of CO2 
release to the atmosphere and local ecology hence giving it the name "Deadliest 
lake" by Guinness World Records in 2008. CO2 is beneficial to life on earth at a 
concentration of 0.05-0.08% over and atmospheric background concentration of 
0.037% but higher level of exposure to this gas could prove to be injurious and as 
in the case of the Lake Nyos fatal to the living organisms around the area. 
According to Benson et al. (2002) prolonged exposure to concentration of 20 – 
30% can result to the death for air breathing animals while single celled 
organisms and microbes can survive 50 and 100% concentrations respectively 
On 21
st
 of August 1986, the volcanic crater Lake Nyo in the North Western 
region of Cameroun suddenly released CO2 from magmatic sources into the 
surrounding area and water. The leaked CO2 was claimed to be responsible for 
the deaths of around 1700 people in Cameroon, West Africa. Clinical findings in 
845 survivors seen at or admitted to hospital were compatible with exposure to an 
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Figure 28(a, b &c) Area reported with trees dying in Mammoth Mountain area of 
California. Sources: United States Geological Society website 
 
Figure 10c Area reported with trees dying in Mammoth Mountain area of California. 
Sources: United States Geological Society website 
Figure 29 Life-cycle of a geological sequestration project for CO2 will involve 
four phases. In addition to the operator of a site and the financial and insurance 
organizations that support the project, two different government entities have a 
role. In order to avoid potential conflicts of interest, the regulatory organization 
responsible for reviewing and approving the creation of a site, monitoring its 
operation, and certifying its satisfactory closure should be separate from the 
government entity that ultimately assumes responsibility for long-term 
stewardship. 
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Risks of Geological Storage 
Figure 30 An illustration of the broad characterisation of geological Carbon storage risks.  
Adapted from Wilson et al 2003 Taxonomy of risk of geological sequestration 
 
Figure 12 An illustration of the broad characterisation of geological Carbon storage risks.  
Adapted from Wilson et al 2003 Taxonomy of risk of geological sequestration 
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5.3 Project and Risk Assessment 
The concluding part of this chapter will deal with the project evaluation in relation to the 
assessment of risk with an overview about the conceptual interpretation of risk. There 
will be an expository on the process of project evaluation and the importance or role of 
risk in this evaluation process. Finally, the risk assessment approaches will be discussed 
in the final section of this chapter with the importance of risk treatment as it is needed in 
the assessment of risk in CCS project under the CDM framework. 
5.4 Risk Evaluation of Project 
It is acceptable to infer that risk could be of positive consequence if projects are properly 
evaluated, the risks assessed and risk management strategies are correctly in place to 
enhance the rewards from the project. Underscoring this, Stewart 2000 noted that if the 
negatives [events during a project] could be effectively and proficiently managed the 
risks associated with projects could effectively bring about reward for the investor or 
project developer.
479
 Consequent to this returns and risks are taken into consideration by 
the investor and to maximise the trade off to the benefit of returns is important.
480
  Figure 
31 shows the project evaluation as it relates to the maximisation of expected returns given 
potential risks and the minimisation of risks in light of the potential return from the 
project. 
This section also further emphases the importance of risk evaluation by discussing the 
fundamental differences between risk and uncertainty which often is inter used 
incorrectly in evaluating projects, and identify the constituent elements of risks such as 
probability and severity of the occurrence 
Risk is understood to require both uncertainty and exposure to this uncertainty i.e. the 
possible consequence. By Holton’s definition, “Risk... is exposure to a proposition of 
which one is uncertain...”481This suggests a more general definition of risk that might 
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apply to all action with the two essential components: exposure and uncertainty. 
However, the risk definition widely accepted is by Frank Knight (1921) and it defines risk 
as “[...] to preserve the distinction... between the measurable uncertainty and an 
immeasurable one risk may be used to designate the former and the term ‘uncertainty’ for 
the later.”482The evaluation of CCS project makes the necessary assumptions for the 
likelihood of uncertainties or risks.  Knight (1921) clearly separates the definition based 
on the mathematical assumptions and quantitative indicators vis-à-vis the probability of 
occurrence relative to the severity of the consequence, whilst uncertainty lacks the 
justification of the probability function and the quantitative indicators, it can also be 
based on subjectivity of the interpreter which often gives it the negative connotation as it 
is often defined in dictionaries. This subjectivity can be taken care of within the 
framework of a well prepared objective climate change mitigation policy portfolio. 
One such objective approach is to consider risk as a simple mathematically-derived 
expression which provides for the use of quanitative (factors like probability of 
occurance, the extent of the consequence) and or qualitative (in such a case there is lack 
of probability distribution)parameters. Using the schematic depiction of risk-return 
analysis shown in Figure 31, it is possible to expect a variance in the expected return 
given risk as a neutral terminology to express uncertainty. Risk could be measured 
therefore, by the value-at-risk,
483
 the risk severity
484
or the risk volatility and probability 
forecasting.
485
 
         Equation 2 
The value-at-risk which indicates the risk exposure provides a measure for the worst case 
scenario while a projection of the scenarios from a collection of data could indicate the 
volatility of the risk impact since it gives range high probability of occurrence for a range 
                                                          
482
 Knight, F. H. 1921, “Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit”, Hart, Schaffner, and Marx (NY) as quoted 
in Holton, G A., 2004, “Defining Risk”, Financial Analysis Journal, Vol. 60, No. 6 (Nov/Dec 
2004) 
483Choudhry, M., 2006, “An Introduction to Value-at-Risk”, 4th Edition Securities and Investment 
Institute, published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.  
484
 Lam, J 2003, “Enterprise Risk Management, from Incentives to Control”, John Wiley & Sons, 
2003, p24-25 
485
 Lopez, J 1997, “Regulatory Evaluation of Value-at-Risk Models”, Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York Research paper No. 9710, March 1997 
Risk = (Likelihood or probability of Occurrence) x (Severity of the consequence) 
 
 
Risk = (Likelihood or probability of Occurrence) x (Severity of the consequence) 
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of worst and best case scenarios. Risk severity would measure the extent of damage that 
is likely suffered and the return from the project or investment as shown in the Yield 
curve. These would invariably help to justify the actions aimed at reducing the risk to 
maximise returns. 
The possibility or likelihood of an event occurring that has the potential of impacting the 
overall objective or objectives of a given activity is referred to as the risk
486
 as described 
in previous section. This possibility could result in negative (injurious or hazardous) 
consequences or threat on the activity which could potentially herald some level of 
uncertainty.
487
 Either way, an outcome is expected from the project even if such outcome 
is inconsistent with the expectation of the project developer or investor such negative 
outcome or consequence is considered the risk implication of the activity.  
 
In more mathematical terms therefore, risk is the product of probability that an event or 
events will occur and with consequence, if such event does occur.
488
 Equation 2 shows a 
generic mathematical expression of risk. CCS under CDM faces a number of risks 
especially when considering it as a CO2 emissions avoidance or reduction project. Under 
such circumstance, it is appropriate to suggest that the greater the chance of a negative 
event happening and its severity, the higher the risk.  
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Figure 31 Risk Return Variance Analysis  
Adapted from Sonntag O’Brien 2004 Process of Project evaluation for investment 
decision.  
 
Figure 13 Risk Return Variance Analysis  
Adapted from Sonntag O’Brien 2004 Process of Project evaluation for investment 
decision.  
Figure 32 Risk - Return Yield Curves 
 
 
 
Figure 14 Risk - Return Yield Curves 
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5.5 CCS-CDM Regulatory Risk Assessment and Management 
In analysing regulatory risks, there is the need to distinguish between risk assessment and 
risk management. This section is divided broadly into these two parts with the overriding 
interest been on risk assessment and risk management strategies within the context of 
CDM-CCS framework.  
 
In approaching the valuation of risk i.e. its assessment, the probability of [negative] 
occurrence as outcome is fundamentally the bases for conducting such a process while 
risk management engages the political and policy indicators in order to arrive at what 
should or should not be done to control the processes of mitigating the societal risk 
impact.
489
 Risk management therefore, concentrates mainly on identifying the 
opportunities and avoiding or mitigating any negative impact
490
 resulting from the output 
of a well conducted risk assessment.  
5.6 Regulatory Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment should justify the allocation of risk among project stakeholders in order 
to reduce the probability of risk occurring
491
 and also ensure that contracting parties are 
able to bear the specific risk(s) with adequate compensation consequent to the risk 
allocation.
492
 The allocation process should be based on processes akin to the agency 
theory
493
  which allows the assigning of risks to party (or parties) that can bear the 
specific risk most effectively and give adequate incentive for bearing the risk.  
 
Although risk and uncertainty are often used interchangeably (and mostly in qualitatively 
terms), regulatory risk like any other risk however, is implied to qualify situations where 
adequate information exists to make a probabilistic assessment of likelihood and 
                                                          
489
Supra note [Shalyakhter A et al., (1995)] 
490
 Brennan M. J., 2004, “Assessing Risk within a triple Bottom line framework” available on 
www.lanfaxlabs.com.au/papers/P61-B-P-D-Cairns-final.PDF 
491
Beidleman  C. R., et al 1990, “On allocating Risk: The essence of Project Finance”, Sloan 
Management Review, Spring 1990, p.47-55 
492
Id.  
493
Kesner and Dalton, 1986,  
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magnitude of harm
494
 with a regulatory framework. Uncertainty associated with 
regulation, on the other hand, occurs where indications of harm exist, but there is 
insufficient data to conduct a ‘proper’ risk assessment495 of such uncertainties to ascertain 
the cause and impacts of the project. This distinction may serve as a rough and ready 
delineator of the remit of certain regulatory regimes as this could be essentially flawed
496
 
due to the following reasons as accentuated by Hayvaert (2010). Firstly, the submission is 
based on the view that, it ignores that the information required to conduct a risk 
assessment which does not exist ‘out there’, but is at least partially generated within the 
very context of regulation.
497
 Second (which is more defining) as indicated above, the 
distinction is entirely acquiescent to the mode of conceiving of risk assessment.
498
 
However, it is extremely valuable as a reminder that risk regulation within regulatory risk 
assessment involves the creation of fictional certainty; as unknown future events are 
translated into known probabilities and thereby become actionable.
499
 Further indication 
also suggests that the regulatory response implies the acceptance of a fictional or at the 
very least unexamined certainty, namely that rules can have a pre-determined impact on 
risk. Regulatory risk assessment does, however, tend to recognise the fragility of its 
inherent belief system and already existing structures, and correspondingly creates 
opportunities for the integration of new information, for review and adaptation within the 
regulation. 
 
The assessment of the different elements in each CCS activity and the consequences in 
terms of its kinds and degree of threat, along with the safety of such activity in this case 
                                                          
494
 Commission Communication on the Precautionary Principle COM(2000)1 final; V. Heyvaert, 
‘Facing the Consequences of the Precautionary Principle in European Community Law’ (2006) 
European Law Review 
185. 
495Cf P. O’Malley, ‘Uncertain Subjects: Risk, Liberalism and Contract,’ (2001) 29:4 Economy and 
Society 460, 462. 
496Hayvaert, V., 2010, “ Europe in a Climate of Risk: Three Paradigms at Play”, Centre for 
Climate Change Economics and Policy Working Paper No.23  
497
Id. 
498
Id.  
499
Cf N. Luhmann, Risk: A Sociological Theory (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1993) 
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CCS within the regulatory framework of CDM can thus be referred to as CCS-CDM 
Regulatory Risk Assessment.
500
 
An ordinal scale for rating the probability and impact of individual risk could vary and 
grow in complexity. However, the basic Cox theorem matrix (Figure 33) shows that 
“probability of occurrence” and “consequence” or “severity” redefining the expression of 
risk as expressed in this equation bringing about to a large extent subjectivity in the 
interpretation of individual indicator. 
 
 
Equation 3 
 
This risk model can occur as an ordinal scale which is colour coded and showing 
distinctive risk scoring in each cell to mitigate to some extent the subjectivity, thereby 
allowing for scores to be compared with benchmarks acceptable to the risk level.
501
  The 
risk matrix, therefore will represent the table as several categories of “probability,” 
“likelihood,” or “frequency” for its rows (or columns) and other categories of “severity,” 
“impact,” or “consequences” for its columns (or rows, respectively) 
                                                          
500
For the purpose of clarity, the nature of risks from project to project is highly individuated 
relative to the geology from site to site, the socio economic and political realities of the jurisdiction 
and other inherent factors that are unique to the circumstances surrounding the implementation of 
the project. 
501Barringer, P 2004, “Risk –Based Decisions, Barringer Associate, November 2004 available at 
http://www.barringer1.com/nov04prb.htm (last viewed 23/11/2011)  
Risk = probability × consequence (or frequency) × severity or 
likelihood × impact or threat × (vulnerability × consequence), etc.) 
 
Risk=probability ×co s quence (or frequency)×sev rity or 
likelihood ×impact or threat ×(vulnerability ×consequence), etc.) 
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For effective and robust analysis of the whole process, these elements cannot be 
considered to be mutually exclusive or linear processes when risk assessment is 
conducted; and the complexity of the paradigm could vary depending on the number of 
indicators involved. Therefore, assessment of risks should factor in the possibility of 
overlap as suggested by Kates (1978).
502
 Also, estimating risk according to Condor et al., 
(2011) is highly dependent on the level of knowledge of the system, the better known a 
system is vis-à-vis the constituent variables, the greater the understanding of the implied 
risk.
503
 
5.6.1 Uncertainty and Risk: CCS-CDM Alliance 
Currently, the evolution of the CCS is still at its early stages.
504
 While still awaiting the 
CMP.17/COP7, its implementation into the CDM framework is non-existent and the 
influences of the different uncertainties could be very unclear to accurately assess and 
ascertain any risk impact. However using life cycle environmental risk profiling Benson 
                                                          
502
Kates, R.W., 1978, “Risk Assessment of Environmental Hazard”, Scientific Committee on 
Problem of the Environment (SCOPE). 
503
 Condor et al., 2011b, A comparative analysis of risk assessment methodologies for the geologic 
storage of carbon dioxide EnergyProcedia, Vol. 4, 2011, Pages 4036-4043 
504
 Benson, S.A., 2007, “Geological Storage of CO2: Analogues and Risk Management” 
presentation to Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum, 7 May 2007, Pittsburgh PA 
Figure 33 Basic Risk Matrix Framework from Cox Theorem 
 
Figur  15.The Basic R sk Matrix Framework
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2007 was able to identify the most critical environmental risk stages in the injection 
process of CO2storage in geological formations.  
The relationship that exists between uncertainty and risk is such that during early stages 
of project activities when the uncertainties are high the risks are also high but as 
uncertainties decreases the risk are easily mitigated and hence there is reduction in the 
levels of risks (see Figure 35). A good example of such occurrence is during subsurface 
injection phase of CO2, the level of uncertainty during this phase is high so also is the risk 
of leakage.
505
 The lifecycle Risk Profile diagram in Figure 34 shows at what point in the 
CO2 injection is the risk considered most critical. 
 
 
 
 
In context therefore, risk assessment works within the framework of identifying and 
quantifying potential risks caused by and during the different stages of the operation. As 
mentioned above, this indicates a combination of the probability that an event will occur 
and the consequence of such occurrence as it relates to the activities surrounding in this 
case the injection of CO2.This risk relates directly with uncertainty associated with this 
phase of the operation. The work carried out by the European Commission as 
documented in the Commission Guidance Document 4 is most relevant in this instance.
506
 
 
                                                          
505
Id. 
506
 Implementation of Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide 
Guidance Document 4, European Commission 2011, DOI: 10.2834/99563 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/lowcarbon/ccs/implementation/docs/gd4_en.pdf 
Figure 34 Lifecycle Risk Profile for Geologic CO2 Storage Illustration from 
Benson 2007 
 
Figure 16 Lifecycle Risk Profile for Geologic CO2 Storage Illustration from 
Benson 2007 
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For CCS project operators, investors and policy makers to have a solution based approach 
to risk management, assessment of risk based on each activity in the life cycle of CCS 
project is crucial;
507
 risk assessment, monitoring and verification, remediation and 
communication of results should be framed with the intention to promote a solution based 
risk management framework as opposed to problem oriented strategy. This strategic 
approach if duly implemented could help in effectively assessing and resolving potential 
pitfalls of CCS operation during the formulation of the CDM PDD by project developers 
and also serve as a benchmark for the competent authorities or DNA who will be 
involved in the national approval and reviews of CCS project before and after the 
approval of the methodology by the CDM EB.  
 
In conclusion, risk assessment involves the identification and characterisation of risk 
framework (see Table 10), estimating or calculating, methods and evaluating potential 
risk of CCS activities on human health and safety, the environment and assets.
508
 Risk 
assessment remains an integral non-negotiable part of any comprehensive risk 
management strategy for geological storage of CO2 that includes alongside the 
comprehensive assessment, recommendations of treatment, acceptance and 
communication
509
 of such identified risks using the characterisation profiling below for 
effective and efficient risk management. Various authors have extensively discussed the 
potential liability issues, health, safety and environmental risks associated with geological 
storage of CO2 (de Figueiredo 2006; Stenhouse et al., 2009, Damen et al., 2003 and 
Holloway 1997) the context of such discussion could be categorised into the following; 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
507
 Risk Assessment Network IEA Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme (IEA GHG) in 2006. See 
Figure 17 for a pictorial depiction of the CCS Life Cycle 
508
 Beck B. et al., 2009, “An Introduction to the IEA GHG International Research Network on 
Risk Assessment”, ScienceDirect Energy Procedia 1 (2009) 2581-2586, Available online at 
www.sciencedirect.com 
509
 Egmond B., 2006, “ Developing a Method to Screen and Rank Geological CO2 Storage Sites 
on the Risk of Leakage”, Final Report, Copernicus Institute, Department of Science, Technology 
and Society, NWS-E-2006-108 August 2006. 
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 Leakage or seepage (the major risk) 
 Possible Risk Assessment methodologies 
 Time scale of the risk impact assessment 
 Risk Modelling techniques 
 Monitoring  
 Analogous roles of industry and natural occurring CO2 Storage 
  
Figure 35 Risk and Uncertainty Relationship Source: DNV 2009 
 
Figure 17 Risk and Uncertainty Relationship Source: DNV 2009 
Risk 
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Consequence 
 
Consequence 
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Uncertainty and risk reducing measures implied 
Uncertainty in consequence 
 
Uncertainty in con equence 
192 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Risk Character Possible Action Explanation 
Tolerate Consider the risk as a 
part of the process and 
accept any loss 
resulting 
Under this situation it is 
possible that the risk in 
the short-term may 
prove to be beneficial in 
the long-term. For 
example, a short-term 
loss resulting from 
newness of project, 
technology, or 
methodology could 
become a gain as the 
loss leader could lead to 
success in other 
jurisdictions with net 
gain resulting from 
increase in the portfolio 
of projects generated. 
Treat Ensure that risk 
control measures are 
implemented 
accordingly  
Responsible party or 
parties may be able to 
develop and apply risk 
mitigating measures 
without reference to 
third party. In the case 
of the investor, this 
could help to apply a 
robust emissions 
abatement solution to a 
proposed project based 
technology like CCS 
with a small cost. 
Transfer Pass on the risk to 
“third party” 
It is possible that the 
most effective risk 
management strategy 
with regards risk would 
be to contract out the 
risk to a third party (e.g. 
Hedging Insurance) to 
secure a guaranteed (but 
possibly reduced) CERs 
returns. 
Terminate Out rightly stop 
project. 
In a case the risk levels 
is considered high and 
unsustainable, it is 
advisable the project and 
further funding are 
stopped to avoid further 
irrecoverable loses. 
Table 10 Risk Characterisation Framework 
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The following leakage and risk assessment methodologies from above listed issues will 
be discussed in more detail below showing how this categorisation reflects on the risk 
management strategy for operations in geological storage of CO2. 
5.7 Potential Risk Characterisation for CCS – CDM framework 
It is conventionally the case that CDM experts will apply regulatory and non-regulatory 
risk and financial assessment tools in order to determine the risk and potential financial 
losses associated with the project by considering the risk impact on investment using a 
risk distribution mechanism or negotiate leverage as a more favourable investment terms 
for parties. Within the EU context for instance, the Directive 2009/31/EC on geological 
storage Guidance Document 4 suggests relevant financial mechanisms to this effect albeit 
underscoring the specificity of site in leakage risk issues.
510
 
Characterising risk prior to deploying any risk management strategy is important both to 
respond to existing project requirements and also to mitigate risks not covered by current 
regulatory and legal regimes. It is therefore for these reasons that evidentiary information 
should be collected and provided to ensure a well-informed risk management strategy. To 
this effect, risk characterisation is based on the following Tolerate, Treat, Transfer or 
Terminate categories. These indicators are summarily discussed in Table 10above with 
brief explanation and actions commensurate to each category. 
5.8 Leakage Threshold and Tolerable Risk 
It is ubiquitously accepted that the need to avoid or reduce leakage of injected CO2 
underground to the barest minimum is the measure of the integrity of such storage 
operation. However, the attainment of absolute or 100% permanence of CO2 storage is 
almost impossible.
511
 Therefore, the rate of leakage must be measurable and almost 
negligible for associated risk to be considered acceptable or adequately managed.  
                                                          
510
Supra note (Implementation of Directive 2009/31/EC GD4) 
511
van der Zwaan, B. and Smekens, K. (2007). “CO2 Capture and Storage with Leakage in an 
Energy-Climate Model”, Environmental Modeling and Assessment, Springer Science + Business 
Media B.V. 2007 DOI 10.1007/s10666-007-9125-3 
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The debate about acceptable leakage rates is ongoing with different experts basing 
acceptability on site management, proper accounting and monitoring regimes,
512
 and the 
legal framework that mitigates liabilities issues in case these limits or acceptable levels or 
rates are exceeded. Therefore, acceptable rate of leakage is not only informed based on 
the disciplinary bias and inferences of the experts involved in carbon capture and storage 
but also bears relevance to other factors which varies considerably depending on the 
composition of the physical and geochemical structure of the storage site, the economic 
impact,
513
 public perception, availability of appropriate technology and legal implications 
associated with such leakage vis-à-vis the short and long term liabilities.
514
 For this 
purpose, knowledge from industrial analogues and or naturally occurring geological 
accumulation of CO2 could be of immense benefit. In the United States for instance, 
analogues industries like the oil and gas companies have vast experience, methodologies 
and data which could be relevant to assess the potential risk impact and the likely rate of 
leakage of CO2as to date there has been no evidence of leakage issues raised in the 
injection of CO2 for oil production optimisation.
515
 
The rates of leakages are based on different models but according to Torvanger (2005) 
the real rate are dependent and specific to the site and time for it to be considered 
credible. The frequently cited International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2005) report 
which adopted the research findings of Bowden et al (2005) and Shuler et al (2005) on 
acceptable leakage rate stated, “Observations from engineered and natural analogues as 
well as [other]models suggest that the fraction retained in appropriately selected and 
managed geological reservoirs is very likely to exceed 99% over 100 years and is likely 
to exceed 99% over 1000 years.”516 
Leakage rate expressed as a percentage of the total volume injected not exceeding 0.01% 
per year over a hundred year period (i.e. 1% per 100years) and 0.001% per year over a 
                                                          
512Meadowcroft, J., et al., 2011, “Caching the Carbon: The Politics and Policy of Carbon Capture 
and Storage”, Pg. 282. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011 
513Lippmann, M et al., 2002, “Relevance of underground natural gas storage to geologic 
sequestration of carbon dioxide”, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.Available online at 
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/5gs5q111 
514
Supra note [de Figueiredo 2007] 
515
Makuch et al 2011, Carbon Capture and Storage Regulating Long Term Liability, Centre for 
Environmental Policy 2011. 
516
Supra note [IPCC 2005] 
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thousand years period (i.e. 1% per 1000 years). The conclusions reached by other 
research work conducted for European Union DG ENV. by van der Zwaan et al. (2008) 
suggested however, that after investigating the impact of CO2 leakages at varying rates 
between 1 per cent, 0.5 per cent, 0.1 per cent and 0.05% per year they concluded by 
arguing that an effective mitigation was not possible at the IPCC recommended leakage 
rate of 1% per 100 years without the use of additional reduction measures such as 
renewable energy and nuclear energy giving that climate change is a problem that is 
expected to span over centuries.
517
 The argument was for a storage option with 1% 
leakage rate per year, a given quantity of geological stored CO2 would have reduced to 
37% of the amount after 100 years, whereas 90% of that quantity will remain in 
geological storage after a hundred years for storage of medium characterisation if 0.1% 
per year leakage rate is used.
518
 
 
Another considered argument was by Ha Duong et al. (2003) using the integrated 
assessment numerical model (DIAM) to explore the role of leakage further substantiated 
that the lower the leakage rate the more attractive the storage potential of CO2. They 
concluded that “leakage rate of 0.1% is nearly the same as perfect storage while a leakage 
rate of 0.5% renders storage unattractive.”519 This therefore also makes it progressively 
less economically attractive as the leakage rates exceed 0.1% per year. This possesses a 
risk that affects not only the environment but potential investors as there is no financial 
incentive to invest in such activity. 
The third consideration is that leakage rate is also a function of the geological reservoir 
type.
520
 Under this consideration, Dooley et al.,(2003), and Hepple et al., (2003) argued 
that leakage rates greater than 0.1% will be not make CCS a viable climate change 
mitigation option. It is therefore apt and acceptable to agree that leakage rate closer to 
zero is not only desirable for CCS as a mitigation technology but also for it to be 
attractive as a business enterprise.  
                                                          
517
Id. van der Zwaan et al., (2007) 
518
Id. van der Zwaan et al., (2007) 
519
 Ha-Duong M., et al 2003, “Carbon Storage: The Economic Efficiency of Storing CO2 in leaky 
Reservioirs”, Clean Techn Environ Policy 5 (2003) 181–189, DOI 10.1007/s10098-003-0213-z 
520
Supra note Id. (Torvanger et al 2005) pg. 698 
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Whatever acceptable threshold is reached, it is imperative to recognise that the released 
emissions will have to be compensated either by additional emission reductions or 
increased numbers of CCS
521
 projects if stabilisation and eventual reduction of the GHG 
concentration is ultimately the aim.
522
 All these must be factored into the whole risk 
assessment process to ensure that the impacts are mitigated by well-designed risk 
management model.  
5.9 Possible Risk Assessment Methodologies 
Overall, risk assessment is currently more robust and a common place operational activity 
in analogous industries(such as those of oil and gas, hazardous chemicals and nuclear 
waste) and technologies than in the CCS due to vast experience in these analogous fields. 
According to the IPPC Special Report (2005), the different risk assessment techniques 
currently available provide a useful basis for assessing the risk of CO2 storage albeit not 
in assessing risks arising from long term storage of CO2 underground but such as 
applicable to operational risk.
523
 
Crucial and integral parts of a robust risk assessment are the following; (i) Design, (ii) 
Analysis, (iii) Evaluation and (iv) Development of methodologies and frameworks for 
evaluating the risk potentials and monitoring tools. All these allow for early detection and 
remediation. Various methodologies currently are used in the assessment of risks for CCS 
technology and analogous technologies. Due to the relative newness of CCS technology 
and the fluidity of associated knowledge, no defined established methodology is available 
for assessing risk in the industry.
524
However, this may be difficult due to the complexities 
associated with the implementation of the technology.  
A combination of different risk assessment methodologies are currently been used and 
this could be broadly classified into two main groups namely the qualitative and 
                                                          
521
Michaelowa A., 2003, Limiting global cooling after global warming is over – differentiating 
between short and long lived greenhouse gases, in OPEC Review, December 2003, pg. 343-351 
522
 Bode S., et al., 2004, On the integration of Carbon Capture and Storage into the International 
Climate Regime’, HWWA Discussion Paper 303. 
523
 IPCC 2005, IPCC Special Report on Carbon dioxide Capture and Storage, Chapter 5: 
Underground Geological Storage. Pg. 250 
524
Supra note [IPCC, 2005] 
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quantitative methodologies.
525
 Also, substantial efforts have been put into assessing the 
risks posed by particular storage sites.
526
  For the purpose of this thesis, the qualitative 
methodologies namely FEP and VEF have been selected for discussion due to its 
relevance. The summary of other methodological groupings has been tabulated in Table 
11 while Figure 36 below gives a clear indication of the relationship and the possibilities 
that exist between the unique functional aspects of risk management and how these layers 
of processes result in the effective management of risk. The focus of this subsection is the 
methodologies involved with risk assessment. 
 
Method Goal Data needed Industrial 
application 
Application 
for CCS 
Feature, Event, 
Process 
(FEP) 
Scenario 
Development 
Qualitative 
expert 
estimation for 
scenario 
Development 
Scenario 
Analysis 
Used in 
Screening and 
Site 
selection
527
 
Vulnerable 
Evaluation 
Framework  
(VEF) 
Conceptual 
framework for 
regulators and 
technical 
experts 
Qualitative 
expert 
estimation to 
identify which 
areas should be 
in-depth studied 
Hazard 
identification 
and potential 
consequences 
Framework for 
site selection 
and regulator 
guidance 
Structured-
What-If-
Technique  
(SWIFT) 
Elaborate 
hypothesis 
Qualitative 
expert 
estimation to 
identify hazard 
Hazard 
identification in 
engineering 
Hazard and 
consequence 
mapping 
Probabilistic 
Risk 
Assessment 
Predict the 
probability of 
safety failures 
Numerical 
qualitative 
expert 
Safety 
engineering 
Detail risk 
assessment. 
Uncertainty 
                                                          
525
 Condor J. et al, 2011b, A comparative Analysis of Risk Assessment Methodologies for the 
Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide”, ScienceDirect Energy Procedia 4(2011) 4036-4043. 
Published by Elsevier Ltd. ©2011 
526
 Gale 2003, Geological storage of CO2: what’s known, where are the gaps and what more needs 
to be done. Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Greenhouse Gas Control 
Technologies (GHGT-6), J. Gale and Y. Kaya (eds.), 1–4 October 2002, Kyoto, Japan, Pergamon, 
v.I, 207–212. 
527
 Site selection -The oil and gas industry has decades of experience understanding and assessing 
sites kilometers deep underground. The latest technology to map oil and gas fields is now being 
used to assess sites suitable for CO2 storage. The most effective way to ensure permanent safe 
storage is to choose sites of sufficient depth (typically deeper than 800 metres) with adequate 
capacity and an overlying sealing system to ensure containment of fluids. 
Table 11 Tabulation of different Risk Assessment methods 
 
Table 5 Tabulation of different Risk Assessment methods 
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(PRA) of complex 
systems 
estimation for 
scenario 
development, 
model 
development 
quantifying 
PDFs 
 
estimation 
System 
Modelling 
Approach 
(SMA) 
Estimation of 
risk based on 
probabilities 
Quantitative 
estimation of 
risk and PDFs 
Development of 
complex 
models in well 
know systems 
 
PRA for the 
whole CCS 
chain 
Deterministic 
Risk 
Assessment  
(DRA) 
Analytical 
point estimate 
calculations 
Numerical and 
qualitative 
expert 
estimation for 
scenario 
development 
and model 
development 
 
Safety 
Engineering 
(sensitivity 
analysis) 
Initial risk 
assessment. No 
uncertainty 
estimations 
Risk 
Identification 
and Strategy 
using 
Quantitative 
Evaluation 
(RISQUE) 
 
Systemic 
Process with 
participation of 
expert panels 
Qualitative and 
numerical 
expert 
estimation in 
event-tree 
approach 
Hazard 
identification 
and potential 
consequences 
Hazard and 
consequence 
mapping 
Multi Criteria 
Assessment/ 
Multi-
Attribute 
Utility Theory 
(MCA/MAUT) 
 
Evaluation of 
alternatives in 
multiple 
objective 
Qualitative and 
numerical 
expert 
estimation for 
data input utility 
Decision 
making 
Framework for 
screening and 
site selection. 
Certification 
Framework 
Approach/ 
Screening and 
Ranking 
Framework 
(CFA/SRF) 
 
Estimation of 
risk based on 
probabilities of 
occurrence in 
individual 
features 
Qualitative and 
quantitative 
estimation of 
risk and 
uncertainty 
Development of 
simple and 
probabilistic 
models 
Managing risk 
in Carbon 
storage sites 
Method 
Organised for a 
Identify and 
preventing risk 
Qualitative and 
quantitative 
Risk reduction 
in complex 
Systematic 
Risk analysis 
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Systematic 
Analysis of 
Risk 
(MOSAR) 
 
data for a well-
known system 
systems for well-known 
sites 
Evidence 
Support Logic 
(ESL) 
Identification 
of uncertainties 
in decisions 
Qualitative and 
quantitative 
understanding 
of uncertainties 
Reduction of 
uncertainties in 
well-known 
systems 
 
Detailed PRA 
and dealing 
with 
uncertainties 
Performance 
and Risk 
(P&R) 
Risk mapping 
in wellbores 
under the 
criteria of 
degradation 
scenarios 
 
Qualitative and 
quantitative 
data for 
wellbores 
Risk evaluation 
under the 
concept of 
ALARP 
Long-term 
well integrity 
 
As inferred above, a number of risk assessment methodologies exist and are been used in 
assessing the risks associated with CCS related projects. Depending on the availability of 
data and specificity of knowledge, time and expertise, Condor et al 2011 suggested that 
qualitative risk assessment which allows for scenario analysis such as the Feature, Event 
and Process (FEP) and the Vulnerability Evaluation Framework (VEF) may be sufficient 
and most effective.
528
 
5.9.1 Feature, Event and Process 
FEP method of assessing risk articulates by scenario analysis the different factors 
associated with CO2 migration/ leakage, storage site (in the case of storage site selection 
or characterisation) and other aspects of the project vis-à-vis the current and possible 
future direction and how these factors will evolve.
529
 This could also be used in licensing 
and certification stages of CCS projects development
530
 by relevant competent authorities 
in host countries. 
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Id. Condor J., et al 2011b 
529
Id. Condor J., et al 2011b 
530
Id. Condor J., et al 2011b 
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By considering and understanding relevant features, events and processes, associated with 
CO2 migration effective management of potential risks can be achieved. Specific site 
parameters such that identifies or classifies the porosity of the cap rock, how permeable 
the geological reservoir is and the number of injection wells would be considered as the 
features in this methodology. Events would include seismic activities, possible 
penetrations of new wells in the storage sites and the well blowouts. Chemical and or 
physical processes are to be considered in this aspect of the methodology with emphasis 
on chemical reactions, the multiphase migration through a fracture or micro fracture,
531
 
geo-mechanical stress changes that affect the GS capacity and security.
532
 The implication 
                                                          
531Zweigel P., (2004), “Towards a methodology for top seal Efficacy Assessment for underground 
CO2 storage”.7th International Conference on Greenhouse Gas Control Technologies (GHGT-7) 
Vancouver, Canada. 
532
 Condor et al 2009 An Alternative Theoretical Methodology for Monitoring the Risks of CO2 
Leakage from Wellbores, Energy Procedia 1 (2009) 2599–2605 Proceedings of the 9th 
International Conference on Greenhouse Gas Control Technologies (GHGT-9), 16–20 November 
2008, Washington DC, USA; Wildenborg et al., 2005, Risk assessment methodology for CO2 
sequestration scenario approach, Carbon Dioxide Capture for Storage in Deep Geologic 
Formations—Results from the CO2 Capture Project, v. 2: Geologic Storage of Carbon Dioxide 
Figure 36 Risk Analysis, Risk Assessment and Risk Management (Source: DNV 2009). 
 
Figure 18 Risk Analys s, Risk Assessment and Risk Management (Sourc : DNV 2009). 
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of this is that it allows for modular but holistic bottom-up or top-bottom analysis of the 
potential risk influences and recommends risk mitigation strategies that are unique to the 
findings and analysis per module and cumulatively impacting the whole project. 
A pyramidal structure in Figure 37adapted from the work of Savage et al (2004) could be 
used as the implementation strategy for this type of risk assessment methodology either as 
a bottom-up or top-bottom approach.
533
 In a later work, Condor (2011b) further expounds 
the top-bottom approach as an audit tool that helps to ensure all relevant FEPs derived 
from the available database are included in the models while the reasons for not using the 
rest information is also documented.
534
 The bottom-up approach on the other hand, uses 
database to develop the assessment model directly without necessarily filtering the 
information used. Although, this approach could arguably be time consuming, however, 
the ability to use both approaches individually, interchangeably and together makes it 
possible for proper classification on a spatial scale, time scale and likelihood of 
occurrence
535
 for risk and providing risk assessment of different plausible scenarios.
536
 An 
example of CCS project that engaged scenario analysis for risk assessing the whole 
project implementation process is the Weyburn project.
537
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S.M. Benson, Editors , Carbon Dioxide Capture for Storage in Deep Geologic Formations–Results 
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5.9.2 Vulnerability Evaluation Framework 
Developed by the US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) to systematically 
identify conditions surrounding geological storage systems that could influence potential 
adverse effect, identify potential impacts and provide a decision support flow-charts that 
are organised systematically to facilitate the assessing of the attributes and impacts
538
 in a 
discrete and coherent manner.   
This framework is conceptually designed as shown in Figure 39 to consider the following 
without prejudice of one over the other. Firstly, that the conceptual model includes a 
holistic approach to evaluating vulnerability vis-à-vis the storage system, and the 
geological attributes identifying the vulnerability of the geological storage system vis-à-
vis unanticipated migration, leakage and undesirable pressure changes.  Secondly, how 
the different attributes such as human health and their welfare, the ecological systems, 
atmosphere surface and underground water and the geosphere and other receptors 
interplay. And finally, a focus on the different temporal scales vis-à-vis the spatial area of 
                                                          
538
 US EPA Technical Support Document 2008, Vulnerability Evaluation Framework for 
Geological Sequestration of Carbon Dioxide 
FEP Identification 
FEP Classification 
FEP ranking 
FEP screening 
FEP interaction 
and grouping  
Scenario 
Formation 
Figure 37 Pyramidal display of FEP analysis showing the different stages 
Source: Adapted from the work of Savage et al. 2004 
 
Figure 19 A pyramidal display of FEP analysis showing the different stages 
Source: Adapted from the work of Salvage et al. 2004 
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evaluation consequent to the impacts resulting from migration, leakage and adverse 
pressure changes.
539
 
5.10 Site Storage Risk Assessment 
The factors that are responsible for leakage or seepage may be considered to be well 
understood;
540
 however, the risk implication and mitigation strategies are still far from 
being equally clear. One of such factors that causes the seepage of sequestered CO2 is the 
heterogeneity of the layers over the geological formation the gas has been stored, to 
mitigate this risk, the choice of storage site, the depth, porosity and permeability, the 
understanding of the intended reservoir’s geology vis-à-vis the faults and fractures541 and 
the need to have a well operated site could serve as mitigating factors in reducing the 
possibility of seepage occurring. Furthermore, proper documentation of abandoned wells 
for proper monitoring of seals and the constant monitoring of CO2 dynamics during and 
post injection phases in the geological storage site are important.
542
 
In relation to storage sites, the levels of risk could vary. For instance, according to Pollak 
et al., (2009), saline reservoirs and oil and gas storage sites onshore are more vulnerable 
and would show greater impact on local risk profiling more than offshore geological 
storages. Risk is considered to be significantly less if offshore storage reservoir is used 
instead of onshore due to distance to human communities and also, the body of water 
such as the ocean could easily absorb CO2 leaked which could be used up by planktons 
and algae growing in the seabed. However, excessive leakage of CO2 in large quantity 
into the body of water could result in acidification of the surrounding water (referred to as 
Ocean Acidification),
543
or contamination of groundwater which could have a negative 
                                                          
539
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540
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Report from ACCSEPT” (deliverables D4.1 and D4.4) BRINO912OGSIG2007-1242 1st 
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effect on the organisms.
544
 The legal ramifications under international environment law 
require further clarification. 
In the case of oil and gas, the multiplicity of well drills could easily compromise the 
confining layers resulting in significant leakage of CO2 to the atmosphere with all the 
associated consequences.
545
 While in the case of saline geological formation, lack of 
extensive historical evidence of geological characterisation of this site type accentuates 
the uncertainty associated with it.
546
 The need for further research into this type of 
geological storage is important due to its vast storage capacity potential (see Section 7.6 
for details of the storage site types), therefore to accept risk it is important to continuously 
assess and monitor the accepted risk ensuring that the meet with the agreed performance 
indicators and regulatory framework. 
5.11 Risk Management 
The approach to risk management (RM) demands for “a comprehensive, systemic process 
that assists decision makers in identifying, analysing, evaluating and treating all types of 
risk both internal and external to [the project or] organisation”547 according to Leiss 2009. 
RM remains an evolving methodological activity that integrates organisational ethos to 
the overall implementation strategy of carrying out the project from start to finish. 
Invariably, this makes the management of risk fundamentally focused on preventing or 
mitigation of harm
548
 and uncertainty. 
Environmental protection regulations are designed to prevent the release of pollutants, 
and other types of adverse human impacts, as opposed to cleaning up after the release.
549
 
Pre-emptive measures on events such as CO2 storage that has the potential to cause future 
harm (if not adequately prevented) should be of central interest and importance in risk 
                                                          
544
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Figure 38 Schematic of Technical and Public policy Relationship in effecting Risk 
management 
Adapted from Leiss W.O 2009.  Source W.O Leiss 2009 Risk Management of CCS 
 
 
Figure 20 Schematic of Technical and Public policy Relationship in effecting Risk 
management 
Source W.O Leiss 2009 Risk Management of CCS 
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Risk Mitigation 
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Perception 
 
Risk Acceptability 
 
Public Trust 
management activities of project developers and indeed all concerned. Mitigation or a 
program of action that can significantly pay-off in term of avoiding costs that otherwise 
might be payable is central to the concept of insurance (see section 5.14 for risk 
management strategies).  
To achieve credible result in the management of risks, it is important that a holistic 
approach or thorough risk assessment is undertaken to consider and analyse risks, 
controls and mitigation must be aligned with public perception and concerns about the 
project thereby raising the stake for the importance vis-à-vis level of risk acceptability 
and the trust level for the whole process among the public and stakeholders. These 
interfaces must work coherently resulting in a credible and acceptable risk management 
strategy. Using Leiss schematic in Figure 38 to illustrate the relationship between the 
different entities under a risk-based approach, the delineation provides two broad 
interfaces of science and public policy both being in relation to risk management.
550
 In 
essence, science serves as the technical disciplines with the ability to integrate risk 
assessment, control and mitigation which deals with all the possible options available 
with the precautionary measures, potential consequences of failure to control and the cost 
implications of mitigating the risk.
551
 While on the other hand, the involvement of 
externalities such as public perceptions, their level of acceptability of risk
552
 and other 
drivers which have impact on the project outcome and life cycle.  
Science  Interface Risk Management      Interface Public Policy 
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These elements well defined and articulated have the capacity to respond effectively to 
mitigating CCS-CDM risks and bring about a risk management process that would 
facilitate a well informed decision making and improve the level of public trust and 
confidence about CCS project. Subsequent sections will discuss this in more detail within 
the context of geological storage risk management and strategies, while Chapter 8 will 
discuss the results of the survey conducted vis-à-vis the risk perception about CCS-CDM 
within my primary case study jurisdiction. 
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Figure 21 Conceptual Model of the VEF 
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5.12 Geological Storage Risk Management 
Risk management strategy within any operation (not the least CCS CDM) should be 
based on risk treatment that involves a combination of any of the following different 
measures (avoidance
553
, optimisation,
554
 transfer or risk spreading
555
and acceptance or 
risk retention
556
).
557
 These implications remain the overarching goal of geological 
storage i.e. the ability to ensure that risks mostly due to leakage of sequestered gases are 
either completely avoided or adequately managed/mitigated to an acceptable level and 
in a worst case the remediation of environmental accidents resulting from CO2 leakage 
from the geological storage system (especially when considering localised risk impact) 
are adequately considered in the risk management strategy. Therefore, the achievement 
of such manageable levels of leakage risk mitigation in CCS life cycle as described 
above is within the purview of risk management.  
To achieve the anticipated levels of risk mitigation from long term sequestration of CO2 
it is important to have a regime that has rigorous site selection process, meticulously 
designed and implemented project management, a well-developed monitoring and 
verification program and in case of any leakage a site specific remediation plan.
558
 
Generally as discussed in Section 5.2, risk associated with CCS could either be of a 
global or localised nature
559
 and this is a result of possible CO2 movement either insitu 
(i.e. migrate from the intended storage reservoir to another subsurface area outside the 
project boundary) or escape directly into the atmosphere. This will not be any different 
if CCS is implemented under a CDM framework. CCS related risks could have local 
                                                          
553
Avoidance: An informed choice not to accept the risk. By this the investor or project 
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monitoring or implementation of procedures or by changing the framework of the project. 
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operate a joint venture, hedge the operation outsource or use insurance products to mitigate any 
loss of revenue as a result of risk. This simply provides an opportunity cost for lowering the risk 
to a level that is deemed acceptable. 
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developer that the risk is within the agreed tolerance levels and can be managed with the 
resources available. 
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and global
560
implications affecting the atmospheric composition with effect on the 
whole climate and ecology with other risks associated with health and safety or a 
geographically defined ecosystem resulting from seepages contaminating the ground 
water or the immediate environment is considered local.
561
 
The management of these risks involve the use and application of well-structured 
processes to identify and quantify the risks associated with a given process. The 
evaluation needs to consider the inputs of experts and or stakeholders and accordingly 
undertake appropriate monitoring and intervention strategies to manage the remaining 
risk.
562
 
The risk management strategy applicable to each storage site or operational process 
could differ and therefore require an understanding of the peculiarities associated with 
each of them.  To achieve this, an understanding of the storage site and the selection 
process, and the use of adequate risk assessment methodology is paramount. Secondly, 
comprehensive monitoring during and post the project to ensure that the storage project 
is performing within pre-determined specification and mitigate any leakage if such 
arises is also crucial. Thirdly, the need to put into action remediation measures in order 
to stop the causes and impact of leakage. And finally, there is the need to ensure there is 
an effective regulatory oversight and reporting structure for the project.   
Environmental safety can be accentuated by the robustness of the risk management 
strategy and its implementation. It should be an ongoing theme throughout any 
proposed CCS/CDM project life cycle. Using various methods, the conducting of proper 
risk assessment that results in an effective risk management strategy is important as this 
will be helpful in understanding the risk mitigation strategy that is relevant and 
achievable; thereby proffering the suitable level of monitoring required and any other 
intervention if required.
563
 
In the finally analysis it is important to note that an effective regulatory risk 
management system must overall aim to reduce the cost implications of such projects as 
such protecting both the public (human health and safety) and environment (climate 
change and atmospheric pollution), and also reduce the cost of compliance to the 
                                                          
560
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regulation for private sector participants. It is therefore with these varying but 
fundamental interests that regulatory and non-regulatory risks potentials and 
implications need to be considered and articulated.  
5.13 Methodological Considerations in Accounting for Risk 
When considering future CCS-CDM projects risks, regulatory and non-regulatory risk 
types could be considered as the broad concerns. However as discussed in Chapter 4, 
relative to the CDM methodological consideration the regulatory risks can be discussed 
under the procedural and non-procedural functions of CDM implementation. Table 12 
shows a tabulated analysis of the six regulatory risk types within possible CCS-CDM 
regulatory framework vis-à-vis the definitions, possible institutional sources of the risk 
and the cost implications.
564
 Whilst Table 13 identifies non-regulatory risk types 
associated with the implementation of such approved methodology or project under the 
framework.
565
 
                                                          
564
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565
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Regulatory Risk 
types 
Definition Institutional 
sources of risk 
Cost 
implication of 
risk type 
Host Country Risk Possibility that the 
DNA may refuse 
or delay the 
approval of 
proposed CCS 
project 
Possible adverse 
impact of national 
CDM rules on the 
progress of 
project. 
National 
Government or 
Competent 
Authorities 
Delay in 
approval 
Refusal to 
Approve 
Negative impact 
on the 
implementation 
process of the 
project 
Methodological 
Risk 
Consequent to 
inappropriateness 
or that it a new 
methodology, 
approval maybe 
denied or 
otherwise not 
applicable 
CDM Executive 
Board 
Inappropriate or 
new 
methodology not 
approved 
Methodology not 
applicable 
Validation Risk Likelihood of 
failing the DOE 
validation regime 
Possible delay in 
the process 
Designated 
Operational 
Entity 
Delayed DOE 
Validation 
Failed DOE 
Validation 
Registration Risk Validation of 
project does not 
guarantee the 
project registration 
CDM Executive 
Board 
Delay in project 
registration  
Failure in 
registration of 
the project 
Certification Risk Failure in 
verifying 
accurately the 
emissions 
reduction by the 
DOE 
Designated 
Operational 
Entity 
Rejection of 
partial or  full 
emission 
reductions 
Non Host Country 
Sale/Trade Risk 
Risk of capping or 
restricting the 
Annex 1 country’s 
national     
allocation plans  
Non Host (or 
Annex 1) 
Country 
Government  
Partial or No sale 
or trade in the 
Certified 
Emissions 
Reductions 
Table 12 Regulatory risk types that could affect CCS implementation under CDM 
Adapted from Aidelojie et al 2012(in press for publication) 
 
 
Regulatory Risk 
types 
Definition Institutional 
sources of risk 
Cost implication 
of risk type 
Host Country Risk Possibili y that the 
DNA may refuse 
or delay the 
approval of 
proposed CCS 
project 
Possible adverse 
impact of national 
CDM rules on the 
progress of project. 
National 
Governm nt or 
Competent 
Authorities 
D lay in approval 
Refusal to 
Approve 
Negative impact 
on the 
implementation 
process of the 
project 
Methodological Risk Consequent to 
inappropriateness 
or that it a new 
methodology, 
approval maybe 
denied or otherwise 
not applicable 
CDM Executive 
Board 
Inappropriate or 
new methodology 
not approved 
Methodology not 
applicable 
Validation Risk Likelihood of 
failing the DOE 
validation regime 
Possible delay in 
the process 
Designated 
Operational 
Entity 
Delayed DOE 
Validation 
Faile  DOE 
V lidation 
Registration Risk Validation of 
project does not 
guarantee the 
project registration 
CDM Executive 
Board 
Delay in project 
registration  
Failure in 
registration of the 
project 
Certification Risk Failure in verifying 
accurately the 
emissions 
reduction by the 
DOE 
Designated 
Operational 
Entity 
Rejection of 
partial or  full 
emission 
reductions 
Non Host Country 
Sale/Trade Risk 
Risk of capping or 
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Annex 1 country’s 
national     
allocation plans  
Non Host (or 
Annex 1) 
Country 
Government  
Partial or No sale 
or trade in the 
Certified 
Emissions 
Reductions 
 Table 18Regulatory risk types that could affect CCS implementation under CDM 
Adapted from Aidelojie et al 2012(in press for publication) 
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5.14 Risk Management Strategies 
5.14.1 Precautionary Principle as a CCS Risk Management 
Strategy 
Effective management of risks require some degree of precautionary measures to be in 
place. The need to apply the principle as defined within the framework of international 
environmental laws is apt. Precautionary principle accentuates the need to avoid 
activities or processes that is deemed unsafe regardless of the financial returns or its 
anticipated positive impact. Precautionary relative to safety in this case is premised on 
lack of certainty on the outcome. In other words, an activity is considered unsafe if there 
is uncertainty on its likely harm and the likelihood that there could be a harmful 
consequence. It is inconsequential in this circumstance the extent and or probability of 
the harm.
566
 Using the European Commission Communication on the Precautionary 
Principle to illustrate implies that the application of the principle must depend on a risk 
                                                          
566Kirchsteiger, C., 2008, “Carbon Capture and Storage-desirability from a risk management 
point of view”, ScienceDirect Safety Science 46 (2008) pg 1149-1154 
Non Regulatory Risk types Description 
Technological risk The risk that a new, relatively untried, non-off-
the-shelf technology will not be successful 
Operational risk The risk that installation of implementation of 
such technology could cause operational 
challenge resulting from negligence, poor 
oversight, flaws in procedure for commissioning 
and implementation of technology,  and lack of 
coherence or fit between the technology and 
plant’s operational  
Implementation risk This is typical risk associated with construction 
phase. Such risks results from faults in poor 
construction of facilities. 
Technical risk This risk is often a consequent of below 
predicted performance of the technology or 
implementation techniques. 
Performance risk This risk is in connection with delivery of 
expected CERs based on performance of the 
technology throughout the whole realisation 
period of the CERs. 
Contractual risk Breach of contractual obligation by project 
parties by omission or commission 
Table 13 Non Regulatory Risk types that could affect CCS implementation under CDM  
Adapted from K Aidelojie et al 2012(in press for publication) 
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assessment methodology more or less along the lines of one of the main points indicated 
above. 
5.14.2 Insurance and Private Mechanism 
Another risk management strategy is to use insurance to mitigate liabilities in the CO2 
Storage operation (With this strategy it is important to note that post site closure risk is 
not insurable in current insurance markets. When considering environmental mitigation 
processes such as CO2 the use of insurance could either be the ease of transferring risk 
from adverse party to preferring parties
567
 or it could be used to spread risk elements by 
creating a pool for the risks
568
 or by charging premiums to reflect the degree of risks 
posed by the insured.
569
 The high level of uncertainty associated with such liabilities 
proves to be a challenge in determining the insurability of such a project. Although 
many of the environmental risks do not meet the condition of insurability within the 
framework of the conventional insurance framework,
570
 however, the interpretation of 
environmental insurance policy language has set a framework in place with the private 
insurance mechanism to cover losses resulting from environmental risk.
571
 
Environment specific insurance policies do differ from the conventional policies
572
 
since environmental risks lack historical data hence are not well suited to the actuarial 
modelling provided for by conventional insurance policies.
573
 Claims on insurance 
policy associated with environmental liability are retrospective as they cover past 
actions and site specific after due assessment of the site.
574
 The ability to estimate the 
socio-economic cost implication of environmental risk and its liability is currently 
institutionally undefined and is work in progress. As identified by Kehne as far back as 
1986, environmental liability insurance is not challenged by the premium paid for 
environmental incidents but by how this industry can predictably estimate the cost 
implications associated with such risk vis-à-vis setting the premium.
575
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Risk management by allocating risk among different participating parties could work 
under a private contractual model which involves the following representation, 
covenants, warranties, conditions and indemnities.
576
 See the contractual framework in 
Chapter 2 for full detail. However, with the context of risk mitigation representation 
involves the presentation of what constitutes the facts and are central to the contractual 
obligations of the participants. For instance, a party responsible for the project storage 
site would give a clear representation of the state of the storage site. Warranties in this 
are a special interpretation of covenants. While the covenants indicates promise to carry 
out a responsibility in a defined manner,
577
 for instance the operating on the site within a 
particular timeframe, the Warranties retains the features of implied promises with 
guarantees of compensation from the responsible contracting party or parties to the 
other in case the representation is found to be invalid.
578
 Indemnity contractually 
indicates that a party has agreed to take responsibility or liability for another party given 
a factual development.
579
 This allows for the relocation of risk responsibilities from one 
party to the other putting into consideration all the implications associated with taking 
up the liability such as what “triggers” the indemnification580 (e.g. a claim or court 
judgement) and the scope of the indemnification vis-à-vis the allocation of risk among 
the contracting parties.
581
 
5.14.3 Risk Management Government as Insurer 
The other possible alternative in risk management is to involve the government in 
management of risk beyond a cap covered by insurance. Government could provide the 
alternative to the private insurance alternative discussed above since it has the capacity 
to use the instruments of government like coercion and taxation to compel parties to 
purchase insurance or spread the risk across generations by tax regimes.
582
 The 
implication of such action in a country like Nigeria however is clearly defined. As in the 
case of gas flaring the government have over the years proved not to be able to enforce 
the regulations that force contracting parties to limit the flaring of gas into the 
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atmosphere despite the different laws it had promulgated in this direction. However the 
notion of using laws and regulations to limit the risks of an activity could easily apply 
as long as the relevant agency has the competence and authority or political will to 
implement the regulation relevant to such risk.  
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Chapter6 
CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE ACTUAL RISKS IN A CLEAN 
DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM CONTEXT 
6.0 Leakage as liability concerns 
The Marrakesh Accord of the CDM defined leakage as  
...the net change of anthropogenic emissions by sources of greenhouse gases 
(GHG) which occurs outside the project boundary and which is measurable and 
attributable to the CDM Project activity
583
 
Issues suggesting the inclusion of CCS project under CDM raised during the first 
session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC acting as the Meeting of the 
Parties (COP/MOP 1) to the Kyoto Protocol, held at Montreal (Canada) in December 
2005, among other things aimed to solicit submissions by parties on CCS as CDM 
project activities, taking into account issues related to project boundary, accounting for 
emissions, leakage and permanence. Subsequent meeting of the COP/MOP considered 
different proposals ranging from methodologies to operational and environmental 
impact concerns.
584
 However, the impacts of the consequence remain an overriding 
concern which not only affects environmental integrity of such operation but also the 
liability consequence. 
6.1 Permanence issues for Environmental Integrity. 
In analysing permanence under CCS it is crucial and fundamental to account for the 
possibility of leakages
585
 or seepage
586
 of sequestered gas into the atmosphere and other 
biosphere. How this plays out in the overall legal, risk assessment and environmental 
impact (both locally and globally) within the context of CDM remains crucial to the 
environmental integrity of CCS in CDM activities and international emissions 
trading.
587
 The risk of leaks to the atmosphere or migration of the gases within the 
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underground geological formation or the seepage of the gases between the geosphere 
and the biosphere will vary depending on the geology of the sequestering site,
588
 along 
other natural and induced anthropogenic activities, these issues in relation to 
environmental integrity and liability remains an ongoing and very present important 
issue to resolve for CCS to be accepted as a credible CDM activity.
589
 
As permanence of sequestered greenhouse gases remain the overriding purpose of any 
climate change mitigation strategies under CDM, the integrity of such activity holds its 
relevance to the local and global environmental integrity which needs to be 
contractually defined, applicable and measurable as articulated in previous chapters. 
Incremental release of the stored gases does not only have project environmental 
integrity detrimental effects but also bears contractual and legal consequences since it 
could undermine the validity of CCS activity and the goal of it as a climate change 
mitigation.  
The measurability of such activities in terms of the leakage against a set of standards 
could be used as evidence during contractual liability cases against the party concerned. 
However, it is important to note that while a typical CDM project activity would aim to 
avoid the formation of the GHG in the first place, avoidance of formation is not 
fundamental to the CCS technology and operations but rather the avoidance of emission 
to the atmosphere and ensuring a permanence of the injected gases to avoid seepage or 
leakage to the atmosphere after storage.
590
 
Also crucial is the situation of a vicious cycle scenario (Figure 40) associated with 
promoting CCS as a climate change mitigation strategy. As Bode et al. (2004) clearly 
articulated there is the possibility for large quantities of CO2 to be stored in geological 
formations over a long period of time and during this period a release of a significant 
proportion of the CO2 to the atmosphere may occur thus making any stabilisation target 
impossible to reach or inconsequential. Acceptable release rates as mentioned in Section 
5.8 must be below 0.1% for CCS to be realistically referred to as a viable climate 
change mitigation option. 
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6.2 Timeframe as Environmental Concern 
Different IPCC reports noted the association between leakage risk and timeframe, this 
further underscore the importance of permanence. Any globalised and localised 
consequence resulting from a poorly structured regime would be of environmental 
concern in CCS CDM project execution vis-à-vis the timeframe of CO2 retention in the 
geological formation post crediting period. 
The IPCC 2005 report indicated an increased CO2 atmospheric levels over the long 
term, while an earlier report in 2000 (albeit in relation to LULUCF but relevant to CCS 
under CDM) identified the need to for actions to be considered in terms of decades or 
centuries which takes the issue clearly out of the CDM regulatory timeframe (or 
crediting period) as stipulated by the Protocol.
591
 As noted in Chapter 3, the permanence 
of storage is dependent of a range of factors and processes which keep injected CO2 
underground. Mineralisation reaction which is the most desirable provides the 
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Figure 40 Possible Vicious Cycle Scenario as adapted from Bode and Jung (2004) 
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permanence required however, the timeframe for such process spans into thousands of 
years as a minimum.
592
 
With permanence of storage as an integral part of environmental concern vis-à-vis the 
global impacts(and the local impact), there is also the need to avoid the harmful effect 
associated with Health, Safety and Environmental risk (HS&E).
593
 Nigeria in this case 
remains of critical concern due to the laxities in the enforcement of environmental laws. 
The environment degradation and pollution records from oil and gas exploration are 
known to impact lives and livelihood negatively in the oil producing regions. Therefore, 
assessment of HS&E impact should take into consideration that the approximate 
timeframe for related risk could vary from few hundred years to tens of thousands of 
years (this in human time horizon is long). However, the leakage at the time could have 
detrimental effect on the local ecology and groundwater or cause global climate damage 
beyond the immediate boundary of the storage or CCS operation. The possibility of 
such effects is a function of different factors which are linked to timeframe.
594
 
Therefore, as further suggested by Stenhouse et al (2009), it best fits the purpose to 
evaluate the different impacts on a case-by-case basis as accuracy of timeframe in 
relation to other factors may not be accurately determined.
595
 
6.2.1 Economic Value of Permanence 
Herzog et al (2003) worked on issues relating to permanence in carbon sequestration 
(albeit in ocean sequestration of CO2) suggested that there is economic value regardless 
of the timeframe.
596
 This would be the bases for discussion in this section. Their 
approaches mathematically expressed below emphasised the IPCC report 2000 
submission that storage and leakage elements can be separated when under 
consideration in CCS as in LULUCF, using the varied discounted rate approach of 
carbon price.
597
 However, the relationship between leakage and storage in terms of the 
immediate and future value to storage was argued to hinge on the carbon price.
598
 
                                                          
592
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However, in order for environmental integrity and possible economic investment to be 
reasonably ascertained, the potential consequence of leakage needs to be economically 
considered, the cost implications, the emissions credit value of the stored carbon, 
possible liability resulting from non-permanence and the migration of the stored CO2 
must be considered.  
Herzog et al., (2003) further used the equation below of net present value to define and 
explain the possibility that current mitigation options could some worth be temporary 
since the ton of CO2 sequestered today is likely to be emitted in the future due to the 
lower price path of fossil fuel in the future therefore underscoring the importance of 
time and price in the value of the climate change mitigation process.
599
 For there to be a 
positive impact therefore, the conclusion by Herzog (2003), and supported by 
Torvanger et al., (2005) was, the price needed either be capped or kept constant by what 
is referred to as “backstop technologies” at a relatively low cost.600 Conclusively 
therefore, the carbon storage without these conditions is of no effect as a mitigation 
strategy as this could result in marginal damages from climate change effectively 
decreasing the value of storage. However, if there is a considerable leakage of CO2 to 
the atmosphere over time, the temporal mitigation would have its value also,
601
 as this 
provides the needed leeway for the appropriate backstop technologies to be developed 
and deplored. 
        
Equation (4) 
Equation (4) above can be divided into two parts which premise on 2 assumptions. The 
first argument suggests that value of permanence is predicated on quantity of gas stored 
less the quantity leaked out of storage. The storage component of the equation P0Q0 
reflects on the overall permanence prospect of the process. While the other underscoring 
assumption of this equation is that, leakage would decrease the value of storage over 
time and the value is a function of any future carbon price P(t), the quantity of leaked 
CO2 from the site over time Q(t) and the discount rate r. Hence the equation 
∑  ( ) ( )(   )    shows the leakage value of the process. From this therefore the net 
value or potential for permanence of CO2 (V) from CCS operation could be determined 
with 3 possible relational scenarios between the storage component and the leakage 
                                                          
599
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600
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component.  Firstly, with the value of stored CO2 (P0Q0) greater than the amount of 
leaked CO2 from the storage site, the potential for permanence of CO2 is greater   
Equation (4a) 
Secondly, a negative value would be reached for permanence (V) if CO2 leakage is 
greater than the retained amount of CO2.In this case the contracting parties should hold 
on from executing the project.
602 
Equation (4b) 
The final scenario is highly hypothetical, with quantity of CO2 released or leaked equal 
to the quantity stored the net value in this case would be Zero
 
      Equation (4c) 
6.3 Leakage or Permanence in Storage Site 
When considering political and public acceptance of CCS, the issues of leakage and 
permanence of CO2 could be thorny and form a major problem to deal with. It is 
therefore important that issues of permanence be considered within the context of public 
acceptance of the project itself;
603
 future leakage accountability structure vis-à-vis the 
national inventory of emissions and accounting regimes;
604
 how any arising 
uncertainties are handled by the contracting parties in terms of liability (i.e. who is 
responsible for liabilities – during and post the project, project funding, insurance 
etc.);
605
 and finally, the intergenerational moral principles which questions the ethical 
implication of our actions on how it affects future generations vis-à-vis the implications 
of transferring the burden of current actions on the future generation. This has been 
discussed in detail in the context of contractual importance - See section 2.4 above. 
Finally, cost implications resulting from leakage of the stored CO2. All these must be 
considered within the context of risk management.  
As referenced earlier, the physical movement or seepage of CO2 in situ or to the 
surrounding atmospheric environment could constitute major risk as geological 
formations could be unstable as a result of natural or induced seismic activities, poor or 
                                                          
602
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corroded injection point (well) sealing in the case of depleted oil reservoirs.
606
 Our 
exposure to the knowledge and data from storage sites such as sub-sea and deep saline 
aquifer storage permanence is limited due to limited experience about CO2injection to 
such geological formations. Comparatively however, in the case of depleted oil and gas 
reservoirs as a result containment of petroleum and natural gas for millennia with 
limited release of its content gives some level of guarantee of site stability for storage of 
CO2 in such geological formation. That said, there is still insufficient information 
available on permanency of storage for most geological formations.
607
Therefore, in the 
interest of safety and avoidance of leakage, responsible actions and due process are 
required in mitigating or managing leakage from storage sites and also the issue of 
permanence must be integrated into mitigation policy options
608
 as it relates to liability, 
accounting and clean development mechanism regulatory regimes. 
6.4 Accounting Regime under UNFCCC for CCS 
When accounting for CO2 emission or leakage from CO2 Storage, it is important to 
understand the considerations and methodologies needed for site characterisation, 
estimation of potential risk of leakage, monitoring and reporting such leakages from 
geological formations. The 1997 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas 
Inventories (referred to as IPCC Guidelines), the 2000 IPCC Good Practice Guidance 
and Uncertainty Management in National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (GPG2000), and 
the 2003 IPCC Good Practice Guidance for Land Use and Land Use Change and 
Forestry (GPG-LULUCF) reports are used to prepare and develop national inventories 
for GHG accounting purposes under the UNFCCC. Under these regimes, the accounting 
framework for CO2 must account for the stored CO2 and the leaked CO2,
609
 providing 
for transparency, accuracy, comparability within and between countries. See Box 3 and 
Box 4. 
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The 2006 IPPC inventory Guidelines used the “Tier 3” methodology in reporting CO2 
storage in other to be consistent with the recommendations of 2005 IPCC Special 
Report on CCS which requires the detection of leaks at low levels or zero emissions at 
source or storage site. Using the Tier 1 or 2 was limited due to heterogeneity of the 
Box 3. Emission Inventories 
National Greenhouse Gas Inventories are complete estimates of the 
anthropogenic annual emissions and removals of greenhouse gases from 
a country developed source-by-source and sink-by-sink. Inventories are a 
valuable tool for many users. Not only are they needed for reporting 
greenhouse gas emissions, they are a key input to policy makers and also 
to developing the scientific understanding of climate change. Good 
knowledge of emissions and removals of greenhouse gases: 
 enables reduction policies to be developed in a cost effective 
way, 
 allows different policy options to be compared, 
 provides a simple monitoring mechanism to monitor 
implementation of these policies, 
 are a key input to scientific studies of many environmental 
issues. 
Box 4. Good Practice Guidance 
 
Good practice is a set of procedures intended to ensure that greenhouse 
gas inventories are accurate in the sense that they are systematically 
neither over- nor underestimates so far as can be judged, and that 
uncertainties are reduced so far as possible. 
Good practice inventories are: 
Transparent + Complete + Internally Consistent + Comparable 
between countries + Accurate 
The two volumes on inventory good practice are: “Good Practice 
Guidance and Uncertainty Management in National Greenhouse Gas 
Inventories” and “Good Practice Guidance for Land Use, Land-Use 
Change and Forestry". These have now been updated and merged into 
the 2006 Guidelines. 
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geological formation and limited empirical data from monitoring storage.
610
 Figure 
41below shows the schematic flow for Accounting Procedure under the IPCC Inventory 
Guidelines. 
 
 
 
Contracting parties to the UNFCCC under Article 4.1 are required to use the Guidelines 
to report national inventory of anthropogenic GHG emissions and sinks not controlled 
by the Montreal Protocol.
611
 This provision makes it mandatory for Annex 1 Parties to 
submit annual inventories (3/CP.1)
612
 with an expert review team to review the 
submitted inventories and national communication submitted
613
 but Non Annex 1 
Parties are encouraged to keep inventory as they are not expressly mandated within the 
                                                          
610
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Figure 41 Accounting Procedures under the IPCC Inventory Guidelines. Adapted from 
IPCC with permission 
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provision.
614
 However, further clarification was articulated under the Copenhagen 
Accord (CP.15) for both contracting parties requiring robustness and adherence to 
further guidelines so provided by the CP.15 for developed countries while in the case of 
developing countries, the need to communicate every two years based on the provision 
of guidelines adopted by CP.15. 
Annex 1 Parties (para. 4): “Reductions…by developed countries will be 
measured, reported and verified in accordance with existing and any further 
guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties, and will ensure that 
accounting of such targets...is rigorous, robust and transparent.” And for 
Non Annex 1 Parties (para. 5): “Mitigation actions subsequently taken and 
envisaged by Non-Annex I Parties, including national inventory reports, shall 
be communicated through national communications…every two years on the 
basis of guidelines to be adopted by the Conference of the Parties.” 
Clarity of rules on associated methodologies for accounting quantified commitments 
and other related regimes such as emissions trading, emissions removal and storage is 
required. However, there are several difficulties in articulating this framework as 
indicated in the IPCC 2005 report. Such challenges include a lack of in-depth 
knowledge about the rate of physical leakage from different storage options and the 
likelihood of accidental leakage over time (vide supra permanence and liability issues). 
Secondly, the associated implications of energy needed to achieve the goals vis-à-vis the 
energy penalty resulting from additional energy requirement from CO2 capture, 
transportation and injection into the geological reservoir. Also, for consideration are 
associated liabilities and cost issues when considering CCS crossing traditional 
accounting boundaries.
615
 
To account for CO2 storage under a national inventory there are 2 possible 
considerations. According to Yoshigahara et al (2004), it is possible to account for CO2 
by assuming a zero emission through avoidance of emission in the first place.
616
 The 
second option involves the discounting of the amount of CO2 leak from the geological 
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formation.
617
 This consideration accounts as emissions reduction since the capture and 
storage aspects of CCS will be accounted for individually but allowing for a full 
reporting of all captured and emitted CO2.
618
 
In 2006, almost a decade after the first IPCC Inventories Guidelines was published, a 
revised version was published stipulating methodology for calculating and reporting 
GHG emission and removal by contracting parties. The uniqueness of this edition was 
that for the first time, it included CO2 storage for reporting
619
 and classified carbon 
capture and storage into 4 sub-systems namely, capture and compression system, 
transport system, injection system and the storage system. Table 14 shows the potential 
sources and emissions of greenhouse gases through each system identified above.
620
                                                          
617
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618
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IPCC Guideline Emissio
ns 
Captur
e 
System 
Transportatio
n System 
Injectio
n 
System 
Storag
e 
System 
Sector Source Category      
1  
Energy 
GHG emissions from 
stationary combustion 1A1; 
1A2 
CO2,CH4
, CO, 
N2O, 
NOX
621
, 
NMVOC
s
622
, SO2 
      
1 
Energy 
GHG 
emissions 
from mobile 
combustion 
Water-borne 
navigation 
1A3di 
1A3dii 
CO2, 
CH4, 
CO, 
N2O, 
NOX, 
NMVOC 
     
                                                          
621
NOx includes NO and NO2 reported in NO2 mass equivalents. 
622
 NMVOC means any non-methane organic compound having at 293.15 K a vapour pressure of 0.01 
kP or more, or having a corresponding volatility under the particular conditions of use. 
Table 14 Potential sources and emission of greenhouse gases (GHG) in CCS subsystems
26
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SO2 
Other 
Transportatio
n (pipeline 
Transportatio
n) 1A3ei 
CO2, 
CH4, 
N2O, 
NOX, 
NMVOC
s, SO2 
     
 Fugitive 
emissions 
from fuels 1B 
Oil and 
natural gas 
1B2 
CO2,CH4
, N2O, 
NMVOC
s 
     
 Mineral 
products 2A 
(e.g. cement) CO2, 
SO2 
      
 Chemical 
industry 2B 
(e.g. ammonia) CO2, 
NMVOC
s, CO, 
SO2  
      
 Metal 
Production 2C 
(e.g. iron and 
steel) 
CO2, 
NOX, 
NMVOC 
      
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CO, SO2 
 Other 
Production 
2D 
(e.g. food and 
drinks) 
CO2 
NMVOC 
      
6 
Waste 
Industrial wastewater handling 
6B1 
CH4      
 Fugitive CO2 
emissions 
from Capture, 
transportation 
and injection 
processes 
Normal 
Operation 
CO2        
Repair and 
maintenance 
CO2        
Systems 
upsets and 
accidental 
discharge 
CO2        
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6.5 Reporting and Verification Framework by Contracting Parties 
With regards CCS, although Kyoto Protocol does not specifically mention geological 
CO2 storage; the analogous biological storage in the form of Land Use and Land Use 
Change and Forestry (LULUCF) is clearly encouraged
623
 consequent to the Marrakech 
Declaration.
624
 To this end, issues resultant from emission credits associated with 
geological storage operations between the country generating the CO2 and the country 
willing to store the emissions has to be clarified. Section 6.6 will discuss the trans-border 
CCS projects accounting methodology with its possible implications as UNFCCC 
provisions and how Kyoto Protocol can manage the relationship that can possibly exist 
between contracting parties in this regard. 
Kyoto Protocol Article 5, 7 and 8 accentuates the fundamental need for reporting and 
monitoring of emissions and removal inventories firmly to underscore that the reported 
emissions reduction or removal are real and in compliance with the rules of emissions 
trading.  Without ambiguity, the Protocol states that guidelines for national systems, 
adjustments, the preparation of inventories and national communications, as well as for 
the conduct of expert reviews, should be adopted by the CMP at its first session (CMP 1), 
and regularly reviewed thereafter.
625
 
All Parties must report on the steps they are taking or envisage undertaking to 
implement the Convention (Articles 4.1 and 12).  In accordance with the principle of 
"common but differentiated responsibilities" enshrined in the Convention, the required 
contents of these national communications and the timetable for their submission are 
different for Annex 1 and Non Annex 1 Parties.  Each Non Annex 1 Party shall submit 
its initial communication within three years of the entry into force of the Convention 
for that Party, or of the availability of financial resources (except for the least 
                                                          
623
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624
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625
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developed countries, which may do so at their discretion).
626
 However, Nigeria remains 
one of the 141 countries that have submitted only the initial national communication, 
while 45 others have submitted the second national communication with 2 and 1 
countries respectively just submitted the third and fourth national communications 
respectively.
627
 The last national communication submitted to the UNFCCC by Nigeria 
was done on the 17
th
 of November, 2003.
628
 
One of the reasons for proper reporting and verification is to allow for accurate 
crediting of relevant party[ies], according to Torvanger et al 2004, the 2 possible 
options for crediting CCS operation are either to credit the country whose emissions 
were avoided or credit the country who stores the emission.
629
 In order to understand 
this, the section below expands on the cross-border accounting possibilities as IPCC 
Inventory Guideline has stipulated for such accounting methodology.  
6.6 Cross Border Scenarios for accounting methodology 
The responsibility of contracting parties in the facilitation of CO2 emissions mitigation 
will be best understood if the possible scenarios of the accounting methodology are 
explained. As mentioned earlier, it is important to carefully assess the effectiveness of 
CCS technology across the three distinctive processes that make up the technology as a 
mitigation strategy based on the IPCC emissions estimation guidelines. Net avoided CO2 
emission must consider the additional energy (AdE) used in achieving each of the three 
processes (i.e. Capture, Transportation and Injection), the estimated leakage (LkE) that 
could be possible in each phase of the processes and the long term leakage (SP) and 
spontaneous or sudden leakage (Sd). To this effect, the net CO2 stored as shownby the 
equation (5)below must be consistently integrated in the accounting methodology used by 
any of the reporting country in the scenarios described below. 
                                                          
626
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Equation (5) 
 
According to the IPCC Inventory Guidelines, multiple countries could be involved in CCS 
technology and it is important as stated above that adequate accounting methodology is 
articulated. The possible scenarios for the cross-border CCS operation seen in Figure 42, 
43&44, below identify the operational phases of the technologies and the responsible party 
for reporting any leakage in the whole process. 
The scenarios suggest the relationship that might exist between contracting parties and how 
potential leakage affects accounting and inventory compilation responsibilities of the 
parties. 
The first scenario (Figure 42) indicates Country X where the operation of CO2 capture takes 
place and transported to Country Y for injection and storage.
630
The guideline in this case 
stipulates that reporting associated with the capture and transportation operation must be by 
Country X while the injection and storage reporting should be the responsibility of Country 
Y.
631
 Secondly, in a case whereby all the CCS activities are carried out in a particular 
Country X and the leakage occurs in a different Country Y
632
 (see Figure 43), the guidelines 
stipulates that the emission to the surface in the Country Y must be reported by Country X 
and it is within the responsibility of Country X to ensure that Country Y is using adequate 
monitoring techniques where the leakage had been anticipated by subsurface injection 
models. The third scenario (Figure 44) however is a situation that involves more than 2 
contracting countries to the whole operation.
633
If there are multiple countries generating 
CO2 but the injection and storage site is only in one country, the country holding the storage 
reservoir is responsible for the reporting of any leakage unless the leakage occurs in a 
different country that is not a part of the contractual obligation. In which case the whole 
                                                          
630
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2006, IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse 
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Net CO2 Stored = Ecap – (AdEcap+ AdETrans + AdEinj) – (LkEcap + 
LkEtrans + LkEinj) – (SPstore) – (Sdstore) 
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contracting parties involved in the CO2generation would be treated as a single country and 
must be responsible for the reporting of the leakage.
634
 
 
 
 
International Boundary 
 
 
  Country Y 
         
  
 
                                                          
634
Id. 
Country X 
Capture Transportation 
Country Y 
Injection Storage 
Country X 
Capture Transportation Injection Storage 
Figure 42 Scenario 1 involving 2 different countries with individual country report for its 
operation 
CO2 
Figure 43 Scenario 2 involving 2 different countries but Country X responsible for 
reporting and monitoring in both countries 
International Boundary 
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   International Boundary
 
International Boundary 
 
 
 
6.7 IPCC Inventory Guidelines National Inventory Compilation 
Ensuring adherence to the IPCC Guidelines is the responsibility of the national GHG 
inventories compiler.
635
 These responsibilities involve the annual collection of emissions 
estimates from CO2 storage operators and keeping an accurate and comprehensive record 
on all geological storage operations and sites in the country among other things such as 
the sources of the CO2 to be stored, the infrastructure and mode of transporting the CO2 to 
the site and the injection procedure of the CO2 to the geological formation.
636
 It is within 
the responsibility of the national compiler to determine the accuracy and approve the 
report produced for the site characterisation and other data relating to the modelling of the 
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Capture Transportation 
Capture Transportation Injection Storage 
Capture Transportation 
Country Y 
Country Z 
CO2 
Country X 
CO2 
Figure 44 Scenario 3 involving multiple countries but Country Y is responsible for 
reporting leakage (unless leakage is outside participants’ jurisdiction) 
235 
 
site.
637
 To ensure that the CO2 storage operator has properly assessed for leakage potential 
of the site (both on the short and long term by using sensitivity analysis model and 
injection and storage simulations,) the national compiler validates the operator’s data and 
report.
638
 It is also within the function of the national compiler to ensure that the 
monitoring plan of the operator is appropriate for the operation.
639
 The monitoring report 
must contain information about the ground movement of CO2 in situ and outside the 
project boundary; account for the quantity of CO2 injected into the individual wells, the 
levels of emission through the injection systems, post injection monitoring and most 
pertinent is that this information and data about the emissions estimate must be 
verified.
640
 
The collation of the total national emissions from the CO2 storage reported to the national 
GHG inventories must include the sources of the CO2 injected, an up-to-date quantity 
injected into the geological formation, the technologies used for monitoring and the 
methodology used for verifying the inventory process.
641
 Generally, it is accepted to 
consider and use the international accounting methodology for CO2 storage and as the 
base accounting standard for determining liability. However, it is not a legally binding 
accounting Protocol that all countries must use to achieve this goal. Nations are at liberty 
to develop other accounting Protocols to account for CO2 storage. 
6.8 CCS integration to Kyoto Protocol Framework 
As stated above CCS is not directly articulated within the framework of the UNFCCC or 
the Kyoto Protocol however, some degree of finality and approval on the position of the 
UNFCCC is anticipated to emerge from the COP17/CMP7 coming up in Durban in 
December 2011. Also, the need for guidance on the methodologies on how to calculate 
and account for project based CO2 reductions from CCS under the CDM is anticipated. 
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However, two geological CO2 storage projects
642
 and ocean CO2sequestration 
project
643
referred to below have been considered by the CDM Methodology Panel 
(“CDM Meth Panel”) and the CDM Executive Body. In September 2006 the CDM Meth 
Panel made recommendations on issues associated these CCS project activities under 
CDM based on the assessment of proposed CCS projects.
644
 These recommendations 
were in relation to the following submitted CDM projects namely NM0167,
645
 
NM0168
646
 and the SSC038
647
 projects. 
There is no explicit reference to CCS project based activities (unless when considered in 
analogous activities like the LULUCF which is discussed in context below),
648
 neither did 
any of the international or regional regimes
649
that bear relevance to CDM and JI 
operations
650
 address the CO2 reporting scheme concerns for the projects,
651
 the 
implications therefore are that issues of additionality, emissions baseline and potential 
risk of leakage which are necessary for emission credits calculation and issuance was also 
not explicitly discussed. However, Article 2(1) of the Kyoto Protocol implicitly referred 
                                                          
642
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to CCS in the Protocol by stating the Annex 1 countries need to “research, promote, 
develop and increase the use of CO2 technologies.”
652
 Paragraph 26, Decision 5/CP.7 of 
the Marrakech Accords went a step further to request that Annex 1 Parties give priority to 
cooperation in the development and transfer of technologies related to the capture and 
storage of greenhouse gases from fossil fuel.
653
 On these bases, the rest of this chapter 
will discuss the broad implications of CCS under project based mechanism vis-à-vis 
methodological issues that go beyond other CDM methodological issues project 
boundary, emissions baseline and additionality implications.
654
 
6.9 CDM EB Valuation of Proposed CCS projects 
The following proposed CCS-CDM projects White Tiger Oil Field project in Vietnam 
(NM0167), the Capture of the CO2 from the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) complex and 
its geological storage in the aquifer located in Malaysia (NM0168) and the 
Anthropogenic Ocean Sequestration by Changing the Alkalinity of Ocean Surface Water 
(SSC_038) were the first CCS related projects sent to the CDM Executive Body for 
approval. These projects formed the trial bases for CDM Methodological framework in 
determining the procedural and technical limits of the CDM framework for CCS.  
Upon submission and after due consideration by the Meth Panel, the recommendation to 
the CDM EB by the Meth Panel in September 2006 was that the proposed methodologies 
should be rejected since the approaches and procedures did not address methodological 
and accounting issues adequately
655
 vis-à-vis issues faced by other CDM methodologies 
such as alternative selection and baseline scenario, project boundary issues, Additionality, 
carbon dioxide leakage or seepage, project emission, emissions reduction, and the 
algorithm for calculating baseline emissions.
656
 Also, there were doubts as to whether 
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some of the issues could be resolved without further guidance from the COP/MOP and or 
a technical body on CCS
657
vis-à-vis issues that lie within the frontier of technical and 
scientific knowledge e.g. site selection, monitoring methods, legal or policy and 
accounting issues associated with the permanence of CO2.
658
 The implication of this lack 
of clarity was that further clarification about the current framework and how it is 
applicable to CCS projects under CDM framework was needed. This was not necessarily 
only due to inconsistencies but also due to inadequate regulatory and methodological 
framework to comply with.
659
 
Critical to the implications associated with addressing methodological and accounting 
concerns, the following key questions were asked by the CDM EB in 2006 in relation to 
leakage on one hand, and on the other, permanence and liability for leakage from 
geological storage projects for clarification and provide the bases for guidance 
formulation for CCS under the CDM (see Table 15).
660
 
 
Leakage/Seepage from geological 
formations 
Permanence and liability of 
Geological Storage Projects 
• What are reasonable site selection 
criteria and which entity should 
develop a procedure and criteria 
for selection of storage sites? 
• What are appropriate monitoring 
methods, given the differences in 
the characteristics of storage sites, 
and which entity should develop 
guidance on monitoring? 
• Given the limitations in the 
• How should (non-trivial) seepage 
emissions from storage reservoirs be 
accounted for (during and) after the 
end of the last crediting period or 
before and after 
sealing/abandonment of the 
reservoir? 
• Do the uncertainties justify 
considering an alternative accounting 
framework for emission 
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current ability to directly measure 
and track the underground volume 
of injected CO2 and to accurately 
measure any seepage, what are the 
likely uncertainties in monitoring 
seepage? 
• Are these significantly larger than 
the uncertainties in other CDM 
methodologies, and if so, how can 
they be addressed? 
• How should seepage emissions 
that are difficult to monitor be 
addressed (e.g. abrupt emissions 
due to natural events)? 
• What is a workable unit for 
seepage? Is the concept of seepage 
threshold an appropriate concept 
for site selection (ex-ante) and/or 
for project eligibility (ex post), and, 
if so, what are the appropriate 
threshold(s)? If not, what are the 
alternatives? 
• What are acceptable levels of 
long-term physical leakage 
(seepage) risk and uncertainty (e.g. 
less than X% seepage by year Y 
with a likelihood of Z%)? 
reductions/removals from CCS 
project activities? 
• Who should be responsible (and 
liable) for any necessary remediation 
measures after well closure and/or 
after the end of the crediting period? 
• How can it be ensured that 
necessary remediation measures are 
undertaken? 
• What is the interaction with 
national regulation on these issues 
(many countries with underground or 
offshore operations have mining 
laws that regulate site abandonment 
and long-term liability)? 
 
6.10 CCS Project Cross Border Issues 
In considering CCS projects under international climate change regimes, it is important to 
understand possible implications of project boundaries and geographical distribution of 
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storage sites, and the guidelines that account for the different possibilities available for 
the transfer of CO2 between countries. According to the Marrakesh Accord project 
boundary for CDM based projects must “encompass all anthropogenic emissions by 
sources of the GHGs under the control of the project participants that are significant and 
reasonably attributable to the CDM project activity.”661 
Within the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol provisions CO2 mitigation project activities 
could take place between different geographical territories that are contracting parties to 
the international regimes.
662
 Box 5 explains the possible scenarios that could exist 
between contracting parties based on whether or not they have ratified the Protocol. 
During the August 2006 Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological (SBSTA) 
workshop,
663
 the UNFCCC Secretariat acknowledged three concerns related to project 
boundary namely, that the boundary includes not only the capture, transportation and 
storage of the CO2 but also the sources of the CO2
664
 and possible areas the emissions 
could escape (pre, during and post injection into the reservoir) to which might extend 
beyond the initial storage reservoir per se.
665
 Secondly, project boundary could be 
transnational and this must be considered
666
 and finally, the project reservoir could either 
be the same or could overlap.
667
 The concern noticeably absent was how the international 
laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) and its interpretation would be applicable if the project 
boundary and reservoir borders with the international waters since for instance Nigeria 
borders the Atlantic Ocean to the south. This in my opinion requires further clarification 
on how this relates to international climate change regimes although this thesis has 
attempted to contribute considerably in chapter 7 dealing with international 
                                                          
661
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environmental laws. The project boundary should be defined based on the preliminary 
study of the storage site characterisation
668
 and any project emissions generated within 
this boundary must include or account for both direct and or indirect emissions which 
could be fugitive (resulting from imperfect capture or leakage during transportation or 
injection phase), storage site breaches (e.g. resulting from sudden failure in storage site), 
or physical leakages which is long term but gradual release from the geological 
reservoir.
669
 
  
                                                          
668Boute A., 2008, “Carbon Capture and Storage Under the Clean Development Mechanism – An 
Overview of Regulatory Challenges”, Vol. 2 No. 4 Carbon and Climate Law Review 339-352 
669
Id Pg. 348 
Box 5 Relational Scenario between Contracting Parties 
The scenarios under the flexible mechanism could involve the exchange of CO2 
between either Annex 1 country (like the UK) and a Non Annex 1 country (like 
Nigeria) in this case, both who have ratified the Protocol (CDM flexible 
mechanism), or between Annex 1 country (like the United States of America) that 
have not ratified the Protocol and a Non Annex 1 country that have ratified the 
Protocol or in the case of JI flexible mechanism, between 2 Annex 1 Countries that 
have ratified the Protocol or between  Annex 1 country that has ratified the Protocol 
and another that has not ratified the Protocol. 
Where there is a transfer of between 2 Annex 1 Kyoto Protocol ratified countries 
leakages monitoring on the long term could be based on bilateral agreement with 
special attention on avoiding double counting while resulting transaction credits 
could be shared based on contractual agreement between the parties. 
A situation where the CO2 capturing State is an Annex 1 signatory to the Protocol 
and the receiving Country is a Non Annex 1 country or Annex 1 country that has not 
ratified the Protocol, a bilateral agreement is also important which must include 
measures to mitigate against rogue behaviour such attention to storage conditions, 
long term monitoring conditions, risk of intentional release of CO2 and how the 
payments are transferred between the parties. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter country like Nigeria not been consistent with 
providing UNFCCC with national communication and does not have a clear cut 
accounting methodology for such activities. 
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6.11 Carbon Capture and Storage Additionality Determination 
One of the conditions for the acceptance of a project as a CDM is the demonstration of 
additionality of the project, in other words the project has to prove less emissions 
generated than would have been in the case of normal operation (i.e. “business as usual”) 
and that this would not have occurred otherwise without financial support towards the 
project.
670
 It is recommended that this is clearly stipulated in the CDM-PDD.  
To demonstrate additionality, CDM EB set out two distinct tools to test for additionality 
namely the ‘Tool for demonstration of additionality’ and the ‘Combined tool for 
demonstration of additionality and baseline methodology’.671 However, these tools differ 
in applicability depending on if the project is a retrofit or a new built operation
672
 and 
with respect to additionality tools, it is also applicable to oil and natural gas industrial 
operations
673
 which could intrinsically be linked to CCS projects within the industry.  
In demonstrating additionality, the recommendation suggested was that the tool used for 
CCS project alternative has to be able to identify the generated power in the absence of 
the project activity (in the case of electricity power generation), what would happen to the 
emission of CO2 and what the state of the geological storage formation is if the project 
activity does not occur.
674
 Therefore, determining additionality in CCS project activities 
under CDM ought to be in relation to baseline scenario which is based on comparison 
with potential alternatives to the proposed project
675
 and this is possible by considering a 
reasonably straightforward investment, barrier and common practice analysis of CCS 
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projects.
676
 According to the CDM EB, one of the reasons for the rejection of the 
NM0167 and NM0168 methodology submissions was lack of plausible baseline 
scenario.
677
 It is important therefore to ensure that there exist some level of consistency 
between the determination of additionality and the determination of the baseline 
scenario.
678
 
As mentioned above the use of each of the analysis require the assessment of alternative 
scenarios in the case of the Investment analysis, the economic attractiveness while in the 
case of the barrier analysis the measures or drivers that could prevent the implementation 
of the project. 
In the case of a country like Nigeria, the investment analysis could use various financial 
indicators to demonstrate additionality one such indicator could be the cost of flaring a 
metric tonne of the associated gas or the internal rate of return in investing on the 
opportunity cost.  
Considering EOR activity for instance as a CCS project under CDM could prove to be 
more economically viable beyond the mitigation of climate change. Based on this, 
additionality could be proved using the relative cost - benefit implication of such activity 
instead of the above two since it could provide a more stable comparable data to the 
analysis.  Knowing the factors (such as the capture technology, transportation cost, 
geology of the storage site vis-à-vis the location and depth of storage, and the ongoing 
cost of monitoring) that influence these costs would help know the value of CO2 storage 
under a business as usual scenario and additionality thereby underscored. Although in 
Nigeria, there is currently a poor return on investment due to various socio economic 
factors and poor electricity generation profile for the country,
679
 these indicators or 
drivers could still easily be calculated against the alternative baseline scenarios as there is 
                                                          
676
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no other known objective indicator that can be used to demonstrate additionality in my 
opinion.  
The barrier analysis indicators such as technology or information indicators could be 
subjective and lack transparency.
680
 Hence it is only recommended as a supportive 
analytical measure for CCS project under CDM. The latest round of meeting by the 
SBSTA in Durban however showed with regards to additionality that there was a broad 
consensus about CCS projects been in many cases ‘first of a kind’ and therefore 
additional
681
 with a further consideration when it is in relation to EOR projects.
682
 In this 
sense additionality of such projects could be justified albeit requiring the technical 
expression of these documents presented for the registration of the project. 
6.12 Land Use Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) Model 
implication on Carbon Capture and Storage 
The offset of CO2 emission by increasing of CO2 uptake or reducing CO2 emissions is 
characteristic of LULUCF
683
 was in line with determining the net change of GHG 
emissions for achieving compliance with the stated emissions reduction obligation as 
agreed in the Kyoto Protocol.
684
 It is akin to the CCS but more of the use of biological 
processes in the form reforestation,
685
 afforestation
686
 and or deforestation
687
 to achieve 
                                                          
680
Supra note Schneider 2007 p8 
681
 December 2011 UNFCCC/SBSTA/2011/INF.14 
682
Id 
683
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Land Use, Land Change and 
Forestry (LULUCF), at http:/unfccc.int/methods_and_science/lulucf/items/3060.php 
684
 As stated in Art. 3.3 of the Kyoto protocol that the net changes in the greenhouse gas emissions 
by sources and removals by sinks resulting from direct human-induced land use change and 
forestry activities limited to afforestation, reforestation and deforestation since 1990, measured as 
verifiable changes in carbon stocks in each commitment period, shall be used to meet the 
commitment under this Article of each Party included in Annex 1. UNFCCC KP 37 I.L.M. 22. 10 
December 1997. 
685
 “Reforestation involves the direct human induced conversion of non-forested land to forested 
land through the planting, seeding and or human-induced promotion of natural seed sources on 
land that was forested, but currently used as non-forest land”. UNFCCC, COP preparation for the 
First Session of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties, Preparing for 
the First Session of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol (Decision 8/CP.4) Matters Relating to Land-Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry, 
245 
 
the goal of climate change mitigation and compliance with the emission reduction 
obligations. 
The use of afforestation and reforestation under the CDM regime was reached during the 
Seventh Conference of Parties (COP-7) to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. However, the use of these two CO2 emissions offset mechanism are 
limited to first Kyoto commitment period with CDM
688
 and suggests 3 fundamental 
propositions namely, that it must be direct human-induced activity as this would be the 
bases for crediting such project.
689
 Emphasis on CO2 benefits in plant growth and 
increased atmospheric concentration of CO2 is crucial in the carbon sink.
690
 Secondly, 
there is a need to provide “verifiable” changes to the carbon stocks. This provides for the 
measurability of the LULUCF project activities within the framework of the direct 
human-induced activity not outside.
691
 And finally, LULUCF activities must be 
considered within the context of equity, which in this case according to Marland et al., 
(1999) implies that the activities are secondary to other CO2 reducing and avoiding 
actions.
692
 
In seeking the approval for LULUCF project, the project developer or Parties must 
submit such project proposal to the CDM EB.
693
 This proposal must include the impact 
analysis of such a project activity on not just the environment but the socio-economy of 
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the people,
694
 the baseline scenario analysis,
695
 and the monitoring plan
696
 (clearing 
stating the methods used to measure the GHG removal. And finally, it is important to 
select the crediting period for CERs accrued from the project
697
 after it has been 
independently validated that there is a net removal of anthropogenic GHG by the 
designated operational entity
698
 for any project registration to take place.
699
  As indicated 
above the responsibility of the EB include the certification of what constitutes a reduction 
in emission by issuing the CERs.
700
 
The possibility for non-permanence is common to both LULUCF and CCS project 
activities.
701
 The release of CO2 into the atmosphere could be during or post crediting 
period by events like forest land fire or injection phase leakage. However, mitigation of 
non-permanence and liability under the CCS suggested by the SBSTA 35
th
 Session is 
similar to that suggested for LULUCF during the 9
th
 Conference of Parties. The SBSTA 
35
th
 Session in Durban 2011, reviewed the following measures with regards to 
permanence and liability under CCS project activities by considering the concepts of 
discounting and the issuance of temporary CERs (tCERs)
702
 or long-term CERs 
(lCERs)
703
 as possible options. 
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Under LULUCF, consequent to verification and certification of the project activity, the 
permanence issue can be addressed by CER credit issued. The project participant can 
choose between the tCERs or the lCERs depending on the commitment period it is issued 
for.
704
 However, during the SBSTA 35
th
 session, some Parties clearly held the view and 
argued that CCS tCERs and lCERs cannot apply in the same way as afforestation and 
reforestation due to fungibility issues and by extension its impact on investment
705
 
favouring instead the issuance of the regular CERs.
706
 And with regards discounting the 
view was also varied mostly in line with the view that since discount rates cannot be 
established with any certainty along scientific bases but rather arbitrarily it was in 
consistent to uphold such a measure.
707
 SBSTA 35
th
 session was not conclusive on this 
issue contrary to the conclusion reached in the case of LULUCF.  
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Chapter 7 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL AND 
NATIONAL REGIMES 
7.0 Legal Regimes Impact on CCS-CDM Implementation 
The legal relations that exist out of the need for jurisdictions to mitigate climate change 
effects under International obligations, have both implicit and explicit impacts on national 
regulatory regimes and cannot be more profound in the case of operations (CCS or 
otherwise) offshore and onshore. In considering CCS and indeed its implementation 
under CDM regulatory framework, many factors should be considered among these are 
the relevance and interaction of the different international and national environmental 
laws vis-à-vis CCS projects, the analogous operations and how these laws inform the 
choices made e.g.in the choice of CO2 storage site (either offshore or onshore) or in the 
transportation and final storage across borders. Another example is that the international 
regimes on environmental protection may have implication on the geological storage site 
for CO2 in the sub-seabed, the definition of the CO2 to be stored and transportation over 
the legal zones of the sea. The interaction of these characterisations with each other and 
between the different legal regimes could have both immediate and long term legal 
implication. This is currently the case in the implementation of CCS and more so as a 
CDM project. 
7.1 International CO2 Storage Regulatory Regimes 
Until recent decade, different international environmental regulatory regimes have been 
negotiated with very limited emphasis on CCS. However, with the increased need to 
reduce the atmospheric levels of GHGs and meet international obligations, storage in 
geological formations (both onshore and offshore) have gained prominence on the global 
environmental mitigation agenda. It is important to mention at this point that there are 
still issues about cost, safety, permanence and environmental impact of the various 
storage alternatives that have not been clarified.
708
 And the relevance of this to case study 
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country is based on the geopolitical location of Nigeria as a coastal State and the potential 
capacity of the country to be a storage site due to the large volume of hydrocarbon 
deposits. As shown in Figure 7a and 7b depicting the geopolitical boundaries of the 
country with highlighted Niger Delta area where most of the hydrocarbon deposits are in 
abundance 
For jurisdictional relevance and legal disciplining of geological storage of CO2, it is 
important to note that there is a difference between onshore CO2storage and at sea (or 
offshore) storage. The latter could be further classified into ocean storage and sub seabed 
CO2 storage.  
Sub seabed geological formations
709
 such as offshore oil and gas reservoir and deep saline 
formation have become attractive to store CO2 for various reasons and are under the legal 
jurisdiction of international laws
710
 unless when within the territorial waters of a State. 
Onshore geological formations are governed by national and regional environmental laws 
and directives
711
 as long as they take into account the applicable international legal 
provisions. Generally, the preference for offshore CO2 storage is preferred as it is 
believed to result in a lesser likelihood of direct harmful impact on humans in terms of 
hazard to health and contamination of ground water and aquifers.  
Most relevant for analysis in this chapter as international environmental laws are the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); London Convention of 
1972 and its 1996 Protocol; the OSPAR Convention for the Protection Marine 
Environment of the North East Atlantic and other regional environmental regimes. While 
relevant national environmental laws for Nigeria will also be analysed in the chapter. 
                                                          
709
 Although the consequences of using such geological storage are not thoroughly tested however, 
there are ongoing demonstrations projects analogues operations in the oil and gas sector and also 
natural occurring geological storage formations. 
710
 International Energy Agency (IEA), 2005, Legal Aspects of Storing CO2 OECD/IEA Paris  
711
Id. 
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7.1.1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
Regime 
The United Nation Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the international 
legal framework that governs and regulates activities that relates to seas and oceans vis-à-
vis the actions, consequence and mitigation of pollution and dumping of wastes.
712
 Often 
referred to as the ‘Constitution of the Ocean’, it clearly stipulates the limits of a broad 
spectrum of activities and holds a jurisdictional reference over the seabed, ocean floor 
and subsoil beyond the limit of the national jurisdiction.
713
 The first conference in 1958 
produced four conventions
714
 and a protocol on compulsory settlement of disputes. There 
are currently 162 countries that have ratified the convention to date including Nigeria (in 
1986)
715
 and United Kingdom (in 1997)
716
 since its adoption in 1982. However, notable 
among the nations that have not ratified the convention is the United States of America.
717
 
See Figure 45 for detailed distribution of countries that have ratified, signed but not 
ratified and not signed at all. 
7.1.1.1 Jurisdictional Scope 
The jurisdictional provision of the UNCLOS regime has broadly classified coastal States’ 
territorial borders with the high sea
718
 into 3 namely, the territorial sea,
719
 the continental 
shelf,
720
 and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
721
 This classification underpins the 
sovereign rights to usage of the seabed and the subsoil and the distance from the shores of 
                                                          
712
 OECD/IEA 2007, “Legal Aspects of Storing CO2: Update and Recommendations” available at 
www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2007/legal_aspects.pdf ,  
713
UNCLOS Art. 1, 2, 56 and 76 
714
These Conventions include the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone; the 
Convention on the High Seas; the Convention on the Fishing and Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the High Seas; and the Convention on the Continental Shelf 
715
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related Agreements as at 
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Id. 
718
UNCLOS (1982) Art. 86 
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Id. Section 2, Art. 3-16 
720
Id. Art. 76-85 
721
Id. Art. 55 to 75 
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the coastal State. The “full sovereign right” of the coastal State over territorial sea722 (this 
extends 12 nautical miles (22.2km) into the sea from the shorelines
723
 and includes the 
seabed and subsoil) is subject to adherence to other provisions which could have relevant 
interpretation as it relate to issues of pollution and dumping in marine environment.
724
 
Figure 46 shows the annotated diagram of the different zones. 
Pursuant to Article 55 of UNCLOS, coastal States are allowed to establish EEZ with 
Article 57 defining the boundary not to extend beyond 200 nautical miles (370.4km) from 
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. Within these limits 
the States are allowed to execute sovereignty rights which allow for 
“[…] exploration, exploitation conserving and managing the natural resources, 
whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the 
seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic 
exploitation and exploration of the zone…”725 
and other jurisdictional rights which include “marine scientific research”726 (this clause 
could be interpreted to justify offshore CCS demonstration projects). However, the 
sovereign rights to continental shelf are restricted to all stipulated in relation to EEZ 
provisions except within the waters superjacent to the seabed and it subsoil.
727
 Also, 
landlocked States are allowed to enjoy the relevant provisions of the Convention vis-à-vis  
“... [t]he freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the 
laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of 
the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of 
                                                          
722
Id. Art. 193 
723
Id. Art. 3 
724
Id. Art. 210 
725
Id. Art. 56 (1)(a) 
726
Id. Art. 56 (1)(b)(ii) this clause could be interpreted to justify offshore CCS demonstration 
projects. 
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Id. Art.76 
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ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other 
provisions of this Convention.”728 
This provision accentuates the possibility that landlocked Non Annex 1 States such as 
Niger Republic, Chad Republic or South Sudan can engage in CCS projects especially the 
transportation phase projects over marine territories of coastal States like Nigeria. 
The legal ambiguity associated with the term exploitation of natural resources as it relates 
to CO2 injection for EOR and CO2 storage within the continental shelf and the EEZ as 
geological formations is currently subject to academic debate; however, it is safe to 
assume that when it relates to oil recovery processes, the injection of CO2 is allowed. 
 
reSRatified  DieNot Ratified but signed dieNot Signed  
 
 
But the need to provide clarity arises when the issue is to use geological formations vis-à-
vis its pore space primarily for the storage of CO2 in marine territories.  The need to 
provide clarity and balance interpretation to sovereign rights over the ownership of 
resource such as hydrocarbons in geological formations and the right or ownership over 
                                                          
728
Id. Art 58 
Figure 45 Colour coding of Signatory and non-Signatory Countries to the UNCLOS 
Source: en.wikipedia.org website page of UNCLOS 
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the pore space for the storage of gases outside the purpose of enhancing recovery of such 
hydrocarbons is important as there is no clear definition of this within the UNCLOS 
provisions; although there is evidence that there are State practices demonstrating 
entitlement to exploiting geological storage capacity.
729
 The interpretation of this could 
have far reaching implications when considering CDM regulation within national 
jurisdictions vis-à-vis the ownership rights to the CERs generated by such project. See the 
context of interpretation as it relates to contractual interpretation discussed in Section 2.6 
The International Seabed Authority (ISA)
730
 holds the jurisdictional authority as 
conferred on it by States Parties (i.e. both coastal and landlocked States) in accordance 
with the provisions of the Convention
731
 to organise and control activities over the high 
sea for the benefit of mankind as a whole irrespective of the geographical location of 
States (whether coastal or land-locked), and taking into particular consideration the 
interests and needs of developing States and of peoples who have not attained full 
independence or other self-governing status recognized by the United Nations in 
accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)
732
 and other relevant General 
Assembly resolutions,
733
 and with a view to administering the resources or benefits of the 
Area
734
 as it is explicitly declared as the common heritage of mankind.
735
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 Scott K., 2005, “The Day After Tomorrow: Ocean CO2 Sequestration and the Future of Climate 
Change”, GEO. Int’l Env’l Law Rev. 57, (2005). 
730
 Supra note [UNCLOS 1982] Art. 156 ISA is the Assembly of all member States to the 1982 
Convention on the Law of the Sea providing policy direction for the whole body. 
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Id. Art. 157(2) 
732
 Pursuant to UN Administrative Instruction ST/AI/189/Add.9/Rev.2 
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Id. Art. 140 
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Id. Art.136 and Art. 29 of the UN General Assembly Chart of Economic Rights and Duties of 
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This implicitly therefore suggests that CCS as a climate change mitigation strategy with 
benefit to mankind could be implemented in the high sea with the approval of ISA. 
However, the degree of involvement of the ISA in terms of post closure liabilities, 
remediation and other legal and regulatory technicalities requires further clarification. 
7.1.1.2 Obligation to Protect and Preserve Marine life 
In accordance with article 192 of the Convention, States have the obligation to protect 
and preserve the marine environment (avoiding pollution
736
 and dumping
737
), [...] despite 
their sovereign right to exploit the natural resources and operate in and around the 
ocean.
738
 The risk of pollution associated with such large scale marine operation in the 
context of CO2 storage is a possibility and the consequent implications of CO2 leakage 
from marine geological formations into the ocean thereby polluting or creating chemical 
                                                          
736
 UNCLOS (1982) Article 195 
737
Id. Article 210 
738
Id. Article 192 
Figure 46 Maritime Zones and Boundaries, including limits of territorial sea, 
contiguous zone, EEZ and continental shelf. 
Source: National Intelligence Council and NOAA Office of the General 
Counsel Websites 2011. 
255 
 
imbalance in the marine environment and ecology is yet unclear to justify what marine 
pollution is. Nevertheless, Article 1 (4) of the Convention defines pollution of marine 
environment as  
[…] the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into 
the marine   environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result 
in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to 
human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other 
legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and 
reduction of amenities 
It is the responsibility of States to take adequate measures by ensuring that known 
pollutants are not transferred (directly or indirectly) to damage or cause hazards from one 
area to another or transform one type of pollution into another.
739
 A leak during 
transportation and or during storage of CO2 in marine geological formations is argued 
could start a potentially dangerous ecological and environmental damage in the sea and to 
the marine ecosystem due to increased ocean acidification.
740
 However, the ocean is 
considered as a natural sink for anthropogenic gases,
741
 thus providing a mitigating 
mechanism against pollution of the marine environment.  
Also, the concern about leakage, has a greater relevance to onshore operations since 
leakage could also result from improperly plugged abandoned wells
742
  while evidence 
show that demonstrations of sub-seabed storage of CO2 has not shown any release of the 
injected gases into the geological formation
743
 it would be premature to suggest that such 
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 Art. 195 
740
 Seibel et al., (2001), “ Potential Impact of CO2 injection on Deep-Sea Biota”, Vol. 294, no. 
5541 Science 319-320 
741
 Rau et al., (2002), “Minimising the Effect of CO2 Storage in Oceans”, Vol 295, no. 5553, 
Science 275-276 and Sabine et al., (2004), “The Oceanic Sink For Anthropogenic CO2”, Vol. 305, 
no. 5682 Science 367-371 
742Damen, K. et al., (2006), “Health Safety, Environmental Risk of Underground CO2 Storage – 
Overview of Mechanisms and Current Knowledge”, Climate Change, Vol. 74, no. 1-3 pg. 289-318  
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 Arts et al., (2004), Recent Time –Lapse Seismic Data Show No Indication of Leakage at 
Seipner CO2 injection site, in Proc. Seventh Int’l Conf. GHG Control Tech. 
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maritime contamination and release of CO2 to the surrounding marine environment is not 
a risk worth mitigating against. 
Following Article 1(4), sub Section 5(a)(b) clarified what the definition of disposal of 
waste or pollutants at sea is or is not.  Article 1 (5)(a)(i& ii) defined dumping as  
[…]any deliberate disposal of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, 
platforms or other man-made structures at sea; or  
[…]any deliberate disposal of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made 
structures at sea; 
While on the contrary, Article 1(5)(b)(i & ii) inferred that  
[t]he disposal of wastes or other matter incidental to, or derived from the normal 
operations of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea and 
their equipment, other than wastes or other matter transported by or to vessels, 
aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea, operating for the 
purpose of disposal of such matter or derived from the treatment of such wastes 
or other matter on such vessels, aircraft, platforms or structures; or […] 
placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof, provided 
that such placement is not contrary to the aims of this Convention[...]  
does not constitute dumping.  
Can it therefore be argued that CO2 used for the purpose of EOR (or any other purpose) is 
not waste or matter? Or that the process of transporting CO2 across the sea and storing of 
CO2 in the sub seabed geological formation should not be considered under this provision 
as dumping at sea? Also, to what extent has the interpretation of normal operation of 
vessels, […] and other man-made structures have implications on the interpretation of 
whether CO2 is waste dumped at sea? It is obvious however, that UNCLOS has not 
provided enough clarity on what constitutes waste. It is therefore of necessity that 
UNCLOS provides the necessary guidance notes and clarity as to the extent of the legal 
interpretation of its laws vis-à-vis CCS operations for ease of implementation. But, it is 
apt to note that there are other legal regimes which will be discussed in subsequent 
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sections of this chapter that will effectively highlight the definition of what waste is and 
its possible relevance to CCS. And also, UNCLOS allows for States via the competent 
authority to provide relevant measures to define and interpret what waste would 
constitute in relation to their territorial seas, EEZ and Continental shelf and also be able 
to enforce the pollution by dumping provision with the coastal territorial waters.
744
 
7.1.1.3 Provisions for Monitoring, Enforcement and 
Settlement of disputes 
The monitoring of activities by flag or coastal States requires compliance with the 
provisions of International Marine laws. The monitoring of risk or effects of pollution 
impact of marine activities involves the different contracting States and must be 
consistent with the rights of each party. They are required to engage in the observing, 
measuring, evaluating and analysing such risk impacts directly or in collaboration with 
the relevant competent international organisations. The reporting of such activities 
provides a basis or evidence to justify intervention and enforcement of the regulatory 
provisions and standards. 
If there is a need for intervention consequent to monitoring reports (often understood as a 
strong measure) taken by States under the 1969 Intervention Convention.
745
 The 
Intervention Convention under Article 1 requires that there has to be a grave or imminent 
danger to the “coastline or related interests from pollution or threat of pollution of the sea 
by oil, following maritime casualty or acts related to such a casualty who may be 
reasonable expected to result in major harmful consequences.”746For the purpose of 
adequate enforcement, monitoring standard must be defined and meet with all the 
provisions of the international laws.  
 
In accordance with the provision in UNCLOS Section 6, Articles 213 to 222, which 
stipulates that the enforcement of International Laws relating to pollution is predicated on 
                                                          
744
UNCLOS Art. 207, and Art. 208 
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 Sage B 2005, “Identification of High Risk Vessels in Coastal Waters”, Marine Policy 29 (2005) 
349–355. 1969, Convention on Intervention on the High seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties. 
746
Supra note [UNCLOS Art. 1] 
258 
 
States enforcing their laws and regulations in accordance with relevant sections of the 
International convention related to pollution from land-based sources
747
 and seabed 
activities.
748
 In effect the enforcement of these rules and standards under both 
circumstances must be established through competent international organizations or 
diplomatic conferences to prevent reduce and control pollution of the marine 
environment. In case there is contravention of these standards and rules, or there is a need 
to resolve disputes arising from marine activity or activities of any of the parties, the 
adjudicating body shall be as indicated by the Convention’s Article 287 to be any of the 
following legally constituted bodies:  
i. the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established in accordance 
with Annex VI provision of UNCLOS
749
 
ii. the International Court of Justice750 
iii. an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII provision of 
UNCLOS;
751
 
iv. And a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII for 
one or more of the categories of disputes specified therein.
752
 
So far, no case has been referred to any of these bodies which has resulted in clear 
pronouncement on CO2 Storage or the injection of CO2 in sub seabed geological 
formation. However on the basis of […] protection and preservation of the marine 
environment, marine scientific research [...] provisions of Article 1 of the Annex VIII 
Special Arbitration, cases referring to CCS could be appropriately resolved due to the 
expert composition of the special arbitral tribunal. The lack of consistent and outright 
jurisprudence by a singular court to interpret UNCLOS rules has been given as the reason 
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for states seeking redress on issues relating to law of the sea in the international tribunal 
and courts
753
 
7.1.2 London Convention 1972 
The London Convention which came into effect in August 1975 has 87 contracting 
parties including the United Kingdom and Nigeria as signatories.
754
 The countries in 
green in Figure47have ratified the LC1972. Although the importance of the London 
Convention
755
 as a legal regime relevant to CO2 Storage is limited however it pre-dates 
UNCLOS of 1994 and also acts as a robust foundation on which its sequel the London 
Protocol 1996 is based which holds greater relevance to CO2 storage in the context of this 
discourse.  
 
SunRatified  youNot Signed 
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LC-1972 promotes the regulatory control of all sources of pollution and dumping of 
waste or other matter to the marine environment where it is liable to create hazard to 
human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or other 
legitimate uses of the sea.
756
 The contracting parties are expected to conduct their 
obligations, however by observing a precautionary approach towards environment 
protection with appropriate measures taken to prevent or avoid the dumping of substances 
[“Wastes”] or release of energy into the marine environment where there is inconclusive 
evidence to prove a casual relation between the dumped substance and its effect.
757
Article 
X of the Convention contains provisions which require Contracting Parties to develop 
procedures for the 'assessment of liability' arising from the dumping of waste in 
accordance with the principle of international law regarding State responsibility for 
environmental damage.
758
The enforcement of the obligations under LC-1972 is generally 
premised on coastal States implementing such obligations within its jurisdiction and the 
flag States of the vessel or operation ensures the enforcement at the high sea
759
. 
In pursuant to Article III of the LC-72, the disposal or dumping of waste materials or any 
other material is defined as “[t]he deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter 
from vessels, aircraft, platform or other man-made structures at sea[...] However, [t]his 
does not consist of the placement of materials for the purpose other than the mere 
disposal thereof…”760 and also [i]t does not include the disposal of waste or other matter 
directly arising or related to the exploration, exploitation and associated off-shore 
processing of seabed mineral resources.”761 It is clear that the definition is similar to that 
employed in UNCLOS definition of dumping which underscores deliberate disposal of 
material from vessels, aircraft, platform or other man-made structures at sea and also 
include the 2 exemptions to dumping as stipulated in UNCLOS Article 1(5)(b)(i& ii). 
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This section will analyse the implications of the critical terms such as waste or other 
matter to be dumped at sea, precautionary approach to actions of Contacting Parties, the 
enforceability of the convention and finally I will discuss the legal implications as it 
relates to capture and storage of CO2. 
7.1.2.1 Waste Dumping under the Convention 
The definition and categorisation of waste or other matter under the London Convention 
Article IV underscore the following; first, that the dumping of waste or other matter at sea 
is under prohibition if it is on the lists of substances in Annex 1 (see Appendix for detail 
list); second, to dump materials (waste or other matter) listed in Annex 1I (see Appendix) 
requires a prior special permit; and finally there is the need for general permit for 
dumping of materials (waste or other matter) not listed in Annex 1 and II to take 
place.
762
Since CO2 is not listed in any of the Annex lists in the convention as a waste or 
other matter, it is arguable therefore that CO2 can be dumped at sea under the general or 
special permit rule. However, section (3) of Article IV allows Contracting Parties define 
what wastes or other matter constitute and prohibit such as it deems fit as long as it 
informs the Organisation.
763
 Also, the 1996 amendment to the Convention prohibits the 
dumping of industrial waste (defined as waste materials generated by manufacturing or 
processing operations…) by implication this could include CO2 although the Parties to 
the convention have not made any binding interpretation to this with regards to CO2. 
7.1.2.2 Precautionary Measures under the Convention 
Contracting Parties are required in accordance with the provisions of international 
environmental regimes to take preventive measures within reason to ensure that 
substances or energy which is considered harmful are not introduced into marine 
environment. Citing the sixth consultative meeting amendment of the London Convention 
1991, “[…] the application of a precautionary approach in environmental protection 
within the framework…” is to be applied in instances where there is no conclusive 
                                                          
762
Id. art. IV 
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evidence to prove the causal relationship between inputs and their effects. In the light of 
this, CO2 sub seabed injection and storage could be prohibited citing the precautionary 
indicator since the likelihood of CO2 release into the surrounding marine environment of 
the sub seabed is possible i.e. with the degree of uncertainty that it will fail the likelihood 
to harm test.
764
 However, the risk of such release or leakage happening from sub-seabed 
geological formation is less likely compared to this occurrence in onshore geological 
formations.   
7.1.2.3 Enforceability of Convention and Settlement of 
Dispute 
The enforcement of the provisions of the Convention is within national jurisdiction and 
authority. For the ease of enforceability of the provisions the Contracting parties are 
required to designate an appropriate authority or authorities to issue permits (special and 
general),
765
 […] keep records766  and […] monitor individually or in collaboration with 
other Parties and competent international organisations, the condition of the sea for the 
purpose of the Convention.
767
 
In furtherance to the implementation of the Convention, Contracting Parties are obliged to 
apply measures that implement the convention on Vessels and aircraft registered within 
its territory [and] or flying its flag; loading within its territory or territorial waters and or 
fixed or floating under its jurisdiction.
768
 It is also the responsibility of each Contracting 
Party to take appropriate measures to prevent and punish conduct[s] which contravene the 
provisions of the convention.
769
 This section of the Convention entrench obligation to 
enforce the provisions in the hands of the Parties within its respective territory. This could 
                                                          
764
 International Energy Agency 2005, “Legal Aspects of storing Carbon Dioxide”, IEA/OECD 
Available at http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/co2_legal.pdf   
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Id. Art. VII § 2 
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be implied to affect the storage of CO2 and related operations within its territorial 
waters.
770
 
Consequent to the need to resolve disputes arising from the use of the marine 
environment (including the sub-seabed geological formation) between Contracting 
Parties, the Convention stipulates in Article X that it has to be carried out “in accordance 
with the [relevant] principles of international laws…” such as the UNCLOS provision 
and the follow up London Protocol (see below for detail) and in tandem with non-
conflicting supranational and national environmental regulations. However, the 
Contracting Parties should undertake to develop procedures for the assessment of liability 
and the settlement of disputes regarding dumping with strict commitment to the 
international provisions and obligations.  
Under Article XI, Parties were made to consider procedures for the settlement of disputes 
at the First Consultative Meeting. However a dispute resolution procedure was adopted at 
the Third Consultative Meeting in 1978 as an amendment to the Convention but it never 
came into force. Nevertheless, the amendment provides that if negotiations fail, the 
dispute must be submitted to the International Court of Justice or to arbitration in 
accordance with the arbitration procedures in Annex 1II if one of the parties so 
requests.
771
 This amendment instead formed the basis of the Arbitral Procedure in Annex 
3 to the London Protocol.
772
 
7.1.2.4 Legal Implications of the London Convention on CCS 
The issue of radioactive material disposal in the sub seabed in the later 1980s raised legal 
issues about what the term “deliberate disposal” implied vis-à-vis the location of the 
dumped waste at sea or the structure dumping the waste.
773
 However Resolution LDC 
41(13) of 1990 prohibited the disposal of radioactive wastes into the sub-seabed. The 
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context of discourse of the section in interpretation of Article III(b)(ii) “placement […] 
mere disposal of waste” and the implication of the texts “deliberate disposal” Article 
III(a) is critical to resolving the legal issues associated with the CO2 storage in the sub-
seabed.   
The storage of CO2 could be argued not to contravene the Resolution for the following 
reasons, if CO2 storage aims at climate change mitigation, then Article III(b)(ii) which 
suggests that the condition of “placement […] mere disposal of waste”, could be called 
upon to justify the injection of CO2  under conditions such as EOR or EGR operations as 
this goes beyond mere disposal. The injection of CO2 under this circumstance is outside 
the realms of having to dispose of CO2 at sea with the intention of polluting the marine 
environment. In similar manner CO2 storage would also be justified as it is not deemed to 
be placement of matter for a purpose other than mere disposal at sea. 
Secondly, there was no specific reference to CO2 injection or storage in sub seabed 
geological formation in the Resolution or the convention since neither Annex 1 or Annex 
1I identified CO2 on the list of compounds classified as wastes not suitable for disposal or 
requiring special permits for dumping
774
 but would require in accordance with the 
provisions of Annex 1II the issuance of permit to dump at Sea.
775
 It is important to note 
however that the Convention's Scientific Group decided that CO2 derived from fossil 
fuels was to be considered an industrial waste as this decision was in accordance with the 
views of some member States to the convention notably the UK Government. However, 
no consensus has been reached on this issue amongst all the Contracting Parties to the 
Convention. 
Thirdly, as noted by Purdy (2007), it is clear that there is no reference to seabed in the 
text of the convention as such it could be assumed that the injection or storage of CO2 in 
sub seabed geological formations is not covered by the provisions of the Convention. 
However, the UK Government expressed the need to interpret the Convention in context 
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of the London Protocol 1996 which incorporated the sub-seabed.
776
 Nevertheless, de 
Figueiredo (2007) argued that even if sub-seabed CO2 was considered to be governed by 
the London Convention regime, the injection of the gas during an offshore operation is 
not governed by the Convention.
777
 
Furthermore, the point remains argued that while this disposal at sea is done within the 
context of climate change mitigation, the issue of ownership of the CO2 permit annuls the 
condition of disposal as implied by the Convention as the CO2 is technically still owned 
by the operator, it is possible to argue therefore conditions that best justify the operation 
at sea is not disposal but the placement or injection of industrial greenhouse gases which 
hitherto is not within the legal jurisdiction of the convention.   
Finally, it is important to note that regardless of the different interpretations and possible 
arguments there is the need to also prove that the action or operation is not deliberate 
disposal at sea of waste or other matter. Different implications arise from the 
interpretation of the Convention when viewed from this context.   
7.1.3 London Protocol 1996 
Unlike the preceding Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by dumping of 
waste and other Matter of 1972, the 1996 Protocol  
[…] prohibits Contracting Parties from dumping of any waste or other matter 
(with the exception of those listed in Annex I)
778
 and [t]he dumping of any Annex I listed 
waste or other matter requires the permit […].779 
The definition of wastes in the protocol though akin to that of the Convention, with 
emphasis on“the deliberate disposal into sea of wastes…”, it however includes in the 
                                                          
776
Purdy, R., 2007, Geological Carbon Dioxide Storage and the Law, Chapter 4, in Gough, C. & 
Shackley, S. (eds.) in Capturing Carbon: The Prospects for Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage in 
the UK, 2006, pp87-139, Ashgate 
777
Supra note [de Figueiredo M., 2007 pg 243] 
778
1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of marine Pollution by dumping of waste 
and other matter 1972Art. 4§1§.1 
779
Id. Art. 4§1§.2 
266 
 
definition any storage of waste…780 and [t]he abandonment or toppling at site…781. The 
import of this is broader in scope of possible interpretation  and that although the 
inclusion of CO2 storage was not necessarily the focus during the negotiations in the 
1990s, it however implies that it could be argued that CO2 storage (or any storage of  
Waste or other Material for that matter) within the seabed and the subsoil falls under the 
jurisdiction of the Protocol and therefore such activity within maritime jurisdiction 
contravenes the Protocol’s Article 1(4)(1)(3) regardless of whether it was deliberate 
disposal or not. To further emphasis this, on 2 November 2006 the Contracting Parties to 
the London Protocol adopted amendments to Annex 1 by adding “CO2 streams from CO2 
capture processes” to this list. This suggests a basis was created in international 
environmental law to regulate storage of CO2 in sub-seabed geological formations by this 
amendment. 
Another distinguishing character of the Protocol was the stricter emphasis placed on the 
precautionary approach when compared to the London Convention which based its 
provision on the need for contracting parties to be guided rather than the enforcing of the 
preventive measure. The next 2 subsections will discuss the relevance and ramification of 
the protocol and the underlining precautionary approach interpretations in the protocol. 
7.1.3.1 CO2 Storage Relevance to the Protocol 
Consequent to the Protocol’s entry into force in 24 March 2006, the Contracting Parties 
agreed to amend the Protocol at the First Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the 
Protocol to allow the storage of CO2 within sub-seabed geological formation albeit with 
some conditions.
782
 This amendment set the basis for the regulation of CCS within 
international environmental law in sub-seabed geological formations for both the long 
and short term.  
The amendments, which entered into force 100 days after adoption (on 10 February 
2007), stated that carbon dioxide streams may only be considered for storage in the sub 
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seabed, if the following three conditions are met. First, disposal (or injection) is into a 
sub-seabed geological formation; Second, the material to be deposited consist 
overwhelmingly of carbon dioxide (they may contain incidental associated substances 
derived from the source material and the capture and sequestration processes used); and 
finally, no wastes or other matter are added for the purpose of disposing of those wastes 
or other matter.
783
 In as much as this provision has created a degree of allowance for the 
involvement of CCS activities at sea, it is however important to note that the vagueness of 
these conditions in terms of the definition or what constitutes “overwhelmingly of carbon 
dioxide” and “ incidental” associated substances needed further clarification.  
To this end, the Second Meeting of Contracting Parties held in London in 2007 brought 
some clarity as anticipated to these terms. For instance, Section 4.33 of the Report 
indicated that Japan had set a standard for the CO2 streams of 99% (or 98% for the gas 
streams captured from the hydrogen production process during petroleum refining) in the 
context of Annex 1 to the Protocol which stated that “CO2 streams may only be 
considered for “dumping” if ....they consist overwhelmingly of carbon dioxide”784. In this 
case Japan could have set the benchmark for the definition of overwhelming to be 99% of 
CO2 in the material to be injected into the sub-seabed. Whilst in the case of “[…] 
Incidental associated substance…” as mention in Annex 1 of the Protocol, the report 
recommended that the following must be taken into account “origin, amount, form and 
composition; chemical and Physical properties and the potential for interaction amongst 
stream components and toxicity, persistence, potential for bio-accumulation”785 for the  
substance to be considered as incidental associated substance. 
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7.1.3.2 Precautionary Approach Interpretation under the 
Protocol 
As mentioned above, the precautionary approach is crucial to the implementation of the 
marine environmental protection regimes. However, although the precautionary approach 
is fundamental to both the Convention and the Protocol, there are however two obvious 
core differences. Firstly, the fact that Contracting Parties are required under the Protocol 
to be preventive in approach when implementing the provisions of marine environmental 
protection regime within their jurisdiction. Article 3.1 clearly articulates this 
“In implementing this Protocol, Contracting Parties shall apply a precautionary 
approach to environmental protection from dumping of wastes or other matter 
whereby appropriate preventative measures are taken when there is reason to 
believe that wastes or other matter introduced into the marine environment are 
likely to cause harm even when there is no conclusive evidence to prove a causal 
relation between inputs and their effects”. 
 
Whilst the Protocol accentuated the need for Contracting Parties to “…apply 
precautionary approach…” the Convention limited the emphasis to been “… guided by 
precautionary approach…”making it non-enforceable, but rather it is a discretionary 
option for Contracting Parties to work with. The extent to which Contracting Parties are 
compelled to ensure the protection of the maritime area is stricter
786
 under the preventive 
approach requirements of the Protocol as this implicitly requires the precautionary 
principles to be engrained in the legal framework of all Contracting Parties.  
 
The second difference is in relation to the terms used by the different provisions in 
defining when preventive measures are to be taken. In this case, the Protocol used the 
phrase “wastes or other matter” rather than the Convention’s phrase “substances or 
energy” in defining when preventative measures are to be taken. “Wastes or other matter” 
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is defined only as “material and substance of any kind, form or description.787 However, 
with the inclusion of CO2 storage in the white list of the protocol, it is arguable that this 
particular discrepancy has been resolved. 
7.1.3.3 Liability, Enforceability and Settlement of Dispute 
The Protocol clearly defines responsibility and liability in the context of Contracting 
Parties having an obligation to uphold the principles of international environmental law 
vis-à-vis relations with other States or any other area of the environment and also 
undertake to develop procedures regarding liability consequent to dumping or 
incineration at sea of Waste or other matter.
788
 However the enforcement of this 
procedure is within the jurisdiction of each State and as stated in Article 3(4) and Article 
4(2) is not restricted to the provisions of the Protocol as long as it is “[…] in accordance 
with International law…” and “[…] prohibiting the dumping of waste or other matter 
mentioned in Annex I”. 
 
It is the responsibility of each Contracting Party to apply [and enforce] the appropriate 
measures required in accordance with international laws to implement the Protocol to all 
stipulated facilities and infrastructure
789
 in its territory
790
 except such vessels or aircraft 
entitled to sovereign immunity under international law.
791
 If consequent to such actions or 
for any other reason there is a dispute between Contracting Parties, the interpretation and 
application of the Protocol shall be resolved firstly by negotiation, mediation or 
conciliation, or other peaceful means chosen by the parties to the dispute
792
 within twelve 
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months.
793
 However, if there is no resolution within the limits of the provision of Article 
16(1) of the Protocol, the Arbitral Procedure of UNCLOS as stipulated in the 
Convention’s Article 287 could be used to settle the dispute.  
 
Finally, in relation to CCS, it behoves upon Contracting Parties therefore to enact laws in 
compliance with international environmental regimes, and enforce the laws within the 
national jurisdiction since both the Convention and the Protocol are congruent about the 
powers vested on the State in developing and enforcing the laws of the sea. 
7.2 Applicable Regional and National Regulatory Framework 
7.2.1 Oslo and Paris (OSPAR) Convention 
Under this section on OSPAR Convention, the following will be discussed as it relates to 
CO2 storage; the Precautionary Principle and Polluter Pays under OSPAR Convention as 
it relates to CO2 storage, the monitoring and enforcing pollution prevention measures 
under the regime and key legal implication of this convention in relation to CO2 Capture 
and Storage. 
One of the most recognisable regional legislative institutions on the protection of the 
marine environment is the Oslo and Paris Commission (OSPARCOM) with its law 
addressing pollution and damage of North-East Atlantic marine environment. This 
regulatory framework is referred to as the OSPAR Convention (1992).
794
  This regional 
Convention governs the North-East Atlantic marine environment
795
 with 15 member 
states
796
 mostly EU States (including the UK) and the European Union on behalf of the 
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European Community as Contracting Parties. It came into force on 25
th
 March 1998 
replacing the 1972 Oslo Convention on Waste Dumping at Sea
797
 and the 1974 Paris 
Convention on Pollution of the North Sea and Adjacent Areas from Land-Based 
Sources.
798
 The Convention reemphasis the core elements of the London Convention and 
its Protocol in terms of the avoidance of dumping of waste or other matter deliberately at 
sea, However Article 2(1)(a) further emphasised the need “…to take steps to prevent and 
eliminate pollution and shall take the necessary measures to protect the maritime area
799
 
against the adverse effects of human activities…”. Based on these, further to Article2.2a 
and 2.2b, the obligation lies squarely on Contracting Parties to apply the precautionary 
principle
800
 and the polluter pays principle
801
in engaging the preventive measures and 
effecting the elimination of pollution in the maritime area. The precautionary principle is 
likely to be adopted by regulators
802
 at both regional and national levels since in practice 
the OSPAR Convention takes precedence over the London Convention and the UN Law 
of the Sea for Contracting Parties.
803
 
 
The OSPAR Convention as categorised based on pollution from land-based sources 
(Article 3 and Annex I), pollution by dumping (Article 4 and Annex II) and pollution 
from offshore sources (Article 5 and Annex III) rises substantive conditions as it relates 
to interpretation. Under Annex I, it sets the regulatory framework for authorising 
pollution from land-based sources i.e. it does not prohibit CCS activities such as pipeline 
transportation of CO2 from land to sub-seabed geological formation provided the 
operators meet the strict requirements of relevant competent authorities of Contracting 
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Parties.
804
 The regulatory framework of the above mentiond Annexes is fundamentally 
analogous to the UNCLOS and the London convention and its 1996 Protocol which 
established the prohibition of dumping or deliberate disposal of wastes or other matter at 
sea from vessels and from offshore installations. It brings to question the justification (if 
any) about the disparity in acceptance vis-à-vis the bases for discriminating against CCS 
conducted from vessels, aircraft or other offshore installations while the CCS involving 
the transportation from land by pipeline into sub-seabed geological formation is 
acceptable upon approval of the competent authorities. It is argued that the OSPAR 
regime does not differentiate between effects of CCS placements on the marine 
environment, but rather by the method and purpose of placement.
805
 This concern was 
also raised by the Group of Jurists and Linguists of the commission that placements with 
different impacts on the environment (for example, CCS in a water column and CCS in 
the sub-seabed) may not be distinguished, while different methods of placement (i.e. 
dumping or pollution through pipelines) are treated differently even though the 
environmental danger is the same.
806
 
 
In summary, the proposal by the Norwegian government in 2002 to OSPARCOM on the 
desire to carry out experimental field storage of CO2 within its maritime, made 
OSPARCOM for the first time to be confronted with the issue of CO2 Storage within its 
jurisdiction,
807
 this led to the establishment of the Group of Jurists and Linguists to study 
the legalities and other issues that affect CO2 Storage as it relates to the Convention. 
However, the conclusion was that the placement of land-derived CO2 via pipelines into 
sub-seabed geological formation for the purpose of EOR or the mitigation of climate 
change was acceptable under the provisions on 2 conditions  
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1. must be subject to strict regulation and authorisation by a competent 
authority
808
 
2. CO2 is not defined as an industrial waste dumped from offshore installation, 
vessel or a structure in the marine environment.  
Therefore to adjudge relevance of these 2 conditions it must be within the context of the 
submission of the Group of Jurists and Linguists as it relates issue of CO2 storage and the 
legal compatibility with the OSPAR Convention. The findings of relevance are in the 
Table 16 below. 
 
 
 
Methods of 
placement in the 
maritime area 
Applicable 
Annex 
Reason for placement Submission 
By pipeline pure 
and simple 
Annex I  Experimental 
 Mitigation of 
climate change 
 Other mere 
disposal 
The placement for 
the purposes of 
experimentation, 
mere disposal  and 
mitigating climate 
change are not 
prohibited but are 
should be highly 
regulated  
 
By pipeline 
working with a 
structure in the 
maritime area 
that is not an 
offshore 
installation 
 
Annex I  Experimental  
 Mitigation of 
climate change 
 Other mere 
disposal 
 
These also require 
strict regulation 
and authorisation 
as it is not 
prohibited.  
By transportation 
in a vessel for 
placement  from 
a vessel  
Annex II  Experimental  
 Mitigation of 
climate change 
 Other mere 
disposal 
 
Placement for 
experimentation is 
not prohibited as 
long as it is within 
the confines of the 
Convention 
In the case of 
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climate change 
mitigation and 
mere disposal, it is 
prohibited. 
 
By placement 
from a structure 
in the maritime 
area that is 
neither part of a 
pipeline nor any 
offshore system 
Annex II  Experimental  
 Mitigation of 
climate change 
 Other mere 
disposal 
 
Placement for 
experimental 
purpose is not 
prohibited again 
must be under 
strict accordance 
with the 
Convention. 
However for the 
purposes of 
climate change 
mitigation and 
other mere 
disposal it is 
prohibited 
 
By placement 
from an offshore 
installation 
Annex III  Experimental  
 Improving 
hydrocarbon 
production (e.g. 
EOR) 
 Mitigation of 
climate change 
 Other mere 
disposal 
 
There are two 
different categories 
in the method of 
placement 
In respect of 
CO2consequent to 
offshore activities: 
Placement for 
experimental 
reasons is not 
prohibited as long 
as they adhere to 
the provisions of 
the Convention, 
and also it is not 
prohibited for the 
other stated 
purposes but it is 
however subject to 
strict regulatory 
regime. 
The second 
category is with 
regards to CO2 
arising from 
activities other 
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than offshore 
activities: 
There is not 
prohibition to 
experimental 
activities as long 
as the meet with 
the relevant 
provisions of the 
Convention 
In the exploration 
of hydrocarbon, it 
must be subject to 
strict regulation 
finally, for the 
purpose of 
mitigating climate 
change and other 
mere disposal it 
prohibited. 
 
7.2.1.1 Precautionary Principle 
OSPAR Convention was designed to be more interventionist in approach and proactive in 
dealing with the potential hazard that could arise from activities related to maritime areas 
when compared to the previous international environmental and marine regimes. The 
context of its conclusion is premised on 
“the precautionary principle, by virtue of which preventive measures are to be 
taken when there are reasonable grounds for concern that substances or energy 
introduced, directly or indirectly, into the marine environment may bring about 
hazards to human health, harm living resources and marine ecosystems, damage 
amenities or interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea, even when there is no 
conclusive evidence of a causal relationship between the inputs and the 
effects.”809 
It articulates the need for specific preventive measures to be taken regardless of the level 
of certainty about the damage the activity will or is likely to cause, in other words, the 
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possibility of damage does not have to be deemed serious or irreversible
810
 before 
preventive actions are taken as long as “[t]here are reasonable grounds for concern…”. 
The interpretation of this condition although vague nevertheless, makes it permissible for 
intervention by regulatory bodies or competent authorities of contracting parties to ensure 
the prevention of hazards to human health, harm to living resource and marine 
ecosystems.  
Despite the acceptance of the principle among Contracting Parties, Friedrich (2007) noted 
there are indications of differences in opinion among States.
811
 The debate among the 
Group of Jurists and Linguists on the applicability of this principle to CO2 Storage in the 
event of leakage at sea as stated above indicated a conclusion that was in favour of 
allowing sub-seabed storage of CO2.
812
 Although CCS may not be considered an illegal 
activity per se, but CCS activities would still have to refrain from harming the 
environment
813
 for its acceptability within the provisions of the framework. This therefore 
extends to its role in the inclusion and broad interpretation of “industrial waste” within 
context of acceptability of CCS activities.  
 
The other point of consideration with regards to interpretation is the vagueness of the 
terms precautionary approach. The acceptance and recognising CCS as a climate change 
mitigation strategy permissible under the OSPAR Convention brings to bear the question 
of when to apply the precautionary approach. The interpretation of this obligation to 
pursue precautionary measures exposes the vagueness of the principle and justifies the 
action or inaction of contracting parties. As it could be argued within the context of the 
London Convention for the precautionary approach that to be extra cautious could be safe 
for the environment,
814
 it is on this premise also for OSPAR that a truly precautionary 
approach should result in more caution, at least until overwhelming evidence exists that 
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carbon dioxide would remain in the proposed repository and not have any harmful effect 
on the marine environment.
815
 
7.2.1.2 Polluter Pays Principle 
In Pursuant to Article 2(2)(b) of the OSPAR Convention:  
[t]he polluter pays principle, by virtue of which the costs of pollution prevention, 
control and reduction measures are to be borne by the polluter. 
To this end, this regulatory framework allows for making polluters vis-à-vis the private 
actors financially liable for pollution to the maritime area as a result of their activities. 
The implication of this clause introduces the legal framework to pursue a case for liability 
against private actors conducting CCS (or indeed any other) activities offshore even 
within the CDM regulatory purview that could potentially result in the pollution of the 
maritime area. 
 
Generally, international law does not offer much in terms of rules or provisions for civil 
liability.
816
 Although some international agreements like the UNCLOS and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) contain liability provisions that are of 
relevance to CCS activities, they are not however, legally robust enough liability 
provisions relative to the legal system of States, therefore making the domestic legal 
principles the main reference on liability of private actors.
817
 
 7.2.2 Conclusion 
In summary, the above discussed important international treaties for protecting the marine 
environment require amendment in order to easily and effectively implement CCS but the 
OSPAR and London conventions have now been amended so as to allow the storage of 
CO2 in geological storages that are offshore. The London Protocol still prohibits the 
transboundary movement of CO2 for offshore storage; unless the amendment is ratified by 
the 27 member states before it can come to force. This ratification and enforcement is still 
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uncertain and could have major impact on transboundary movement of CO2 if it CCS-
CDM is to be implemented. 
7.2.3 European Union (EU) CCS Legislations 
Currently the EU is guided by a number of legislation among which are the following, the 
CCS Directive (which will be the core of discourse in this section); the Environmental 
Liabilities Directive (ELD), the European Trading Scheme Directive (ETS), the Oslo-
Paris Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic 
(OSPAR) (see OSPAR discussed above in section 7.2.1), the Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control Directive (IPPC) (now in the process of being subsumed under 
the forthcoming Industrial Emissions Directive (IED)), and possibly the Marine Strategies 
Framework Directive (MSD). 
 
The EU Directive 2009/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 
2009 on the geological storage of carbon dioxide and amending Council Directive 
85/337/EEC, Environmental Liability Directive, Emission Trading Scheme Directive, 
Directives 2000/60/EC, 2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC, 2008/1/EC and 
Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006(d)
818
is the principal EU legal regime that applies to 
geological Storage of CO2 both onshore and offshore sites among Member States and 
cements the commitment of the regional body to the use of CCS as a bridging technology 
that has the potential to contribute to the mitigation of climate change.
819
 It was adopted 
by the Council of Ministers on 6
th
 of April 2009 and expected to be transposed into 
national legal frameworks of Member States by 25
th
 of June 2011. The United Kingdom 
is a leading member state in the Union that has developed the Storage of Carbon Dioxide 
(Licensing) Regulations 2010 which have been in force since 6
th
 April 2010. Section 
5.2.3 gives a detailed discussion on the UK-CCS regulatory exposure in relation to EU 
Directive.  
The Directive is consistent with EU’s view that all mitigation options must be harnessed 
and integral to its efforts to achieve the global reduction of greenhouse gas emission of 
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50% by 2050 which in effect translates to GHG reduction in developed nations of 30% by 
2020 and 60-80% by 2050.
820
 The main objective of the Directive is to ensure that CO2 is 
sequestered in an “environmentally safe” manner and this is in relation to the permanent 
containment of CO2 in such a way that there is prevention or to a lesser extent the 
elimination of any possible negative effect or risk to the environment and human 
health.
821
 
To this extent, the Directive defines within its provisions a risk management framework 
for regulators and competent authorities about storage site operations which has to be 
implemented by operators thereby allowing for CCS approval to be based on risk level of 
the geological profile which is positively accepted under the provisions for permits (see 
Table 18 for relevant Provisions within the Directive that address Risk management 
competencies of operators). 
 With regards penalties and liability, the Directive makes clear the responsibilities of 
operators of geological CO2 storage sites as laid down by Member States that preventive 
measures are not only necessary vis-à-vis the risk assessment but penalties are applicable 
for infringement of such national provisions
822
 as well as remedial actions with regards 
environmental damage or leakage such as the surrender of allowances pursuant to 
Directive 2003/87/EC preventive and remedial action pursuant to Articles 5(1) and 6(1)of 
Directive 2004/35/EC with a further recovery of costs by the competent authority if the 
need arises
823
 and financial contribution by the operator to the competent authority before 
the transfer of responsibility in pursuant to Article 18 has taken place.
824
 
The Directive along with other amended legal acts focuses on all aspects of the CCS 
technology however, its main emphasis is on storage of CO2 among Member States’ 
territories
825
 (including territorial waters) allowing for jurisdictional oversight by 
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Members States as to allow or disallow storage of CO2 within its territory. It also covers 
operation, closure and post closure obligations, CO2 acceptance criteria, monitoring and 
reporting obligations, inspections, measures in case of irregularities and or leakage and 
provisions of financial security.
826
 It is also clearly defines the liability framework and the 
environmental rules for CCS technology. The acceptance of CO2 storage operations by 
Member States is a function of adherence to Article 4(2) of the Directive by the Member 
State. This states that, 
Member States which intend to allow geological storage of CO2 in their territory 
shall undertake an assessment of the storage capacity available in parts or in the 
whole of their territory, including by allowing exploration pursuant to Article 
5.
827
 
This implies that properly conducted assessments of storage capacity of geological 
formations (in part or whole territory) before exploration permits can be issued to 
operators as stipulated by Article 5 of the Directive is required. The assessment in 
accordance with the provision involves having to assess risk impact on environment and 
human health; the storage site (looking at site characterisation, selection and exploration) 
such that it covers both the maritime area for coastal states and internal water mass such 
as lakes, river or any such body of water for both coastal and landlocked states; the 
possibility of leakage during and post closure as it affects ecosystems and liability issues; 
and finally the regulatory impact vis-à-vis the permit process. Non adherence to the 
provisions on issued exploration and storage permits will result in changes, review, 
update or withdrawal of the permits.
828
 In ensuring strict adherence, pursuant to Articles 5 
and 6, subsequent operation, closure and post closure of the storage operation makes it 
the obligation of  
“[M]ember States to ensure that the operator carries out monitoring of the 
injection facilities, the storage complex (including where possible the CO2 
plume), and where appropriate the surrounding environment…”829and the 
                                                          
826Condor, J. et al., 2011a, “A Comparative Analysis of Regulations for Geological Storage of 
Carbon Dioxide” Science Direct/ Energy Procedia 4 (2011) 5895–5902 
827
Supra note [EU Directive 2009/31/EC], Art. 4§2 
828
Id.  Art. 11 (See Table 7 for full content) 
829
Id. Art. 13 
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reporting by the operators “at a frequency to be determined by the competent 
authority, and in any event at least once a year, the operator shall submit to the 
competent authority all results of the monitoring pursuant to Article 13 in the 
reporting period, including information on the monitoring technology 
employed.”830 
                                                          
830
Id. Art. 14 
Relevant Provision Expanded Provision 
 
 
 
 
Article 4 
Selection of storage 
sites 
 
1. Member States shall retain the right to determine the areas 
from which storage sites may be selected pursuant to the 
requirements of this Directive. This includes the right of 
Member States not to allow for any storage in parts or in 
the whole of their territory. 
 
2. Member States which intend to allow geological storage 
ofCO2 in their territory shall undertake an assessment of 
the storage capacity available in parts or in the whole of 
their territory, including by allowing exploration pursuant 
to Article 5. The Commission may organise an exchange 
of information and best practices between those Member 
States, in the context of the exchange of information 
provided for in Article 27. 
 
 
Article 5 
Exploration permits 
 
1.      Where Member States determine that exploration is 
required to generate the information necessary for 
selection of storage sites pursuant to Article 4, they shall 
ensure that no such exploration takes place without an 
exploration permit. Where appropriate, monitoring of 
injection tests may be included in the exploration permit.  
2.      Member States shall ensure that the procedures for the 
granting of exploration permits are open to all entities 
possessing the necessary capacities and that the permits 
are granted or refused on the basis of objective, published 
and non-discriminatory criteria. 
3.      The duration of a permit shall not exceed the period 
necessary to carry out the exploration for which it is 
granted. However, the Member States may extend the 
validity of the permit where the stipulated duration is 
insufficient to complete the exploration concerned and 
where the exploration has been performed in accordance 
with the permit. Exploration permits shall be granted in 
Table 17 Relevant Provisions within the Directive that address the Risk management 
competencies of operators 
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respect of a limited volume. 
4.      The holder of an exploration permit shall have the sole 
right to explore the potential CO2 storage complex. 
Member States shall ensure that no conflicting uses of the 
complex are permitted during the period of validity of the 
permit. 
 
Article 6 
Storage permits 
 
1.      Member States shall ensure that no storage site is 
operated without a storage permit, that there shall be only 
one operator for each storage site, and that no conflicting 
uses are permitted on the site. 
2.      Member States shall ensure that the procedures for the 
granting of storage permits do open to all entities possess 
the necessary capacities and that the permits are granted 
on the basis of objective, published and transparent 
criteria. 
3.      Without prejudice to the requirements of this Directive, 
priority for the granting of a storage permit for a 
particular site shall be given to the holder of the 
exploration permit for that site, provided that the 
exploration of that site is completed, that any condition 
set in the exploration permit has been complied with, and 
that the application for a storage permit is made during 
the period of validity of the exploration permit. Member 
States shall ensure that no conflicting uses of the complex 
are allowed during the permit procedure. 
 
 
Article 11 
Changes, review, 
updating and 
withdrawal of 
storage permits 
 
1. The operator shall inform the competent authority of any 
changes planned in the operation of the storage site, 
including changes concerning the operator. Where 
appropriate, the competent authority shall update the 
storage permit or the permit conditions. 
2. Member States shall ensure that no substantial change is 
implemented without a new or updated storage permit 
issued in accordance with this Directive. Annex 1I, point 
13, first indent of Directive 85/337/EEC shall apply in 
such cases. 
3. The competent authority shall review and where 
necessary update or, as a last resort, withdraw the storage 
permit:  
(a) if it has been notified or made aware of any leakages 
or significant irregularities pursuant to Article 16(1); 
(b) if the reports submitted pursuant to Article 14 or the 
environmental inspections carried out pursuant to Article 
15show non-compliance with permit conditions or risks 
of leakages or significant irregularities; 
(c) if it is aware of any other failure by the operator to 
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meet the permit conditions; 
(d) if it appears necessary on the basis of the latest 
scientific findings and technological progress; or 
(e) without prejudice to points (a) to (d), five years after 
issuing the permit and every ten years thereafter. 
 
4. After a permit has been withdrawn pursuant to paragraph 
3,the competent authority shall either issue a new storage 
permit or close the storage site pursuant to Article 
17(1)(c). Until a new storage permit has been issued, the 
competent authority shall temporarily take over all legal 
obligations relating to acceptance criteria where the 
competent authority decides to continue CO2injections, 
monitoring and corrective measures pursuant to the 
requirements laid down in this Directive, the surrender of 
allowances in cases of leakage pursuant to Directive 
2003/87/EC and preventive and remedial action pursuant 
to Articles 5(1) and 6(1)of Directive 2004/35/EC. The 
competent authority shall recover any costs incurred from 
the former operator, including by drawing on the financial 
security referred to in Article 19. In case of closure of the 
storage site pursuant to Article 17(1)(c),Article 17(4) shall 
apply. 
 
Article 16 
Measures in case of 
leakage or 
significant 
irregularities 
 
1. Member States shall ensure that in the event of leakages 
or significant irregularities, the operator immediately 
notifies the competent authority, and takes the necessary 
corrective measures, including measures related to the 
protection of human health. In cases of leakage and 
significant irregularities which imply the risk of leakage, 
the operator shall also notify the competent authority 
pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC. 
 
2. The corrective measures referred to in paragraph 1 shall 
be taken as a minimum on the basis of a corrective 
measures plan submitted to and approved by the 
competent authority pursuant to Article 7(7) and Article 
9(6). 
 
3. The competent authority may at any time require the 
operator to take the necessary corrective measures, as 
well as measures related to the protection of human 
health. These may be additional to or different from those 
laid out in the corrective measures plan. The competent 
authority may also at any time take corrective measures 
itself. 
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In summary, the Directive, evidently lays down the consequence of conducting CCS for 
the operator and provides flexibility in the conduct of competent authorities. It is the 
responsibility of operators of geological CO2 storage sites to ensure that preventive 
measures as well as remedial actions with regards environmental damage caused are 
adequately provided for within the framework of the measures. However, how this 
translates for CDM in Non Annex 1 states is not clear but could form a basis for the Non 
Annex 1 parties to not only formulate relevant national regulatory regime and to hold 
Annex 1entities accountable if contractually agreed that arbitration jurisdiction is within 
the EU. Also, to what extent will OSPAR members who are non EU members be affected 
is not clear. However, it sets the legal framework for operations and could be adapted as 
the relevance arises and a non EU state like Norway has a robust functional regime by 
which the Sleipner Project one of the world largest CCS projects is regulated.  
 
Also, the regime provides the regulatory framework by which the EU Member States can 
structure the exploration and storage permits for operators, clearly stipulating the 
procedural regime for transfer of long liability of operation of CCS sites to the competent 
authority and the financial security in relations to obligations as referred to in Article 20.  
7.2.4 United Kingdom Carbon Capture and Storage Directive 
The transposition of the EU CCS Directive into national domestic laws of Member States 
is fundamental in the implementation of EU Directives across the board. By 
implementing relevant regulatory frameworks either partially or fully in different EU 
Member States, this results in the institutionalisation of EU Directive 2009/31/EC on 
geological storage of carbon dioxide. It was agreed that by 25
th
 June 2010, Member States 
would have transposed the EU CCS Directive into national legal and regulatory 
framework.  
4. If the operator fails to take the necessary corrective 
measures, the competent authority shall take the necessary 
corrective measures itself. 
 
5. The competent authority shall recover the costs incurred 
in relation to the measures referred to in paragraphs 3 and 
4 from the operator, including by drawing on the financial 
security pursuant to Article 19. 
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The United Kingdom has been at the forefront in transposing the EU CCS Directive into a 
national regulatory framework and has incorporated different existing and proposed 
regimes (see Table 18 below) to achieve national CCS regulatory framework that is 
consistent with the regional requirements. In December 2010 as part of the transposition 
process, DECC launched a consultative session on implementing the Third Party Access 
Provision of the CCS Directive. The consultation documentation included an Impact 
Assessment on Implementing the CCS Directive,
831
 Statutory Investment vis-à-vis 
Environmental Protection
832
 and the Call for Evidence on long term development of CCS 
Infrastructure also.
833
 In terms of commercialisation which is outside the scope of this 
research, the Treasury was involved in the consultation relating to financial instruments, 
incentives and grants.
834
 
Evidently, a cross governmental task force of relevant governmental institutions having 
competence in different regulatory regimes has worked to facilitate the development of 
the National CCS regulatory framework for the UK. These different bodies include DTI 
(now known as Business Innovation and Skills- BIS), DEFRA, DECC, Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) and Environment Agency (EA). And different legal regimes are 
implemented by these governmental institutions to facilitate UK’s to the overall 
international and regional climate change obligation. Below is a discussion of various 
substantive laws with a tabulated summary of national CCS legislation relevant to the UK 
CCS Directive at the end of the section. 
                                                          
831
 DECC 2010 “Implementing the Third Party Access Requirement of the CCS Directive”, DECC 
Publication October 2010 Available online http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/Consultations/ccs-
third-party-access/1007-ia-cons-ccs-third-party.pdf last viewed on 01/08/2011 
832
 DECC 2010, “Statutory Investment: Environmental Protection – The Storage of Carbon 
Dioxide (Access to Infrastructure) Regulations”, Available Online 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/Consultations/ccs-third-party-access/991-si-ccs-third-party-
access-cons.pdf last viewed on 01/08/2011 
833
 DECC 2010, “Developing CCS Infrastructure : Consultation on the implementing the Third 
Party Access Provisions of the CCS Directive and call for Evidence on the long term development 
of CCS Infrastructure” DECC Publication URN: 10D/989 available on 
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/consultations/ccs_3rd_party/ccs_3rd_party.aspx 
834
 Treasury, Carbon capture and storage: A consultation on barriers to commercial deployment, 
March 2006 as cited Haszeldine et al 2007, “Regulation for CCS beneath the UK offshore and 
onshore: deep geological storage and sequestration of CO2”, International Risk Governance 
Council 
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7.2.4.1 United Kingdom Carbon Capture and Storage Legal 
and Regulatory Exposure 
The UK Energy Act 2008 provides the legal and regulatory framework for the operations 
of CCS in the UK and draws on other domestic, regional and international laws to 
provide the legal and regulatory framework for the CCS in the UK. This energy 
regulatory framework also seeks to implement both this domestic Acts and laws, the EU 
CCS directive of 2009 (EU Directive 2009/31/EC on Geological Storage of Carbon 
Dioxide (April 2009)), and any other relevant international public law or treaties it is 
bound by.  The Energy Act 2008 draws on the Petroleum Act 1998 related to 
abandonment of offshore sites to articulate the regulatory framework for licensing 
offshore storage
835
 aspect of CCS asserting clearly the rights of the Crown to an 
Exclusive Economic Zone estimated at 200 nautical miles.
836
 
 
Within the UK, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) has the regulatory mandate 
to oversee the CCS technology and the financial elements such as the financial 
instruments, incentives and grants relevant to the commercialisation of the technologies is 
carried out by the Treasury. However a cross governmental Task Force of DTI, DEFRA, 
HSE and the Environment Agency have the joint responsibility on issues involving 
regulation and licensing related the CCS operations. The different governmental bodies 
working together are saddled with the objective of ensuring the environmental integrity of 
CCS and significantly reduce or eliminate possible associated regulatory and industrial 
barriers and or uncertainties.
837
 
Carbon dioxide sequestration related laws in the UK, allows for CO2 storage projects to 
be undertaken both offshore and onshore. The extent of the coverage of the rights of the 
crown by the Energy Act covers what is referred to as the Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) that is, approximately 200 nautical miles as defined by UNCLOS.  Consequently, 
                                                          
835
 Majority of the potential storage capacity in the UK are offshore. See Fig XXX  
836Odeh et al, 2009, “International CCS Policies and Regulations” WP5.1a/WP5.4 Report, NZEC 
CCS 
837Haszeldine et al 2007, “Regulation for CCS beneath the UK offshore and onshore: Deep 
Geological Storage and Sequestration of CO2.” International Risk Governance Council 
www.irge.org 
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different domestic and international legal and regulatory regimes will apply. See table 
below for notes on the different relevant laws relevant to the CCS framework in the UK. 
The UK Energy Act 2008
838
 and the Petroleum Act 1998 have profound relevance in 
defining and interpreting the property rights associated with the sequestration of CO2vis-
à-vis the site identification, injection, restriction on assignment etc. in both instances of 
onshore and offshore sequestration. However, in the case of onshore storage there is 
application of the Town and County planning regulations using the Local Authority 
legislative framework
839
 and EU Waste,
840
 Groundwater,
841
 Pollution Prevention 
Directives
842
 and other EU Directives have to be complied to as they affect CCS as a 
result of UK legal to the European Union. While on issues related to offshore projects, 
international treaties such as UNCLOS, the London convention and Protocol and the 
OSPAR treaty also interplay specifically on issues of transportation and storage in sub 
seabed geological formation.
843
   Other existing relevant regulatory framework include 
the  
 The Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive (2001/42/EC) 
 The EC Habitats Directives 1992 
 The Food and Environmental Protection Act 1985 
 The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and  
 The Coast Protection Act 1949. 
  
                                                          
838
 See Table12 For the tabulated summary of the Energy Act 2008 
839
Id pg 10 
840
 EU Directive 2006/12/EC 
841
 EU Directive. 2006/118/EC 
842
 EU Directive 2008/1/EC, Directive 96/61/EC, Directive 85/337/EEC, Directive 76/464/EEC 
843
 See Section 6.2.1On detail discussion on different Marine treaties including OSPAR Treaty 
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Table 19 gives a breakdown of other instruments and regimes adapted from the work of 
Ducroux and I included my compilation of Nigeria’s other relevant regulatory regimes  
Legislation Status and Framework Notes 
Energy Act 2008  In force – November 2008 
Broadly divided into six 
parts 
Part 1: Gas Importation and 
Storage 
Part 2: Electricity from 
Renewable Sources 
Part 3: Decommissioning of 
Energy Installations 
Part 4: Provisions Relating 
to Oil and Gas 
Part 5: Miscellaneous 
Part 6: General 
 
 
Covers matters relating to 
gas and combustible gas 
importation and storage, 
Carbon Capture and 
Storage, Electricity from 
Renewable sources, 
decommissioning of energy 
installation, offshore 
renewable installations, oil 
and gas installations feed in 
tariffs and other related 
areas.  
Pursuant to the consent of 
the Scottish Parliament, 
Chapter 3 of the Act applies 
to the territorial waters of 
Scotland 0-12 nautical miles 
under the legislative 
jurisdiction of the Scottish 
Minister. However, 
otherwise the Secretary of 
State is defined as the 
competent authority over 
licensing and enforcement 
issues in relation to CCS. 
Relevant section of the Act 
Table 18 Relevant UK Regulatory Regimes associated with Carbon Capture and Storage 
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to CCS is Chapter 3 which 
establishes the framework 
for all issues relating to 
licensing and enforcement 
 
Energy Act 2008 
(Consequential 
Modifications) (Offshore 
Environment Protection) 
Order 2010 
In force – July 2010 This Order enacted 
transposes Article 31 of the 
EU Directive 2009/31/EC 
into UK law by the 
modification of the 
Offshore Petroleum 
Production and Pipeline 
(Assessment of 
Environmental Effects) 
Regulations 1999.  
Consequent to the adoption 
of the Energy Act 2008, this 
Order modified Regulations 
relating to the protection of 
Offshore environment so as 
to allow for consistency 
with the importation and 
storage of combustible gas 
and permanent storage of 
carbon dioxide provisions 
as stipulated by the Art.   
 
Energy Act 2010 In force – April 2010 
Broadly divided into four 
parts 
Part 1: Carbon Capture and 
The Act covers the 
provision relating to 
demonstration, assessment 
and technologies associated 
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Storage and 
Decarbonisation 
Part 2: Schemes for 
reducing fuel poverty 
Part 3: Regulation of Gas 
and Electricity Markets 
Part 4: Final Provisions  
with CCS. It provides the 
incentive (financial) to 
support CCS demonstration 
and retrofits projects, 
through levy on electricity 
suppliers under Ofgem. 
Other covered area within 
the Act is the 
decarbonisation of 
electricity generation and 
development in the UK. 
Under this act Article 35 
brings to effect the 
consequential amendments 
 
The Storage of CO2 
(licensing etc.)Regulation 
2010 
In Force – October 2010 Although this Regulation 
does not completely 
transpose EU Directive 
2009/31/EC into UK law as 
required, however it covers 
(excluding the Scottish 
jurisdiction) pertinent issues 
of granting licences and 
exploration permits, the 
storage operator’s 
obligation, closure and post 
closure issues as it relates to 
storage sites, the 
Environmental Liability 
Directive and financial 
security 
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844
 The Petroleum Act 1998 Section 29 
Petroleum Act 1998 In force – 1998 
 
The 1998 Act covers areas 
which includes site 
Identification, drilling, 
consenting, Operator 
appointment, injection, 
interaction with other users, 
record –keeping, restrictions 
on assignment.  
Consequent to Section 30 of 
the Energy Act 2008, the 
Petroleum Act 1998 (c. 17) 
applies in relation to carbon 
storage Installation as it 
relates to an offshore 
installation as defined by 
Section 44§3(a) of the 1998 
Act. 
In terms of the 
decommissioning or 
abandonment of wells 
Section 29 clearly stipulates 
the framework for the 
abandonment of any 
offshore installation 
(referred to as the 
abandonment 
programme)
844
. The 
Secretary of State acts as 
the competent authority 
responsible to oversee the 
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7.3 Nigerian Regulatory regimes predisposed to CCS 
Like most developing nations, Nigeria currently does not have a clearly articulated 
regulatory framework specific to Carbon Capture and Storage however there are different 
legislative frameworks that can serve as fundamental bedrock for a robust CCS regulatory 
regime. Nigeria is committed to a national environmental policy that is geared towards 
sustainable development that is based on proper management of the environment. 
Nigeria’s National Environmental Standards and regulations Enforcement Agency 
(NESREA) Act 2007, clearly states its strategies for achieving this (see Section 5.3.3 
below for details).  
                                                          
845
Id. Section 42 
process of approval of 
plugging or abandonment of 
wells. The court act as an 
appellate body to any 
dispute resulting from the 
decision of the Secretary of 
State
845
. 
It is however important to 
note for certain that such 
high risk activities would 
incur liability in the absence 
of adequate risk assessment 
and risk management 
strategies except any 
damage caused is  a result 
of force majeure.  
There is clearly no position 
yet on how the Petroleum 
Act affect property rights 
within the UK jurisdiction   
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This section gives a brief synopsis of all the regulatory regimes that are predisposed to the 
implementation of CCS and CDM, however, emphasis is made on the Nigerian Petroleum 
Act of 1998, NESREA Act 2007, Environmental Impact Assessment Act 1992, and the 
Land Use Act 2004. 
Within the legal framework of Nigeria, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria (1999) (hereafter referred to as the Constitution) is the supreme binding 
legislative force on all authorities and persons throughout the Federal republic of 
Nigeria.
846
 Pursuant to Section 44(3) of the Nigerian Constitution, vested on the Federal 
Government is an absolute proprietarily ownership and control of all minerals, mineral 
oils and natural gas in under or upon any land in Nigeria or in, under or upon the 
territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria. This indicates clearly the 
hold of exclusive legislative powers by the State on all matters related to regulation and 
management of onshore and offshore surface and subsoil environment. In furtherance to 
this, the obligation remains also with the State according to Article 20 of the Constitution 
that  
“The State shall protect and improve the environment and safeguard the water, 
air and land, forest and wild life of Nigeria.”847 
Within the scope of this constitutional provision, the Federal Government reserve the 
right to engage measures such as it deems fit and necessary to institute policies and laws 
that will promote the decarbonisation of the economy in a bid to protect and improve the 
environment and meets with its international obligations. The process of achieving this is 
further reinforced by different statutory laws and regulations which are discussed below. 
According to Lotz et al. (2008) laws that could be applicable to CCS include Mining, oil 
and gas operations, pollution control, wastes disposal, drinking water, treatment of high-
                                                          
846
 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 
847
Id Section 20 
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pressure gases and subsurface property right.
848
 Below, these different laws will be 
discussed in relation to the Nigerian legal regime 
7.3.1 Petroleum Act 1969 
The Petroleum Act 1969 vests jurisdictional and ownership rights vis-à-vis complete 
Propriety rights and ownership of petroleum assets and resources found upon and beneath 
lands or territorial waters, continental shelves or Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria 
and operations of petroleum and related activities on the State.
849
 To engage in activities 
within this jurisdiction require the approval of the State by the granting of licences by the 
Federal Minister of Petroleum Resources (hereafter referred to as the Minister)
850
 to 
operators for as defined reason in the license or lease which could include oil prospecting, 
exploration, drilling, production, storage, refining and or transportation.
851
 
The licensing regime currently covers the storage of petroleum and petroleum products 
only without any reference to the storage of any such compound or chemical as it relates 
to greenhouse gases responsible for global warming or geared towards the mitigation of 
climate change by storing in the geological formation from which crude or natural gas has 
been exploited. However, pursuant to Section 9 of the Act, the Minister is vested with the 
powers to make regulations inter alia for “prevention of pollution of water courses and 
the atmosphere
852
 [and for] the constructions, maintenance and operation of 
installations.
853
 This clearly could be bases for the implementation of regulations that 
would allow for the development and implementation of CCS projects under 
collaborative operations with the private sector and the relevant Federal Environmental 
agencies or possibly a base for the development of regulatory framework that is solely 
geared towards CCS operations onshore and offshore.  
                                                          
848Lotz, M., Brent, A. C., 2008, “A Review of Carbon dioxide Capture and Sequestration and the 
Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism and Prospect of Southern Africa”, Journal of 
Energy in Southern Africa, Vol. 19 No 1: 13-24  
849
 The Petroleum Act 1969 Section 1§1&2 
850
Id. Section 2§1 
851Iledare O. et al., (2010) “Oil and Gas Resources in the Federal Republic of Nigeria” Conference 
on Oil and Gas in Federal Systems 
852
Id Section 9§1b(iii) 
853
Id. Section 9§1c 
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7.3.2 Nigerian Environmental Laws 
Generally the enforcement of Nigeria’s environmental laws has been poor; however, 
progressively this has improved with high profile cases and landmark ruling against 
major environmental polluters like Shell.
854
 Prior to the 1980s, industry in Nigeria 
developed with no enforceable legislation on industrial pollution. Incidences of 
environmental pollution vis-à-vis air pollution, gas flaring, destruction of marine biotic 
life, pollution of underground aquifers and surface potable water systems resulting in 
human and animal poisoning are very prevalent.
855
 However, different governments and 
non-governmental organisations have attempted to tackle the environmental degradation 
perpetuated by mostly the oil and gas sector through laws and awareness campaigns. The 
creation of the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA)
856
 and subsequently the 
passing into law the National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement 
Agency (NESREA) bill in 2007
857
 clearly showed a commitment by the government to a 
national environmental policy that will ensure not just sustainable development rooted in 
proper management of the environment but in practises that are consistent with the 
national interest and obligations to meet the international consensus for the need to 
mitigate climate change. 
                                                          
854
Jonah Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd, Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation and Attorney General of the Federation, Decision of the Federal High 
Court of Nigeria in the Benin Judicial Division Holden at Court Benin City (Suit No 
FHC/B/CS/53/05, 14 November 2005). 
855
 Objective and Strategies of Nigeria’s Agenda 21 submitted to Federal Environmental Protection 
Agency by Adegboke O.S et al. under the auspices of UNDP support environment and natural 
resources management programme for Nigeria (NIR\C3)  
856
 Section 36, NESREA Act expressly repealed the FEPA Act cap F 10 LFN, 2004. 
857
 The National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (Establishment) 
Act 2007, No. 25 the Act officially commenced on 30 July, 2007. 
296 
 
7.3.3 National Environmental Standards and Regulations 
Enforcement Agency (NESREA) Act 2007
858
 
Pursuant to the establishment of NESREA in 2007 to replace the FEPA, the agency will 
by the provisions of Section 2 of the Act hold the responsibility as administered by the 
Ministry of Environment  
“…the protection and development of the environment, biodiversity conservation 
and sustainable development of Nigerian’s natural resources in general and 
environmental technology, including coordination and liaison with relevant 
stakeholders within and outside Nigeria on matters of enforcement of 
environmental standards, regulations, rules, laws, policies and guidelines” 
The inference of such available powers to the Agency suggests in pursuant to Section 8 of 
the Act, that the Agency can 
“Prohibit processes and use of equipment or technology that undermine 
environmental quality”.859 
This does not however indicate that the agency has the authority to authorise the use of 
equipment or technologies that enhance environmental quality which would be the 
grounds for the authorisation of CCS technology or enforcement of the CCS policies 
when such technology becomes operational in the country. Nevertheless, it can be argued 
that the framework allows the integration of mitigation strategies as Section 8(1)(K) 
empowers the Agency to make and review regulations on air and water quality, effluent 
limitations, control of harmful substances and other forms of environmental pollution and 
sanitation.    
 
Pursuant to Section 7,
860
 the NESREA Act provides authority to ensure that enforcement 
and compliance with environmental laws (domestic and international) within it defined 
environmental jurisdiction can be pursued and prosecuted if the need arises and that 
                                                          
858
 The Agency does not have jurisdiction over environmental matters resulting from the oil and 
gas sector 
859
Supra note NESREA Act. section 8 (d) 
860
 See Appendix for the full detail of the Section as it enumerates the functions of the Agency  
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prevention and control through monitory and regulatory measures is integral to the 
overall strategy of ensuring compliance. 
7.3.3.1 Aquifer Quality Regulations 
The fresh water and Seawater are also protected by the NESREA Act. Pursuant to the 
provisions of the Act, the discharge in harmful quantity of any hazardous substance into 
Nigerian waters or adjoining territorial waters is prohibited
861
 which makes punishable 
under the Territorial Waters Act. There are usually collaborative operations between the 
NESREA and other agencies to enforce these provisions and enhance the quality of 
water. It is the responsibility of industries and facilities operating within the jurisdiction 
to ensure that they have the right permit and authorisation before engaging in any form of 
substance discharge into geological formations which might affect surface or 
underground aquifer quality or quantity
862
 failure to comply with the different available 
provisions could result in criminal or civil liabilities. 
7.3.4 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Act 1992
863
 
This piece of legislation governs environmental impact assessment with respect to any 
proposed project(s) in Nigeria and flows directly from the provisions of principle 17 of 
the Rio declaration.
864
 The Environmental Impact Assessment Act (cap E12, LFN 2004), 
makes the conduct of an environmental impact assessment mandatory prior to the 
development of any project or activity likely to have a significant effect on the 
environment
865
. Such projects as listed in the Schedule identifies the Mandatory study 
Activities to include the following, Agriculture, Airport, Drainage and Irrigation, 
Fisheries, Forestry, Housing, Industry, Infrastructure, Ports, Mining, Petroleum, Power 
                                                          
861
 Water Resources Act, CAP W2, LFN 2004 
862Perales C. 2008, “Environment in 26 Jurisdictions Worldwide,” A synopsis on Nigeria in the 
publication “Getting the Deal Through, by Awogbade, S., et al., 2008 AELEX. 
863
 Environmental Impact Assessment Act EIA (cap E12, LFN 2004), LFN 2004 (Often referred to 
as Decree No. 86) 
864Anago, I., 2002, “Environmental Impact Assessment as a tool for Sustainable Development: The 
Nigerian Experience”, TS10.3 Sustainability, FIG XXII International Congress Washington, D.C. 
USA, April 19-26 2002 
865
 Spurn C., 2008, “Oil Regulation in 31 Jurisdictions Worldwide” A synopsis on Nigeria in the 
publication “Getting the Deal Through, by Awogbade, S., et al., 2008 AELEX. 
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generation and transmission, Quarries, Railways, Transportation, Resort and Recreational 
Development, Waste treatment and disposal, and Water supply.  This assessment deals 
with environmental impacts associated with public or private projects putting into 
consideration the potential significance of the (negative) impact of such project(s) on the 
environment
866
 before the issuance of any permit.  
 
Broadly the categorisation of the EIA Act is divided into 4 Parts namely, General 
Principles of Environmental Impact Assessment which defines the objective of the Act as 
(a)  the determining procedure for the effect of the activity on the environment
867
,  
(b)  to promote the implementation of appropriate policies at all levels of 
government
868
 and  
(c) to encourage adequate information dissemination and exchange procedure among 
all sectors, levels and legal jurisdictions.
869
 
 
Part II covers the processes that must be involved in the implementation of the EIA. This 
does not only allow for the conduct of the assessment but it requires a high level of 
transparency on the part of the adjudicating parties and the involvement of relevant 
stakeholders in the assessment process. It is fundamental that mandatory study or 
screening of project(s) and design of a follow up programme
870
 to ascertain the 
environmental effects of the project
871
 is carried out under a regime that shows not only 
fairness but credibility and competence. Therefore, the competent authority (in this case 
the Agency) is required to take necessary and appropriate actions consequent to the 
conclusions of the assessment
872
 and if the need arises therefore, it is provided for within 
the EIA Act the referral of any discrepancy to the Council for mediation or the Review 
                                                          
866
(cap E12, LFN 2004). Section 2 §1 
867
Id Section 1§a 
868
Id Section 1§b 
869
Id Section 1§c 
870
Id Section 16§a,§c 
871
Id Section 17§1(a) 
872
Id Section 22 
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Panel for any required review to the assessment process pursuant to the provisions of 
Section 25 of the Decree.
873
 
 
Part III covers Miscellaneous issues which provides the Competent Authority powers to 
issue guidelines, codes of practice and facilitating regulations; offence and penalty; 
interpretation etc. While the final Part identifies all the areas that mandatory assessment 
has to be conducted (See the itemised list above). 
7.3.5 Land Use Act 1990 (CAP L5 LFN 2004) 
As stated above Section 44(3) of the Nigerian Constitution, gives the Federal Government 
an absolute proprietarily ownership and control of all minerals, mineral oils and natural 
gas in, under or upon any land in Nigeria or in, under or upon the territorial waters and 
the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria. However, the Land Use Act 1990 - cap L5 LFN 
2004, which regulates ownership rights and tenure system of landholding further 
emphasises this but clarifies by vesting ownership rights of land designated as “Federal 
Government Lands”874 to the Federal government while land otherwise stated are under 
the control of the State government or Governor or the designated authority.
875
 
 
Lands included in the definition of Federal land include both onshore and offshore oil and 
gas reservoir and deep saline formation which could be used for CCS purposes. It is 
important also to note however that Section 51 of the said Act allows for the 
expropriation of land by the government for public purposes which could include but not 
limited to the following mining, exploitation and transportation of hydrocarbons (e.g. 
Petroleum and petroleum products).
876
 
                                                          
873
Id Section 23§b 
874
 Land Use Act 1990 Part VIII Art 49§1 
875
 Preamble to the Land Use Act of the Federal Republic of Nigeria: “An Act to Vest all Land 
compromised in the territory of each State (except land vested in the Federal government or its 
agencies) solely in the Governor of the State , who would hold such Land in trust for the people 
and would henceforth be responsible for allocation of land in all urban areas to individuals resident 
in the State and to organisations for residential, agriculture, commercial and other purposes while 
similar powers will with respect to non-urban areas are conferred on Local Governments.(27
th
 
March 1978) Commencement.” 
876
 This action is subject to compensation to holders of surface ownership property rights. 
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Pursuant to Section 51(2),  
“The powers of a Governor under this Act shall, in respect of land comprised in 
the Federal Capital Territory or any land held or vested in the Federal 
Government in any State, be exercisable by the Head of the Federal Military 
Government or any Federal Commissioner designated by him in that behalf and 
references in this Act to Governor shall be construed accordingly”.  
This section clarifies any possible ambiguity in terms of ownership and presiding 
authority in lands designated as federal lands and any such land within the National 
jurisdiction. 
It is however important that ownership of land and the use of it is transferred to individual 
or organisation with the condition of sustainable development and or use of the 
resource(s) as required by the provisions of the National Environmental Policy 
framework and as such stated clearly within the context and conditions of the principle of 
the land tenure through the issuance of appropriate certificate of occupancy specific to the 
use of the land. 
7.2.10 Recommendation 
The diversity in available laws and Regulations need to be synergised to meet the 
necessary legal requirements and avoid legal plurality resulting to conflicts of regulatory 
positions. It is important that a stringent and clear interpretation of these laws in relation 
to CCS as in other developed countries running CCS is in place for such countries to 
show interests in CDM projects in Nigeria, also, the laws have to be adequately 
appropriated to avoid issues that undermine environmental integrity and perverse the 
climate change mitigation measures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
301 
 
 
 
Global Conventions and Agreements 
•United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty 1982 (UNCLOS, 1982) 
•Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992 (FCCC, 1992) 
•London Convention 1972 (LC, 1972) 
•1996 Protocol under the London Convention 1972 
•International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973 and its 
1978 Protocol (MARPOL 73/78) 
•Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from 
Land-Based Activities 1995 (GPA-LBA Agreement, 1995) 
•Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes 1989 (Basel 
Convention, 1989) 
•Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain 
Hazardous 
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (PIC Convention, 1988) 
•Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods: Model Regulations 
(United Nations, 2001) 
 
 
European Union Directives, Regulations and Strategies 
• EU Water Framework Directive 2000 (2000/60/EC) 
• EU Waste Directive 1975 (75/442/EEC) 
• EU Directive on Hazardous Waste 1991 (91/689/EEC) 
• EU Council Regulation on the Supervision and Control of Shipments of Waste 
within, into and out of the European Community 1993 (259/93/EEC) 
• EU Council Regulation amending Regulation 259/93/EEC on the Supervision and 
Control of Shipments of Waste 1997 (120/97/EEC) 
• EU Environmental Impact Directive (85/337/EEC) 
• EU Directive on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control 1996 (96/61/EC) 
Table 19 Other instruments and regimes International Conventions and Agreements 
Relating to Marine Environmental Protection 
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• EU Directive on the Effects of Plans and Programmes on the Environment 2001 
(2001/42/EC) 
• EU Directive on Pollution Caused by Certain Dangerous Substances Discharged 
into the Aquatic Environment 1976 (76/464/EEC) 
• EU Strategy for a Future Chemicals Policy 
• EU Strategy to Protect and Conserve the Marine Environment 
 
 
Regional Conventions and Agreements 
• OSPAR Convention 1992 (Northeast Atlantic) 
• Helsinki Convention 1992 (Baltic Sea) 
• Antarctic Treaty 1961 & CCAMLR (Antarctic) (+ Protocols) 
• Barcelona Convention 1976 (Mediterranean Sea) (+ Protocols) 
• Jeddah Convention 1982 (Red Sea and Gulf of Aden) (+ Protocols) 
• Nairobi Convention 1985 (Western Indian Ocean) (+ Protocols) 
• Noumea Convention 1986 (South Pacific) (+ Protocols) 
• Waigani Convention 1995 (South Pacific) 
• Abidjan Convention 1981 (Southeast Atlantic) (+ Protocols) 
• Bucharest Convention 1982 (Black Sea) (+ Protocols) 
• Cartagena de Indias Convention 1983 (Caribbean Sea) (+ Protocols) 
• Lima Convention 1981 (Southeast Pacific) (+ Protocols) 
• Kuwait Convention 1978 (Persian/Arabian Gulf) (+ Protocols) 
• Draft Caspian Sea Convention (Caspian Sea) (+ Protocol) 
• Arctic Council (Arctic) (+ Guidelines) 
 
 
UK Regulatory regimes  
• The Food and Environment Protection Act 1985 
• The Coast Protection Act 1949 (but these all are not designed for long-term 
operations). 
• The EC Habitats Directive 1992, 
• The Strategic Environment Assessment Directive (2001/42/EC). 
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• The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.  
• Pipelines Act 1962 
 
 
 
Nigerian Regulatory Regimes 
 Harmful Waste (Special Criminal Provisions) Act CAP H1, LFN 2004 
The Harmful Waste Act prohibits, without lawful authority, the carrying, 
dumping or depositing of harmful waste in the air, land or waters of Nigeria 
 
 Hydrocarbon Oil Refineries Act, CAP H5, LFN 2004. 
The Hydrocarbon Oil Refineries Act is concerned with the licensing and control 
of refining activities 
 Oil in Navigable Waters Act, CAP 06, LFN 2004.  
The Oil in Navigable Waters Act is concerned with the discharge of oil from 
ships 
 Associated Gas Re-Injection Act, CAP 20, LFN 2004.  
The Associated Gas Re-Injection Act deals with the gas flaring activities of oil 
and gas companies in Nigeria 
 Oil Pipelines Act, CAP 07, LFN 2004. 
The Oil Pipelines Act and its Regulations guide oil activities 
 Territorial Waters Act, CAP T5, LFN 2004.  
The Territorial Waters Act makes punishable any act or omission committed 
within Nigerian waters which would be an offence under any other existing law. 
 Water Resources Act, CAP W2, LFN 2004.  
The Water Resources Act is targeted at developing and improving the quantity 
and quality of water resources. 
 Criminal Code: 
The Criminal Code contains provisions for the prevention of public health 
hazards and for environmental protection. 
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7.4 Conclusion and Environmental Sustainable Development Policy 
Inferences 
The Nigerian Government clearly articulates its committed to the principle of Sustainable 
development and its integration in national policies is becoming more evident in recent 
years. The direction of the recent democratic regimes has shown a change in attitude 
towards Sustainable Development based on proper management of the environment and 
proactive actions (although this is arguable) towards engaging stakeholders in resolving 
environmental matters in the different affected areas. 
The inclusion and involvement of different preventive, remedial and penal measures 
which includes but not limited to the following principles; Precautionary Principle, 
Pollution Prevention Pays Principle (3P+), the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP), User Pays 
Principle, the intergenerational and Intra-generational Principle and the Subsidiary 
Principle in environmental policies reinforces the commitment of the government on the 
issue of Sustainable Development and shows an obvious change in the direction of 
environmental policy initiatives
877
.  
According to the National Policy on the Environment, the [primary] goal of the policy is 
to achieve Sustainable Development in Nigeria and in particular to  
a. Secure a quality of environment adequate for good health and well being 
b. Conserve and use the environment and natural resources for the benefit of 
present and future generations 
c. Restore, maintain and enhance the ecosystem and ecological processes 
essential for the functioning of the biosphere to preserve biological diversity 
and the principle of optimum sustainable yield in the use of living natural 
resources and ecosystem 
d. Raise public awareness and promote understanding of the essential linkages 
between the environment, resources and development and encourage, and 
encourage individual and community participation in environmental 
improvement efforts; and  
                                                          
877
 National Policy on the Environment(NPE), 1998, under the auspices of UNDP support 
environment and natural resources management programme for Nigeria (NIR\C3) 
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e. Co-operate in good faith with other countries, international organisations and 
agencies to achieve optimal use of Transboundary natural and resources and 
effective prevention or abatement of Transboundary environment 
degradation. 
Within this context therefore, these policy goals incorporates all sectors of the economy 
which includes but not limited to the following Culture, Education, Construction, Health, 
Oil and Gas, Mining and Mineral Resources, Tourism, Marine and Coastal Area 
Resources etc. Construction, Oil and Gas, Marine and Coastal Area Resources and 
Mining and Mineral Resources would be of particular interest to the CCS implementation 
in Nigeria. To the end, SD has its relevance when considering the implementation of CCS 
technology and its operations to avoid the environment short falls currently associated 
with the activities of the mining, oil and gas industries in Nigeria. 
Included in this report, the section on oil and gas framework, clearly suggest that 
CO2along with other gases discharged at production platforms, refineries, petrochemical 
and gas processing facilities as gaseous waste needs to be monitored
878
 and the need to 
engage in periodic maintenance procedure to detect any possible corrosion, leakages and 
damages to the facilities
879
 is a fundamental prerequisite in developing and interpreting 
any credible SD framework.  
While the Marine and Coastal Area Resources clause might have accentuated the issue of 
transboundary movement of toxic and hazardous substances within Nigerian marine and 
coastal waters,
880
 the interest here however is the interpretation of the terms toxic and 
hazardous substance since no national legal framework identifies CO2 as a toxic and 
hazardous substance but rather as a waste, and no such inference is in reference to SD 
component such activity. The clear identification of CO2 as waste under Section 4.14 (J) 
is not clear enough indication that this could be classified as toxic or hazardous substance 
under any Nigerian legal framework. However to further clarify with the provisions of 
relevant international law, the 1989Basel Convention on hazardous waste which Nigeria 
                                                          
878
Id. NPE, 1998, Section 4.14, Subsection  J., Pg. 24 
879
Id. NPE, 1998, Section 4.14, Subsection G., Pg. 24 
880
Id. NPE, 1998, Section 4.10, Subsection J., Pg. 17 
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is a signatory to
881
identify the characteristics of a hazardous waste stipulated in Annex 1II 
of the Basel Convention stipulating such substance(s) must be explosive, inflammable, 
toxic or corrosive
882
 or that the importing, transit or exporting country classifies it as a 
hazardous waste.
883
 This further emphasis the exclusion of CO2from the list of toxic or 
hazardous waste that cannot be transported over Nigerian territorial waters as Nigeria is a 
signatory to the convention.  
In case of the Construction sector, strategies need to be put in place to ensure Sustainable 
Development by enacting by-laws aimed at minimising the negative impact on the 
environment of noxious gases during and post construction.
884
 The Mining and Mineral 
Resource section of the framework stipulates there must be stringent measures to ensure 
long term stability of the mines
885
 if they are to be considered for such operations as CCS. 
This accentuates the relevance of this policy framework on sustainable development and 
avoidance of leakage if such geological formations would be used for sequestration 
purpose.   
The contextual framework wholly justifies the prevention, abatement, remediation and 
restorative activities directed at problems which could or do arise from industrial 
production processes; demographic pressures; weakness of legal instruments (by allowing 
the enactment of necessary legal regimes to strengthen the activities and strategies 
consistent with the policies, and consistently drive the policy in such a way that 
recognises the organic nature of the environment. This therefore allows for targeted 
approach to implementation of the relevant policies within the sector of the economy that 
could pose as a problem to the implementation of the CCS activities under a CDM 
framework. 
                                                          
881
 Nigerian signed the convention on 15
th
 of March 1990 and ratified the Convention on the 13
th
 
of March 1991 Available online http://www.basel.int/ratif/convention.htm viewed on 22/08/2011 
882
 Article 1§a Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes 1989 (Basel 
Convention, 1989) 
883
 Article 1§b of the above convention states “Wastes that are not covered under paragraph (a) but 
are defined as, or are considered to be, hazardous wastes by the domestic legislation of the Party of 
export, import or transit. 
884
Supranote. NPE, 1998, Section 4.15, Subsection E., Pg. 26  
885
Id. NPE, 1998, Section 4.11, Subsection I., Pg.19 
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7.5 Conclusion 
Offshore storage is principally within the purview of international law, it remains a work 
in progress in relations to CCS and CDM. Litigation based on tortious liability are less 
likely when compared it the possibility of this in the onshore regulatory regimes, however 
the general uncertainty as to the directions and interpretation of International 
Environment laws vis-à-vis carbon storage and CDM remains a major challenge.  
The provisions of international and national laws shows that storage of CO2 is a feasible 
option provided the regulations are adequately enforced by respective States. The existing 
international laws analysed in this chapter gives credence to the possibility of using the 
sub-seabed for CO2 storage by allowing for land-based pipeline transportation of captured 
CO2 directly to the sub-seabed injection point akin to the method used in the Statoil 
Snøhvit project. The other option would be the use of captured CO2 from offshore 
activities for the enhanced recovery process. Although current national laws are 
dependent on the internationally ratified provisions, the national laws could reflect such 
provisions if the need to for offshore CO2 storage is so required.  
In relations to onshore implementation of environmental regimes as the need arises for 
the CCS-CDM implementation, current national laws would require amendments. For 
instance, the Nigeria’s Land Use Acts needs the provision to accommodate for large scale 
operations of the private sector explicitly for the purpose of storing in geological 
formations deemed adequate; the enforcement of national environmental laws needs to be 
sufficiently implemented to eliminate the human health risk that could be associated to 
onshore storage and any ambiguity must be clarified in the laws to ensure that risk are not 
only mitigated but that remediation to litigations is available to aggrieved parties without 
undue influence or manipulations. 
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Chapter 8 
INFORMING CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE RISK REGULATION 
WITHIN THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM: THE NIGERIAN 
PERSPECTIVE 
8.0 Carbon Capture and Storage Perception Risk impact of public 
participation 
“...Although a number of technical issues dealing with storage safety, 
monitoring and longevity are still outstanding, the public acceptance of 
geological storage is probably the overriding issue...” The Royal Society 
of Chemistry
886
 
CCS dynamism and continuous flux in relation to understanding element risks associated 
with the technologies, operations and implementation are ubiquitous and this is consistent 
with the stage of the industry. As discussed in this thesis, the fluidity and evolving 
knowledge of this subject area has its impact on the perception of CCS both from  public, 
policy, legal, regulatory and risk management perspectives. However, the extent to which 
this is considered in developing countries has been very sparely researched into, analysed 
and documented.  It is apt to suggest that any future coherent and workable regulation, 
policies or legal frameworks in Non Annex 1 countries should be based on a high degree 
of certainty
887
  and acceptance by stakeholders.  
The analysis of this survey hopes to show the level of understanding and stakeholders’ 
perception within the chosen Non Annex 1 country (i.e. Nigeria), and the interaction of 
the different risk elements that needs to be considered in CCS-CDM implementation. 
Also for the purpose of this research, it is important to know how the different CCS risk 
dynamics will affects it implementation under the CDM regulatory framework in a 
developing country like Nigeria.  
                                                          
886
 Memorandum from the Royal Society of Chemistry to the Select Committee on Science and 
Technology Appendix 23 section 2.3 as cited in the UK Parliament website. 
887
 This degree of certain should be defined by the competent authority or authorities 
commissioned to carry out the duties of developing the regulatory framework and should be based 
on the pool of available knowledge about the CCS as at the time of articulating the framework. 
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CCS under the CDM framework has the defined purpose of climate change mitigation, 
but no such project has been fully implemented under CDM, however, there have been 
proposals submitted to the CDM EB from Vietnam (Case NM0167),
888
 Malaysia (Case 
NM0168)
889
 and the Ocean Sequestration Project (Case SSC_038). But there are some 
demonstrations and analogues projects in Annex 1 countries including the UK and those 
implemented by transnational corporations such as In Salah in Algeria, which could serve 
as experimental grounds for CDM project in Non Annex 1 countries.   
 
The impact of perception of CCS has been widely studied in the major Annex 1 
countries.
890
 However to the best of my knowledge, no structured research has been 
conducted to accentuate the extent of risk perception by the different stakeholders neither 
has this factor been coherently articulated about Nigeria as a developing or UNFCCC 
Non Annex 1 country with a significant potential to implement CCS under possible CDM 
framework due to the geology and experience relative to the oil and gas industry.  
The analysis will focus on the issues of risk and benefit perception, the level of 
understanding of such risk implications and the risk implication of implementing CCS 
using the CDM framework in a Non Annex 1 oil and gas producing country. It will 
attempt to contribute as best as possible but also in the process provide the bases for 
future research engagement in this area as it affects Non Annex 1 countries of the Kyoto 
Protocol.  
The implementation of CCS in Annex 1 countries factors in public perception in 
developing relevant policies and regulatory framework.
891
 It is also evident that the 
acceptance of evolving technologies and processes hinges on the perception the public 
                                                          
888
 White Tiger Oil Field CCS project was the first submitted CDM project to CDM-EB by 
Vietnam subject to comments from oil companies like Shell the CDM-EB the project was not 
approved  
889
 This CCS project was the second but also met with the same fate consequent to the comments 
and strong reservation for companies like Shell. 
890Wallquist L, Visschers V., and Siegrist M 2010, “Impact of Knowledge and Misconceptions on 
Benefit and Risk Perception of CCS”, Environ Sci. Technol. 2010, Vol. 44, Pg. 6557-6562 
891
 Gough C., 2008, State of the art in CO2 Capture and Storage in the UK: An expert’s review. Int. 
J. Greenhouse Gas Control 2008, 2 (1), 155-168  
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and stakeholders have about the risk and benefit impacts of the project. This has not been 
articulated properly in any rigorous academic format in the case of the CCS CDM 
projects and in particular in Nigeria that has the potential for such project 
implementation. Undermining the importance of public perception when dealing with 
environmental and energy policy issue, could prove to be counterproductive as reinforced 
by the events in the oil producing region of Niger Delta area of Nigeria over the years.  
Using a systematic approach in conducting this survey, I hope to bring to bear the need to 
factor in the perceptions of expert stakeholders in any future development of CCS 
national regulatory framework under the current national adaptation to the UNFCCC 
framework. 
8.1 Survey Design and Method 
Participants: The survey was conducted by sending out questionnaires to 
participants by email and as the need arose telephone interview with some of the 
participants in Nigeria was necessary and duly conducted. The choice of participants was 
made by initial random selection using contacts provided to me by the Nigerian-British 
Chamber of Commerce (NBCC), the Nigerian High Commission in the UK and the 
Nigerian University Council (NUC) with requests sent to them to participate in the 
survey. Email addresses were requested and a copy of the questionnaire was sent out to 
80 willing participants who accepted my request.   
The survey participants were sourced from the following groups NGO, Governmental, 
Academia and Business sectors and it is important to note that they were not selected 
based on their expertise in CCS or CDM (see below for reasons). The survey 
questionnaire was distributed by email to 70 respondents out of the 80 participants, 
however, the rest 10 participants (mostly in the NGO sector) were interviewed over the 
telephone due to lack of access to internet on the field. See Table 20 for a detailed 
distribution of questionnaires and responses. 
Survey Structure: The subjects of the survey represent the contextual 
discourse of the thesis and the survey structure and its results were based on a contextual 
interpretation relative to the objectives of the theses. The questionnaire was broadly 
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divided into subsections which were aimed to ascertain the following; first, the level of 
Climate Change Awareness by the individual participating in the survey, the 
organisation/sector they represented and their view of public perception about the topic in 
Nigeria. Secondly, participants’ knowledge about CDM flexible mechanism, CCS 
technology, legal/regulatory externalities associated with CCS and CDM, and finally, 
their perception of risks associated with the CCS technology and general questions 
related to CDM and CCS implementation in the country.  
Overall, the process of conducting this survey was very tedious due to poor access to 
communication facilities by participants and delayed response from the participants.  This 
survey does not in any way suggest the full picture of this subject in Nigeria but however 
gives a perception of a cross section of potential participants and a basis for further 
academic work in this area.  
The pool of participants for the survey was constrained due (but not limited) to the 
following, lack of adequate communication infrastructure in Nigeria, the low level of 
expertise and knowledge base about the technology in the country and lack of adequate 
infrastructure within the organisations contacted to adequately answer the questions 
provided and participate in the survey. Finally, the time and financial constraint on my 
part did not allow for a broader engagement or to conduct a more comprehensive field 
work. However, I was able to deduce and establish from the responses from participants 
the situation on ground in Nigeria about the subject matter and reach my conclusions due 
to the way the questionnaire was structured, and also due to the level of respondents’ 
credibility vis-à-vis their position in the organisation, the quality and robustness of 
responds. 
For the purpose of confidentiality, participants and the organisations were only 
numerically identified. Also, samples of the answered questionnaire will not be included 
in this thesis or disclosed as this was part of the terms agreed with participants.  
The survey distribution and participants’ selection were based on geographical relevance 
to the following country’s administrative seat of power, commercial, and industrial focal 
areas. The government participants were from the federal capital territory Abuja, in the 
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northern part of Nigeria, the business respondents were mostly from the Niger Delta area 
and Lagos (the commercial capital of the country), and the NGOs were from the Niger 
Delta area and Western states of the country. Finally the academics were from the higher 
institutions in southern States of Nigeria due to proximity to industry. 
Results Analysis 
 This survey is divided into the 2 broad themes (CDM and CCS), however the focus of 
analysis will be on the three topical issues mentioned above and my observations will be 
made in this result analysis section and my conclusion as the final section of this chapter. 
 
 
Out of the 80 questionnaires sent out, there was a 95% response by the cut-off date and 
final compilation of this chapter. The rest of the sent questionnaires had not returned, 
therefore was not included in the final discussion and analysis. The breakdown of the 
respondents is shown in Table 20 above. The table showed that the Business sector and 
Academia had a full participation in the survey, with the NGO category having 93% 
response rate, while only 1out of 4 government respondent was not considered returned 
because the questionnaire was not complete (some pages not included) therefore was not 
used in the analysis.  
Sector Number of 
Questionnaire sent 
Number of 
questionnaire 
returned 
Percentage 
Response 
(%) 
Government 4 3 75 
Industry 20 20 100 
Non-Governmental 
Organisation (NGO) 
 
40 
 
37 
 
92.5 
Academia/Research 16 16 100 
Total 80 76 95 
  
Table 20 Distribution of Questionnaire and Responses 
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The number of participants interviewed per sector was not equally or proportionally 
distributed. Some sectors had fewer participants than the other in this survey. The 
distribution and response of questionnaires was not uniform, this must therefore be 
considered in understanding the percentage indicators used in my analysis. The different 
sectors chosen for this survey had different number of representation in the survey. There 
was no scientific or statistical reason for this distribution profiling, however it could 
hypothetically justify the distribution of these sections in the country. Another possible 
reason for this difference in distribution was because the numbers of participants who had 
the capacity to get involved in the survey was limited by access to communication 
technology such as emails and telephones and their geographical location and 
accessibility varied across the country. Also, other reasons include their relevance and 
level of knowledge in the subject area of CCS and CDM project development was not 
consistent across the sectors selected to adequately provide for uniformity of participation 
in the survey. All the above mentioned factors contribute in one way or another to the 
distribution. 
Awareness and Acceptance  
Generally the concept of climate change is not of high priority on the agenda of most 
institutions in Nigeria as economic realities push this lower in the hierarchy of priorities 
for most decision makers. As one of the respondents noted, “[W]e need to provide for our 
immediate and daily survival before thinking about saving the whole world.” Despite this, 
the survey results indicate that 70% of the respondents claimed to be very aware when 
asked about individual level of awareness on climate change and the impacts in Nigeria 
(Q2) and 50% considered their sector to be moderately aware about climate change (Q3). 
There was however an obvious inconsistent in their understanding of the fundamentals of 
climate change as a significant number of respondents who ticked “It is man-made 
problem” (option b of Q1) also ticked “It is a natural circle that will correct itself” (option 
c of Q1). The reason behind this inconsistence is not clear but can only be attributed to 
opinions expressed by the media and climate change commentators in the media. 
These particular set of questions posed to the participants must be contextually 
understood because Nigeria as a country is presently not energy sufficient neither is the 
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economy energy intensive in terms of energy production and consumption
892
 (but 
progressively becoming so). The need to measure the level of awareness of available 
mitigation strategies against the consequence of a carbon intensive economy justifies the 
following questions asked in the survey Q9 to Q13. Conclusively the respondents 
confirmed that they are aware that the Nigerian government has in place Climate change 
mitigation policy but 70% of the respondents thought the adequacy of the framework was 
difficult to assess, this might be due to poor accessibility to government information by 
majority of the population. Also, the information is centralised and getting information is 
difficult even with the recent Freedom of Information (FoI) Act 2011, the bureaucracy is 
hideous and involves some degree of bribing officials to assess information. However, 
15% considered it as adequate. Interestingly, none of the respondents to question Q10 
considered it as moderately adequate or very adequate, not even respondents from the 
government sector. The rest respondents (15%) that considered it inadequate were from 
the NGO and Academia.  
In response to Q13, renewable energy technology remains very high as the preferred 
choice for alternative mitigation technology as shown in Figure 48 below for details. This 
could be attributed to varying factors which are outside the scope of this thesis. However, 
it remains clear that CCS technology remains preferred as a mitigation strategy 
comparable to nuclear by the different respondents. 
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 Based on the IEA 2008 selected indicators for Nigeria the Energy Production is 226.79 and the 
Electricity consumption is 19.12 TWh as available on 
http://www.iea.org/stats/indicators.asp?COUNTRY_CODE=NG viewed 01November 2011. 
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With regards to sector contribution to climate change (Q7), Figure 49 shows that 55% of 
the respondent opted for the Energy sector of the economy as the sector that contributes 
the most to the problems of climate change in Nigeria while only 5% chose Homes as 
most responsible for climate change problems faced by the country. The participants’ 
response to the question of sector’s attitude towards climate change, emphasised the view 
that energy sector (in particular oil and gas) are believed to be most responsible for 
climate change impacts in the country.  See detailed analysis of CO2 emissions in Nigeria 
in section 1.9.3 
With regard their level of concern to this contribution, 95% of NGO respondents viewed 
their sector as very concerned, overall the comments from the participants on Q8 suggest 
that the oil and gas sector are responsible for the climate and environmental degradation 
in the country. Fifty per cent of the academia and 20% from the industry ticked 
moderately concerned while the rest were not sure. The Government sector had a 100% 
return on concerned. 
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Figure 48 Technological alternatives for Climate Change mitigation 
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With reference to the impact of new international or national regulation, 45% of the 
business sector considered new legislation would significantly affect business 
development while only 5% of the NGO considered it as having any significant impact on 
development. In response to legislation potentially reducing pollution and greenhouse gas 
levels, 20% of NGOs and 55% of the Academia who responded believed it would reduce 
the levels of pollution and greenhouse gases while only 15% mainly from the Business 
sector were of the view that any new legislation would have impact on the level of 
pollution as suggested in comments by some of the respondents. This low percentage 
score of NGOs and Business sector participants is linked to the fact that they consider the 
implementation of previous laws and policies very poor and the enactment of new laws 
will not make any difference. As one of the NGO respondent I spoke to commented “[…] 
Nigeria’s laws are mostly set out to fulfil all righteousness but not necessarily to be 
implemented…” she further added that “[…] government should therefore concentrate its 
efforts on the implementation of the current laws especially as it relates to gas flaring and 
venting in the Niger Delta area of the country.” 
The widely held views and understanding of climate change and the different mitigation 
strategy is to a large extent superficial and intrinsically considered an elitist concept and a 
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Others, 5% 
Home, 5% 
Figure 49 showing the perception of sectors contribution to Climate 
Change 
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problem for the western world to solve as it is generally believed that the source of the 
current climate problem originated from western industrialisation activities. However the 
involvement and engagement in climate change policy discussions, projects and technical 
awareness is gaining momentum this is mostly due to (among other reasons) the activism 
surrounding the Niger Delta ecological and environmental degradation, recent flooding in 
most of the south western areas of the country, erosion of large areas resulting to gullies 
and gorges in the eastern States and the increased evidence of desertification resulting 
from lack of adequate rainfall in the northern states of the country.  
Climate change awareness has further been helped by continuous media campaigns and 
coverage of these events as indicated by 60% of the respondents claiming to get 
information from conventional news media sources such as television, radio and 
newspaper (See Figure 50). Response to Q6 also correlates with the response to Q47 
which suggest education and awareness campaign would be more effective than 
legislation or socioeconomic improvements.  
In relation to the adherence to national and international climate change mitigation 
obligations, among other reasons such as lack of technical competence, inadequate legal 
framework and poor infrastructure, the mitigation strategies as recommended by relevant 
international bodies are still not very well understood by relevant stakeholders such as 
policy initiators and decision makers. Hence, the use of internationally recommended 
measures is not wide spread compared to some other developing countries like China, 
Brazil and South Africa. Furthermore, when considering awareness about CCS in CDM 
there is significantly lower level of awareness generally among developing countries and 
in particular the least developing countries in the sub-Saharan Africa which makes it a 
serious barrier or challenge in ending the uncertainty surrounding CCS in the CDM.
893
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 Bakker, S., et al. 2010, “Progress on including CCS Projects in the CDM: Insight on increased 
awareness, market potential and baseline methodologies”, International Journal of Greenhouse Gas 
Control 4 (2010) pg. 322 
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In the questionnaire, questions were asked to accentuate and discuss participants’ level of 
awareness about CDM as a UNFCCC flexible mechanism. Reference to this observation 
was also made in other chapters in the thesis. For instance the question on CDM project 
implementation risk was discussed in detail in chapter 4 of this thesis and CCS 
technologies as a possible mitigation strategy under CDM and how these two interrelate 
in climate change risk management is discussed in detail in the Chapter 5.  
Response to Q17 and Q26 showed the respondents indicated they were knowledgeable. 
This therefore leads to the analysis of participants’ response to Q33 and Q34 to underpin 
their level of awareness about the interrelatedness between CDM and CCS. 
Participants’ response to Q33 were compared to their responses to Q34 which meant the 
participants indicating their level of understanding based on Q33 were compared to their 
level of knowledge for each of the identified areas Legal framework, Economic 
consideration, extent of technological involvement and Environmental/Ecological 
ramification (Q34).Cumulatively, 55% of all respondents agreed to having a very clear 
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Figure 50 Identifying regular sources of information on Climate 
Change Issues 
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understanding of the inter-relatedness that could be possible between climate change 
mitigation strategies such as CDM under the Kyoto Protocol flexible mechanism and 
geological formation storage projects based on CCS technology and only 5% of those that 
indicated the “Highly understood” option also indicated to be very knowledgeable (VK) 
in the four indicators in Q34 while about 65% indicated knowledgeable (K) for all the 
indicators listed in Q33. From the academia sector, 75% agreed to have high understand 
of the inter-relatedness while the NGOs followed with 55%, but the industry sector 
showed a below average representation with 35% of the respondents agreeing to highly 
understand the inter relatedness. However, 50% of the Government and NGO respondents 
claimed not to understand CCS enough to form an educated opinion (Table 21gives 
breakdown and graphically expressed in Figure 51).  
 
 
Sectors Level of 
understanding 
of inter-
relatedness 
(%) 
Highly 
Understood 
Moderately 
Understood 
Understood Not 
Understood 
Government 50% 1 0 1 2 
Industry 35% 7 7 5 1 
Non-
Government 
55% 22 8 8 2 
Academia/ 
Research 
75% 12 4 0 0 
Percentage 
(%) 
 55 23.75 16.25 5 
 
 
Table 21 Level of Understanding about the interrelatedness between CDM and CCS 
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Survey participants were also asked the plausibility of having CCS technology as a CDM 
project post Kyoto (Q35). With 15% unsure, 45% of the participants opted for the 
“moderately inter-related so it is plausible” option. Some survey participants commented 
on the need for COP17/CMP7 in Durban to bring about a concrete and workable 
resolutions to these issues related to the integration of CCS into CDM otherwise it would 
not be possible to implement in the immediate post Kyoto dispensation.  This is a well-
informed view as the fate of CDM post 2012 has not yet been decided. 
The survey results of participants questioned with regards to their views about CDM and 
CCS as a mitigation strategy (Q16 & Q24) showed the Industry sector led with all 
respondents (100%) agreeing to the use of CCS to mitigate climate change under CDM 
framework, followed by the Academia respondents with 60% agreeing and the rest 
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Figure 51 shows the level of understanding that exist between CCS and 
CDM 
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opposed to CCS as a mitigation measure. One of the government respondents was not 
sure, the rest two of the government respondents had a positive view of the technology 
noting that “[...] the government is always open to all options of mitigating climate 
change impact  although within reason”, while the rest of the respondents had a very 
negative perception about the whole concept of CCS. With the NGOs, only 20% of 
respondents were not sure, with the exception of about 5% of the respondents who 
viewed CCS as a positive opportunity to mitigate the effects of Climate change, the rest 
had a negative perception about CCS as a mitigation strategy.   
There was however an overwhelming commonality of reasons when asked during further 
conversation about why their lack of confidence in CCS as a mitigation strategy, The 
reasons included the cost involvement in terms of the development and deploying the 
technology, there was the believe it would tinker with the earth’s geology which could 
result in other problems such as leakages from the geological formation, fears of it 
resulting in seismic activities in Nigeria which is considered a nation relatively less prone 
to earthquakes due to it sparse and infrequent occurrence.
894
 However, it is important to 
note that he cautioned in his paper that this frequently cited assumption will not hold with 
an increase in the frequency of earth tremors in Nigeria which could mean the widely 
held perception that Nigeria is a seismically safe area is soon to be proved wrong not 
necessarily due to any human activities but due to geological and plutonic movements.
895
 
Another crucial question asked was, if provided with further information on CCS, would 
they reconsider their position on CCS as a mitigation strategy? Sixty percent of the 
respondents identified more information may influence their current position while 10% 
was unsure and the rest mostly from the NGO sector identified their opinion about CCS 
as formed and would not consider changing it even with new information except if it is 
substantively compelling. 
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 This citation was recommended to me to read up by one of the academic respondent during the 
survey conducted.  
Osagie E.O 2008, Seismic Activities in Nigeria, The Pacific Journal of Science and Technology, 
Vol.9. No 2 November 2008. http://www.akamaiuniversity.us/PJST.htmAvailable as at 2nd 
December 2011  
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With 60% of respondents willing to reconsider their stance, it is possible with an increase 
in awareness through various means (formal or informal), policy initiatives and 
incentives, the potential for growth in interest in the CCS among the stakeholders and the 
different groups is high. 
Finally, the level of awareness about climate change mitigation strategy can be 
considered moderate among the sector participants surveyed. However, much lower is the 
awareness about CCS projects as a possible climate change mitigation strategy under 
CDM in the country. This could be a trend indicative of most developing countries 
because of their level of development but of course with the exception of countries like 
India, China and South Africa where coal fired power stations are critical to their plans 
for economic and technological growth and their efforts to provide and improve basic 
amenities and standard of living of their citizens.
896
 But in a country like Nigeria, 
indication from the survey and other premise such as the legal, political and socio-
economic infrastructure show that the trend is consistent with other developing countries.  
Risk Perception 
This section of the survey was designed to articulate the participants’ perception on the 
issue of risk
897
 as it impacts the implementation of CCS projects under CDM. The section 
classified risk in the following context, Regulatory/legal risk, Environmental and human 
impact, technological risk impact, Socio-economic impact, leakage and infrastructural 
risk.  
When asked which risk in their opinion would be most associated with CCS, regulatory 
and legal risk was least associated with CCS by all participants. On the average, only 
35% identifying this risk element as most associated with CCS. From the participants 
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 CO2 Capture Project, Public Perception of Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage: Prioritized 
Assessment of Issues and Concerns, Summary for Policy Makers. Commissioned by International 
Energy Agency Working Party (IEA-WP) on Fossil Fuels and UK Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) CCS Communication Strategy 
897
 The perception of CDM among the respondents was more positive albeit with some level of 
uncertainty and concerns about its future (post Kyoto) and also the inadequate financing and low 
success rates of projects from the country, however when placed in comparison with CCS, the 
latter is not well known hence the reluctance of acceptance. 
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surveyed, 90% of all respondents from the business sector considered CCS as too capital 
intensive a venture that the government and local investors might not be interested in 
committing large capital to because they perceive it as a low returns on investment 
venture.  The environmental impact and cost implication (and economic factor in general) 
of implementing CCS in the country were identified as the most important reasons why 
CCS implementation will stall in the immediate future in Nigeria. The general consensus 
was that unless there was a credible environmental impact assessment regime in place and 
massive foreign investment or incentives to make CCS viable, the implementation of any 
technology and infrastructure intensive project like CCS will be difficult to implement 
considering the current economic climate and very long history of environmental 
degradation by the oil exploration companies in Nigeria. 
Participants quizzed on the subject of major risk sources to CCS (Q37) as shown in 
Figure 52 indicates that 85% and 70% of those surveyed identified leakage from 
geological storage site and the potential for seismic activities resulting from the storage in 
geological formation respectively. Accident resulting from transportation of CO2 was also 
highly considered (60%) most probably due to the experiences associated with the 
vandalism of the oil and gas pipe lines in the Niger Delta area of the country.
898
 The 
injection process recorded a low percentage of 25%.  
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 K.N. Aroh, I.U. Ubong, C.L. Eze, I.M. Harry, J.C. Umo-Otong, A.E. Gobo, (2010) "Oil spill 
incidents and pipeline vandalizing in Nigeria: Impact on public health and negation to attainment 
of Millennium development goal: the Ishiagu example", Disaster Prevention and Management, 
Vol. 19 Iss: 1, pp.70 - 87 
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The survey participants were presented with the question on what the potential risks CCS 
will face in Nigeria if it is allowed to be implemented under CDM (Q38).  On the average 
about 56% ticked public resistance as the risk that CCS will face under CDM. On the 
average about 75% of the surveyed respondents considered lack of technical expertise 
and lack of adequate regulatory framework as a risk, with the academia showing the most 
concern with 94%. All NGOs respondents indicated fear of environmental and human 
impact from leakage, while Industry (80%) indicated the lack of technical expertise and 
85% for cost of development. The trend suggests that the perception of risk and fear are 
clearly in line with the respondent’s sector interests and organisational bias. It is unclear 
if this is a true indication of the perception or just based on the inclination of the sector’s 
ethos.    
Despite the available evidence of negligible leakage from current CCS demonstration 
projects and no known consequence on environmental and human impact, it is clear that 
generally most stakeholders in developing countries as is the case of Nigeria believe that 
the possibility of leakage is highly probable for two main reasons namely seismic or 
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Figure 52 Potential sources risk in CCS Implementation in Nigeria. 
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human mineral exploration activities. It is important to note therefore that this response 
suggests that the respondents believe that CO2 stored in geological formations will over 
time find its way into the atmosphere ultimately.
899
 Despite the absence of leaks with 
current CCS demonstration projects, respondents still tended to reflect the submissions, 
challenges and observations identified by Isehunwa et al (2006), Galadima et al (2009) 
and Anastassia et al (2009) in their different publications relating to risk perception. 
It is worth noting that in terms of political uncertainty, no Government official who took 
part in the survey saw it as a risk that would affect CCS implementation under any post 
Kyoto arrangement. This is understandably so because with regards to political risk it is 
evident that the trend towards stability in government is reflected in the results. With 
cautious optimism however, only 47% (although high arguably not for Nigeria) of the rest 
respondents identified political risk would rise to a point of being a barrier to the 
implementation of CCS. It was the view of respondents that the right and robust legal 
regime will reduce interference since the country was experiencing a greater degree 
political stability due to current democratic progress in the country. 
As shown in Figure 53 below, environmental and human risk option had all NGOs 
participants (i.e. 100%) identifying it as a concern while only 50% of the industry 
participants identified it as risk concern. From the distribution in the Figure 53 there is an 
obvious bias of interest in what participants risk concerns are. Industry considers cost of 
technology as its main concern more than the environmental implication and on the 
contrary NGOs showed least favour towards the cost implications of the technology. 
While there was a 0% concern for political uncertainty by government with the Academia 
showing the highest concern for this possibly because this sector and NGOs are 
government critics. The high level of public resistance concern among the NGO and 
industry could be linked to the direct contacts with agitation from the Niger Delta militias 
on environmental degradation issues and the impact of damaged infrastructure in the 
region on the industry. 
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 This opinion was not discussed or commented on in the questionnaire but was remarked in 
some of the telephone conversations with the respondents. The respondents made reference to the 
incident at Nyo Lake in Cameroun that resulted in the deaths of animals and locals in the vicinity.    
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When the respondents were asked how they would best describe public risk perception to 
projects like CCS (Q39), about 62% of respondents identified with the “Not Sure” option 
while 30% ticked the “High risk” option. And this was not in contrast with response to 
Q45 that asked the participants about what they think the public attitude towards CCS 
would be. To this question 65% of respondents ticked the public are largely ignorant and 
the rest opted for Unsure. This might be consistent with low level of CCS awareness 
among the generality of Nigerians. 
With regards desirability of storage site type (Q48), Figure 54 below shows that NGO and 
Academia respondents showed significant preference for the offshore geological 
storage
900
 (46% and 56% respectively) possibly due to the distance from land putting into 
consideration the lake Nyos experience in 1986. In contrast, 60% of the Industry 
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 Offshore geological storage involves the CO2 being injected into a geological formation deep 
beneath the seabed where it will be stored for millennia, isolated from the ocean water. 
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respondents’ surveyed showed preference for onshore storage possibly due to the cost 
implication which is considerably lower compared to offshore storage.
901
 
Two of the 3 Government respondents (i.e. 67%) opted for any form of storage at all but 
one was not sure. It must be stated at this point that the government respondents do not 
represent the official policy on this since there was none on CCS during the conducting of 
this survey.  With regards the ocean storage
902
 option, 27% of the surveyed NGOs and 
25% of the academia considered it a desirable option while industry had only 10% 
desirable response. Interestingly, there is seems to be a shift in NGOs opinion about this 
storage option. It showed consistency with the result of de Figueiredo (2007) but contrary 
to his earlier work carried out on the ocean storage field experiments in Hawaii and 
Norway in 2003.
903
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 This observation by the participants is consistent with the IPCC 2005 Special report 
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 In the case of ocean storage, the CO2 is injected directly into the water column either at mId-
depth (1500 to 3000 metres), where it dissolves in the ocean waters, or at greater depths (below 
3000 metres), where it forms a deep CO2 lake. 
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 de Figueiredo (2003), The Hawaii Carbon Dioxide Ocean Sequestration Field Experiment: A 
Case Study in Public Perceptions and Institutional Effectiveness (Thesis MIT, 2003) 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Government
Non Govt'al Org.
Industry
Academia
Figure 54 Desirability of Storage Site Type in Nigeria 
328 
 
8.2 Conclusion 
Indications from this survey suggest that a significant majority of respondents (70%) have 
a moderately high level of awareness about climate change, although not the technical 
detail. The media both shape and form the main source of the information about climate 
change and it is clear from the comments of the respondents that there is no concerted 
government policy initiative to provide this awareness outside media discourse. It must be 
said that government interest in mitigating climate change although documented, is 
difficult to assess and, overall, relevant legislation is poorly enforced. 
Another indication relative to awareness and mitigation strategy was evident when the 
respondents were presented with options for alternative strategies for mitigating climate 
change effects; a sizeable percentage of respondents (25% to 70% apparently due to the 
abundance of the sources renewable energy such as sunlight, wind and coastal surges ) 
preferred the use of renewable technologies as alternative mitigation strategy to 10% for 
CCS technology, citing different reasons ranging from seismic activities to possible 
leakage of stored CO2, and abundance of renewable energy sources. Leakage from 
geological formations due to seismic activities has not been evidentially proven.  
Furthermore, stakeholder observations about the introduction of new regulations suggest 
that it would be a welcome idea provided enforcement is also in tandem with enactment. 
The concern unique to all respondents was that current laws and regulations were not 
enforced which makes it difficult to ascertain the effectiveness and impact of 
environmental laws and the need for new regulation. 
It is apt at this point to submit that CCS may be slow to develop where there is low level 
of awareness about the technology and perhaps that this would negatively impact any 
Government-set target. Also, it is important to consider setting binding targets to enhance 
the chances of implementing mitigation technologies within developing country 
jurisdictions. There is a need therefore for a concerted effort to correct these issues among 
developing nations before the agreed implementation phase of the CCS in CDM 
commences. 
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The delineation of risk perception into the sources of risk, its classification based on the 
composite frameworks and their impacts, and the concerns associated with its 
implementation under CDM regime helped respondents to direct their risk considerations 
and opinions within the context of the thesis. The concern of leakage resulted in fear of 
environmental and health impact and remained the main concern for respondents with 
over 80% registering this source of risk as the main anti implementation factor in Nigeria. 
It also was noted by respondents to be the main reason why there will be public 
resistance. The poor handling of Niger Delta environmental disasters and the Lake Nyos’ 
catastrophe in the neighbouring Cameroon Republic remains a major fear to allay. 
Furthermore, for reasons as to why the respondents think that CCS will be implemented, 
only 35% of all respondents associated regulatory/legal risk with CCS implementation 
while economic considerations were considered to have the greatest impact. This could be 
a result of CCS projects correctly perceived as capital intensive that poor economies 
cannot take on without adequate foreign investment or government subsidy which might 
be difficult to come by within the current global economic climate. The submission by 
one respondent suggests therefore that current national regulatory regimes could be 
tweaked and harnessed to achieve the implementation of CCS projects much more easily 
than internally generating the needed funds to actualise such a project. 
In conclusion, CCS implementation in Non-Annex 1 countries remains a theoretical 
possibility provided that barriers and risks are mitigated.  
This can be done in part with the appropriate regulatory framework and risk management 
strategies in place, ensuring the various indicators work in tandem to ensure that not only 
is environmental integrity achieved but that in the process the needed socio-economic 
benefits, technological transfer, and public acceptance are duly considered.  However, 
large carbon dioxide producing industries must be made to pay or carbon dioxide 
injection activities to optimise oil and gas reserves must have their financial gains 
earmarked for CCS (or both).  
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Chapter 9 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
The potential for CCS technology and projects to contribute to a national climate change 
mitigation portfolio can be significant. However, the implementation strategy and its 
impact vis-à-vis the regulatory platform, cost implications and socio-economic 
consequences remains in the sphere of political and academic debate.  This thesis aimed 
to contribute to this debate mainly by considering CCS implementation within the context 
of the international environmental regulatory regime of the Kyoto Protocol Clean 
Development Mechanism. This is done in a more rigorous academic manner than what 
available literature provide, considering the regulatory risk implications for a Non Annex 
1 country with a potential to implement the sequestration of CO2.  
The thesis also examined then manner in which different relevant international and 
national environmental regimes can impact upon implementation in the case study 
jurisdiction. This research has tried to show that countries like Nigeria although a Non 
Annex 1country does (with the right geological formation profiling for CO2 storage and 
appropriate legal and regulatory framework) have the potential to implement CCS under a 
CDM framework provided the associated regulatory and operational risks are adequately 
mitigated. 
In summary, this thesis has extensively analysed relevant regulatory frameworks both 
from a historic context and attempted to link these with more recent legislation. Also, 
identifying potential loopholes within these regimes when considering the 
implementation of CCS-CDM in a host country like Nigeria, however making a case for 
CCS-CDM project implementation if these loopholes are adequately mitigated.  
Secondly, this thesis also argued for the importance of a robust contractual framework for 
successful project implementation and further analysed such contractual interplay not 
only as it affects project implementation vis-à-vis the relationship between the different 
parties but within the following context  
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 how this affects the ownership rights of the emission credits generated during the 
project,  
 the intergenerational implication of such contractual framework,  
 a contractual framework for the operations of a CCS 
 liability issues as it relates to third parties  
 and most importantly, the potentials inherent in Contracts to mitigate potential 
project risks.  
The thesis has argued for an increase in legal expertise in contract drafting in host 
countries for CCS-CDM to be successful. The current practise of using generic contracts 
and poor legal drafting of contracts for CDM projects is not an adequate way forward. 
Neither can it mitigate the complexities associated with developing and implementing 
CCS under a CDM framework.  
This thesis has also extensively considered the regulatory risk implications of CDM in its 
original state (i.e. as it is currently being implemented) underscoring the ramifications for 
investment. This was followed by an extrapolation of the regulatory risks associated with 
CCS as it interplays with CDM. Finally, I have suggested mitigation strategies for 
potential CCS-CDM risks. 
The arguments presented support the need to use all measures and resources available to 
mitigate the impact of climate change. For this reason, CCS cannot be ignored.  However, 
considering the complexities of CCS developing appropriate solutions to these challenges 
requires holistic and systematic risk management if CCS projects are to attract 
investment. This field is evolving. However, further study needs to be carried out to 
understand the impact of different risks (i.e. environmental, regulatory, operational, 
contractual etc.) and to develop workable risk management strategies.  
The author has sought to contribute to the tentative knowledge about the importance of 
using CCS technology as a climate change mitigation tool within a portfolio of mitigation 
strategies and the potentials inherent in implementing CCS under an incentive based 
framework like CDM in a hydrocarbon rich State. It is vital to admit that the extent to 
which the author can achieve this is modest as the issues surrounding the topic area are 
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vast and complex requiring greater research attention and effort by teams of researchers 
on various parts of the planet. In addition, it is often argued that the implementation of 
CCS could result in the delay of innovative policies and implementation of avoidance 
inspired technologies and, thereby, reduce the pace of transition from a carbon intense 
economy to zero carbon economy. While details of such discourse are outside the 
purview of this thesis, it is important to note that a well implemented CCS strategy should 
fulfil a ‘bridging function’ while affordable avoidance and emissions reduction-based 
technologies become viable and well-established. 
In relation to the case study country, Nigeria, with the right regulatory framework of 
investment incentives, political will and a well-directed foreign investment strategy, she 
has the potential to host CCS-CDM projects. This argument is further supported by her 
geology and well-established oil and gas industry comparative to other Non Annex 1 
countries. The Kwale flare reduction project (CDM00513) may form an important 
reference point in developing relevant CDM methodology.  
For the purpose of this research work, the following recommendations are made based on 
the stakeholder profile used in the survey conducted; 
Recommendations for Academia 
 Research and Development: As referred to above, the need for further research in 
earth sciences, engineering and policy and law are important. Researchers and the 
academics must engage in and conduct objective multidisciplinary research 
projects to study the effects associated with the CCS within the jurisdiction. 
Currently there are a number of unanswered questions about issues pertaining to 
seismic (micro and macro) activities, physical and chemical interactions vis-à-vis 
CO2 storage, the geological structure of sites and risk impacts. Such technical and 
scientific questions need to be answered in order to have an informed and a clear 
picture about the overall impact of and potential for CCS-CDM implementation 
in Nigeria.  
 Exposure to Trends: Furthermore, it is important that Nigeria-based academics 
engage with the current evolving research trends and the wider discourse on the 
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subject area. From my interaction with the academic sector in Nigeria during this 
research, I observed that there is a dearth of knowledge as to current expert 
knowledge in the CCS world. This challenge may be difficult to overcome 
without governmental leadership and reforms to current support for tertiary 
education research policy initiatives.  
 Collaboration: It is important that domestic and international academia engage in 
collaborations and capacity building initiatives related to CCS-CDM 
development including different relevant stakeholders.In a wider climate change 
context, domestic academia must effectively use its core competence as expert 
information searchers and disseminators to achieve overall climate change goals. 
They must effectively articulate the inherent potentials in this mitigation strategy 
and help policy makers in designing effective strategies on how to transfer this 
awareness across the spectrum of the society most effectively.  
Government Recommendations 
 Early Mover Opportunity: Within the developing world, the Nigerian 
Government has the opportunity to shape and lead in the CCS-CDM global 
framework implementation by engaging early with its development. To be at the 
forefront, the Nigerian Government needs to develop policies within a reasonable 
timeframe that would integrate CCS in the decarbonisation operations of the oil 
and gas sector (or the electricity sector which has a huge potential if it works 
efficiently) and indeed the whole economy without compromising other sectors’ 
climate change mitigation strategies. These policies in my opinion need to be 
financial incentive-based in nature.  
 Capacity Development: The Government needs to develop and expand the CCS 
knowledge capacities of relevant institutions by providing the infrastructure and 
framework that allows and encourages research, development and training for the 
stakeholders. One additional concern identified during the research was access to 
CCS information. It is important that such information is adequately available as 
it is proven that access to information will encourage the involvement of the 
different key stakeholders. 
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 Attract Investment: Develop regulatory framework and pass legislation that are 
investment friendly, address competitiveness issues and help jump start 
productive international collaborations and the flow of foreign investment from 
Annex 1 countries who are interested in meeting their international 
environmental obligations and climate change targets by investing in CCS and 
related projects through the Clean Development Mechanism in other countries. 
 Government Long-term Commitment: The Government must make a clear long-
term commitment to the development of CCS-CDM as part of the holistic 
strategy of mitigating climate change by providing not only the regulatory 
framework but other infrastructural incentives and planning supports to project 
developers and investors 
 Clarity of climate change mitigation strategies: The Government must develop 
and make available a clear holistic climate change mitigation strategy that has 
CCS as an integral part. This will not only allow for public acceptance but it will 
help in understanding the place of CCS in the whole climate change mitigation 
strategy and provide a clearer picture of the nation’s pathway to achieving 
relevant CCS goals and related environmental protection requirements. 
NGO Recommendations 
 CCS Promotion: In the case of NGOs, the organisation must take a more 
proactive approach to the CCS challenges for environmental protection while 
promoting CCS projects among the different stakeholders. At the moment, NGOs 
in Nigeria are more involved in environmental activism rather than being solution 
oriented. NGOs must constructively engage with relevant sectors e.g. oil and gas 
and the Government in dialogues at the very early stages of development of CCS-
CDM in order for their concerns to be integrated into planning and 
implementation processes.  
 Facilitating Agents: Also, they could act as facilitating agents between 
communities and project developers to ensure that the interests of all concerned 
are adequately considered.  
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 International Alliances: Local and national NGOs should endeavour to have 
international alliance with CCS bodies or institutions to keep abreast of the 
current profile and developments within the CCS industry  
 NGOs efforts that support government and industry initiatives in reducing CCS-
CDM projects implementation costs should not be ignored or underestimated in 
the overall impact it can have in achieving the goal. 
 With regards to local health and safety impacts and the overall environmental risk 
implications of CCS projects, NGOs must help engage the public in the 
consultation process, raising issues in line with health and safety measures on 
individuals and property with project developers and other relevant stakeholders.  
 Finally, NGOs should develop and use their capacity to engage communities to 
transfer their knowledge both to the public and to project developers and other 
stakeholders on how public risks resulting from storage site leakages and other 
risk factors can be mitigated or otherwise addressed. 
Industry Recommendations 
 Funding Project Development: The industry should contribute towards a pool of 
funds for the development of CCS that will facilitate: the financing of projects, 
underwriting risks and supporting the potential to use CCS-CDM projects to 
achieve climate change regulatory obligations in the host country. Due to the high 
cost associated with the processes of CDM this funding mechanism could among 
other things also help in providing project developers with start up costs.  
 Harnessing the Knowledge Base: Industries usually have a robust knowledge 
base which if well harnessed will be beneficial to all stakeholders. Knowledge 
sharing should be easily available among the different industry participants and 
project developers to allow for effectiveness and efficiency in the wider 
decarbonisation process for current carbon intensive industries.  
In conclusion, the inherent potential (with over 850 projects needed to be operational 
globally by 2030 and the capacity for thousands of jobs to be generated) and the evolving 
knowledge associated with CCS technology implementation, indicates that with the right 
policies and regulatory frameworks in a country like Nigeria, CCS operation under CDM 
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framework could hold an important share in the climate change mitigation portfolio. 
However, this is still very uncertain not only due to the risks associated with the cost of 
implementation and the relative complexities of the technology but also from a regulatory 
perspective and perverse public perception to such projects. The rules and modalities 
needed for implementation and ensuring the environmental integrity of such projects 
under a CDM regulatory framework must successfully integrate risk mitigation strategies 
at both international and national levels in order to create a credible framework and 
provide credible bases for public acceptance. 
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Appendix 1 - Questionnaire 
Level of Climate Change Awareness 
1. What is your opinion about Climate Change (you can tick more than one option) 
a. It is of significant threat to our world 
b. It is man-made problem  
c. It is a natural cycle that will correct itself 
d. It does not exist hence not a problem 
e. Difficult to assess 
f. Not enough adequate information to come to conclusion 
2. How aware do you think you are about climate change and its Impacts in Nigeria 
a. Very Aware 
b. Aware  
c. Ignorant 
d. Highly ignorant  
e. Ambivalent 
3. What level of awareness do you think exist in your sector about Climate Change 
a. Very High Awareness level  
b. Moderate Awareness level 
c. Ignorant 
d. Highly ignorant  
e. Ambivalent 
4. Which of the listed region(s) contribute the most to climate change 
a. Africa 
b. Asia (including Australia) 
c. Europe and North America 
d. Middle East  
e. South America 
5. Do you know if there are current public debates about climate change and 
mitigation strategies in Nigeria 
a. Yes, there are ongoing debates 
b. There were debates but not currently 
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c. No, there is currently no debate 
d. The debate will start soon 
e. Unsure 
6. In order of ease of accessibility, can you identify your regular source of 
information on climate change issues (scale 1-5 with 5 as least accessible to you) 
a. Conventional News Media (Newspaper, Television and Radio)  
b. Internet Sources  
c. Academic journals  
d. General conversation with Peers 
e. Others (please state)  
7. In your opinion, which sector of the Economy contributes the most to the 
problems associated with Climate Change in Nigeria 
a. Government 
b. Homes  
c. Private Sector 
d. Energy Sector  
e. Others… 
f. Unsure 
8. How do you assess your Sector’s attitude towards Climate Change in Nigeria? 
a. Very Concerned 
b. Moderately Concerned 
c. Concerned 
d. Ambivalent 
e. Not Sure 
f. Comments… 
9. Do you know if the Nigerian government has any Climate Change mitigation 
policy or framework 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Not sure 
10. If yes to Q9, how adequate are the current National Climate Change policies or 
regulations in mitigating the threat of climate change in the country 
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a. Very adequate 
b. Moderately adequate  
c. Adequate  
d. Difficult to assess  
e. Not adequate  
11. What do you think would be the impact of any new national and International 
regulation to Climate Change in Nigeria 
a. Would be significant burden on development 
b. Would help reduce the level of pollution and greenhouse gases  
c. Would help diversify the economy from oil dependency  
d. Would make no difference 
e. Unsure 
12. Does the current National regulatory framework make room for any national 
accounting systems vis-a-vis emissions reductions? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Not sure 
13. Which of the technologies do you think would best help to mitigation Climate 
Change in Nigeria 
a. Renewable Energy technologies 
b. Clean Coal technology 
c. Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technology 
d. Nuclear energy technology 
e. Unsure 
f. A mix of all the measures  
g. Retain the Status quo  
14. Does your organisation have a clear and documented position on climate change 
vis-à-vis the current public debate  
a. Yes and it is documented 
b. Yes but not documented 
c. No and not a priority 
d. Unsure 
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15. Does your organisation have an internal Climate Change policy or an 
organisational Environmental Management System 
a. Yes, clearly formulated and publicly available 
b. Yes, clearly formulated but not publicly available 
c. Currently under review 
d. No, but intended to produce in the near future 
e. No, no intention to have one 
f. Unsure 
CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM (CDM) 
16. Do you know about Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) flexible mechanism 
under the Kyoto Protocol? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Unsure 
16a. If yes to Q16, what is your opinion about CDM as a mitigation 
mechanism for Climate Change in Nigeria 
a. Very Positive 
b. Moderately Positive  
c. Ambivalent 
d. Moderately Negative  
e. Very Negative 
f. Unsure 
 
17. Which best describes your level of knowledge of CDM 
a. Very knowledgeable (VK) 
b. Knowledgeable (K) 
c. Knowledgeable but specialised (KS) 
d. Lack Knowledge (LK) 
e. Unsure of Knowledge (UK) 
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18. What do you think the attitude towards CDM is in the country? 
a. Very Positive 
b. Moderately Positive  
c. Ambivalent 
d. Moderately Negative  
e. Very Negative 
f. Unsure 
19. Is there a regulatory framework for CDM in the country? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Not sure 
20. If Yes to Q19, is your organisation running any CDM project in compliance to 
the national framework? 
a. My organisation is not currently into CDM projects 
b. No my organisation does not comply fully with this framework 
c. Yes my organisation comply fully to the framework 
d. Not sure  
20a If yes to Q19, what is your opinion about the current National regulatory 
framework towards CDM 
a. Very adequate 
b. Moderately adequate  
c. Adequate  
d. Difficult to assess 
e. Not adequate 
21. Is your organisation involved in any CDM Project in the country 
a.  Yes 
b. No 
c. Unsure 
21a  If yes to Q21, to what extent do you thing your organisation is involved? 
a. Very Involved 
b. Moderately Involved 
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c. Ambivalent 
d. Not involved 
22. Please select appropriately how you think these risks affect CDM project 
implementation in Nigeria 
RISK    High Risk | Medium Risk | Low Risk | No Risk 
a. Political Risk   --------         --------          -------      ------ 
b. Methodological Risk  --------           --------           -------     ------ 
c. Host Country Approval Risk  --------            --------          -------      ----- 
d. Legal/Contractual Risk  --------            --------          -------      ----- 
e. Regulatory Risk  --------            --------          -------      ----- 
f. Others 
……………………………………………………………………………
…………………… 
g. Difficult to assess 
 
23. Do you think CCS technology should be accepted under CDM framework? 
a. Yes  
b. No 
c. Unsure 
d. Does not matter 
CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE (CCS) 
24. Do you know about Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technologies or projects 
as a Climate Change mitigation strategy? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. unsure 
24a. if yes to Q24, what is your opinion about using CCS in combating 
climate change in Nigeria 
a. Very Important to the mitigation strategy mix 
b. Important but unsure of medium and long term risk implications 
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c. Indifferent in opinion  
d. Not inclined to CCS as a climate change mitigation strategy  
e. Unsure 
25. Is your organisation involved in any CCS Project in the country 
a.  Yes 
b. No 
c. Unsure 
26. Which best describe your level of knowledge of CCS 
a. Very Knowledge (VK) 
b. Knowledgeable (K) 
c. Knowledgeable but specialised (KS) 
d. Lack Knowledge (LK) 
e. Unsure of Knowledge level (UK) 
27. Do you understand the concept of Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR)?  
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Unsure 
28. What level of knowledge of EOR technology do you have in relation to CCS 
a. Very knowledge 
b. Moderately knowledgeable  
c. Knowledgeable  
d. Lack knowledge  
e. Unsure of knowledge level  
29. How does this level of knowledge affect your opinion about CCS 
a. Gives a favourable impression about CCS 
b. Does not influence my opinion 
c. It is a negative to my opinion about CCS 
30. Are you aware or familiar with other CCS projects around the world 
a. Yes 
b. No 
31. If yes to Q30, how does this affect your opinion about CCS 
a. Gives a favourable impression about CCS 
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b. Does not influence my opinion 
c. It is a negative to my opinion about CCS 
32. Which sector of Nigeria do you think will benefit the most from successful CCS 
technology implementation in Nigeria? 
a. Government 
b. Oil and Gas  
c. NGOs 
d. Academia 
e. General populace 
f. Nobody 
g. Unsure 
33. To what extent do you understand the inter relatedness between CDM and CCS  
a. Highly understood 
b. Moderately understood  
c. Understood 
d. Do not understand 
34. Which of the following in your opinion best describes the relationship between 
CDM and CCS (Tick the appropriate option) Also select your level of knowledge 
in the area of choice (VK = Very Knowledgeable; K = Knowledgeable; KL = 
Lack Knowledge; UK =  Unsure) 
 
a. Legal framework   (VK) (K) (LK) (UK) 
b. Economic consideration   (VK) (K) (LK) (UK) 
c. Extent of Technological involvement  (VK) (K) (LK) (UK) 
d. Environmental/Ecological ramification (VK) (K) (LK) (UK) 
e. None of the Above 
35. Based on your level of knowledge, do you think CCS technology will be 
integrated into CDM in a post Kyoto regime? 
a. Very Inter-related so it is highly plausible 
b. Moderately inter-related so it is plausible 
c. Moderately inter-related but not plausible 
d. There is no relation between both 
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e. Not Sure 
RISK PERCEPTION  
36. Which of the risk in your opinion would be most associated with CCS  
a. Regulatory and Legal Risk 
b. Leakage Risk  
c. Economic and Social Risk 
d. Technological Risk 
e. Environmental and Human Risk 
f. Poor Infrastructure 
g. Lack of knowledge about CCS 
37. Which of the following do you think will be the major source of risk if CCS is 
implemented in Nigeria 
a. Leakage from geological storage site 
b. Seismic activity 
c. Injection process at storage site 
d. Accident during transportation of CO2 
e. Others not on the list above 
f. Not Sure 
38. What do you consider will be the biggest risk in relations to CCS technology 
implementation under CDM in Nigeria? (You can tick more than one) 
a. Public Resistance 
b. Lack of adequate legal and regulatory framework 
c. Political uncertainty 
d. Lack of technical expertise 
e. Fear of Environmental and Human impact 
f. Cost of Development and deployment of technology 
39. In your opinion which of the options best describes public risk perception of CCS 
a. High risk should not be allowed  
b. Moderate Risk  
c. Risk  
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d. No Risk  
e. Not sure 
40. Is there any regulatory framework available for the development and or 
deployment of CCS in the country? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Not sure 
41. If yes to Q40, what stage or phase of CCS development  is the regulatory 
framework aimed at 
a. Research 
b. Demonstration  
c. Commercial 
d. Not sure 
42. If yes to Q25 and Q40, do you think that your organisation is compliant with the 
national framework for its CCS project? 
a. Yes my organisation comply fully to the national framework 
b. No my organisation does not comply fully with this framework  
c. My organisation is not currently implementing any CCS projects 
d. Not sure  
43. Do you think there is currently any debate on the role of CCS in the National 
Climate Change mitigation strategy in Nigeria 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Not sure 
44. If yes to Q43, how can you describe the debate in Nigeria 
a. Increasing substantially 
b. Increasing slightly 
c. No progress 
d. Decreasing slightly  
e. Decreasing substantially 
f. Not sure 
45. What do you think would be the public attitude towards projects like CCS 
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a. Very receptive 
b. Moderately receptive 
c. Unsure  
d. Moderately unreceptive 
e. Very unreceptive 
f. Largely ignorant 
46. Do you think the public perception will change? 
a. Yes  
b. No 
c. Not sure 
47. If yes to Q46, what do you think will most facilitate the change 
a. More obvious climate change effects 
b. Government policies and legislation 
c. Socio Economic improvements 
d. Education and awareness campaign 
48. Which form of CCS would be most desirable in your opinion 
a. Onshore geological storage 
b. Offshore geological storage 
c. Ocean Storage 
d. Any form of geological storage (I do not have any preference) 
e. I do not want any CCS project in Nigeria 
f. Not sure 
49. Please class the following into any of this category of risk 1. Very Risky (VR), 2. 
High Risk (HR), 3. Medium Risk (MR), 4. Low Risk (VR), 5. Negligible Risk 
(NR), 6. Unsure (Un); 7. No Information (NI).  
What do you consider the biggest risk of CCS and tick most appropriate level of 
risk? 
a. Ecological Degradation  (VR) (HR) (MR) (LR) (NR) 
    (Un) (NI) 
b. Human Health Impact   (VR) (HR) (MR) (LR) (NR) 
    (Un) (NI) 
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c. Leakage to Atmosphere  (VR) (HR) (MR) (LR) (NR) 
    (Un) (NI) 
d. Water pollution   (VR) (HR) (MR) (LR) (NR) 
    (Un) (NI) 
e. Other forms of pollution (VR) (HR) (MR) (LR) (NR) 
    (Un) (NI) 
50. When do you think CCS will be operational in Nigeria 
a. Within the next 5 years 
b. In 10  to 20 years  
c. In 20 to 50 years 
d. After the technology and operations is well established in the Annex I 
countries 
e. Never 
f. Not sure 
51. Do you think CCS will be integrated into the Kyoto Protocol Flexible Mechanism  
a. Yes. With improved legal regulatory framework 
b. Yes. With current legal regulatory framework 
c. No. There are too many associated risks and uncertainties 
d. No. It is uneconomically viable for CDM investors  
e. Not sure 
52. When do you think it will be possible for CCS to start generating carbon credits 
for investors 
a. During the second commitment period (2013-2016) 
b. Within the next 10 years 
c. Next 20 years 
d. After the technology and operations is well established in the Annex I 
countries 
e. Never 
f. Not sure 
53. How would CCS play out in Nigeria in the next 10 to 20 years 
a. Very Positive due to pressure to mitigate climate change effect   
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b. Positive but depends on the availability of technology and adequate 
policies 
c. Moderately Positive but implementation is outside the suggested time 
frame 
d. It will not take off in Nigeria 
e. Unsure  
f. Difficult to assess 
g. Not adequate 
54. If provided more information on CCS as a mitigation strategy would you 
reconsider your current position 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Not Sure 
55. Which of the following sector best represent your organisation 
a. Governmental 
b. Oil and Gas 
c. Chemical 
d. Manufacturing 
e. Electricity 
f. Media 
g. Academia/Research 
h. NGO 
i. Others 
56. Will you be willing to be further engaged in short discussion on matters arising 
from this questionnaire sent to you giving the opportunity to elaborate on your 
choice answers here? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
Preferred form of contact  
Email: 
Telephone: 
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Appendix 2 - UNFCCC 
Article 4: 
COMMITMENTS  
1. All Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances, 
shall:  
(a) Develop, periodically update, publish and make available to the Conference of the 
Parties, in accordance with Article 12, national inventories of anthropogenic emissions by 
sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal 
Protocol, using comparable methodologies to be agreed upon by the Conference of the 
Parties;  
(b) Formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where appropriate, 
regional programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change by addressing 
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol, and measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to 
climate change;  
(c) Promote and cooperate in the development, application and diffusion, including 
transfer, of technologies, practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol in 
all relevant sectors, including the energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry and 
waste management sectors;  
(d) Promote sustainable management, and promote and cooperate in the conservation and 
enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases not 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol, including biomass, forests and oceans as well as 
other terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems;  
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(e) Cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change; develop and 
elaborate appropriate and integrated plans for coastal zone management, water resources 
and agriculture, and for the protection and rehabilitation of areas, particularly in Africa, 
affected by drought and desertification, as well as floods;  
(f) Take climate change considerations into account, to the extent feasible, in their 
relevant social, economic and environmental policies and actions, and employ appropriate 
methods, for example impact assessments, formulated and determined nationally, with a 
view to minimizing adverse effects on the economy, on public health and on the quality 
of the environment, of projects or measures undertaken by them to mitigate or adapt to 
climate change;  
(g) Promote and cooperate in scientific, technological, technical, socio-economic and 
other research, systematic observation and development of data archives related to the 
climate system and intended to further the understanding and to reduce or eliminate the 
remaining uncertainties regarding the causes, effects, magnitude and timing of climate 
change and the economic and social consequences of various response strategies;  
(h) Promote and cooperate in the full, open and prompt exchange of relevant scientific, 
technological, technical, socio-economic and legal information related to the climate 
system and climate change, and to the economic and social consequences of various 
response strategies;  
(i) Promote and cooperate in education, training and public awareness related to climate 
change and encourage the widest participation in this process, including that of non- 
governmental organizations; and  
(j) Communicate to the Conference of the Parties information related to implementation, 
in accordance with Article 12.  
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Appendix 3 – Kyoto Protocol 
Article 5 
1. Each Party included in Annex 1 shall have in place, no later than one year prior to the 
start of the first commitment period, a national system for the estimation of anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the 
Montreal Protocol. Guidelines for such national systems, which shall incorporate the 
methodologies specified in paragraph 2 below, shall be decided upon by the Conference 
of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol at its first session.  
2. Methodologies for estimating anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by 
sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol shall be those 
accepted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and agreed upon by the 
Conference of the Parties at its third session. Where such methodologies are not used, 
appropriate adjustments shall be applied according to methodologies agreed upon by the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol at its first 
session. Based on the work of, inter alia, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
and advice provided by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall 
regularly review and, as appropriate, revise such methodologies and adjustments, taking 
fully into account any relevant decisions by the Conference of the Parties. Any revision to 
methodologies or adjustments shall be used only for the purposes of ascertaining 
compliance with commitments under Article 3 in respect of any commitment period 
adopted subsequent to that revision.  
3. The global warming potentials used to calculate the carbon dioxide equivalence of 
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases listed in 
Annex A shall be those accepted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and 
agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties at its third session. Based on the work of, 
inter alia, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and advice provided by the 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall regularly review and, as 
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appropriate, revise the global warming potential of each such greenhouse gas, taking fully 
into account any relevant decisions by the Conference of the Parties. Any revision to a 
global warming potential shall apply only to commitments under Article 3 in respect of 
any commitment period adopted subsequent to that revision. 
Article 7 
1. Each Party included in Annex 1 shall incorporate in its annual inventory of 
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol, submitted in accordance with the relevant decisions 
of the Conference of the Parties, the necessary supplementary information for the 
purposes of ensuring compliance with Article 3, to be determined in accordance with 
paragraph 4 below.  
2. Each Party included in Annex 1 shall incorporate in its national communication, 
submitted under Article 12 of the Convention, the supplementary information necessary 
to demonstrate compliance with its commitments under this Protocol, to be determined in 
accordance with paragraph 4 below.  
3. Each Party included in Annex 1 shall submit the information required under paragraph 
1 above annually, beginning with the first inventory due under the Convention for the 
first year of the commitment period after this Protocol has entered into force for that 
Party. Each such Party shall submit the information required under paragraph 2 above as 
part of the first national communication due under the Convention after this Protocol has 
entered into force for it and after the adoption of guidelines as provided for in paragraph 4 
below. The frequency of subsequent submission of information required under this 
Article shall be determined by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Protocol, taking into account any timetable for the submission of national 
communications decided upon by the Conference of the Parties.  
4. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol 
shall adopt at its first session, and review periodically thereafter, guidelines for the 
preparation of the information required under this Article, taking into account guidelines 
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for the preparation of national communications by Parties included in Annex 1 adopted 
by the Conference of the Parties. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of 
the Parties to this Protocol shall also, prior to the first commitment period, decide upon 
modalities for the accounting of assigned amounts.  
Article 8 
1. The information submitted under Article 7 by each Party included in Annex 1 shall be 
reviewed by expert review teams pursuant to the relevant decisions of the Conference of 
the Parties and in accordance with guidelines adopted for this purpose by the Conference 
of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol under paragraph 4 
below. The information submitted under Article 7, paragraph 1, by each Party included in 
Annex 1 shall be reviewed as part of the annual compilation and accounting of emissions 
inventories and assigned amounts. Additionally, the information submitted under Article 
7, paragraph 2, by each Party included in Annex 1 shall be reviewed as part of the review 
of communications.  
2. Expert review teams shall be coordinated by the secretariat and shall be composed of 
experts selected from those nominated by Parties to the Convention and, as appropriate, 
by intergovernmental organizations, in accordance with guidance provided for this 
purpose by the Conference of the Parties.  
3. The review process shall provide a thorough and comprehensive technical assessment 
of all aspects of the implementation by a Party of this Protocol. The expert review teams 
shall prepare a report to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Protocol, assessing the implementation of the commitments of the Party 
and identifying any potential problems in, and factors influencing, the fulfilment of 
commitments. Such reports shall be circulated by the secretariat to all Parties to the 
Convention. The secretariat shall list those questions of implementation indicated in such 
reports for further consideration by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting 
of the Parties to this Protocol.  
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4. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol 
shall adopt at its first session, and review periodically thereafter, guidelines for the review 
of implementation of this Protocol by expert review teams taking into account the 
relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties.  
5. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol 
shall, with the assistance of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and, as appropriate, 
the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, consider:  
(a) The information submitted by Parties under Article 7 and the reports of the expert 
reviews thereon conducted under this Article; and  
(b) Those questions of implementation listed by the secretariat under paragraph 3 above, 
as well as any questions raised by Parties.  
6. Pursuant to its consideration of the information referred to in paragraph 5 above, the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall take 
decisions on any matter required for the implementation of this Protocol.  
Article 12: 
Communication Of Information Related To Implementation 
1. In accordance with Article 4, paragraph 1, each Party shall communicate to the 
Conference of the Parties, through the secretariat, the following elements of information:  
(a) A national inventory of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of 
all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, to the extent its capacities 
permit, using comparable methodologies to be promoted and agreed upon by the 
Conference of the Parties;  
(b) A general description of steps taken or envisaged by the Party to implement the 
Convention; and  
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(c) Any other information that the Party considers relevant to the achievement of the 
objective of the Convention and suitable for inclusion in its communication, including, if 
feasible, material relevant for calculations of global emission trends.  
2. Each developed country Party and each other Party included in Annex 1 shall 
incorporate in its communication the following elements of information:  
(a) A detailed description of the policies and measures that it has adopted to implement its 
commitment under Article 4, paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b); and  
(b) A specific estimate of the effects that the policies and measures referred to in 
subparagraph (a) immediately above will have on anthropogenic emissions by its sources 
and removals by its sinks of greenhouse gases during the period referred to in Article 4, 
paragraph 2(a).  
3. In addition, each developed country Party and each other developed Party included in 
Annex II shall incorporate details of measures taken in accordance with Article 4, 
paragraphs 3, 4 and 5.  
4. Developing country Parties may, on a voluntary basis, propose projects for financing, 
including specific technologies, materials, equipment, techniques or practices that would 
be needed to implement such projects, along with, if possible, an estimate of all 
incremental costs, of the reductions of emissions and increments of removals of 
greenhouse gases, as well as an estimate of the consequent benefits.  
5. Each developed country Party and each other Party included in Annex 1 shall make its 
initial communication within six months of the entry into force of the Convention for that 
Party. Each Party not so listed shall make its initial communication within three years of 
the entry into force of the Convention for that Party, or of the availability of financial 
resources in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 3. Parties that are least developed 
countries may make their initial communication at their discretion. The frequency of 
subsequent communications by all Parties shall be determined by the Conference of the 
Parties, taking into account the differentiated timetable set by this paragraph.  
389 
 
6. Information communicated by Parties under this Article shall be transmitted by the 
secretariat as soon as possible to the Conference of the Parties and to any subsidiary 
bodies concerned. If necessary, the procedures for the communication of information may 
be further considered by the Conference of the Parties.  
7. From its first session, the Conference of the Parties shall arrange for the provision to 
developing country Parties of technical and financial support, on request, in compiling 
and communicating information under this Article, as well as in identifying the technical 
and financial needs associated with proposed projects and response measures under 
Article 4. Such support may be provided by other Parties, by competent international 
organizations and by the secretariat, as appropriate.  
8. Any group of Parties may, subject to guidelines adopted by the Conference of the 
Parties, and to prior notification to the Conference of the Parties, make a joint 
communication in fulfilment of their obligations under this Article, provided that such a 
communication includes information on the fulfilment by each of these Parties of its 
individual obligations under the Convention.  
9. Information received by the secretariat that is designated by a Party as confidential, in 
accordance with criteria to be established by the Conference of the Parties, shall be 
aggregated by the secretariat to protect its confidentiality before being made available to 
any of the bodies involved in the communication and review of information.  
10. Subject to paragraph 9 above, and without prejudice to the ability of any Party to 
make public its communication at any time, the secretariat shall make communications by 
Parties under this Article publicly available at the time they are submitted to the 
Conference of the Parties. 
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Appendix4 - UNCLOS 
PART I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Article 1 
Use of terms and scope 
1. For the purposes of this Convention: 
(1) "Area" means the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction; 
(2) "Authority" means the International Seabed Authority; 
(3) "activities in the Area" means all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of, the 
resources of the Area; 
(4) "pollution of the marine environment" means the introduction by man, directly or 
indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environment, including estuaries, 
which results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources 
and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing 
and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and 
reduction of amenities; 
(5)  (a) "dumping" means: 
(i) any deliberate disposal of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, 
platforms or  other man-made structures at sea; 
(ii) any deliberate disposal of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-
made structures at sea; 
(b) "dumping" does not include: 
(i) the disposal of wastes or other matter incidental to, or derived from 
the normal operations of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures 
at sea and their equipment, other than wastes or other matter transported by or to 
vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea, operating for the 
purpose of disposal of such matter or derived from the treatment of such wastes 
or other matter on such vessels, aircraft, platforms or structures; 
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(ii) placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal 
thereof, provided that such placement is not contrary to the aims of this 
Convention. 
Article 3 
Breadth of the territorial sea 
Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not 
exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this 
Convention. 
Article 4 
Outer limit of the territorial sea 
The outer limit of the territorial sea is the line every point of which is at a distance from 
the nearest point of the baseline equal to the breadth of the territorial sea. 
Article 5 
Normal baseline 
Except where otherwise provided in this Convention, the normal baseline for measuring 
the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-
scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State. 
Article 6 
Reefs 
In the case of islands situated on atolls or of islands having fringing reefs, the baseline for 
measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the seaward low-water line of the reef, as 
shown by the appropriate symbol on charts officially recognized by the coastal State. 
Article 7 
Straight baselines 
1. In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of 
islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining 
appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of 
the territorial sea is measured. 
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2. Where because of the presence of a delta and other natural conditions the coastline is 
highly unstable, the appropriate points may be selected along the furthest seaward extent 
of the low-water line and, notwithstanding subsequent regression of the low-water line, 
the straight baselines shall remain effective until changed by the coastal State in 
accordance with this Convention. 
3. The drawing of straight baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the 
general direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently 
closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters. 
4. Straight baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, unless 
lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently above sea level have been built 
on them or except in instances where the drawing of baselines to and from such 
elevations has received general international recognition. 
5. Where the method of straight baselines is applicable under paragraph 1, account may 
be taken, in determining particular baselines, of economic interests peculiar to the region 
concerned, the reality and the importance of which are clearly evidenced by long usage. 
6. The system of straight baselines may not be applied by a State in such a manner as to 
cut off the territorial sea of another State from the high seas or an exclusive economic 
zone. 
Article 8 
Internal waters 
1. Except as provided in Part IV, waters on the landward side of the baseline of the 
territorial sea form part of the internal waters of the State. 
2. Where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with the method set forth 
in article 7 has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not previously 
been considered as such, a right of innocent passage as provided in this Convention shall 
exist in those waters. 
Article 9 
Mouths of rivers 
If a river flows directly into the sea, the baseline shall be a straight line across the mouth 
of the river between points on the low-water line of its banks. 
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Article 10 
Bays 
1. This article relates only to bays the coasts of which belong to a single State. 
2. For the purposes of this Convention, a bay is a well-marked indentation whose 
penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to contain land-locked 
waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast. An indentation shall not, 
however, be regarded as a bay unless 
its area is as large as, or larger than, that of the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn 
across the mouth of that indentation. 
3. For the purpose of measurement, the area of an indentation is that lying between the 
low-water mark around the shore of the indentation and a line joining the low-water mark 
of its natural entrance points. Where, because of the presence of islands, an indentation 
has more than one mouth, the semi-circle shall be drawn on a line as long as the sum total 
of the lengths of the lines across the different mouths. Islands within an indentation shall 
be included as if they were part of the water area of the indentation. 
4. If the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points of a bay 
does not exceed 24 nautical miles, a closing line may be drawn between these two low-
water marks, and the waters enclosed thereby shall be considered as internal waters. 
5. Where the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points of a 
bay exceeds 24 nautical miles, a straight baseline of 24 nautical miles shall be drawn 
within the bay in such a manner as to enclose the maximum area of water that is possible 
with a line of that length. 
6. The foregoing provisions do not apply to so-called "historic" bays, or in any case 
where the system of straight baselines provided for in article 7 is applied. 
 
 
Article 11 
Ports 
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For the purpose of delimiting the territorial sea, the outermost permanent harbour works 
which form an integral part of the harbour system are regarded as forming part of the 
coast. Off-shore installations and artificial islands shall not be considered as permanent 
harbour works. 
Article 12 
Roadsteads 
Roadsteads which are normally used for the loading, unloading and anchoring of ships, 
and which would otherwise be situated wholly or partly outside the outer limit of the 
territorial sea, are included in the territorial sea. 
Article 13 
Low-tide elevations 
1. A low-tide elevation is a naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by and 
above water at low tide but submerged at high tide. Where a low-tide elevation is situated 
wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the 
mainland or an island, the low-water line on that elevation may be used as the baseline for 
measuring the breadth 
of the territorial sea. 
2. Where a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a distance exceeding the breadth of the 
territorial sea from the mainland or an island, it has no territorial sea of its own. 
Article 14 
Combination of methods for determining baselines 
The coastal State may determine baselines in turn by any of the methods provided for in 
the foregoing articles to suit different conditions. 
Article 15 
Delimitation of the territorial sea between States with opposite or adjacent coasts 
Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two 
States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial 
sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on 
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the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is 
measured. The above provision does not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason 
of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two 
States in a way which is at variance therewith. 
Article 16 
Charts and Lists of Geographical Coordinates 
1. The baselines for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea determined in accordance 
with articles 7, 9 and 10, or the limits derived there from, and the lines of delimitation 
drawn in accordance with articles 12 and 15 shall be shown on charts of a scale or scales 
adequate for ascertaining their position. Alternatively, a list of geographical coordinates 
of points, specifying the geodetic datum, may be substituted. 
2. The coastal State shall give due publicity to such charts or lists of geographical 
coordinates and shall deposit a copy of each such chart or list with the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations. 
 
PART EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE 
Article 55 
Specific legal regime of the exclusive economic zone 
The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject 
to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction 
of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the 
relevant provisions of this Convention. 
Article 56 
Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the exclusive economic zone 
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has: 
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing 
the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed 
and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic 
exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, 
currents and winds; 
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(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with 
regard to: 
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and 
structures; 
(ii) marine scientific research; 
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment; 
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention. 
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the exclusive 
economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other 
States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention. 
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the seabed and subsoil shall be 
exercised in accordance with Part VI. 
Article 57 
Breadth of the exclusive economic zone 
The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
Article 58 
Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone 
1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, 
subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 
of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and 
other internationally lawful 
uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of 
ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other 
provisions of this Convention. 
2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive 
economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part. 
3. In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention in the 
exclusive economic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the 
coastal State and shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State 
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in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law 
in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part. 
Article 59 
Basis for the resolution of conflicts regarding the attribution of rights and jurisdiction in 
the exclusive economic zone 
In cases where this Convention does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to the coastal State 
or to other States within the exclusive economic zone, and a conflict arises between the 
interests of the coastal State and any other State or States, the conflict should be resolved 
on the basis of equity and in the light of all the relevant circumstances, taking into 
account the respective importance of the interests involved to the parties as well as to the 
international community as a whole. 
Article 60 
Artificial islands, installations and structures in the exclusive economic zone 
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have the exclusive right to 
construct and to authorize and regulate the construction, operation and use of: 
(a) artificial islands; 
(b) installations and structures for the purposes provided for in article 56 and 
other economic purposes; 
(c) installations and structures which may interfere with the exercise of the rights 
of the coastal State in the zone. 
2. The coastal State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such artificial islands, 
installations and structures, including jurisdiction with regard to customs, fiscal, health, 
safety and immigration laws and regulations. 
3. Due notice must be given of the construction of such artificial islands, installations or 
structures, and permanent means for giving warning of their presence must be 
maintained. Any installations or structures which are abandoned or disused shall be 
removed to ensure safety of navigation, taking into account any generally accepted 
international standards established in this regard by the competent international 
organization. Such removal shall also have due regard to fishing, the protection of the 
marine environment and the rights and duties of other States. Appropriate publicity shall 
398 
 
be given to the depth, position and dimensions of any installations or structures not 
entirely removed. 
4. The coastal State may, where necessary, establish reasonable safety zones around such 
artificial islands, installations and structures in which it may take appropriate measures to 
ensure the safety both of navigation and of the artificial islands, installations and 
structures. 
5. The breadth of the safety zones shall be determined by the coastal State, taking into 
account applicable international standards. Such zones shall be designed to ensure that 
they are reasonably related to the nature and function of the artificial islands, installations 
or structures, and shall not exceed a distance of 500 metres around them, measured from 
each point of their outer edge, except as authorized by generally accepted international 
standards or as recommended by the competent international organization. 
Due notice shall be given of the extent of safety zones. 
6. All ships must respect these safety zones and shall comply with generally accepted 
international standards regarding navigation in the vicinity of artificial islands, 
installations, structures and safety zones. 
7. Artificial islands, installations and structures and the safety zones around them may not 
be established where interference may be caused to the use of recognized sea lanes 
essential to international navigation. 
8. Artificial islands, installations and structures do not possess the status of islands. They 
have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the delimitation of 
the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf. 
Article 61 
Conservation of the living resources 
1. The coastal State shall determine the allowable catch of the living resources in its 
exclusive economic zone. 
2. The coastal State, taking into account the best scientific evidence available to it, shall 
ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the maintenance of 
the living resources in the exclusive economic zone is not endangered by over-
exploitation. As appropriate, the coastal State and competent international organizations, 
whether subregional, regional or global, shall cooperate to this end. 
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3. Such measures shall also be designed to maintain or restore populations of harvested 
species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by 
relevant environmental and economic factors, including the economic needs of coastal 
fishing communities and the special requirements of developing States, and taking into 
account fishing patterns, the interdependence of stocks and any generally recommended 
international minimum standards, whether subregional, regional or global. 
4. In taking such measures the coastal State shall take into consideration the effects on 
species associated with or dependent upon harvested species with a view to maintaining 
or restoring populations of such associated or dependent species above levels at which 
their reproduction maybecome seriously threatened. 
5. Available scientific information, catch and fishing effort statistics, and other data 
relevant to the conservation of fish stocks shall be contributed and exchanged on a regular 
basis through competent international organizations, whether subregional, regional or 
global, where appropriate and with participation by all States concerned, including States 
whose nationals are allowed to fish in the exclusive economic zone. 
Article 62 
Utilization of the living resources 
1. The coastal State shall promote the objective of optimum utilization of the living 
resources in the exclusive economic zone without prejudice to article 61. 
2. The coastal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the living resources of the 
exclusive economic zone. Where the coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest 
the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other arrangements and 
pursuant to the terms, conditions, laws and regulations referred to in paragraph 4, give 
other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch, having particular regard to the 
provisions of articles 69 and 70, especially in relation to the developing States mentioned 
therein. 
3. In giving access to other States to its exclusive economic zone under this article, the 
coastal State shall take into account all relevant factors, including, inter alia, the 
significance of the living resources of the area to the economy of the coastal State 
concerned and its other national interests, the provisions of articles 69 and 70, the 
requirements of developing States in the subregion or region in harvesting part of the 
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surplus and the need to minimize economic dislocation in States whose nationals have 
habitually fished in the zone or which have made substantial efforts in research and 
identification of stocks. 
4. Nationals of other States fishing in the exclusive economic zone shall comply with the 
conservation measures and with the other terms and conditions established in the laws 
and regulations of the coastal State. These laws and regulations shall be consistent with 
this Convention and may relate, inter alia, to the following: 
(a) licensing of fishermen, fishing vessels and equipment, including payment of 
fees and other forms of remuneration, which, in the case of developing coastal States, 
may consist of adequate compensation in the field of financing, equipment and 
technology relating to the fishing industry; 
(b) determining the species which may be caught, and fixing quotas of catch, whether in 
relation to particular stocks or groups of stocks or catch per vessel over a period of time 
or to the catch by nationals of any State during a specified period; 
(c) regulating seasons and areas of fishing, the types, sizes and amount of gear, and the 
types, sizes and number of fishing vessels that may be used; 
(d) fixing the age and size of fish and other species that may be caught; 
(e) specifying information required of fishing vessels, including catch and effort statistics 
and vessel position reports; 
(f) requiring, under the authorization and control of the coastal State, the conduct of 
specified fisheries research programmes and regulating the conduct of such research, 
including the sampling of catches, disposition of samples and reporting of associated 
scientific data; 
(g) the placing of observers or trainees on board such vessels by the coastal State; 
(h) the landing of all or any part of the catch by such vessels in the ports of the coastal 
State; 
(i) terms and conditions relating to joint ventures or other cooperative arrangements; 
(j) requirements for the training of personnel and the transfer of fisheries technology, 
including enhancement of the coastal State's capability of undertaking fisheries research; 
(k) enforcement procedures. 
5. Coastal States shall give due notice of conservation and management laws and 
regulations. 
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Article 63 
Stocks occurring within the exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States or 
both within the exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to it 
1. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur within the exclusive 
economic zones of two or more coastal States, these States shall seek, either directly or 
through appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to agree upon the measures 
necessary to coordinate and ensure the conservation and development of such stocks 
without prejudice to the other provisions of this Part. 
2. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur both within the exclusive 
economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone, the coastal State and the 
States fishing for such stocks in the adjacent area shall seek, either directly or through 
appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to agree upon the measures necessary 
for the conservation of these stocks in the adjacent area. 
Article 64 
Highly migratory species 
1. The coastal State and other States whose nationals fish in the region for the highly 
migratory species listed in Annex 1 shall cooperate directly or through appropriate 
international organizations with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the 
objective of optimum utilization of such species throughout the region, both within and 
beyond the exclusive economic zone. In regions for which no appropriate international 
organization exists, the coastal State and other States whose nationals harvest these 
species in the region shall cooperate to establish such an organization and participate in 
its work. 
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 apply in addition to the other provisions of this Part. 
Article 65 
Marine mammals 
Nothing in this Part restricts the right of a coastal State or the competence of an 
international organization, as appropriate, to prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation of 
marine mammals more strictly than provided for in this Part. States shall cooperate with a 
view to the conservation of marine mammals and in the case of cetaceans shall in 
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particular work through the appropriate international organizations for their conservation, 
management and study. 
Article 66 
Anadromous stocks 
1. States in whose rivers anadromous stocks originate shall have the primary interest in 
and responsibility for such stocks.  
2. The State of origin of anadromous stocks shall ensure their conservation by the 
establishment of appropriate regulatory measures for fishing in all waters landward of the 
outer limits of its exclusive economic zone and for fishing provided for in paragraph 3(b). 
The State of origin may, after consultations with the other States referred to in paragraphs 
3 and 4 fishing these stocks, establish total allowable catches for stocks originating in its 
rivers. 
3.  (a) Fisheries for anadromous stocks shall be conducted only in waters landward 
of the outer limits of exclusive economic zones, except in cases where this provision 
would result in economic dislocation for a State other than the State of origin. 
With respect to such fishing beyond the outer limits of the exclusive economic zone, 
States concerned shall maintain consultations with a view to achieving agreement on 
terms and conditions of such fishing giving due regard to the conservation requirements 
and the needs of the State of origin in respect of these stocks. 
(b) The State of origin shall cooperate in minimizing economic dislocation in 
such other States fishing these stocks, taking into account the normal catch and the mode 
of operations of such States, and all the areas in which such fishing has occurred. 
(c) States referred to in subparagraph (b), participating by agreement with the 
State of origin in measures to renew anadromous stocks, particularly by expenditures for 
that purpose, shall be given special consideration by the State of origin in the harvesting 
of stocks originating in its rivers. 
(d) Enforcement of regulations regarding anadromous stocks beyond the 
exclusive economic zone shall be by agreement between the State of origin and the other 
States concerned. 
4. In cases where anadromous stocks migrate into or through the waters landward of the 
outer limits of the exclusive economic zone of a State other than the State of origin, such 
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State shall cooperate with the State of origin with regard to the conservation and 
management of such stocks. 
5. The State of origin of anadromous stocks and other States fishing these stocks shall 
make arrangements for the implementation of the provisions of this article, where 
appropriate, through regional organizations. 
Article 67 
Catadromous species 
1. A coastal State in whose waters catadromous species spend the greater part of their life 
cycle shall have responsibility for the management of these species and shall ensure the 
ingress and egress of migrating fish. 
2. The harvesting of catadromous species shall be conducted only in waters landward of 
the outer limits of exclusive economic zones. When conducted in exclusive economic 
zones, harvesting shall be subject to this article and the other provisions of this 
Convention concerning fishing in these zones. 
3. In cases where catadromous fish migrate through the exclusive economic zone of 
another State, whether as juvenile or maturing fish, the management, including 
harvesting, of such fish shall be regulated by agreement between the State mentioned in 
paragraph 1 and the other State concerned. Such agreement shall ensure the rational 
management of the species and take into account the responsibilities of the State 
mentioned in paragraph 1 for the maintenance of these species. 
Article 68 
Sedentary species 
This Part does not apply to sedentary species as defined in article 77, paragraph 4. 
Article 69 
Right of land-locked States 
1. Land-locked States shall have the right to participate, on an equitable basis, in the 
exploitation of an appropriate part of the surplus of the living resources of the exclusive 
economic zones of coastal States of the same subregion or region, taking into account the 
relevant economic andgeographical circumstances of all the States concerned and in 
conformity with the provisions of this article and of articles 61 and 62. 
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2. The terms and modalities of such participation shall be established by the States 
concerned through bilateral, subregional or regional agreements taking into account, inter 
alia: 
(a) the need to avoid effects detrimental to fishing communities or fishing 
industries of the coastal State; 
(b) the extent to which the land-locked State, in accordance with the provisions of 
this article, is participating or is entitled to participate under existing bilateral, subregional 
or regional 
agreements in the exploitation of living resources of the exclusive economic zones of 
other coastal States; 
(c) the extent to which other land-locked States and geographically disadvantaged 
States are participating in the exploitation of the living resources of the exclusive 
economic zone of the coastal State and the consequent need to avoid a particular burden 
for any single coastal State or a part of it; 
(d) the nutritional needs of the populations of the respective States. 
3. When the harvesting capacity of a coastal State approaches a pointwhich would enable 
it to harvest the entire allowable catch of the living resources in its exclusive economic 
zone, the coastal State and other States concerned shall cooperate in the establishment of 
equitable arrangements on a bilateral, subregional or regional basis to allow for 
participation of developing land-locked States of the same subregion or region in the 
exploitation of the living resources of the exclusive economic zones of coastal States of 
the subregion or region, as may be appropriate in the circumstances and on terms 
satisfactory to all parties. In the implementation of this provision the factors mentioned in 
paragraph 2 shall also be taken into account. 
4. Developed land-locked States shall, under the provisions of this article, be entitled to 
participate in the exploitation of living resources only in the exclusive economic zones of 
developed coastal States of the same subregion or region having regard to the extent to 
which the coastal State, in giving access to other States to the living resources of its 
exclusive economiczone, has taken into account the need to minimize detrimental effects 
on fishing communities and economic dislocation in States whose nationals have 
habitually fished in the zone. 
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5. The above provisions are without prejudice to arrangements agreed upon in subregions 
or regions where the coastal States may grant to land-locked States of the same subregion 
or region equal or preferential rights for the exploitation of the living resources in the 
exclusive economic zones. 
Article 70 
Right of geographically disadvantaged States 
1. Geographically disadvantaged States shall have the right to participate, on an equitable 
basis, in the exploitation of an appropriate part of the surplus of the living resources of the 
exclusive economic zones of coastal States of the same subregion or region, taking into 
account the relevanteconomic and geographical circumstances of all the States concerned 
and in conformity with the provisions of this article and of articles 61 and 62. 
2. For the purposes of this Part, "geographically disadvantaged States" means coastal 
States, including States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, whose geographical 
situation makes them dependent upon the exploitation of the living resources of the 
exclusive economic zones of other States in the subregion or region for adequate supplies 
of fish for the nutritional purposes of their populations or parts thereof, and coastal States 
which can claim no exclusive economic zones of their own. 
3. The terms and modalities of such participation shall be established by the States 
concerned through bilateral, subregional or regional agreements taking into account, inter 
alia: 
(a) the need to avoid effects detrimental to fishing communities or fishing 
industries of the coastal State; 
(b) the extent to which the geographically disadvantaged State, in accordance 
with the provisions of this article, is participating or is entitled to participate under 
existing bilateral, subregional or regional agreements in the exploitation of living 
resources of the exclusive economic zones of other coastal States; 
(c) the extent to which other geographically disadvantaged States and land-locked 
States are participating in the exploitation of the living resources of the exclusive 
economic zone of the coastal State and the consequent need to avoid a particular burden 
for any single coastal State or a part of it; 
(d) the nutritional needs of the populations of the respective States. 
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4. When the harvesting capacity of a coastal State approaches a point which would enable 
it to harvest the entire allowable catch of the living resources in its exclusive economic 
zone, the coastal State and other States concerned shall cooperate in the establishment of 
equitable arrangements on a bilateral, subregional or regional basis to allow for 
participation of developing geographically disadvantaged States of the same subregion or 
region in the exploitation of the living resources of the exclusive economic zones of 
coastal States of the subregion or region, as may be appropriate in the circumstances and 
on terms satisfactory to all parties. In the implementation of this provision the factors 
mentioned in paragraph 3 shall also be taken into account. 
5. Developed geographically disadvantaged States shall, under the provisions of this 
article, be entitled to participate in the exploitation of living resources only in the 
exclusive economic zones of developed coastal States of the same subregion or region 
having regard to the extent to which the coastal State, in giving access to other States to 
the living resources of its exclusive economic zone, has taken into account the need to 
minimize detrimental effects on fishing communities and economic dislocation in States 
whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone. 
6. The above provisions are without prejudice to arrangements agreed upon in subregions 
or regions where the coastal States may grant to geographically disadvantaged States of 
the same subregion or region equal or preferential rights for the exploitation of the living 
resources in the exclusive economic zones. 
Article 71 
Non-applicability of articles 69 and 70 
The provisions of articles 69 and 70 do not apply in the case of a coastal State whose 
economy is overwhelmingly dependent on the exploitation of the living resources of its 
exclusive economic zone. 
Article 72 
Restrictions on transfer of rights 
1. Rights provided under articles 69 and 70 to exploit living resources shall not be 
directly or indirectly transferred to third States or their nationals by lease or licence, by 
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establishing joint ventures or in any other manner which has the effect of such transfer 
unless otherwise agreed by the States concerned. 
2. The foregoing provision does not preclude the States concerned from obtaining 
technical or financial assistance from third States or international organizations in order 
to facilitate the exercise of the rights pursuant to articles 69 and 70, provided that it does 
not have the effect referred to in paragraph 1. 
Article 73 
Enforcement of laws and regulations of the coastal State 
1. The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, exploit, 
conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic zone, take such 
measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be 
necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity 
with this Convention. 
2. Arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released upon the posting of 
reasonable bond or other security. 
3. Coastal State penalties for violations of fisheries laws and regulations in the exclusive 
economic zone may not include imprisonment, in the absence of agreements to the 
contrary by the States concerned, or any other form of corporal punishment. 
4. In cases of arrest or detention of foreign vessels the coastal State shall promptly notify 
the flag State, through appropriate channels, of the action taken and of any penalties 
subsequently imposed. 
Article 74 
Delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with opposite or adjacent 
coasts 
1. The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with opposite or 
adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as 
referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to 
achieve an equitable solution. 
2. If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, the States 
concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in Part XV. 
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3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned, in a spirit of 
understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional 
arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or 
hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without prejudice 
to the final delimitation. 
4. Where there is an agreement in force between the States concerned, questions relating 
to the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone shall be determined in accordance with 
the provisions of that agreement. 
Article 75 
Charts and lists of geographical coordinates 
1. Subject to this Part, the outer limit lines of the exclusive economic zone and the lines 
of delimitation drawn in accordance with article 74 shall be shown on charts of a scale or 
scales adequate for ascertaining their position. Where appropriate, lists of geographical 
coordinates of points, specifying the geodetic datum, may be substituted for such outer 
limit linesor lines of delimitation. 
2. The coastal State shall give due publicity to such charts or lists of geographical 
coordinates and shall deposit a copy of each such chart or list with the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations. 
PART VI 
Article 76 
Definition of the continental shelf 
1. The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation 
of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured 
where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance. 
2. The continental shelf of a coastal State shall not extend beyond the limits provided for 
in paragraphs 4 to 6. 
409 
 
3. The continental margin comprises the submerged prolongation of the land mass of the 
coastal State, and consists of the seabed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope and the rise. It 
does not include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or the subsoil thereof. 
4.  (a) For the purposes of this Convention, the coastal State shall establish the outer 
edge of the continental margin wherever the margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles 
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, by either: 
(i) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to the outermost 
fixed points at each of which the thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least 1 per cent of 
the shortest distance from such point to the foot of the continental slope; or  
(ii) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to fixed points 
not more than 60 nautical miles from the foot of the continental slope. 
(b) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the foot of the continental slope 
shall be determined as the point of maximum change in the gradient at its base. 
5. The fixed points comprising the line of the outer limits of the continental shelf on the 
seabed, drawn in accordance with paragraph 4 (a)(i) and (ii), either shall not exceed 350 
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured 
or shall not exceed 
100 nautical miles from the 2,500 metre isobath, which is a line connecting the depth of 
2,500 metres. 
6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5, on submarine ridges, the outer limit of 
the continental shelf shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines from which 
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
This paragraph does not apply to submarine elevations that are natural components of the 
continental margin, such as its plateaux, rises, caps, banks and spurs. 
7. The coastal State shall delineate the outer limits of its continental shelf, where that 
shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured, by straight lines not exceeding 60 nautical miles in length, 
connecting fixed points, defined by coordinates of latitude and longitude. 
8. Information on the limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured shall be submitted by 
the coastal State to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf set up under 
Annex 1I on the basis of equitable geographical representation. The Commission shall 
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make recommendations to coastal States on matters related to the establishment of the 
outer limits of their continental shelf. The limits of the shelf established by a coastal State 
on the basis of these recommendations shall be final and binding. 
9. The coastal State shall deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations charts 
and relevant information, including geodetic data, permanently describing the outer limits 
of its continental shelf. The Secretary-General shall give due publicity thereto. 
10. The provisions of this article are without prejudice to the question of delimitation of 
the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts. 
Article 77 
Rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf 
1. The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose 
of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. 
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State 
does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may 
undertake these activities without the express consent of the coastal State. 
3. The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, 
effective or notional, or on any express proclamation. 
4. The natural resources referred to in this Part consist of the mineral and other non-living 
resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary 
species, that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on 
or under the seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the 
seabed or the subsoil. 
Article 78 
Legal status of the superjacent waters and air space and the rights and freedoms of other 
States 
1. The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not affect the legal status of 
the superjacent waters or of the air space above those waters. 
2. The exercise of the rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf must not 
infringe or result in any unjustifiable interference with navigation and other rights and 
freedoms of other States as provided for in this Convention. 
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Article 79 
Submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf 
1. All States are entitled to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf, in 
accordance with the provisions of this article. 
2. Subject to its right to take reasonable measures for the exploration of the continental 
shelf, the exploitation of its natural resources and the prevention, reduction and control of 
pollution from pipelines, the coastal State may not impede the laying or maintenance of 
such cables or pipelines. 
3. The delineation of the course for the laying of such pipelines on the continental shelf is 
subject to the consent of the coastal State. 
4. Nothing in this Part affects the right of the coastal State to establish conditions for 
cables or pipelines entering its territory or territorial sea, or its jurisdiction over cables 
and pipelines constructed or used in connection with the exploration of its continental 
shelf or exploitation of its resources or the operations of artificial islands, installations 
and structures under itsjurisdiction. 
5. When laying submarine cables or pipelines, States shall have due regard to cables or 
pipelines already in position. In particular, possibilities of repairing existing cables or 
pipelines shall not be prejudiced. 
Article 80 
Artificial islands, installations and structures on the continental shelf Article 60 applies 
mutatis mutandis to artificial islands, installations and structures on the continental shelf. 
Article 81 
Drilling on the continental shelf 
The coastal State shall have the exclusive right to authorize and regulate drilling on the 
continental shelf for all purposes. 
Article 82 
Payments and contributions with respect to the exploitation of the continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles 
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1. The coastal State shall make payments or contributions in kind in respect of the 
exploitation of the non-living resources of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles 
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
2. The payments and contributions shall be made annually with respect to all production 
at a site after the first five years of production at that site. For the sixth year, the rate of 
payment or contribution shall be 1 per cent of the value or volume of production at the 
site. The rate shall increase by 1 per cent for each subsequent year until the twelfth year 
and shall remain at 7 per cent thereafter. Production does not include resources used in 
connection with exploitation. 
3. A developing State which is a net importer of a mineral resource produced from its 
continental shelf is exempt from making such payments or contributions in respect of that 
mineral resource. 
4. The payments or contributions shall be made through the Authority, which shall 
distribute them to States Parties to this Convention, on the basis of equitable sharing 
criteria, taking into account the interests and needs of developing States, particularly the 
least developed and the land-locked among them. 
Article 83 
Delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts 
1. The delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent 
coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an 
equitable solution. 
2. If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, the States 
concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in Part XV. 
3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned, in a spirit of 
understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional 
arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or 
hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be without prejudice 
to the final delimitation. 
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4. Where there is an agreement in force between the States concerned, questions relating 
to the delimitation of the continental shelf shall be determined in accordance with the 
provisions of that agreement. 
Article 84 
Charts and lists of geographical coordinates 
1. Subject to this Part, the outer limit lines of the continental shelf and the lines of 
delimitation drawn in accordance with article 83 shall be shown on charts of a scale or 
scales adequate for ascertaining their position. Where appropriate, lists of geographical 
coordinates of points, specifying the geodetic datum, may be substituted for such outer 
limit lines or lines of delimitation. 
2. The coastal State shall give due publicity to such charts or lists of geographical 
coordinates and shall deposit a copy of each such chart or list with the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations and, in the case of those showing the outer limit lines of the 
continental shelf, with the Secretary-General of the Authority. 
Article 85 
Tunnelling 
This Part does not prejudice the right of the coastal State to exploit the subsoil by means 
of tunnelling, irrespective of the depth of water above the subsoil. 
 
SECTION 2 - PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE AREA 
Article 136 
Common heritage of mankind 
The Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind. 
Article 140 
Benefit of mankind 
1. Activities in the Area shall, as specifically provided for in this Part, be carried out for 
the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical location of States, 
whether coastal or land-locked, and taking into particular consideration the interests and 
needs of developing States and 
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of peoples who have not attained full independence or other self-governing status 
recognized by the United Nations in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 
(XV) and other relevant General Assembly resolutions. 
2. The Authority shall provide for the equitable sharing of financial and other economic 
benefits derived from activities in the Area through any appropriate mechanism, on a 
non-discriminatory basis, in accordance with article 160, paragraph 2(f)(i). 
 
SECTION 4 -THE AUTHORITY SUBSECTION A. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article 156 
Establishment of the Authority 
1. There is hereby established the International Seabed Authority, which shall function in 
accordance with this Part. 
2. All States Parties are ipso facto members of the Authority. 
3. Observers at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea who have 
signed the Final Act and who are not referred to in article 305, paragraph 1(c), (d), (e) or 
(f), shall have the right to participate in the Authority as observers, in accordance with its 
rules, regulations and procedures. 
4. The seat of the Authority shall be in Jamaica. 
5. The Authority may establish such regional centres or offices as it deems necessary for 
the exercise of its functions. 
Article 157 
Nature and fundamental principles of the Authority 
1. The Authority is the organization through which States Parties shall, in accordance 
with this Part, organize and control activities in the Area, particularly with a view to 
administering the resources of the Area. 
2. The powers and functions of the Authority shall be those expressly conferred upon it 
by this Convention. The Authority shall have such incidental powers, consistent with this 
Convention, as are implicit in and necessary for the exercise of those powers and 
functions with respect to activities in the Area. 
3. The Authority is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members. 
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4. All members of the Authority shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them 
in accordance with this Part in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits 
resulting from membership. 
PART XII 
PROTECTION AND PRESERVATION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 
 
SECTION 1 - GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article 192 
General obligation 
States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment. 
 
Article 195 
Duty not to transfer damage or hazards or transform one type of pollution into another 
In taking measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment, 
States shall act so as not to transfer, directly or indirectly, damage or hazards from one 
area to another or transform one type of pollution into another. 
 
SECTION 5 -INTERNATIONAL RULES AND NATIONAL LEGISLATION TO 
PREVENT, REDUCE AND CONTROL POLLUTION OF THE MARINE 
ENVIRONMENT 
Article 207 
Pollution from land-based sources 
1. States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the 
marine environment from land-based sources, including rivers, estuaries, pipelines and 
outfall structures, taking into account internationally agreed rules, standards and 
recommended practices and procedures. 
2. States shall take other measures as may be necessary to prevent, reduce and control 
such pollution. 
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3. States shall endeavour to harmonize their policies in this connection at the appropriate 
regional level. 
4. States, acting especially through competent international organizations or diplomatic 
conference, shall endeavour to establish global and regional rules, standards and 
recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the 
marine environment from land-based sources, taking into account characteristic regional 
features, the economic capacity of developing States and their need for economic 
development. Such rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures shall be 
re-examined from time to time as necessary. 
5. Laws, regulations, measures, rules, standards and recommended practices and 
procedures referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 shall include those designed to minimize, 
to the fullest extent possible, the release of toxic, harmful or noxious substances, 
especially those which are persistent, into the marine environment. 
Article 208 
Pollution from seabed activities subject to national jurisdiction 
1 Coastal States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution 
of the marine environment arising from or in connection with seabed activities subject to 
their jurisdiction and from artificial islands, installations and structures under their 
jurisdiction, pursuant to articles 60and 80. 
2. States shall take other measures as may be necessary to prevent, reduce and control 
such pollution. 
3. Such laws, regulations and measures shall be no less effective than international rules, 
standards and recommended practices and procedures.  
4. States shall endeavour to harmonize their policies in this connection at the appropriate 
regional level. 
5. States, acting especially through competent international organizations or diplomatic 
conference, shall establish global and regional rules, standards and recommended 
practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine 
environment referred to in paragraph l. Such rules, standards and recommended practices 
and procedures shall be re-examined from time to time as necessary. 
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Article 210 
Pollution by dumping 
1. States shall adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the 
marine environment by dumping. 
2. States shall take other measures as may be necessary to prevent, reduce and control 
such pollution. 
3. Such laws, regulations and measures shall ensure that dumping is not carried out 
without the permission of the competent authorities of States. 
4. States, acting especially through competent international organizations or diplomatic 
conference, shall endeavour to establish global and regional rules, standards and 
recommended practices and procedures to prevent, reduce and control such pollution. 
Such rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures shall be re-examined 
from time to time as necessary. 
5. Dumping within the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone or onto the 
continental shelf shall not be carried out without the express prior approval of the coastal 
State, which has the right to permit, regulate and control such dumping after due 
consideration of the matter with other States which by reason of their geographical 
situation may be adversely affected thereby. 
6. National laws, regulations and measures shall be no less effective in preventing, 
reducing and controlling such pollution than the global rules and standards. 
 
SECTION 6 - ENFORCEMENT 
Article 213 
Enforcement with respect to pollution from land-based sources States shall enforce their 
laws and regulations adopted in accordance with article 207 and shall adopt laws and 
regulations and take other measures necessary to implement applicable international rules 
and standards established through competent international organizations or diplomatic 
conference to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from land-
based sources. 
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Article 214 
Enforcement with respect to pollution from seabed activities States shall enforce their 
laws and regulations adopted in accordance with article 208 and shall adopt laws and 
regulations and take other measures necessary to implement applicable international rules 
and standards established through competent international organizations or diplomatic 
conference to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment arising 
from or in connection with seabed activities subject to their jurisdiction and from artificial 
islands, installations and structures under their jurisdiction, pursuant to articles 60 and 80. 
Article 287 
Choice of procedure 
1. When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time thereafter, a 
State shall be free to choose, by means of a written declaration, one or more of the 
following means for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or 
application of this Convention: 
(a) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established in accordance with 
Annex VI; 
(b) the International Court of Justice; 
(c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII; 
(d) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII for one or more 
of the categories of disputes specified therein. 
2. A declaration made under paragraph 1 shall not affect or be affected by the obligation 
of a State Party to accept the jurisdiction of the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to the extent and in the manner provided for 
in Part XI, section 5. 
3. A State Party, which is a party to a dispute not covered by a declaration in force, shall 
be deemed to have accepted arbitration in accordance with Annex VII. 
4. If the parties to a dispute have accepted the same procedure for the settlement of the 
dispute, it may be submitted only to that procedure, unless the parties otherwise agree. 
5. If the parties to a dispute have not accepted the same procedure for the settlement of 
the dispute, it may be submitted only to arbitration in accordance with Annex VII, unless 
the parties otherwise agree. 
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6. A declaration made under paragraph 1 shall remain in force until three months after 
notice of revocation has been deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
7. A new declaration, a notice of revocation or the expiry of a declaration does not in any 
way affect proceedings pending before a court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this 
article, unless the parties otherwise agree. 
8. Declarations and notices referred to in this article shall be deposited with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the States Parties. 
Appendix5 - London Convention 1972 
Article I 
Contracting Parties shall individually and collectively promote the effective control of all 
sources of pollution of the marine environment, and pledge themselves especially to take 
all practicable steps to prevent the pollution of the sea by the dumping of waste and other 
matter that is liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and 
marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea. 
Article III 
For the purposes of this Convention: 
1 (a) "Dumping" means: 
(i) any deliberate disposal at sea of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, 
platforms or other man-made structures at sea; 
(ii) any deliberate disposal at sea of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other manmade 
structures at sea. 
(b) "Dumping" does not include: 
(i) the disposal at sea of wastes or other matter incidental to, or derived from the 
normal operations of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at 
sea and their equipment, other than wastes or other matter transported by or to 
vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea, operating for the 
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purpose of disposal of such matter or derived from the treatment of such wastes 
or other matter on such vessels, aircraft, platforms or structures; 
(ii) placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof, 
provided that such placement is not contrary to the aims of this Convention. 
(c) The disposal of wastes or other matter directly arising from, or related to the 
exploration, exploitation and associated off-shore processing of sea-bed mineral resources 
will not be covered by the provisions of this Convention. 
2 "Vessels and aircraft" means waterborne or airborne craft of any type whatsoever. This 
expression includes air cushioned craft and floating craft, whether self-propelled or not. 
3 "Sea" means all marine waters other than the internal waters of States. 
4 "Wastes or other matter" means material and substance of any kind, form or 
description. 
5 "Special permit" means permission granted specifically on application in advance and 
in accordance with Annex 1I and Annex 1II. 
6 "General permit" means permission granted in advance and in accordance with Annex 
1II. 
7 "The Organization" means the Organization designated by the Contracting Parties in 
accordance with article XIV(2). 
Article IV 
1  In accordance with the provisions of this Convention Contracting Parties shall 
prohibit the dumping of any wastes or other matter in whatever form or condition except 
as otherwise specified below: 
(a) the dumping of wastes or other matter listed in Annex 1 is prohibited; 
(b) the dumping of wastes or other matter listed in Annex 1I requires a prior special 
permit; 
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(c) the dumping of all other wastes or matter requires a prior general permit. 
2  Any permit shall be issued only after careful consideration of all the factors set 
forth inAnnex 1II, including prior studies of the characteristics of the dumping site, as set 
forth in sections B and C of that Annex. 
3  No provision of this Convention is to be interpreted as preventing a Contracting 
Party from prohibiting, insofar as that Party is concerned, the dumping of wastes or other 
matter not mentioned in Annex 1. That Party shall notify such measures to the 
Organization. 
Article VI 
1  Each Contracting Party shall designate an appropriate authority or authorities to: 
(a) issue special permits which shall be required prior to, and for, the dumping of 
matter listed in Annex 1I and in the circumstances provided for in article V(2); 
(b) issue general permits which shall be required prior to, and for, the dumping of 
all other matter; 
(c) keep records of the nature and quantities of all matter permitted to be dumped 
and the location, time and method of dumping; 
(d) monitor individually, or in collaboration with other Parties and competent 
international organizations, the condition of the seas for the purposes of this 
Convention. 
2  The appropriate authority or authorities of a contracting Party shall issue prior 
special or general permits in accordance with paragraph (1) in respect of matter intended 
for dumping: 
(a) loaded in its territory; 
(b) loaded by a vessel or aircraft registered in its territory or flying its flag, when 
the loading occurs in the territory of a State not party to this Convention. 
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3  In issuing permits under sub-paragraphs (1)(a) and (b) above, the appropriate 
authority or authorities shall comply with Annex 1II, together with such additional 
criteria, measures and requirements as they may consider relevant. 
4  Each Contracting Party, directly or through a Secretariat established under a 
regional agreement, shall report to the Organization, and where appropriate to 
other Parties, the information specified in sub-paragraphs(c) and (d) of paragraph 
(1) above, and the criteria, measures and requirements it adopts in accordance 
with paragraph (3) above.  The procedure to be followed and the nature of such 
reports shall be agreed by the Parties in consultation. 
Article VII 
1  Each Contracting Party shall apply the measures required to implement the 
present Convention to all: 
(a) vessels and aircraft registered in its territory or flying its flag; 
(b) vessels and aircraft loading in its territory or territorial seas matter which is to 
be dumped; 
(c) vessels and aircraft and fixed or floating platforms under its jurisdiction
 believed to be engaged in dumping. 
2  Each Party shall take in its territory appropriate measures to prevent and punish 
conduct in contravention of the provisions of this Convention. 
3  The Parties agree to co-operate in the development of procedures for the effective 
application of this Convention particularly on the high seas, including procedures 
for the reporting of vessels and aircraft observed dumping in contravention of the 
Convention. 
4  This Convention shall not apply to those vessels and aircraft entitled to sovereign 
immunity under international law. However, each Party shall ensure by the 
adoption of appropriate measures that such vessels and aircraft owned or operated 
by it act in a manner consistent with the object and purpose of this Convention, 
and shall inform the Organization accordingly. 
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5  Nothing in this Convention shall affect the right of each Party to adopt other 
measures, in accordance with the principles of international law, to prevent 
dumping at sea. 
Article X 
In accordance with the principles of international law regarding State responsibility for 
damage to the environment of other States or to any other area of the environment, caused 
by dumping of wastes and other matter of all kinds, the Contracting Parties undertake to 
develop procedures for the assessment of liability and the settlement of disputes regarding 
dumping. 
 
Article XI 
The Contracting Parties shall at their first consultative meeting consider procedures for 
the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation and application of this 
Convention. 
 
Annex 1 
1  Organohalogen compounds. 
2  Mercury and mercury compounds. 
3  Cadmium and cadmium compounds. 
4  Persistent plastics and other persistent synthetic materials, for example, netting 
and ropes, which may float or may remain in suspension in the sea in such a manner as to 
interfere materially with fishing, navigation or other legitimate uses of the sea. 
5  Crude oil and its wastes, refined petroleum products, petroleum, distillate 
residues, and any mixtures containing any of these, taken on board for the purpose of 
dumping. 
6  Radioactive wastes or other radioactive matter. 
7  Materials in whatever form (e.g. solids, liquids, semi-liquids, gases or in a living 
state) produced for biological and chemical warfare. 
8  With the exception of paragraph 6 above, the preceding paragraphs of this Annex 
do not apply to substances which are rapidly rendered harmless by physical, chemical or 
biological processes in the sea provided they do not: 
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(i) make edible marine organisms unpalatable, or 
(ii) endanger human health or that of domestic animals. 
The consultative procedure provided for under article XIV should be followed by a Party 
if there is doubt about the harmlessness of the substance. 
9  Except for industrial waste as defined in paragraph 11 below, this Annex does not 
apply to wastes or other materials (e.g. sewage sludge and dredged material) containing 
the matters referred to in paragraphs 1 - 5 above as trace contaminants. 
Such wastes shall be subject to the provisions of Annexes II and III as appropriate. 
 
Paragraph 6 does not apply to wastes or other materials (e.g. sewage sludge and dredged 
material) containing de minimis (exempt) levels of radioactivity as defined by the IAEA 
and adopted by the Contracting Parties. Unless otherwise prohibited by Annex 1, such 
wastes shall be subject to the provisions of Annexes II and III as appropriate. 
10  
(a)  Incineration at sea of industrial waste, as defined in paragraph 11 below, and 
sewage sludge is prohibited. 
(b)  The incineration at sea of any other wastes or other matter requires the issue  
of a special permit. 
(c)  In the issue of special permits for incineration at sea Contracting Parties shall 
apply regulations as are developed under this Convention.
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(d)  For the purpose of this Annex: 
(i) "Marine incineration facility" means a vessel, platform, or other man-made 
structure operating for the purpose of incineration at sea. 
(ii) "Incineration at sea" means the deliberate combustion of wastes or other 
matter on marine incineration facilities for the purpose of their thermal destruction. 
Activities incidental to the normal operation of vessels, platforms or other man-made 
structures are excluded from the scope of this definition. 
11 Industrial waste as from 1 January 1996. 
For the purposes of this Annex: 
                                                          
904
Regulations for the Control of Incineration of Wastes and Other Matter at Sea, as adopted in 1978, 
have not been reproduced in this document. 
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"Industrial waste" means waste materials generated by manufacturing or processing 
operations and does not apply to: 
(a) dredged material; 
(b) sewage sludge; 
(c) fish waste, or organic materials resulting from industrial fish processing 
operations; 
(d) vessels and platforms or other man-made structures at sea, provided that 
material capable of creating floating debris or otherwise contributing to pollution 
of the marine environment has been removed to the maximum extent; 
(e) uncontaminated inert geological materials the chemical constituents of which 
are unlikely to be released into the marine environment; 
(f) uncontaminated organic materials of natural origin. 
 
13 Dumping of wastes and other matter specified in subparagraphs (a) - (f) above 
shall be subject to all other provisions of Annex 1, and to the provisions of Annexes II 
and III. This paragraph shall not apply to the radioactive wastes or any other radioactive 
matter referred to in paragraph 6 of this Annex. 
12  Within 25 years from the date on which the amendment to paragraph 6 enters into 
force and at each 25 year interval thereafter, the Contracting Parties shall complete a 
scientific study relating to all radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter other than 
high level wastes or matter, taking into account such other factors as the Contracting 
Parties consider appropriate, and shall review the position of such substances on Annex 1 
in accordance with the procedures set forth in article XV. 
 
Annex II 
The following substances and materials requiring special care are listed for the purposes 
of article VI(1)(a). 
A. Wastes containing significant amounts of the matters listed below: 
(arsenic, beryllium, chromium, copper, lead, nickel, vanadium, zinc,) and their 
compounds; organosilicon compounds; cyanides; fluorides; pesticides and their by-
products not covered in  Annex 1. 
 
426 
 
B  Containers, scrap metal and other bulky wastes liable to sink to the sea bottom 
which may present a serious obstacle to fishing or navigation. 
C  In the issue of special permits for the incineration of substances and materials 
listed in this Annex, the Contracting Parties shall apply the Regulations for the Control of 
Incineration of Wastes and Other Matter at Sea set forth in the Addendum to Annex 1 and 
take full account of the Technical Guidelines on the Control of Incineration of Wastes 
and Other Matter at Sea adopted by the Contracting Parties in consultation, to the extent 
specified in these Regulations and Guidelines. 
D  Materials which, though of a non-toxic nature, may become harmful due to the 
quantities in which they are dumped or which are liable to seriously reduce amenities. 
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Appendix 6 - OSPAR Convention
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Article 1 
Definitions 
For the purposes of the Convention: 
(a) "Maritime area" means the internal waters and the territorial seas of the Contracting 
Parties, the 
sea beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea under the jurisdiction of the coastal state to 
theextent recognised by international law, and the high seas, including the bed of all those 
watersand its sub-soil, situated within the following limits: 
(i) those parts of the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans and their dependent seas which lie north 
of 
36° north latitude and between 42° west longitude and 51° east longitude, but excluding: 
(1) the Baltic Sea and the Belts lying to the south and east of lines drawn from 
Hasenore Head to Gniben Point, from Korshage to Spodsbjerg and from Gilbjerg 
Head to Kullen, 
(2) the Mediterranean Sea and its dependent seas as far as the point of intersection ofthe 
parallel of 36° north latitude and the meridian of 5° 36' west longitude; 
(ii) that part of the Atlantic Ocean north of 59° north latitude and between 44° west 
longitudeand 42° west longitude. 
(b) "Internal waters" means the waters on the landward side of the baselines from which 
the breadthof the territorial sea is measured, extending in the case of watercourses up to 
the freshwaterlimit. 
(c) "Freshwater limit" means the place in a watercourse where, at low tide and in a period 
of low Freshwater flow, there is an appreciable increase in salinity due to the presence of 
seawater. 
(d) "Pollution" means the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or 
energy intothe maritime area which results, or is likely to result, in hazards to human 
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 For the full document view 
http://www.ospar.org/html_documents/ospar/html/ospar_convention_e_updated_text_2007.pdf 
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health, harm to livingresources and marine ecosystems, damage to amenities or 
interference with other legitimate usesof the sea. 
(e) "Land-based sources" means point and diffuse sources on land from which substances 
or energyreach the maritime area by water, through the air, or directly from the coast. It 
includes sourcesassociated with any deliberate disposal under the sea-bed made 
accessible from land by tunnel,pipeline or other means and sources associated with man-
made structures placed, in themaritime area under the jurisdiction of a Contracting Party, 
other than for the purpose ofoffshore activities. 
(f) "Dumping" means 
(i) any deliberate disposal in the maritime area of wastes or other matter 
(1) from vessels or aircraft; 
(2) from offshore installations; 
(ii) any deliberate disposal in the maritime area of 
(1) vessels or aircraft; 
(2) offshore installations and offshore pipelines. 
(g) "Dumping" does not include: 
(i) the disposal in accordance with the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto, or other 
applicable international law, of wastes or other matter incidental to, or derived from, the 
normal operations of vessels or aircraft or offshore installations other than wastes or other 
matter transported by or to vessels or aircraft or offshore installations for the purpose of 
disposal of such wastes or other matter or derived from the treatment of such wastes or 
other matter on such vessels or aircraft or offshore installations; 
(ii) placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof, provided that, 
if the placement is for a purpose other than that for which the matter was originally 
designed or constructed, it is in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 
Convention; and 
(iii) for the purposes of Annex 1II, the leaving wholly or partly in place of a disused 
offshore installation or disused offshore pipeline, provided that any such operation takes 
place in accordance with any relevant provision of the Convention and with other relevant 
international law. 
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(h) "Incineration" means any deliberate combustion of wastes or other matter in the 
maritime area for the purpose of their thermal destruction. 
(i) "Incineration" does not include the thermal destruction of wastes or other matter in 
accordance with applicable international law incidental to, or derived from the normal 
operation of vessels or aircraft, or offshore installations other than the thermal destruction 
of wastes or other matter on vessels or aircraft or offshore installations operating for the 
purpose of such thermal destruction. 
(j) "Offshore activities" means activities carried out in the maritime area for the purposes 
of the exploration, appraisal or exploitation of liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons. 
(k) "Offshore sources" means offshore installations and offshore pipelines from which 
substances or energy reaches the maritime area. 
(l) "Offshore installation" means any man-made structure, plant or vessel or parts thereof, 
whether floating or fixed to the seabed, placed within the maritime area for the purpose of 
offshore activities. 
(m) "Offshore pipeline" means any pipeline which has been placed in the maritime area 
for the purpose of offshore activities. 
(n) "Vessels or aircraft" means waterborne or airborne craft of any type whatsoever, their 
parts and other fittings. This expression includes air-cushion craft, floating craft whether 
self-propelled or 
not, and other man-made structures in the maritime area and their equipment, but 
excludes offshore installations and offshore pipelines. 
(o) "Wastes or other matter" does not include: 
(i) human remains; 
(ii) offshore installations; 
(iii) offshore pipelines; 
(iv) unprocessed fish and fish offal discarded from fishing vessels. 
(p) "Convention" means, unless the text otherwise indicates, the Convention for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, its Annexes and 
Appendices. 
(q) "Oslo Convention" means the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping from Ships and Aircraft signed in Oslo on 15th February 1972, as amended by 
the protocols of 
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2nd March 1983 and 5th December 1989. 
(r) "Paris Convention" means the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from 
Land based 
Sources, signed in Paris on 4th June 1974, as amended by the protocol of 26th March 
1986. 
(s) "Regional economic integration organisation" means an organisation constituted by 
sovereign States of a given region which has competence in respect of matters governed 
by the Convention and has been duly authorised, in accordance with its internal 
procedures, to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Convention. 
Article 2 
General Obligations 
1. (a) The Contracting Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, 
take all possible steps to prevent and eliminate pollution and shall take the necessary 
measures to protect the maritime area against the adverse effects of human activities so as 
to safeguard human health and to conserve marine ecosystems and, when practicable, 
restore marine areas which have been adversely affected. 
(b) To this end Contracting Parties shall, individually and jointly, adopt programmes and 
measures and shall harmonise their policies and strategies. 
2. The Contracting Parties shall apply: 
(a) the precautionary principle, by virtue of which preventive measures are to be taken 
when there are reasonable grounds for concern that substances or energy introduced, 
directly or indirectly, into the marine environment may bring about hazards to human 
health, harm living resources and marine ecosystems, damage amenities or interfere with 
other legitimate uses of the sea, even when there is no conclusive evidence of a causal 
relationship between the inputs and the effects; 
(b) the polluter pays principle, by virtue of which the costs of pollution prevention, 
control and reduction measures are to be borne by the polluter. 
3. (a) In implementing the Convention, Contracting Parties shall adopt programmes and 
measures which contain, where appropriate, time-limits for their completion and which 
take full account of the use of the latest technological developments and practices 
designed to prevent and eliminate pollution fully. 
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(b) To this end they shall: 
(i) taking into account the criteria set forth in Appendix 1, define with respect to 
programmes and measures the application of, inter alia, 
- best available techniques 
- best environmental practice including, where appropriate, clean technology; 
(ii) in carrying out such programmes and measures, ensure the application of best 
available techniques and best environmental practice as so defined, including, where 
appropriate, clean technology. 
4. The Contracting Parties shall apply the measures they adopt in such a way as to prevent 
an increase in pollution of the sea outside the maritime area or in other parts of the 
environment. 
5. No provision of the Convention shall be interpreted as preventing the Contracting 
Parties from taking, 
individually or jointly, more stringent measures with respect to the prevention and 
elimination of pollution of the maritime area or with respect to the protection of the 
maritime area against the adverse effects of human activities. 
Article 3 
Pollution from Land-Based Sources 
The Contracting Parties shall take, individually and jointly, all possible steps to prevent 
and eliminate pollution from land-based sources in accordance with the provisions of the 
Convention, in particular as provided for in Annex 1. 
Article 4 
Pollution By Dumping Or Incineration 
The Contracting Parties shall take, individually and jointly, all possible steps to prevent 
and eliminate pollution by dumping or incineration of wastes or other matter in 
accordance with the provisions of the Convention, in particular as provided for in Annex 
II. 
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Article 5 
Pollution From Offshore Sources 
The Contracting Parties shall take, individually and jointly, all possible steps to prevent 
and eliminate pollution from offshore sources in accordance with the provisions of the 
Convention, in particular as provided for in Annex III. 
 
Annex 1 
On The Prevention And Elimination Of Pollution From Land-Based Sources 
Article 1 
1. When adopting programmes and measures for the purpose of this Annex, the 
Contracting Parties shall require, either individually or jointly, the use of 
- best available techniques for point sources 
- best environmental practice for point and diffuse sources including, where appropriate, 
clean technology. 
2. When setting priorities and in assessing the nature and extent of the programmes and 
measures and their time scales, the Contracting Parties shall use the criteria given in 
Appendix 2. 
3. The Contracting Parties shall take preventive measures to minimise the risk of 
pollution caused by accidents. 
4. When adopting programmes and measures in relation to radioactive substances, 
including waste, the 
Contracting Parties shall also take account of: 
(a) the recommendations of the other appropriate international organisations and 
agencies; 
(b) the monitoring procedures recommended by these international organisations and 
agencies. 
Article 2 
1. Point source discharges to the maritime area, and releases into water or air which reach 
and may affect the maritime area, shall be strictly subject to authorisation or regulation by 
the competent authorities of the Contracting Parties. Such authorisation or regulation 
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shall, in particular, implement relevant decisions of the Commission which bind the 
relevant Contracting Party. 
2. The Contracting Parties shall provide for a system of regular monitoring and inspection 
by their competent authorities to assess compliance with authorisations and regulations of 
releases into water or air. 
Article 3 
For the purposes of this Annex, it shall, inter alia, be the duty of the Commission to draw 
up: 
(a) plans for the reduction and phasing out of substances that are toxic, persistent and 
liable to bio-accumulate arising from land-based sources; 
(b) when appropriate, programmes and measures for the reduction of inputs of nutrients 
from urban, municipal, industrial, agricultural and other sources. 
 
Annex II 
On The Prevention And Elimination Of Pollution By Dumping Or Incineration 
Article 1 
This Annex shall not apply to any deliberate disposal in the maritime area of: 
(a) wastes or other matter from offshore installations; 
(b) offshore installations and offshore pipelines. 
Article 2 
Incineration is prohibited. 
Article 3 
1. The dumping of all wastes or other matter is prohibited, except for those wastes or 
other matter listed in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article. 
2. The list referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article is as follows: 
(a) dredged material; 
(b) inert materials of natural origin, that is solid, chemically unprocessed geological 
material the chemical constituents of which are unlikely to be released into the marine 
environment; 
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(c) sewage sludge until 31st December 1998; 
(d) fish waste from industrial fish processing operations; 
(e) vessels or aircraft until, at the latest, 31st December 2004; 
2(f) carbon dioxide streams from carbon dioxide capture processes for storage, provided: 
i. disposal is into a sub-soil geological formation; 
ii. the streams consist overwhelmingly of carbon dioxide. They may contain incidental 
associated substances derived from the source material and the capture, transport and 
storage processes used; 
iii. no wastes or other matter are added for the purpose of disposing of those wastes or 
other matter; 
iv. they are intended to be retained in these formations permanently and will not lead to 
significant adverse consequences for the marine environment, human health and other 
legitimate uses of the maritime area. 
3. (a) The dumping of low and intermediate level radioactive substances, including 
wastes, is prohibited. 
 (b) As an exception to subparagraph 3(a) of this Article, those Contracting Parties, the 
United Kingdom and France, who wish to retain the option of an exception to 
subparagraph 3(a) in any case not before the expiry of a period of 15 years from 1st 
January 1993, shall report to the meeting of the Commission at Ministerial level in 1997 
on the steps taken to explore alternative land-based options. 
(c) Unless, at or before the expiry of this period of 15 years, the Commission decides by a 
unanimous vote not to continue the exception provided in subparagraph 3(b), it shall take 
a decision pursuant to Article 13 of the Convention on the prolongation for a period of 10 
years after 1st January 2008 of the prohibition, after which another meeting of the 
Commission at 
Ministerial level shall be held. Those Contracting Parties mentioned in subparagraph 3(b) 
of this Article still wishing to retain the option mentioned in subparagraph 3(b) shall 
report to the Commission meetings to be held at Ministerial level at two yearly intervals 
from 1999 onwards about the progress in establishing alternative land-based options and 
on the results of scientific studies which show that any potential dumping operations 
would not result in hazards to human health, harm to living resources or marine 
ecosystems, damage to amenities or interference with other legitimate uses of the sea. 
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Article 4 
1. The Contracting Parties shall ensure that: 
(a) no wastes or other matter listed in paragraph 2 of Article 3 of this Annex shall be 
dumped without authorisation by their competent authorities, or regulation; 
(b) such authorisation or regulation is in accordance with the relevant applicable criteria, 
guidelines and procedures adopted by the Commission in accordance with Article 6 of 
this Annex; 
(c) with the aim of avoiding situations in which the same dumping operation is authorised 
or regulated by more than one Contracting Party, their competent authorities shall, as 
appropriate, consult before granting an authorisation or applying regulation. 
2. Any authorisation or regulation under paragraph 1 of this Article shall not permit the 
dumping of vessels or aircraft containing substances which result or are likely to result in 
hazards to human health, harm to living resources and marine ecosystems, damage to 
amenities or interference with other legitimate uses of the sea. 
3. Each Contracting Party shall keep, and report to the Commission records of the nature 
and the quantities of wastes or other matter dumped in accordance with paragraph 1 of 
this Article, and of the dates, places and methods of dumping. 
Article 5 
No placement of matter in the maritime area for a purpose other than that for which it was 
originally designed or constructed shall take place without authorisation or regulation by 
the competent authority of the relevant Contracting Party. Such authorisation or 
regulation shall be in accordance with the relevant applicable criteria, guidelines and 
procedures adopted by the Commission in accordance with Article 6 of this Annex. This 
provision shall not be taken to permit the dumping of wastes or other matter otherwise 
prohibited under this Annex. 
Article 6 
For the purposes of this Annex, it shall, inter alia, be the duty of the Commission to draw 
up and adopt criteria, guidelines and procedures relating to the dumping of wastes or 
other matter listed in paragraph 2 of Article 3, and to the placement of matter referred to 
in Article 5, of this Annex, with a view to preventing and eliminating pollution. 
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Article 7 
The provisions of this Annex concerning dumping shall not apply in case of force 
majeure, due to stress of weather or any other cause, when the safety of human life or of a 
vessel or aircraft is threatened. Such dumping shall be so conducted as to minimise the 
likelihood of damage to human or marine life and shall immediately be reported to the 
Commission, together with full details of the circumstances and of the nature and 
quantities of the wastes or other matter dumped. 
Article 8 
The Contracting Parties shall take appropriate measures, both individually and within 
relevant international organisations, to prevent and eliminate pollution resulting from the 
abandonment of vessels or aircraft in the maritime area caused by accidents. In the 
absence of relevant guidance from such international organisations, the measures taken 
by individual Contracting Parties should be based on such guidelines as the Commission 
may adopt. 
Article 9 
In an emergency, if a Contracting Party considers that wastes or other matter the dumping 
of which isprohibited under this Annex cannot be disposed of on land without 
unacceptable danger or damage, it shall forthwith consult other Contracting Parties with a 
view to finding the most satisfactory methods of storage or the most satisfactory means of 
destruction or disposal under the prevailing circumstances. The Contracting Party shall 
inform the Commission of the steps adopted following this consultation. The Contracting 
Parties pledge themselves to assist one another in such situations. 
Article 10 
1. Each Contracting Party shall ensure compliance with the provisions of this Annex: 
(a) by vessels or aircraft registered in its territory; 
(b) by vessels or aircraft loading in its territory the wastes or other matter which are to be 
dumped or incinerated; 
(c) by vessels or aircraft believed to be engaged in dumping or incineration within its 
internal waters or within its territorial sea or within that part of the sea beyond and 
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adjacent to the territorial sea under the jurisdiction of the coastal state to the extent 
recognised by international 
law. 
2. Each Contracting Party shall issue instructions to its maritime inspection vessels and 
aircraft and to 
other appropriate services to report to its authorities any incidents or conditions in the 
maritime area which give rise to suspicions that dumping in contravention of the 
provisions of the present Annex has occurred or is about to occur. Any Contracting Party 
whose authorities receive such a report shall, if it considers it appropriate, accordingly 
inform any other Contracting Party concerned. 
3. Nothing in this Annex shall abridge the sovereign immunity to which certain vessels 
are entitled under international law. 
AnnexIII 
On The Prevention and Elimination Of Pollution From Offshore Sources 
Article 1 
This Annex shall not apply to any deliberate disposal in the maritime area of: 
(a) wastes or other matter from vessels or aircraft; 
(b) vessels or aircraft. 
Article 2 
1. When adopting programmes and measures for the purpose of this Annex, the 
Contracting Parties shall require, either individually or jointly, the use of: 
(a) best available techniques 
(b) best environmental practice including, where appropriate, clean technology. 
2. When setting priorities and in assessing the nature and extent of the programmes and 
measures and their time scales, the Contracting Parties shall use the criteria given in 
Appendix 2. 
Article 3 
1. Any dumping of wastes or other matter from offshore installations is prohibited. 
2. This prohibition does not relate to discharges or emissions from offshore sources. 
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3. The prohibition referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article does not apply to carbon 
dioxide streams from carbon dioxide capture processes for storage, provided 
(a) disposal is into a sub-soil geological formation; 
(b) the streams consist overwhelmingly of carbon dioxide. They may contain incidental 
associated substances derived from the source material and the capture, transport and 
storage processes used; 
(c) no wastes or other matter are added for the purpose of disposing of those wastes or 
other matter; 
(d) they are intended to be retained in these formations permanently and will not lead to 
significant adverse consequences for the marine environment, human health and other 
legitimate uses of the maritime area. 
4. The Contracting Parties shall ensure that no streams referred to in paragraph 3 shall be 
disposed of in sub-soil geological formations without authorisation or regulation by their 
competent authorities. Such authorisation or regulation shall, in particular, implement the 
relevant applicable decisions, recommendations and all other agreements adopted under 
the Convention. 
Article 4 
1. The use on, or the discharge or emission from, offshore sources of substances which 
may reach and affect the maritime area shall be strictly subject to authorisation or 
regulation by the competent authorities of the Contracting Parties. Such authorisation or 
regulation shall, in particular, implement the relevant applicable decisions, 
recommendations and all other agreements adopted under the Convention. 
2. The competent authorities of the Contracting Parties shall provide for a system of 
monitoring and inspection to assess compliance with authorisation or regulation as 
provided for in paragraph 1 of Article 4 of this Annex. 
Article 5 
1. No disused offshore installation or disused offshore pipeline shall be dumped and no 
disused offshore installation shall be left wholly or partly in place in the maritime area 
without a permit issued by the competent authority of the relevant Contracting Party on a 
case-by-case basis. The Contracting Parties shall ensure that their authorities, when 
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granting such permits, shall implement the relevant applicable decisions, 
recommendations and all other agreements adopted under the Convention. 
2. No such permit shall be issued if the disused offshore installation or disused offshore 
pipeline contains substances which result or are likely to result in hazards to human 
health, harm to living resources and marine ecosystems, damage to amenities or 
interference with other legitimate uses of the sea. 
3. Any Contracting Party which intends to take the decision to issue a permit for the 
dumping of a disused offshore installation or a disused offshore pipeline placed in the 
maritime area after 1st January 1998 shall, through the medium of the Commission, 
inform the other Contracting Parties of its reasons for accepting such dumping, in order to 
make consultation possible. 
4. Each Contracting Party shall keep, and report to the Commission, records of the 
disused offshore installations and disused offshore pipelines dumped and of the disused 
offshore installations left in place in accordance with the provisions of this Article, and of 
the dates, places and methods of dumping. 
Article 6 
Articles 3 and 5 of this Annex shall not apply in case of force majeure, due to stress of 
weather or any other cause, when the safety of human life or of an offshore installation is 
threatened. Such dumping shall be so conducted as to minimise the likelihood of damage 
to human or marine life and shall immediately be reported to the Commission, together 
with full details of the circumstances and of the nature and quantities of the matter 
dumped. 
Article 7 
The Contracting Parties shall take appropriate measures, both individually and within 
relevant international organisations, to prevent and eliminate pollution resulting from the 
abandonment of offshore installations in the maritime area caused by accidents. In the 
absence of relevant guidance from such international organisations, the measures taken 
by individual Contracting Parties should be based on such guidelines as the Commission 
may adopt. 
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Article 8 
No placement of a disused offshore installation or a disused offshore pipeline in the 
maritime area for a purpose other than that for which it was originally designed or 
constructed shall take place without authorisation or regulation by the competent 
authority of the relevant Contracting Party. Such authorisation or regulation shall be in 
accordance with the relevant applicable criteria, guidelines and procedures adopted by the 
Commission in accordance with subparagraph (d) of Article 10 of this Annex. This 
provision shall not be taken to permit the dumping of disused offshore installations or 
disused offshore pipelines in contravention of the provisions of this Annex. 
Article 9 
1. Each Contracting Party shall issue instructions to its maritime inspection vessels and 
aircraft and to other appropriate services to report to its authorities any incidents or 
conditions in the maritime area which give rise to suspicions that a contravention of the 
provisions of the present Annex has occurred or is about to occur. Any Contracting Party 
whose authorities receive such a report shall, if it considers it appropriate, accordingly 
inform any other Contracting Party concerned. 
2. Nothing in this Annex shall abridge the sovereign immunity to which certain vessels 
are entitled under international law. 
Article 10 
For the purposes of this Annex, it shall, inter alia, be the duty of the Commission: 
(a) to collect information about substances which are used in offshore activities and, on 
the basis of that information, to agree lists of substances for the purposes of paragraph 1 
of Article 4 of this 
Annex; 
(b) to list substances which are toxic, persistent and liable to bioaccumulate and to draw 
up plans for the reduction and phasing out of their use on, or discharge from, offshore 
sources; 
(c) to draw up criteria, guidelines and procedures for the prevention of pollution from 
dumping of disused offshore installations and of disused offshore pipelines, and the 
leaving in place of offshore installations, in the maritime area; 
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(d) to draw up criteria, guidelines and procedures relating to the placement of disused 
offshore installations and disused offshore pipelines referred to in Article 8 of this Annex, 
with a view to preventing and eliminating pollution. 
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Appendix7 - EU Directive 2009/31/EC 
DIRECTIVE 2009/31/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL of 23 April 2009 on the geological storage of carbon dioxide and amending 
Council Directive 85/337/EEC, European Parliament and Council Directives 2000/60/EC, 
2001/80/EC, 2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC, 2008/1/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 
 
Preambles:  
 
Para 3. The Commission Communication of 10 January 2007 entitled ‘Limiting global 
climate change to two degrees Celsius – The way ahead for 2020 and beyond’ 
clarifies that in the context of the envisaged global reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions of 50 % by 2050, a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of 30 % in 
the developed world by 2020 is required, rising to 60 %-80 % by 2050, that this 
reduction is technically feasible and the benefits far outweigh the costs, but that, 
to achieve it, all mitigation options must be harnessed. 
 
Para 4. Carbon dioxide capture and geological storage (CCS) is a bridging technology 
that will contribute to mitigating climate change. It consists of the capture of 
carbon dioxide (CO2) from industrial installations, its transport to a storage site 
and its injection into a suitable underground geological formation for the 
purposes of permanent storage. This technology should not serve as an incentive 
to increase the share of fossil fuel power plants. Its development should not lead 
to a reduction of efforts to support energy saving policies, renewable energies and 
other safe and sustainable low carbon technologies, both in research and financial 
terms. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Subject Matter, Scope and Definitions 
 
Article 1 
Subject matter and purpose 
 
1 This Directive establishes a legal framework for the environmentally safe 
geological storage of carbon dioxide (CO2) to contribute to the fight against climate 
change. 
 
2. The purpose of environmentally safe geological storage of CO2 is permanent 
containment of CO2 in such a way as to prevent and, where this is not possible, eliminate 
as far as possible negative effects and any risk to the environment and human health. 
 
Article 2 
Scope and prohibition 
 
1.  This Directive shall apply to the geological storage of CO2 in the territory of the 
Member States, their exclusive economic zones and on their continental shelves within 
the meaning of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
 
2.  This Directive shall not apply to geological storage of CO2, with a total intended 
storage below 100 kilotonnes, undertaken for research, development or testing of new 
products and processes. 
 
3. The storage of CO2 in a storage site with a storage complex extending beyond 
the area referred to in paragraph 1 shall not be permitted.  
 
4. The storage of CO2 in the water column shall not be permitted. 
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Article 13 
Monitoring 
 
1.  Member States shall ensure that the operator carries out monitoring of the 
injection facilities, the storage complex (including where possible the CO2 plume), and 
where appropriate the surrounding environment for the purpose of:  
(a) comparison between the actual and modelled behaviour of CO2 and formation water, 
in the storage site; 
(b) detecting significant irregularities; 
(c) detecting migration of CO2; 
(d) detecting leakage of CO2; 
(e) detecting significant adverse effects for the surrounding environment, including in 
particular on drinking water, for human populations, or for users of the surrounding 
biosphere; 
(f) assessing the effectiveness of any corrective measures taken pursuant to Article 16; 
(g) updating the assessment of the safety and integrity of the storage complex in the short 
and long term, including the assessment of whether the stored CO2 will be completely 
and permanently contained. 
 
2.  The monitoring shall be based on a monitoring plan designed by the operator 
pursuant to the requirements laid down in Annex 1I, including details on the monitoring 
in accordance with the guidelines established pursuant to Article 14 and Article 23(2) of 
Directive 2003/87/EC, submitted to and approved by the competent authority pursuant to 
Article 7(6) and Article 9(5) of this Directive. The plan shall be updated pursuant to the 
requirements laid down in Annex 1I and in any case every five years to take account of 
changes to the assessed risk of leakage, changes to the assessed risks to the environment 
and human health, new scientific knowledge, and improvements in best available 
technology. Updated plans shall be re-submitted for approval to the competent authority. 
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Article 14 
Reporting by the operator 
 
At a frequency to be determined by the competent authority, and in any event at least 
once a year, the operator shall submit to the competent authority: 
1. all results of the monitoring pursuant to Article 13 in the reporting period, including 
information on the monitoring technology employed; 
2. the quantities and properties of the CO2 streams delivered and injected, including 
composition of those streams, in the reporting period, registered pursuant to Article 
12(3)(b); 
3. proof of the putting in place and maintenance of the financial security pursuant to 
Article 19 and Article 9(9); 
4. any other information the competent authority considers relevant for the purposes of 
assessing compliance with storage permit conditions and increasing the knowledge of 
CO2behaviour in the storage site. 
 
Article 28 
Penalties 
The Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of 
the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive and shall take all measures 
necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The penalties provided for must be 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive. The Member States shall notify those provisions 
to the Commission by 25 June2011 and shall notify it without delay of any subsequent 
amendment affecting them. 
 
For a detail online copy of the EU Directive 2009/31/EC  view 
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0114:0135:EN:PDF  
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Appendix 8 - National Environmental Standards And Regulations Enforcement 
Agency (Establishment) Act, 2007 Arrangement Of Sections 
SECTION: 
Part I – Establishment Of The National Environmental Standards And 
Regulations Enforcement Agency 
1. Establishment of National Environmental Standards and Regulations 
Enforcement Agency. 
2. Objectives of the Agency. 
3. Establishment  and composition of Council 
4. Tenure of office 
5. Cessation of membership 
6. Emolument, etc, of members 
Part II – Functions And Powers Of The Agency And Council 
7. Functions of the Agency 
8. Powers of the Agency 
9. Functions of the Council 
Part III – Structure Of The Agency 
10 Directorates of the Agency 
Part IV – Staff of The Agency 
11 Appointment of Director –General and other staff of the Agency 
12 Pensions Act No.2 of 2004. 
Part V—Financial Provisions 
13 Fund of the Agency 
14 Expenditure of the Agency 
15 Exemption from the income tax 
16 Annual estimate 
17 Accounts and audit 
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18 Annual report 
19 Investment 
20 Air quality and atmospheric protection 
21 Ozone protection 
22 Noise 
23 Federal water quality standards 
24 Effluent limitations. 
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25 Environmental sanitation 
26 Land resources and watershed quality 
27 Discharge of hazardous substance and related offences 
28 Removal methods, etc. 
29 Co-operations with appropriate authorities. 
Part VI – Miscellaneous Provisions 
30 Power  to enter premises 
31 Offences and penalties 
32 Legal Proceedings 
33 Power of Minister to give Directives 
34 Power to make regulations 
35 Application 
36 Repeal of Cap. F10 LFN, 2004. 
37 Interpretations. 
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NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS  
              ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (ESTABLISHMENT) ACT, 2007 
2007 ACT NO. 25 
An Act To Provide For The Establishment Of The National Environmental Standards 
And Regulations Enforcement Agency Charged With Responsiblity For The Protection 
And Development Of The Environment In Nigeria; And For Related Matters. 
      ENACTED by the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria ---- 
          Part 1 – Establishment Of The National Environmental Standards And 
Regulations Enforcement Agency 
        1- (1) There is established a body known as National Environmental Standards and 
Regulations Enforcement Agency (in this Act referred to as “the Agency”). 
       (2) The Agency: 
              (a) shall be the enforcement Agency for environmental standards, regulations,rules, 
laws, policies and guidelines; 
      (b) shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal; and 
      (c) may sue and be sued in its corporate name. 
        2.The Agency, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, have responsibility 
for the protection and development of the environment, biodiversity conservationand 
sustainable development of Nigeria’s natural resources in general and environmental 
technology, including coordination and liaison with relevantstakeholders within and 
outside Nigeria on matters of enforcement of environmentalstandards, regulations, rules, 
laws, policies and guidelines. 
3- (1) There is established for the Agency, a Governing Council (in this Actreferred to as 
the “Council”) which shall consist of-- 
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     (a)  a Chairman who shall be appointed by the President, on therecommendation of the 
Minister; 
     (b)  the Permanent Secretary of the Federal Ministry of Environment or 
hisrepresentative; 
     (c)  a representative each, not below the rank of Director from the----  
(i) Federal Ministry of  Solid Minerals Development, 
      (ii) Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 
(iii)  Federal  Ministry of Water Resources, 
(iv)  Federal Ministry of Science and Technology, 
(v)  a representative of the Standards Organisation of Nigeria, 
(vi)  a representative of the Manufacturers’ Association of Nigeria, 
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(vii)  a representative of the Oil Exploratory and Production Companies in 
Nigeria; 
            (d) the Director –General of the Agency; and 
            (e) three other persons to represent public interest, to be appointed by the Minister 
of Environment. 
           (2) A member of the Council, other than the Chairman, shall be appointed by the 
Minister on the recommendation of the body, if any, he represents. 
           (3) With the exception of the Director-General, membership of the Council shall 
be on part-time basis. 
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           (4) The members of the Council shall be paid such allowances as provided under 
existing regulations on such payments. 
           (5) The provisions of the Schedule to this Act shall have effect with respect to the 
proceedings of the Council and other matters mentioned therein. 
4. A member of the Council appointed, otherwise than by office and the Director-
General, shall hold office for a term of four years and shall be eligible for reappointment 
for only one further term of four years. 
            5 - (1) The office of a member of the Council shall become vacant if: 
 (a) he resigns as a member of the Council by notice in writing under his hand 
addressed to the Minister ; or 
 (b) the Minister subject to the approval of the President, is satisfied that it is not 
in the interest of the Agency for the person appointed to continue in office and notifies 
the member in writing to that effect. 
(2) If it appears to the Council that a member of the Council, other than ex-
officio member or the Director-General, shall be removed from office on the grounds of 
misconduct or inability to perform the functions of his office, the Council shall make a 
recommendation to the Minister. 
(3) If the Minister, after making such enquiries as he considers necessary, 
approves the recommendation, the Minister shall, in writing, declare the office of such a 
member vacant. 
6. The Chairman and members of the Council shall be paid such emoluments, allowances 
and benefits in accordance with the existing regulations on such payment. 
 Part II – Functions And Powers Of The Agency And Council 
7. The Agency shall--- 
          (a) enforce compliance with laws, guidelines, policies and  standards on 
environmental matters; 
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          (b) coordinate and liaise with stakeholders, within and outside Nigeria, on matters 
of environmental standards, regulations and enforcement; 
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(c) enforce compliance with the provisions of international agreements, protocols, 
conventions and treaties on the environment, including climate change, biodiversity, 
conservation, desertification, forestry, oil and gas, chemicals, hazardous wastes, ozone 
depletion, marine and wild life, pollution, sanitation and such other environmental 
agreements as may from time to time come into force; 
 (d) enforce compliance with policies, standards, legislation and guidelines on 
water quality, environmental health and sanitation, including pollution abatement; 
 (e) enforce compliance with guidelines and legislations on sustainable 
management of the ecosystem, biodiversity conservation and the development of 
Nigeria’s natural resources; 
 (f) enforce compliance with any legislation on sound chemical management, safe 
use of pesticides and disposal of spent packages thereof; 
 (g) enforce compliance with regulations on the importation, exportation, 
production, distribution, storage, sale, use, handling and disposal of hazardous chemicals 
and waste other than in the oil and gas sector; 
 (h) enforce through compliance monitoring, the environmental regulations and 
standards on noise, air, land, seas, oceans and other water bodies other than in the oil and 
gas sector; 
 (i) ensure that environmental projects funded by donor organisations and external 
support agencies adhered to regulations in environmental safety and protection; 
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 (j) enforce environmental control measures through registration, licencing and 
permitting systems other than in the oil and gas sector; 
 (k) conduct environmental audit and establish data bank on regulatory and 
enforcement mechanisms of environmental standards other than in the oil and gas sector; 
 (l) create public awareness and provide environmental education on sustainable 
environmental management, promote private sector compliance with environmental 
regulations other than in the oil and gas sector and publish general scienctific or other 
data resulting from the performance of its functions; 
 (m) carry out such activities as are necessary or expedient for the performance of 
its functions. 
 
 8. The Agency shall have power to--- 
(a) purchase or take on lease any interest in land, building or property; 
(b) build, equip and maintain the offices and premises for the performance of its 
functions under this Act; 
(c) lease out any office or premises held by it, which is no longer required; 
(d) prohibit processes and use of equipment or technology that undermine 
environmental quality; 
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 (e) conduct field follow-up compliance with set standards and take procedures 
prescribed by law against any violator; 
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 (f) subject to the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 1999, and in collaboration with relevant judicial authorities establish mobile 
courts to expeditiously dispense cases of violation of environmental regulations: 
 (g) conduct public investigations on pollution and the degradation of natural 
resources, except investigations on oil spillage; 
 (h) open and operate ordinary and domiciliary accounts for the Agency in 
recognized banking institutions in Nigeria; 
 (i) borrow by overdraft or otherwise, with the approval of the Minister, such sums 
as it may require for the performance of its functions under this Act; 
 (j) accept gifts of land, money or other property, upon such terms and conditions, 
if any as may be specified by the person or organisation making the gift, as long as such 
conditions are consistent with the functions of the Agency; 
 (k) submit for the approval of the Minister, proposals for the evolution and 
review of existing guidelines, regulations and standards on environment other than in the 
oil and gas sector including--- 
  
(i) atmospheric protection, 
(ii) air quality 
(iii) ozone depleting substances, 
(iv) noise control, 
(v) effluent limitations, 
(vi) water quality, 
(vii) waste management and environmental sanitation, 
 (viii) erosion and flood control, 
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(ix) coastal zone management, 
(x) dams and reservoirs, 
(xi) watershed   
 (xii) deforestation and bush burning, 
 (xiii) other forms of pollution and sanitation, and 
 (xiv) control of hazardous substances and removal control methods. 
 (l) develop environmental monitoring networks, compile and synthesize 
environmental data from all sectors other than in the oil and gas sector at national and 
international levels; 
 (m) undertake, coordinate, utilize and promote the expansion of research 
experiments, surveys and studies by public or private agencies, institutions and 
organisations concerning causes, effects, extent, prevention, reduction and elimination of 
pollution and such other matters related to environmental protection and natural resources 
conservation other than in the oil and gas sector as the Agency may, from time to time, 
determine; 
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(n) enter into agreement and contracts with public or private organizations and 
individuals to develop, utilize, coordinate and share environmental monitoring 
programmes, research effects, and basic data on chemical, physical and biological effects 
of various activities on the environment and other environmental related activities other 
than in the oil and gas sector; 
 (o) in collaboration with other relevant  agencies and with the approval of the 
Minister, establish programmes for setting standards and regulations for the prevention, 
reduction and elimination of pollution and other forms of environmental degradation in 
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the nation’s air, land, oceans, seas and other water bodies and for restoration and 
enhancement of the nation’s environment and natural resources; 
 (p) collect and make available , through publications and other appropriate means 
and in co-operation with public or private organisations, basic scientific data and other 
information pertaining to environmental standards; 
 (q) charge fees for tests, investigations and other services performed by the 
Agency; 
 (r) develop and promote such processes, methods, devices and materials as may 
be useful or incidental in carrying out the purposes and provisions of this Act; and 
 (s) do such other things other than in the oil and gas sector as are necessary for 
the efficient performance of the functions of the Agency. 
9. The Council shall---- 
(a) be responsible for the appointment, promotion and discipline of the staff 
of the agency; 
(b) advise the Agency with regard to financial, operational and 
administrative matters; 
(c) establish committees as may be expedient which shall be charged with 
specific functions; 
(d) encourage and promote activities related to the functions of the Agency; 
and 
(e) carry out such other activities as may be directed by the Minister. 
 
Part III--- Structure Of The Agency 
10—(1) The Agency shall have---- 
(a) Directorate of Administration and Finance; 
(b) Directorate of Planning and Policy Analysis; 
(c) Directorate of Inspection and Enforcement; 
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(d) Directorate of Environmental Quality Control; and  
(e) Directorate of Legal Services. 
(2) Each Directorate shall be headed by a Director. 
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(3) The Director of the Directorate of Legal Services shall also function as the 
Legal Adviser to the Agency. 
 (4) The Agency and its Directorates shall have adequate numbers of units and 
divisions as may be required in the discharge of the functions of the Agency. 
 (5) The Agency shall have zonal offices in the six (6) geopolitical zones of the 
country. 
 (6) The Agency may create such other departments, units or offices in any part of 
the Federation as may be required for the proper performance of the functions of the 
Agency. 
Part IV--- Staff Of The Agency 
 11.---(1) The Director-General of the Agency shall be appointed by the President 
on the recommendation of the Minister. 
(2) The Director-General shall; 
(a) be the Chief Executive and Accounting Officer of the Agency; 
(b) be responsible for the day-to-day administration of the Agency; 
(c) be a person with good working knowledge of the environment and with a 
minimum of 15 years postgraduate experience in environmental management or related 
discipline; 
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(d) hold office for a period of 4 years on such terms and conditions as may be 
specified in his letter of appointment and be eligible for re-appointment for another period 
of 4 years and no more. 
(3)The Agency shall, from time to time, appoint such other persons as members 
of staff of the Agency as it may deem necessary, to assist the Agency in the 
performance of its functions under this Act. 
 (4) The appointment of staff in the junior cadre, shall be made by the Director-
General while the appointment in the senior cadre, shall be made with the ratification and 
approval of  the Council. 
 (5) The members of staff of the Agency appointed under subsection (3) of this 
section shall be appointed on such terms and conditions of service (including 
remuneration, allowances, benefits and pensions) as determined by the government. 
 (6) The promotion of staff in the junior cadre shall be as recommended by the 
Junior Staff Committee to the Director-General for ratification and approval. 
 (7) The promotion of staff in the senior cadre shall be as recommended by the 
Senior Staff Committee to the Council for ratification and approval. 
 12.—(1)  The Service in the Agency shall be approved service for the purposes of 
the Pension Reform Act and, accordingly, officers and other persons employed in the 
Agency shall be entitled to pensions, and other retirement benefits as are prescribed there 
under. 
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(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, the Agency may 
appoint a person to any office on terms, which preclude the grant of a pension or other 
retirement benefits in respect of that office. 
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 (3) For the purpose of the Pension Reform Act, any power exercise able there 
under by a Minister or other authority of the Government of the Federation, other than the 
power to make regulations under section 34 of this Act is vested in and shall be exercised 
by the Agency and not by any other person or authority. 
   Part V---- Financial Provisions 
 13.---(1) The Agency shall establish a Fund from which shall be defrayed all 
expenditure incurred by the Agency for the purposes of this Act. 
 (2) There shall be paid and credited to the Fund of the Agency; 
 (a) adequate take off grant from the Federal Government; 
 (b)annual subventions and budgetary allocations from the Federal Government; 
 (c) loans and grants in aid from national, bilateral and multilateral agencies; 
 (d) Counterpart funding as may be  provided from time to time; 
 (e)all sums accruing to the Agency by way of rents, fees and other internally 
generated revenues from services rendered by the Agency, and 
 (f) all sums accruing to the Agency by way of gifts, endowments, bequeaths or 
other voluntary contributions by persons and organisations. 
14. The Agency shall, from time and time, apply the funds at its disposal to— 
 (a) the cost of establishing and maintaining the Head Office of the Agency at the 
Federal Capital Territory, Abuja and its offices located in other  places in Nigeria; 
 (b) the cost of compliance monitoring and enforcement activities; 
 (c) pay allowances and other benefits of members of the Council and of its 
committees; 
 (d) pay the salaries and entitlements of the Director-General and other members 
of  staff of the Agency; 
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 (e) pay the personnel, overhead, allowances, pensions, gratuities, benefits and 
other administrative costs of the Agency; 
 (f) pay for attendance at local and international conferences related to its 
functions; 
 (g) build capacity of members of staff of the Agency; 
 (h) publicize and promote the activities of the Agency; 
 (i) attend national and International scientific and professional seminars on 
environmental matters; 
 (j) develop and maintain any property vested in or owned by the Agency; 
 (k) pay for services and contracts entered into by the Agency; and 
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 (l) undertake any other activity in connection with all or any of the functions of 
the Agency; 
 15. All income derived by the Agency from the sources specified in section 13(2) 
of this Act shall be exempted from income tax and all contributions to the fund of the 
Agency shall be tax deductible. 
 16. The Agency shall submit to the President through the Minister, not later than 
30th September each year, its programme of work and estimates of its income and 
expenditure for the following year. 
 17.—1) The Council shall keep proper accounts of the Agency and proper 
records in relations to those accounts. 
 (2) The accounts of the Agency shall be audited, not later than six months after 
the end of the year to which it relates, by auditors appointed by the Agency from the list 
and in accordance with the guidelines supplied by the Auditor-General of the Federation. 
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 18. The Agency shall prepare and submit to the Federal Executive Council, 
through the Minister, not later that 30th June in each year, a report on the activities of the 
Agency during the immediate preceding year, and shall include in such report, a copy of 
the audited accounts of the Agency for that year and the auditor’s report. 
 19. The Agency may, subject to the provisions of this Act and the conditions of 
any trust created in respect of any property, invest all or any of its funds in any security 
prescribed by the Trustee Investment Act or in such other securities as may, from time to 
time, be approved by the Minister. 
 20.---(1) The Agency may make regulations setting specifications and standards 
to protect and enhance the quality of Nigeria’s air resources, so as to promote the public 
health or welfare and the natural development and productive capacity of the nations’ 
human, animal, marine or plant life including, in particular; 
(a) minimum essential air quality standards for human, animal, marine or plant 
health; 
(b) the control of concentration of substances in the air which separately or in 
combination are likely to result in damage or deterioration of property or of 
human, animal, marine or plant health; 
(c) the most appropriate means to prevent and combat various atmospheric 
pollution; 
(d) control of atmospheric pollution originating from energy sources, including 
that produced by aircraft and other self-propelled vehicles, industries, factories 
and power generating situations or facilities; 
(e) standards applicable to emissions from any new mobile or stationary source 
which in the Agency’s judgement causes or contributes to air pollution which 
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare; and 
 
 
 
461 
 
  National Environmental Standards and Regulation  B2007 No. 25 
                                 Enforcement Agency (Establishment) Act 
(f) the use of appropriate means to reduce emission to permissible levels 
(2) The Agency may establish monitoring stations or network to locate sources of 
atmospheric pollution and determine their actual or potential danger. 
 (3) A person who violates the regulations made pursuant to subsection (1) of this 
section commits an offence and shall on conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding 
N200,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or to both such fine and 
imprisonment and an additional fine of N20,000 for every day the offence subsists. 
 
 (4) Where an offence under subsection (1) of this section is committed by a body 
corporate, it shall conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding N2,000,000 and an 
additional fine of N50,000 for every day the offence subsists. 
 21.---(1) The Agency shall in collaboration with other relevant agencies 
undertake to study data and recognize development in force in other countries regarding 
the cumulative effects of all substances, practices, processes and  activities which may 
affect the stratosphere. 
 (2) The Agency shall, in collaboration with other relevant agencies, embark on  
programmes for the control of any substance, practice, process or activity which may 
reasonably be anticipated to affect the stratosphere, especially ozone in the stratosphere, 
when such effects may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. 
 (3) Where an offence under subsection (2) of this section is committed by a body 
corporate, it shall on conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding N2,000,000 and an 
additional fine of N50,000 for every day the offence subsists. 
 22.—(1) The Agency shall, on the commencement of this Act, in consultation 
with appropriate authorities: 
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(a) identify major noise sources, noise criteria and noise control technology; and  
(b) make regulations on noise, emission, control, abatement, as may be necessary 
to preserve and maintain public health and welfare. 
(2) The Agency shall enforce compliance with existing regulations and 
recommend programmes to control noise originating from industrial, commercial, 
domestic, sports, recreational, transportation or other similar activities. 
 (3) A person who violates the Regulations made pursuant to sub-section (1) of 
this section commits an offence and shall on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding 
N50,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or to both such fine and 
imprisonment and an additional fine of N5,000 for every day the offence subsists. 
(4) Where an offence under subsection (3) of this section is committed by a body 
corporate, it shall on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding N500,000 and an 
additional fine of N10,000 for every day the offence subsists 
 23.—(1) The Agency shall in collaboration with other relevant agencies make 
regulations for the purpose of protecting public health or welfare and enhancing the 
quality of water to serve the purpose of this Act. 
 (2) In drawing up proposals for such regulations and standards, the Agency shall 
take into consideration the use and value of public water supplies, propagation of marine 
and wildlife, recreational purposes, agricultural, industrial and other legitimate use. 
 (3) A person who violates the provisions of the regulations made pursuant to 
subsection (1) of this section, commits an offence and shall on conviction, be liable to a 
fine not exceeding N50,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or to 
both such fine and imprisonment and an additional fine of N5,000 for every day the 
offence subsists. 
 (4) Where an offence under subsection (1) of this section is committed by a body 
corporate, it shall on conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding N50,000 and an 
additional fine of N10,000 for every day the offence subsists. 
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 24.—(1) The Agency shall, on the commencement of the Act, review effluent 
limitations for existing point sources which shall require the application of the best 
management practices, under circumstances as determined by the Agency, and shall 
include, schedules of compliance for installation and operation of the best management 
practices. 
 (2) The Agency shall, on the commencement of the Act, review effluent 
limitations for existing point sources which shall require the application of the best 
management practices, under circumstances as determined by the Agency, and shall 
include, schedules of compliance for installation and operation of the best practicable 
control technology as determined by the Agency. 
 3) Notwithstanding the existing regulations in force, other than in the oil and gas 
sector, the Agency may make regulations on effluent limitations, on existing and new 
point sources, for the protection of human, animal, marine and plant life. 
 (4) A person who violates the provisions of the regulations made pursuant to 
subsection (3) of this section, commits an offence and shall on conviction, be liable to a 
fine not exceeding N200,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or to 
both such fine and imprisonment and an additional fine of N5,000 for every day the 
offence subsists. 
 (5) Where an offence under subsection (3) of this section is committed by a body 
corporate, it shall on conviction, be liable to a fine, not exceeding N1,000,000 and an 
additional fine of N50,000 for every day the offence subsists. 
 25.---(1) The Agency may make regulations for the purpose of protecting public 
health and promotion of sound environmental sanitation. 
 (2) A person who violates the provisions of the regulations made pursuant to sub-
section (1) of this section shall be guilty of an offence and punished under the penalties 
imposed in the regulations made pursuant thereto. 
26.—(1) The Agency may make regulations, guidelines and standards for the 
protection and enhancement of the quality of land resources, natural watershed, coastal 
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zone, dams and reservoirs including prevention of flood and erosion, to serve the purpose 
of this Act. 
(2) In drawing proposals for such regulations, guidelines or standards, the 
Agency shall take into consideration the Zoning Acts, Municipal Development 
Guidelines and Building Codes to prevent sitting of essential facilities on flood plain. 
(3) A person who violates the provisions of the regulations made pursuant to 
subsection (1) of this section, commits an offence and shall on conviction, be liable to a 
fine not exceeding N200,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or to 
both such fine and imprisonment and an additional fine of N10,000 for every day the 
offence subsists. 
(4) Where an offence under subsection (1) of this section is committed by a body 
corporate, it shall on conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding N1,000,000 and an 
additional fine of N50,000 for every day the offence subsists. 
27.—(1) The discharge in such harmful quantities of any hazardous substance 
into the air or upon the land and the waters of Nigeria or  at the adjoining shorelines is 
prohibited, except where such discharge is permitted or authorized under any law in force 
in Nigeria. 
 
(2) A person who violates the provisions of subsection (1) of this Section, 
commits an offence and is liable on conviction, to a fine, not exceeding N1,000,000 or to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years. 
(3) Where an offence under subsection (1) of this section is committed by a body 
corporate, every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of the 
body corporate shall be deemed to be guilty of such offence and shall be liable to be 
proceeded against and punished accordingly provided that nothing contained in this 
subsection shall render any person liable to any punishment, if he proves that the offence 
was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent 
the commission of such offence. 
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(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section or any other sections of this 
Act, the provisions of the Harmful Waste (Special Criminal Provisions, etc) Act shall 
apply in respect of any hazardous substance constituting harmful waste as defined in 
section 37 of this Act. 
23. The Minister for the purpose of implementing the provisions of this Act, shall 
by regulations prescribe any specific removal method, financial responsibility level for 
owners or operators of vessels, or onshore or offshore facilities notice and reporting 
requirements 
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 29. The Agency shall co-operate with other Government agencies for the removal 
of any pollutant excluding oil and gas related ones discharged into the Nigerian 
environment and shall enforce the application of best clean-up technology currently 
available and implementation of best management practices as appropriate. 
Part VII---Miscellaneous Provisions 
 30—(1) An officer of the Agency may, in the course of his duty, at any 
reasonable time and on production of his certificate of designation if so required: 
 (a) enter and search with a warrant issued by a court, any premises including 
land, vehicle, tent, vessel, floating craft except Maritime Tankers, Barges or Floating 
Production, Storages, Offload (FPSO) and oil and gas facilities or any inland water and 
other structures, at all times, for the purpose of conducting, inspection, searching and 
taking samples for analysis which he reasonably believes, carries out activities or stores 
goods which contravene environmental standards or legislation. 
 (b) examine any article found pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection which 
appears to  him to be an article to which this Act or the regulations made under apply or 
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anything which he reasonably believes is capable of being used to the detriment of the 
environment; 
 (c) take a sample or specimen of any article to which this Act or the regulations 
apply or which he has power to examine under paragraph (b) of this subsection; 
 (d) open and examine, pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection, any container 
or package which he reasonably believes may contain anything to which this Act or its 
regulations apply or which may help in his investigations; 
 (e) examine any book, document or other record found pursuant to paragraph (a) 
of this subsection, which he reasonably believes may contain any information relevant to 
the enforcement of this Act or the regulations and make copies thereof or extracts there 
from; 
 (f) seize and detain for such time as may be necessary for the purpose of this Act, 
any article by means of or in relation to which he reasonable believes any provision of 
this Act or the regulations has been contravened; and 
 (g) obtain an order of a court to suspend activities, seal and close down premises 
including land, vehicle, tent, vessel, floating craft or any inland water and other structure 
whatsoever. 
 (2) A written receipt shall be given for any article or thing seized under 
subsection (1) of this section and the reason for such seizure shall be stated on such 
receipt. 
 (3) An article seized under this Act shall be kept or stored in such a place as the 
officer of the Agency may direct and shall be returned to the owner or the person from 
whom it was seized if the article upon analysis or examination is found to conform with 
the requirements of this Act or regulations made under it. 
 (4) An article other than in the oil and gas sector, seized by an officer of the 
Agency in pursuance of this Act or the regulations made under it, may be submitted 
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to an analyst for analysis or examination and the analyst upon making such analysis or 
examination shall, issue a certificate or report in the prescribed form, setting forth the 
result of such analysis or examination and the officer of the Agency shall, on demand, 
deliver a copy of such certificate or report to the owner of the article if the article is to be 
the subject of a proceeding under this Act or regulations there under. 
(5) In this section, the expression “article” to which this Act or regulations made 
under it apply are : 
(a) liquid, soil, vegetation; 
(b) biological and chemical samples; 
(c) particulate filters, air quality gauges; and 
(d) such other articles or samples as may be determined by the Agency. 
31. A person who obstructs an officer of the Agency in the performance of his 
duties under section 3 of this Act commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine 
of not less than N200,000 for an individual or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
one year or to both such fine and imprisonment, and an additional fine of N20,000 for 
each day the offence subsist and in the case of  a body corporate, it shall be liable for a 
fine of N2,000,000, on conviction and an additional fine of N200,000 for everyday the 
offence subsist. 
 32.—(1) A suit shall not be commenced against the Agency before the expiration 
of a  period of one month, after written notice of intention to commence the suit shall 
have been served on the Agency by the intending plaintiff or his agent and the notice 
shall clearly state the: 
(a) cause of action; 
(b) particulars of claim; 
(c) name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff; and  
(d) relief which he claims. 
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(2) The notice referred to in subsection (1) of this section and any summons, 
notice or other document required or authorized to be served on the Agency under the 
provisions of this Act or any other enactment or law may be served by--- 
(a) delivery the same to the office of the Director-General; or 
(b) sending it by registered post addressed to the Director-General at the Head 
Office of the Agency. 
(3) Subject to the provisions of section 174 of the Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1999, (which relates to the power of the Attorney-General of the 
Federation to institute , continue or discontinue criminal proceedings against any person 
in a court of law), an officer of the Agency may, with the consent of the Attorney-General 
of the Federation, conduct criminal proceedings in respect of offences under this Act or 
regulations made under this Act. 
(4) In a judicial proceeding for an offence under this Act or any regulation made 
under it, the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act or depending on the venue, the 
Criminal Procedure Code shall, with such modification as the circumstance may require, 
apply in respect of such matter to the same extent as they apply to the trial offences 
generally. 
 33. The Minister may give directives of a general or special nature to the Agency 
relating to its functions under this Act, and the Agency shall comply and give effect to the 
directives. 
34. The Minister shall make regulations: 
 (a) to prescribe the methodologies for private sector payments into the fund of the 
Agency; 
 (b) to prescribe the fees to be paid for services rendered by the Agency; 
 (c) generally for the purposes of carrying out or giving full effects to the 
functions of the Agency under this Act. 
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 35. Every other requirement, certificate, notice, direction, decision, authorization, 
consent, application, request, agreement or thing made, issued, given or done under any 
enactment repealed by this Act shall, if in force at the commencement of this Act, 
continue to be in force and have effect as if made, issued, given or done under the 
corresponding provisions of this Act. 
 36. The Federal Environmental protection Agency Act is repealed. 
37. In this Act--- 
  “Agency” means the National Environmental Standards and Regulations 
Enforcement Agency established under section 1 of this Act; 
“Appropriate authorities”  means any government agency which has jurisdiction over the 
land or water affected by the pollution or any government agency which ordinarily has 
jurisdiction or any government over the operation which led to the pollution; 
“Authorised authorities or officer” means any employee of the Agency any Police officer 
not below the rank of Inspector of Police or any custom officer; 
“Chairman” means the Chairman of the Agency appointed under section 3 (1) 1999; 
“Constitution” means the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999; 
‘’Court’’ means the Federal or State High Court; 
“Council” means the Council of the Agency established under section 3 of this Act; 
 “Director-General” means the Director-General of the National Environmental 
Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency; 
 “Disposal” includes both land based disposal and dumping in waters and air 
space of Nigeria; 
 “Effluent limitation” means any restriction established by the Agency of 
quantities, rates and concentration of chemical, physical, biological or other constituents 
which are discharged from point sources into the waters in Nigeria; 
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 “Environment” includes water, air, land and all plants and human beings or 
animals living therein and the inter-relationships which exist among these or any of them; 
 “Hazardous substances” means any chemical, physical or biological radioactive 
materials that pose a threat to human health and the environment or any such substance 
regulated under international conventions to which Nigeria is a party or signatory e.g. 
Montreal Protocol, Rotterdam Convention, Stockholm Convention etc.  And includes any 
substance designated as such by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria by order 
published in the Federal Gazette; 
 “He” means male or female gender; 
 “Member” means a member of the Council and includes the Chairman; 
 “Minister” means the Minister charged with the responsibility of the 
environment; 
 “New source” means any source, the construction of which is commenced after 
the publication of any regulations prescribing a standard to such source; 
 “Officer” means qualified persons employed to act in that capacity by the 
Agency; 
 “Offshore facility” means any facility (including but not limited to motor vehicles 
and rolling stock) of any kind located over, in, or under any land within Nigeria other 
than submerged land; 
 “Owner” or “Operator” means, in the case of--- 
(a) vessel, any person owning, operating or chartering by demise such vessel; 
(b) an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating 
such onshore facility or offshore facility; and 
(c) any abandoned offshore facility, the person who owned or operated such 
facility immediately prior to such abandonment; 
“point source” means any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but 
not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduct, well, discrete fissure, container, 
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rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation or vessel or other floating craft from 
which pollutants are or may be discharged; 
 “President” means the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; 
  “Pollution” means man-made or man-aided alteration or chemical, 
physical, or biological quality of the environment beyond acceptable limits and 
“pollutants” shall be construed accordingly; 
 “Removal” means removal of hazardous substances from the environment of 
Nigeria or the taking of such action as may be necessary to minimize or mitigate damage 
to the public health or welfare, ecology and natural resources of Nigeria; 
 “Stratosphere” means the part of the atmosphere above the troposphere; 
 “Water of Nigeria” means all water resources in any form including atmospheric , 
surface and sub-surface, and underground water resources where the water resources are 
interstate, or in the Federal Capital Territory, Territorial Waters, Exclusive Economic 
Zone or in any other area under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government of Nigeria. 
 
38.This Act may be cited as the National Environmental Standards and 
Regulations Enforcement Agency (Establishment) Act, 2007. 
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SCHEDULE   Section 3(5) 
    
Proceedings of the Council 
 
 1.---(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and section 27 of the Interpretation 
Act, the Council may make standing orders regulating its proceedings or those of any of 
its committees. 
 (2) The quorum of the Council shall be the Chairman or the person presiding at 
the meeting and 5 other members of the Council including the Director-General, and the 
quorum of any committee of the Council shall be as determined by the Council 
 2.---(1) The Council shall meet whenever it is summoned by the Chairman and if 
the Chairman is required to do so by notice given to him by not less than 8 other 
members, he shall summon a meeting of the Council to be held within 14 days from the 
date on which the notice is given. 
 (2) At any meeting of the council, the Chairman shall preside but if he is absent, 
the members present at the meeting shall appoint one of them to preside at the meeting. 
 (3) Where the Council desires to obtain the advice of any person on a particularr 
matter, the Council may co-opt him to the Council for such period as it deems fit, but a 
person who is in attendance by virtue of this sub-paragraph shall not be entitled to vote at 
any meeting of the Council and shall not count towards a quorum. 
 3.----(1) The Council may establish one or more committees to carry out, on 
behalf of the Council, such functions as the Council may determine. 
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 (2) A committee established under this paragraph shall consist of such number of 
persons as may be determined by the Council and a person shall hold office on the 
committee in accordance with the terms of his appointment. 
 (3)  A decision of a committee of the council shall be of no effect until it is 
ratified by the Council. 
 4. ---(1)  The fixing of the seal of the Agency shall be authenticated by the 
signature of the Chairman, the Director-General or any person generally or specifically 
authorized by the Council to act for that purpose. 
 (2) A contract or instrument which, if made or executed by a person not being a 
body corporate, would not be required to be under seal may be made or executed on 
behalf of the Agency by the Director-General or any person generally or specifically 
authorized by the Council to act for that purpose. 
 (3) A document purporting to be a document duly executed under the seal of the 
Agency shall be received in evidence and shall, unless and until the contrary is proved, be 
presumed to be so executed. 
 (4)  The validity of any proceedings of the Council or of a committee shall not be 
adversely affected by ---- 
(a) a vacancy in the membership of the council or committee; 
(b) a defect in the appointment of a member of the Council or committee; or 
(c) reason that a person entitled to do so took part in proceedings of the Council 
or committees. 
 
I Certify, in accordance with Section 2 (1) of the Acts Authentication Act, Cap. 
A2, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, that this is a true copy of the Bill passed by 
both Houses of the National Assembly. 
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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
 
This Act establishes the National Environmental Standards and Regulations 
Enforcement Agency for the effective enforcement of standards, Regulations and all 
national and international agreements, treaties, conventions and protocols on environment 
to which Nigeria is a signatory. 
